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Part 1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Purpose and Scope 
1.1.1 Background Information: Respective Status of China and the EU in 
International Investment  
China1 and the EU2 are two of the biggest players in international investment. In the 
past five years, the foreign direct investment inflows and outflows in China and the EU 
were among the top five in the world.3 China’s position in international investment 
continues to improve, from being a purely destination for global foreign investment 
flows to being a state with both strong investment inflows and outflows.4 According 
to UNCTAD World Investment Report 2019, in 2018, China was the second largest 
recipient of foreign direct investment in the world, attracting $139 billion inflows. It 
was in second place with regard to outflows, with an amount of $130 billion.5 Since 
2009, the Union began to handle foreign direct investment policies on behalf of its 
Member States.6 Now, the EU is the world’s largest exporter and importer of foreign 
1 Since Hong Kong, China, Macao, China, and Chinese Taipei enjoy their own power in negotiating international 
investment agreements, and the prospective China-EU Bilateral Investment Treaty would be an agreement between 
mainland China and the EU, in the following discussion, “China” only refers to mainland China, unless otherwise 
specified. 
2 For necessary differentiation, in the present thesis, unless specifically identified, “the EU” is used as a general 
reference to the European Union together its Member States. “The Union” is used when the reference is to the Union 
only. Regarding the situations where only EU Member States are referred to, the expression used is “EU Member 
States” or “its Member States”.  
3 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2019: Special 
Economic Zones, 2019, available at: https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2019_en.pdf, last visited on 
06.08.2020. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2018: 
Investment and New Industrial Policies, 2018, available at: 
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2018_en.pdf, last visited on 06.08.2020. United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2017: Investment and the Digital Economy, 2017, 
available at: http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2017_en.pdf, last visited on 06.08.2020. United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2016: Investor Nationality: Policy 
Challenges, 2016, available at: https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2016_en.pdf, last visited on 06.08.2020. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2015: Reforming 
International Investment Governance, 2015, available at: http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf, 
last visited on 06.08.2020. 
4 Norah Gallagher & Wenhua Shan, Chinese Investment Treaties: Policies and Practice, Oxford University Press, 
2009, pp. 7, 10. David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power, Oxford University Press, 2013. Unlike 
Chinese inbound investment, which became significant around 1990, Chinese outbound investment increased greatly 
only after 2000. In 2014, the inflow and outflow of foreign direct investment in China for the first time came close 
to being balanced. See: Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China & National Bureau of Statistics 
of the People’s Republic of China & State Administration of Foreign Exchange 中华人民共和国商务部&中华
人民共和国国家统计局&国家外汇管理局 , 2014 Statistical Bullentin of China's Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment 2014 年度中国对外直接投资统计公报, China Statistics Press 中国统计出版社, 01.09.2015, p. 85. 
5 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2019: Special 
Economic Zones, 2019, available at: https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2019_en.pdf, pp. 4, 7, last visited 
on 06.08.2020. With the current progressively developed “One Belt One Road” Initiative, Chinese outward 
investment is expected to surpass the amount of inward investment flows into China soon. 
6 European Commission, Investment, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/investment/, 
last visited on 31.07.2020. 
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direct investment.7 During 2016-2017, the foreign direct investment inflows of the EU 
amounted to $304 billion and the outflows were $435 billion.8 
Since 1986, EU investment in China has increased more than 25-fold and, in 2000, the 
EU became the principal investor in China.9  Recent years also witnessed a rapid 
increase of Chinese investments in the EU.10 In fact, Chinese investments in Europe 
have been much more resilient than investments in other parts of the world.11 
1.1.2 Purpose 
With the proliferation of international investment agreements (hereinafter “IIAs”)12 
throughout the world, China and the EU have also made concerted efforts to negotiate 
a China-EU Bilateral Investment Treaty (hereinafter “China-EU BIT”). Such 
negotiations were formally launched at the 16th EU-China Summit of 21 November 
2013.13 This prospective BIT will replace the 25 existing BITs between China and 27 
EU Member States with one single comprehensive investment agreement.14 It aims to 
remove market access barriers to investment and provide a high level of protection to 
investors and investments in the EU and the Chinese markets by incorporating up-to-
date substantial and procedural regulations on investment. 15  Once concluded, this 
investment agreement will undoubtedly be influential and further promote cooperation 
between China and the EU in the field of international investment. As of 30 April 2020, 
there have been 28 rounds of negotiations between the EU and China. 
Although not much concrete information has been released concerning the ongoing 
negotiations, disagreements regarding what constitutes appropriate dispute settlement 
 
7  European Commission, The Multilateral Investment Court Project, 07.06.2019, available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1608, last visited on 31.07.2020. 
8 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2018: Investment 
and New Industrial Policies, 2018, available at: https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2018_en.pdf, p. 184, 
last visited on 06.08.2020. 
9 Wenhua Shan, The Legal Framework of EU-China Investment Relations: A Critical Appraisal, Hart Publishing, 
2005, p. 1. 
10 The states of Eastern and Central Europe were identified as popular potential places for more Chinese investment. 
See: Armand de Mestral C.M., The Lisbon Treaty and the Expansion of EU Competence Over Foreign Direct 
Investment and the Implications for Investor-State Arbitration, at: Karl P. Sauvant (ed.), Yearbook on International 
Investment Law & Policy 2010–2011, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 366. 
11  Rhodium Group LLC, EU-China FDI Monitorr-3Q 2017 Update: Public Version, 2017, available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/january/tradoc_156572.pdf, p. 8, last visited on 01.08.2020. This report 
identified three major reasons of such resilience: first, “investment in the EU were much more diversified and less 
driven by financial investors”; second, “investments in Europe can more easily ride on the ‘Belt and Road’ (B&R) 
boom as investors can pitch European deals in infrastructure, transportation and finance as B&R investments and 
thus easier access financing”; Third, “Europe’s regulatory framework still does not pose a major problem for most 
investments”. 
12 In this paper, the phrase “international investment agreement (IIA)” is used in a broad sense, which refers to an 
agreement on investment concluded by states, regardless whether it is in the form of an independent treaty or part of 
a comprehensive economic agreement in a bilateral or multilateral context. 
13  European Commission, EU and China Begin Investment Talks, Press Release, 20.01.2014, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-33_en.htm, last visited on 31.07.2020. 
14 In June 2016, the United Kingdom held a referendum on membership of the EU, resulting in 51.89% of votes 
cast in favour of leaving. After that, on 29 March 2017, it formally initiated the withdrawal process. On 31 January 
2020, the United Kingdom officially left the EU, making the total number of EU Member States reduce to 27. The 
only EU Member State that has not reached an IIA with China is Ireland. 
15 European Commission, Countries and Regions-China, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-
and-regions/countries/china/, last visited on 31.07.2020. 
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systems 16  in the prospective China-EU BIT is expected to be one of the major 
stumbling blocks in the negotiations.17 This expectation is based on the fact that China 
and the EU have presented conflicting attitudes regarding various issues in investment 
dispute resolution. It is, therefore, important to consider what the appropriate 
arrangements would be for China, the EU and the investors from both territories to deal 
with potential investment disputes under a China-EU BIT.  
This thesis aims to address this issue by exploring the procedural design of the dispute 
settlement systems proposed for the prospective China-EU BIT, including the systems 
for both state-state and investor-state disputes. It does not intend to present an all-
encompassing treaty text that to be incorporated into the prospective China-EU BIT. 
Instead, based on the expected possible proposals from China and the EU, it focuses on 
the potential thorny issues that could become the stumbling blocks in negotiations for 
this prospective investment agreement and recommends possible solutions in order to 
address those obstacles. 
1.1.3 Scope  
Various factors affect the proposals made in the negotiations of an investment 
agreement and the reactions to the proposals by each party, including proposals for the 
design of the dispute settlement system in such an agreement. This thesis does not aim 
to give a comprehensive analysis of all of these factors, but it will focus the examination 
on two essential factors: the negotiating parties’ existing dispute settlement practice and 
the legal culture in each party with regard to dispute settlement.  
First, the existing practice in the territory of each party in the field of investment dispute 
settlement can provide insights or direct evidence to predict a party’s possible proposal 
regarding the design of the investment dispute settlement system in treaty negotiations 
for a new IIA.18 Thus, the practice of China and that of the EU in investment dispute 
settlement forms the foundation of the present work. This includes the concluded IIAs 
and the cases brought under those IIAs. In addition, state-state dispute settlement 
mechanisms (hereinafter “DSMs”), such as those in Free Trade Agreements 
(hereinafter “FTAs”) 19  and under the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute 
 
16 In the present thesis, a “dispute settlement system” is defined as a system composed of various dispute settlement 
mechanisms (DSMs). Under an IIA, for investment dispute settlement, two dispute settlement systems may be 
available: a state-state dispute settlement system and an investor-state dispute settlement system. 
17 In the context of discussing dispute settlement, some scholars argued for the distinction between “dispute” 
“settlement” and “conflict” “resolution”. See e.g. Raymond Shonholtz, A General Theory on Disputes and Conflicts, 
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2003, 2003, pp. 403-415. However, considering “dispute” and “conflict” as well 
as “resolution” and “settlement” are more often used interchangeably, the present thesis follows the mainstream 
practice of using them as synonyms. 
It should also be noted that dispute settlement and conflict resolution are different from conflict management, which 
often refers to the pre-dispute stage, where certain measures can play a role in preventing a conflict developing into 
a real dispute. See: Roberto Echandi, Complementing Investor-State Dispute Resolution: A Conceptual Framework 
for Investor-State Conflict Management, at: Roberto Echandi & Pierre Sauvé (eds.), Prospects in International 
Investment Law and Policy: World Trade Forum, Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 270-305. Conflict 
management focuses more on gathering information, inspecting the situation and identifying issues, which thus goes 
beyond the scope of the present thesis. 
18 Although the content of an IIA is a result of bargaining by the treaty parties and a compromise between their 
different preferences, the inspiration for each party’s possible attitude towards certain issues can deduced, for 
example, by examining its practice under other IIAs concluded within the same period of time. 
19 An FTA normally refers to a contractual arrangement that encompasses mutual preferential treatment between 
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Settlement System are also relevant and are also fall within the scope of the present 
thesis.20  
In a fast-developing field such as international investment law, and especially 
investment dispute settlement, relying only on existing practice to predict a party’s 
future approach is not enough. One reason is that the previously concluded treaties are 
likely not to cover all the issues that a treaty party would like to address in prospective 
treaties. Even when an issue was touched upon in past practice, a treaty party may still 
want to incorporate new changes to ensure that all up-to-date developments are 
included in a new treaty. Furthermore, compromise is normal when negotiating a new 
agreement and, therefore, predicting each party’s reaction to the various proposals is 
indispensable. This makes it necessary to consider other elements that may affect a 
party’s position. Such elements are admittedly broad and varied, and therefore it is 
difficult to provide a comprehensive analysis of all such elements. The focus here is on 
the elements that are relevant to dispute settlement, making a party’s legal culture one 
of the elements that cannot be neglected, since a dispute settlement process is “in large 
part a reflection of the culture in which they are embedded”.21 A legal cultural analysis 
can indicate some underlying reasons for certain approaches to dispute resolution and 
it can reveal the ideological preferences of the treaty parties. Moreover, it is reasonable 
to expect that certain procedural arrangements may be difficult to negotiate about if 
they are supported by the values and principles embedded in one’s legal culture. 
Therefore, the present thesis also explores the legal cultural characteristics of China and 
those of the EU regarding dispute settlement by analysing the respective legal cultures 
and the internal practice in relation to dispute settlement.22 
 
1.2 Research Questions and Structure 
As mentioned in Section 1.1.2, supra, this thesis aims to explore the dispute settlement 
system in the prospective China-EU BIT by identifying the obstacles that may stand in 
the way of a successful conclusion of the agreement and to provide possible solutions. 
In order to achieve these aims, three main research questions are raised and will guide 
the discussion. Based on these three questions, the thesis is structured into five parts, 
including 13 chapters. 
 
states, with regard to the trade in goods and/or services originating in such territories, by eliminating duties and other 
restrictions to commerce. Most contemporary agreements that are titled FTAs also often cover issues such as 
investment, government procurement, competition, etc. See: Stephen Woolcock, A Framework for Assessing 
Regional Trade Agreements: WTO-Plus, at: Gary P. Sampson & Stephen Woolcock (eds.), Regionalism, 
Multilateralism and Economic Integration: the Recent Experience, United Nations University Press, 2003, pp.18-31. 
The phrase “Free Trade Agreement (FTA)” used in the present work refers to preferential trade arrangements reached 
among states, regardless of whether they are titled “free trade agreement”, “preferential trade agreement”, 
“cooperation agreement”, or any other name. 
20 For a further explanation on the relevance of state-state DSMs in FTAs and the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 
see Section 1.5.2.1, infra. 
21 The author also pointed out that “in turn, the ways in which disputes are managed also play an important role in 
shaping the cultures in which they operate”. See: Oscar G. Chase, Law, Culture, and Ritual–Disputing Systems in 
Cross-Cultural Context, New York University Press, 2005, p. 2.  
22 For a further illustration of the legal cultural analysis conducted in the thesis, see Section 1.5.1, infra. 
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1.2.1 Research Questions 
In order to guide the analysis, the three main research questions are divided into several 
sub-questions, as follows. 
 Question 1: Whether, and if so to what extent, differences in legal culture determine 
China’s and the EU’s respective approaches to investment dispute settlement at the 
internal level? 
 1.1 Taking account of legal tradition, what are the legal cultural characteristics 
of China and those of the EU regarding dispute settlement? What are the 
similarities and differences between China and the EU in this respect? 
 1.2 Have the legal cultural characteristics in China and the EU been reflected 
in their internal dispute settlement systems and, if so, how? What are the 
similarities and differences between China and the EU in this respect? 
 Question 2: Do differences in legal culture determine the respective approaches of 
China and the EU to investment dispute settlement at the international level and, if so, 
to what extent? 
 2.1 What have China and the EU done to date regarding international 
investment dispute settlement, including state-state and investor-state dispute 
resolution? What are the similarities and differences between China and the 
EU? 
 2.2 Have the legal cultural characteristics in China and the EU been reflected 
in their performances in international investment dispute settlement and, if so, 
how and to what extent? 
 Question 3: What would/could the dispute settlement system in the prospective 
China-EU BIT look like?  
 3.1 How is the investment relationship between China and the EU, and what 
is the current legal framework that governs it? What progress has been made 
towards a China-EU BIT? 
 3.2 What would/could China and the EU propose for the dispute settlement 
system in a China-EU BIT? Anticipating proposals from both parties, what are 
the benefits and difficulties arising from the dispute settlement system? For 
the benefits, what could China and the EU do with them? For the potential 
thorny issues, what are the suggested solutions? 
The above research questions are inter-related and require a progressive approach, 
which means that the latter questions depend upon the answers to the former questions. 
The answer to each question provides inspiration with its own value, and finally they 
all contribute to addressing the primary goal of the thesis: to explore the comprehensive 
dispute settlement system in the prospective China-EU BIT. 
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1.2.2 Structure  
Addressing the research questions in turn, this thesis is organized into five parts and 13 
chapters. Part 1 contains two chapters dealing with preliminary issues, providing the 
necessary basis for the discussions in the following chapters and providing readers with 
useful background information. The present Chapter 1 offers an introduction to the 
whole thesis, including its purpose and scope, research questions and structure, 
methodology, literature review, and innovative characteristics. Chapter 2 addresses 
general topics that are relevant to the theme of the present thesis, including the legal 
framework of international investment and dispute settlement in this field. The latter 
specifically discusses the two systems under IIAs for state-state dispute settlement 
(hereinafter “SSDS”) and investor-state dispute settlement (hereinafter “ISDS”), 23 
including the various DSMs often contained in such systems. 
Part 2, which includes Chapters 3-5, compares the approach of China and that of the 
EU to dispute settlement from a legal cultural perspective. Chapter 3 analyses the legal 
cultural characteristics of dispute settlement in China from two points of view: dispute 
settlement under traditional Chinese philosophies and contemporary Chinese 
ideologies, and the DSMs in China’s legal system. In particular, it provides an 
interpretation of China’s domestic dispute settlement system from a legal cultural 
perspective, in order to examine whether and, if so, how China’s legal cultural 
characteristics in relation to dispute settlement have been reflected in its current internal 
practice. Correspondingly, Chapter 4 identifies the legal cultural features of dispute 
settlement and internal DSMs within the EU. Compared to China, the situation of the 
EU is more complex because of its special nature as a Union comprised of 27 Member 
States. As a result, in order to provide a conclusion on the EU’s legal culture of dispute 
settlement, both the Union’s measures on regulating DSMs and the practice of the 
Member States deserves attention. Like the analysis conducted for China, a legal 
cultural interpretation of the DSMs in the domestic legal systems of EU Member States 
and the Union’s relevant regulating measures is also provided. After that, Chapter 5 
compares the research results presented in Chapters 3 and 4, in order to examine the 
similarities and differences between the legal culture of China and that of the EU on 
dispute settlement, and how their internal dispute settlement systems have respectively 
been affected by that legal culture.  
Part 3 examines the existing practice of China and that of the EU in the field of 
international investment dispute settlement. Both concluded treaties and specific cases 
involving China or the EU or their investors are within the scope of analysis of Chapter 
6 (focusing on China) and Chapter 7 (focusing on the EU). These two chapters also 
explore the relationship between the legal culture of dispute settlement and the 
approach to international investment dispute settlement in China and the EU. In the end, 
 
23 It is noted that “investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)” often refers in particular to investor-state arbitration in 
the existing literature. At the same time, there are many ways to enable foreign investors to invoke ISDS, such as 
pursuant to the domestic legislation of the host state or through contracts between investors and governments. In the 
present thesis, ISDS is used in a broader sense by incorporating all types of DSMs for resolving disputes between 
investors and host states, and it only refers to disputes invoked by IIAs, namely, treaty-based claims. 
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Chapter 8 offers a horizontal comparison between the two sides in a similar way as in 
Chapter 4. 
Based on the analyses in previous chapters, Part 4 moves on to the crucial step of 
exploring the dispute settlement system in the prospective China-EU BIT. Chapter 9 
first introduces the progress that has been made regarding the legal relationship between 
China and the EU with regard to investment, with a focus on the dispute settlement 
systems in the existing BITs concluded between China and EU Member States and the 
cases brought thereunder. The remainder of this part seeks to identify the possible 
design of state-state and investor-state dispute settlement systems, suggesting how they 
may be shaped to meet the special needs of the treaty parties. Specifically, Chapter 10 
and Chapter 11 respectively discuss the systems for SSDS and ISDS, focusing on the 
objective, jurisdiction and the procedural features of the DSMs contained in each one. 
As a necessary further step, Chapter 12 analyses the relationship between these two 
dispute settlement systems by considering their separation, connection and possible 
combination. It aims at proposing innovative suggestions for this theoretically and 
practically difficult and problematic issue to ensure that the two aspects of the 
comprehensive dispute settlement system under a China-EU BIT can cooperate with 
each other, contributing to successful investment dispute settlement under this treaty.  
In the end, Part 5 presents the summary of the conclusions reached in the present thesis. 
1.3 Methodology 
The methodology adopted in this thesis covers five methods: comparative analysis, 
normative analysis, case study, legal cultural analysis, and systemic analysis. How 
they are used in the analysis in the following chapters is introduced briefly below. 
Since the last two methods, legal cultural analysis and systemic analysis, are 
considered innovative characteristics in the present work, they are introduced 
separately in Section 1.5, infra. 
1.3.1 Comparative Analysis 
Comparative analysis is used as the primary method guiding the whole thesis, and it is 
undertaken in different ways. In this regard, the thesis first compares legal cultural 
characteristics of dispute settlement in China and the EU. Then the comparison 
addresses the practice of dispute settlement at internal and international levels in China 
and the EU. Such comparative analyses on the legal cultural characteristics of dispute 
settlement not only provide a necessary foundation for each territory to examine the 
proposals and also the reactions to the proposals in the negotiations for a China-EU 
BIT, but it also bridges different and contested interpretations by the parties, providing 
a way to improve communication between the parties.24 
24 As pointed out, without acknowledging the differences in legal cultural characteristics in relation to dispute 
settlement, “numerous misunderstandings can become a serious obstacle to the elaboration of international law”. 
See: Jean Yves Heurtebise, Understanding Non-Trade Concerns Through Comparative Chinese and European 
Philosophy of Law, at: Paolo Davide Farah & Elena Cima (eds.), China's Influence on Non-Trade Concerns in 
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1.3.2 Normative Analysis 
The second method used in this research is normative analysis. Rather than simply 
carrying out logical reasoning and theoretical analysis, this thesis tries to figure out the 
underlying reasons for various designs, particularly focussed on the values and 
principles that each side intends to preserve. These values and principles are taken as 
part of the standards for the analysis in Part 4 on the exploration of the possible 
procedural design of the dispute settlement system in a China-EU BIT, by considering 
whether certain features of each party’s proposals can be related to such values and 
principles and thus would be difficult to change. 
1.3.3 Case Study 
The third method is undertaking a case study. As pointed out by Kurt Lewin, theory 
without practice is sterile, but practice without theory is blind. Real situations and 
practical examples thus are used to examine relevant issues. These include the treaties 
signed by China and by the EU in the past. At the same time, the disputes involving 
China, the EU or an investor from either side under their existing IIAs are also useful 
for interpreting the parties’ performance in dispute settlement. However, since some 
aspects of dispute settlement procedures are confidential, especially those conducted 
under amicable DSMs, it may prove difficult to have a sufficient number of cases to 
represent a sound case study analysis. 
 
1.4 Literature Review 
To the author’s knowledge, until now there is no comprehensive analysis of a possible 
dispute settlement system in the prospective China-EU BIT, in English or in Chinese. 
Only selected issues in ISDS under a China-EU BIT were touched upon in some papers. 
On the other hand, there is a wealth of literature providing a general discussion on the 
topics addressed in the present thesis, such as transparency in investor-state arbitration. 
This section presents two relevant topics where existing literature is abundant, the legal 
framework of the China-EU investment relationship and investment dispute settlement 
and summarizes the academic discussion from previously published works. 
1.4.1 Literature on the Legal Framework of the China-EU Investment 
Relationship  
A comprehensive analysis of the legal framework of the China-EU investment 
relationship was made in 2005. The book “The Legal Framework of EU-China 
Investment Relations—A Critical Appraisal” conducted a detailed examination of the 
legal framework that governed the China-EU investment relationship at that time and 
argued that the time was ripe to formulate a new international legal framework for both 
sides.25 After the negotiations on a China-EU BIT were officially initiated in 2013, an 
 
International Economic Law, Routledge, 2016, pp. 290-291. 
25 Wenhua Shan, The Legal Framework of EU-China Investment Relations: A Critical Appraisal, Hart Publishing, 
2005. 
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increasing number of works were been produced.26 Many papers focused on predicting 
the development tendency of the China-EU investment relationship, the possible 
substantive and procedural issues covered by this prospective BIT, and how this treaty 
would contribute to sustainable investment development in the world. In particular, the 
EU’s proposal of establishing an investment court system (hereinafter “ICS”) created a 
wave of discussion among Chinese scholars. Some research considered the origin of 
this innovation in the EU, 27  and many more paid particular attention to specific 
procedural issues, such as transparency, consistency and the selection of adjudicators.28 
1.4.2 Literature on Investment Dispute Settlement 
In the area of international economic law, literature on state-state DSMs in the area of 
international economic law mostly paid attention to DSMs in FTAs and the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System, instead of IIAs. Furthermore, since the end of the 1990s, 
virtually all relevant scholarship has attempted to analyse the DSMs in FTAs 
theoretically in terms of a single dimension of legislation—a DSM is “legal” or 
“political”.29 Typical empirical research in this area appeared after 2000.30 
In contrast, the situation of investor-state DSMs is quite different. This topic was one 
of the most debated topics among scholars and practitioners in the past decades, and 
26 See e.g. Wenhua Shan & Lu Wang, The China-EU BIT: The Emerging "Global BIT 2.0"?, ICSID Review, Vol. 
30, 2015. Jun Xiao, How Can a Prospective China-EU BIT Contribute to Sustainable Investment: In Light of the 
UNCTAD Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development, Journal of World Energy Law and Business, 
Vol. 8, 2015. Ecorys Nederland & Oxford Intelligence & TNO & Reichwein China Consult, Sustainability Impact 
Assessment (SIA) in Support of an Investment Agreement between the European Union and the People's Republic of 
China, 06.2016, available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/july/tradoc_154778.pdf, last visited on 
05.08.2020. 
27 See e.g. Shixi Huang 黄世席, The Origin of and the Response to the EU's Investment Court System 欧盟国际
投资仲裁法庭制度的缘起与因应, Studies in Law and Business 法商研究, Vol. 4, 2016. 
28 See e.g. Jun Xiao 肖军, The Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism in a China-EU BIT: A Comparative 
Analysis Based on the China-Canada BIT and CETA 中欧 BIT 的投资者-东道国争端解决机制——基于中加 BIT
与 CETA 的比较分析, Journal of Xidian University (Social Science Edition) 西安电子科技大学学报(社会科学
版), Vol. 25, 2015. Tingting Deng 邓婷婷, The Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism in a China-EU 
Bilateral Investment Treaty: From the Perspective of the EU's Investment Court System 中欧双边投资条约中的
投资者—国家争端解决机制——以欧盟投资法庭制度为视角, Politics and Law 政治与法律, Vol. 4, 2017, pp. 
99-111. Shaotang Wang 王少棠, Legetimacy Crisis Resolved? Reconsideration of the EU's Reform of Investment
Court System 正当性危机的解除?——欧盟投资争端解决机制改革再议, Studies in Law and Business 法商研
究, Vol. 2, 2018, pp. 159-170.
29 See e.g. David Morgan, Dispute Settlement under PTAs: Political or Legal?, Melbourne Law School Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 341, 2008, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1203022, last visited on 31.07.2020.
Victoria Donaldson & Simon Lester, Dispute Settlement, at: Simon Lester & Bryan Mercurio (eds.), Bilateral and
Regional Trade Agreements: Commentary and Analysis, Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 367-414. Porges
Amelia, Dispute Settlement, at: Jean-Pierre Chauffour & Jean-Christophe (eds.), Preferential Trade Agreement
Policies for Development: A Handbook, The World Bank, 2011, pp. 467-502.
30 Smith seems to be the first to open up the black box of DSMs in FTAs by focusing on 62 regional trade pacts and
differentiates among the levels of legalism ranging from diplomatic to legalistic types. See: James McCall Smith, 
The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts, International Organization, 
Vol. 54, 2000, pp.137-180. Following Smith’s lead, Jo and Namgung carried out a more recent study. See: Hyeran
Jo & Hyun Namgung, Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in Preferential Trade Agreements: Democracy, Boilerplates,
and the Multilateral Trade Regime, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 56, 2012, pp. 1041-1068. A more 
comprehensive empirical analysis published in the past five years is the the work conducted by Allee and Elsig, 
which was based on 589 FTAs concluded between 1947 and 2009. It considered how the dispute settlement
components can be characterized by the degree to which they aid enforceability, entail greater delegation, specify
flexibility, or promote the overall settlement of disputes. See: Todd Allee & Manfred Elsig, Dispute Settlement 
Provisions in PTAs: New Data and New Concepts, at: Andreas Dür & Manfred Elsig (eds.), Trade Cooperation: The
Purpose, Design and Effects of Preferential Trade Agreements, Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 319-352.
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thus there is a wealth of literature in this area.31  Relevant discussions cover both 
substantive and procedural issues in investment dispute resolution. The former includes 
topics such as the definition of investment, the qualification of investors and fair and 
equitable treatment. In terms of the latter, the attention is on transparency, third-party 
funding, independence of adjudicators, consistency of decision making, costs, etc.32 
Comparatively, there has been scattered research on other types of investor-state DSMs, 
such as investor-state mediation or conciliation.33 
Until now, the relationship between a state-state dispute settlement system and an 
investor-state dispute settlement system has rarely been discussed. Most of the 
published works on this topic focus on theoretical analysis and some touched upon the 
limited existing cases.34 Literature on this issue in the context of a specific IIA is 
difficult to find. Although the existing literature on the different topics is diverse, all of 
the aforementioned valuable studies have pushed the scholarship on the legal 
framework of the China-EU investment relationship and investment dispute settlement 
in a useful direction. 
1.5 Innovative Character 
As introduced above, compared to the existing literature, the present thesis has two 
main innovative aims: to analyse dispute settlement practice from a legal cultural 
perspective, and to examine international economic dispute settlement and investment 
DSMs systemically. These two innovative points are argued to make the present 
thesis valuable before and after the conclusion of a China-EU BIT, by providing 
31 See e.g. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Reform of the IIA Regime: Four 
Paths of Action and a Way Forward, 2014, available at: 
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2014d6_en.pdf, last visited on 06.08.2020. Transnational 
Dispute Management, TDM Special Issue on "Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): In Search of a 
Roadmap", 2014, available at: https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/journal-browse-issues-
toc.asp?key=52, last visited on 30.07.2020. Stephan W. Schill, Reforming Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): 
Conceptual Framework and Options for the Way Forward, The E15Initiative (E15), 2015, available at: 
http://e15initiative.org/publications/reforming-investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds-conceptual-framework-and-
options-for-the-way-forward/, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
32 See e.g. David Gaukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the 
Investment Policy Community, 2012, available at: www.oecd.org/daf/investment/workingpapers, last visited on 
02.08.2020. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Investor-State Dispute Settlement: 
Review of Developments in 2016, 2017, available at: 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d1_en.pdf, last visited on 06.08.2020. Frank J. Garcia & Hyun 
Ju Cho & Tara Santosuosso & Randall Scarlett & Rachel Denae Denae Thrasher, The Case Against Third-Party 
Funding in ISDS: Executive Summary, Boston College Law School Faculty Papers, Vol. 4-23, 2018. 
33 See e.g. Jack J. Coe, Toward a Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-State Disputes-A Preliminary 
Sketch, UC Davis Journal of International Law and Policy, Vol. 12, 2005, pp. 7-31. Ucheora O. Onwuamaegbu, The 
Role of ADR in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: The ICSID Experience, 2007, available at: 
https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/, last visited on 09.06.2018. Chunlei Zhao, Investor-State 
Mediation in a China-EU Bilateral Investment Treaty: Talking About Being in the Right Place at the Right Time, 
Chinese Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, 2018, pp. 1-25. 
34 See e.g. Shu Xv 徐树, The Conflicts and Coordination between the Dule Tracks of the Enforcement Mechanisms 
of International Investment Agreements 国际投资条约“双轨”执行机制的冲突及协调, Studies in Law and 
Business 法商研究, Vol. 2, 2017, pp. 139-149. Jamal Seifi, Investor-State Arbitration v. State-State Arbitration in 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, Transnational Dispute Management (TDM), 2004, available at: 
https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=112, last visited on 05.08.2020. Anthea 
Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of Interdependent Rights and Shared 
Interpretive Authority, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 55, 2014, pp. 1-70. 
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inspiration to governments, legal practitioners and academics not only from China and 
the EU, but also other states in the world. 
1.5.1 Legal Cultural Analysis 
As explained in Section 1.1.3, supra, to predict the form the dispute settlement system 
in a China-EU BIT would take, the existing practice of both parties can provide insights 
and direct evidence. However, this is not enough. Among the various elements having 
influence, legal culture is expected to play a vital role in dispute settlement. In general, 
to comprehend any particular procedural detail in a DSM, it is necessary to understand 
both the dispute settlement system in which it operates and how that system is culturally 
imbedded and socially constructed, sustaining and even amplifying the culture as a 
whole. Understanding and recognizing this inter-relationship between legal culture and 
a state’s practice in dispute settlement will enrich our capacity to understand the 
underlying reasons for one party’s particular choice, anticipate its attitude towards the 
practice of the other party and to evaluate recommendations for change. Thus, a legal 
cultural analysis of both parties’ existing practice, which could indicate the values they 
intended to preserve, is argued to be important and necessary.  
Legal cultural characteristics are often difficult to see and thus the identification of 
those characteristics should be the first step in the analysis. There are various definitions 
of legal culture and a rich discussion on related terms, such as legal mentalities, legal 
consciousness, legal tradition, etc35  Examples of the definitions of “legal culture” 
include “those parts of general culture—customs, opinions, ways of doing and thinking 
that bend social forces toward or away from the law”,36 “a way of describing relatively 
stable patterns of legally oriented social behaviour and attitudes”,37 and “the sum of 
non-enforceable prerequisites that a legal society within an autonomous legal system 
 
35 Some academics argued that the terms “legal mentalities” or “legal families” were narrower than “legal culture” 
in that it primarily referred to legal traditions rather than the wider cultural setting within which law and legal 
institutions operate. See: Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not Converging, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 45, 1996, pp. 52-81. Holger Spamann, Contemporary Legal Transplants: Legal 
Families and the Diffusion of (Corporate) Law, Brigham Young University Law Review, Vol. 1813, 2009, pp. 1813-
1877. The difference between “legal culture” and “legal consciousness” was described as “if research on legal culture 
focuses attention on the myriad of ways in which law exists within society generally, the study of legal consciousness 
traces the way in which law is experienced and interpreted by specific individuals as they engage, avoid, or resist 
the law and legal meanings”. See: Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes (eds.), International Encyclopaedia of the Social 
and Behavioural Sciences, Pergamon Press, 2001, p. 8626. Scott Barclay & Susan S. Silbey, Understanding Regime 
Change: Public Opinion, Legitimacy, and Legal Consciousness, at: Gregory A. Caldeira & R. Daniel Kelemen & 
Keith E. Whittington (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 663-
678. In terms of the meaning of “legal traditions”, it was argued that “[a] formal legal tradition reflects the genesis 
and development of a legal system, its norms, doctrines, principles, standards and rules of law”. See: Leon E. 
Trakman, “Legal Traditions” and international Commercial Arbitration, The American Review of International 
Arbitration, Vol. 17, 2007, p. 11. It was also pointed out that, similar to legal culture, the concept of legal tradition 
was not easy to define and “its boundaries are fuzzy”. See: H. Patrick Glenn, Comparative Legal Families and 
Comparative Legal Traditions, at: Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Law, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 422-439.  
For a further discussion on the concept of “legal culture”, see e.g. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Clutures: 
Selected Essays, Basic Books, 1973. Alan Watson, Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture, University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 131, 1983. Roger Cotterrell, The Concept of Legal Culture, at: David Nelken (ed.), 
Comparing Legal Cultures, Routledge, 1997, pp. 13-31. 
36 Tom Ginsburg, The Culture of Arbitration, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law Vol. 36, 2003, p. 1336. 
(quoting Lawrence M. Friedman, The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective, Russell Sage Foundation, 1975, 
p. 15.) 
37 David Nelken, Using the Concept of Legal Culture, Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy, Vol. 29, 2004, p. 1. 
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has developed to make, find, interpret, and confirm law”.38 To some scholars, legal 
culture even constitutes an inherent part of the wider political culture.39 In addition, it 
is noted that legal culture may manifest itself at different levels, including in the 
supranational legal culture, national legal culture and subnational legal culture. 40 
Despite the different opinions on its definition, it is generally recognized that legal 
culture is difficult to describe. 41  Furthermore, it is clear that legal cultural 
characteristics are difficult to isolate from the legal system they exist in and are deeply 
rooted within their communities reflecting “the common history, traditions, outlook and 
approach of that system”.42 The development of legal culture may follow religious, 
political, social patterns, or market forces that impact it differently over time, place and 
space.43 
This thesis does not intend to join the debate to support some opinions or bring up its 
own definition of legal culture. Considering legal cultural analysis is one of the 
methodologies adopted by the present thesis in addressing the final goal, instead of 
limiting its scope in a technical sense, a broad view of legal culture is appropriate. 
Along with the analysis of the general legal cultural situation in China and the EU, 
considering their significant roles in their respective legal cultures, traditional Chinese 
philosophies and the constants in the European legal tradition will be given particular 
attention. 
Legal cultural analysis is used more often when one legal system is being examined.44 
An innovative use of the legal cultural analysis in the area of international public law 
can be found in Colin B. Picker’s work, in which he analysed the legal culture of 
different international organizations and compared it with the relevant states’ own legal 
culture.45 The present thesis conducts a legal cultural analysis of practice on dispute 
settlement by China and the EU at both internal and international levels. Specifically, 
it first identifies both parties’ legal cultural characteristics in dispute settlement and as 
influenced by their legal traditions. Second, it assesses the DSMs in the internal legal 
systems from a legal cultural perspective. As pointed out, “the legal culture present in 
an international investment law context will in broad terms reflect the legal culture of 
 
38 Ari Afilalo & Dennis Patterson & Kai Purnhagen, Statecraft, the Market State and the Development of European 
Legal Culture, at: Geneviève Helleringer & Kai Purnhagen (eds.), Towards a European Legal Culture, Hart 
Publishing, 2014, p. 278. 
39 See e.g. Åse B. Grødeland & William L. Miller, European Legal Cultures in Transition, Cambridge University 
Press, 2015, p. 2. 
40 On this point, any claim discussed in this thesis about legal culture does not assume uniformity within a system. 
It recognizes the existence of differences within China and the EU. However, considering the purpose of using legal 
cultural analysis in this thesis is to facilitate the exploration of the prospective China-EU BIT, the legal culture at 
the national level of China and at the internal or supranational level of the EU are focused on. 
41 Ari Afilalo & Dennis Patterson & Kai Purnhagen, Statecraft, the Market State and the Development of European 
Legal Culture, at: Towards a European Legal Culture, Hart Publishing, 2014, p. 299. 
42 Colin B. Picker, Comparative Legal Cultural Analyses of International Economic Law: A New Methodological 
Approach, The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 1, 2013, p. 34. 
43 Ehhard Blankenburg, Patterns of Legal Culture: The Netherlands Compared to Neighboring Germany, The 
American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 46, 1998, pp. 1-41. 
44 See, e.g. Kun Fan, Arbitration in China: A Legal and Cultural Analysis, Hart Publishing, 2013. 
45 For example, he analysed the possible congruence and conflicts between the WTO and Chinese legal culture. See: 
Colin B. Picker, China, Global Governance & Legal Culture: The Example of China & the WTO, at: Junji Nakagaw 
(ed.), China and Global Economic Governance: Ideas and Concepts, The University of Tokyo-Institute of Social 
Science (ISS) Research Series No.45, 2011, pp. 69-88. 
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the domestic legal systems involved”. 46  In this sense, internal dispute settlement 
systems can be taken as formally reflecting and confirming legal cultural characteristics. 
In other words, certain arrangements in DSMs reflect the deeply held normative values 
of the society that produced them and, at the same time, they help to maintain those 
ingredients of social life.47 Third, a legal cultural analysis is also conducted for the 
performance of both parties in international investment dispute settlement.  
In brief, by focusing on the manner in which the legal culture of China and that of the 
EU has shaped their performance in resolving disputes, the legal cultural analysis in the 
present thesis can be instructive in terms of expecting how it would affect the current 
negotiations on a China-EU BIT. Furthermore, a comparative legal cultural analysis of 
the practice of both parties is arguably helpful for both to understand each other, making 
cultural conflicts more comprehensible and thus also facilitating the conclusion of the 
treaty. 
1.5.2 Systemic Analysis 
In the present thesis, a systemic analysis is adopted and applied in two ways: first, 
dispute resolution is positioned in the international economic law field as a system, 
combining the practice of a state towards dispute settlement in international trade and 
investment; second, various DSMs are viewed as a whole to constitute a comprehensive 
dispute settlement system for the disputes at issue. 
1.5.2.1 Systemic Examination of International Economic Dispute Settlement 
In order to understand a state’s practice in the past and forecast its attitude to 
international investment dispute settlement in the future, a related area, international 
trade dispute resolution as a parallel constituent in the field of international economic 
law, is examined for inspiration, especially for the analysis of SSDS. 
This approach is adopted mainly because international trade and investment are often 
discussed together with regard to procedural issues in dispute resolution. The DSMs for 
trade and those for investment share similarities and their development affects each 
other. In particular, recent years have witnessed a trend of concluding comprehensive 
economic agreements, which cover both trade and investment issues. Such agreements 
normally provide one set of rules for SSDS for disputes about provisions on trade and 
investment. Furthermore, even in separate IIAs, it seems to be clear that the design of 
state-state DSMs, even investor-state DSMs, is influenced by the relevant practice 
under FTAs and the WTO Dispute Settlement System. All of this provides a solid 
ground to put the approach of China and the EU to investment dispute settlement in the 
general context of their international economic dispute resolution practice and to garner 
inspiration from their relevant practice in trade. 
46 Colin B. Picker, International Investmnet Law: Some Legal Cultural Insights, at: Leon Trakman & Nick Ranieri 
(eds.), International Trade and Investment Law: Developments and Directions, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 
148. 
47 Oscar G. Chase, Law, Culture, and Ritual–Disputing Systems in Cross-Cultural Context, New York University 
Press, 2005, p. 46. 
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1.5.2.2 Systemic Examination of Investment Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
Different DSMs, such as negotiation, mediation, consultations, and adjudication, are 
normally taken into account and examined separately. However, it is argued that 
taking a systemic view of a dispute settlement system, rather than only focusing 
separately on each DSM contained therein, is necessary.48 In other words, having 
recourse to multiple DSMs is essential, which arguably provides “the greatest 
opportunity in the future to seek out settlements in the venue that seems most 
appropriate to the parties at the time a particular dispute occurs”,49 but this is not 
enough. A further essential step is to examine these mechanisms systemically, all 
with a view to formulating a coherent dispute settlement system composed of these 
mechanisms. Such a systemic approach can potentially improve the functioning of 
investment dispute settlement, but it has unfortunately been overlooked to a great 
extent in the literature and treaty practice. 
In order to conduct a systemic examination in this thesis, first, it is considered which 
DSMs are appropriate and thus need to be incorporated into the systems for state-state 
and investor-state dispute settlement respectively.50 In addition to analysing various 
individual mechanisms for investment dispute settlement, the present thesis examines 
the interaction between these DSMs. Namely, instead of interpreting multiple DSMs 
as a collection of single method approaches, it pays attention to their interaction as 
well as their positions and functions in the dispute settlement system that is 
composed of those mechanisms. Each DSM has its own features, and they are 
expected to functionally cooperate with each other, thereby comprising a 
comprehensive dispute settlement system. Within the system, DSMs interwoven 
with each other, provide freedom to disputing parties to make full use of the 
characteristics of the different mechanisms. In addition, this thesis also explores the 
collaboration between the two systems, the state-state dispute settlement system 
and the investor-state dispute settlement system, in order to reach the final goal 
of facilitating dispute settlement through the overall system provided in the 
prospective China-EU BIT. 
48 In this sense, it is noted that more discussions on the systematic design of DSMs in a domestic legal system are 
available in the existing literature. For example, Stephanie Smith and Jan Martinez raised six characteristics for the 
best dispute settlement systems for a domestic legal system: (1) multiple process options for parties, including rights-
based and interest-based processes; (2) ability for parties to “loop back” and “loop forward” among these options; 
(3) substantial stakeholder involvement in the system’s design; (4) participation that is voluntary, confidential, and
assisted by impartial third party neutrals; (5) system transparency and accountability; and (6) education and training
of stakeholders on the use of the available process options. See: Stephanie Smith & Jan Martinez, An Analytic
Framework for Dispute Systems Design, Harvard Negotiation Law Review, Vol. 14, 2009, p. 128.
49 Todd Allee & Manfred Elsig, Dispute Settlement Provisions in PTAs: New Data and New Concepts, at: Trade
Cooperation: The Purpose, Design and Effects of Preferential Trade Agreements, Cambridge University Press, 2015,
p. 345.
50 Different DSMs would fit the needs of different types of disputes in practice. For detailed analysis on the suitable
DSMs for various types of investment disputes in practice, see: Wenhua Shan, Toward a Multilateral or Plurilateral
Framework on Investment, The E15 Initiative, 11.2015, available at: http://e15initiative.org/publications/toward-a-
multilateral-or-plurilateral-framework-on-investment/, last visited on 05.08.2020.
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Chapter 2 Background and Context: International Investment and Investment 
Dispute Settlement Systems 
This chapter aims at defining the scope of and building the theoretical basis for the 
following discussion. In order to achieve this, it addresses general topics that are 
relevant to the present thesis, including the legal frameworks of international 
investment and international investment dispute settlement, dispute settlement systems 
under IIAs, and the mechanisms that are commonly provided for in investment dispute 
settlement.  
It is noted that, under an IIA, in addition to the general system established for resolving 
disputes between treaty parties and between investors and host states, other DSMs are 
often provided for special types of disputes, such as financial services disputes.51 These 
specific types of disputes are outside the scope of the general dispute settlement system, 
because they are sensitive for treaty parties and/or have special features. Similarly, the 
DSMs therefore are designed to suit the particular characteristics and have very limited 
ranges of application, and they are therefore not covered by the present discussion. 
2.1 Legal Frameworks for International Investment and International Investment 
Dispute Settlement 
There is no single global multilateral legal framework for international investment 
comparable to the WTO. Current international investment law primarily relies upon a 
large number of IIAs. The development of the legal framework of international 
investment dispute settlement can be divided into two periods characterized by inter-
state based DSMs and investor-state arbitration respectively, which also both have 
different governing international legal regimes. 
2.1.1 The Legal Framework for International Investment 
There is no single global multilateral legal framework for investment comparable to the 
system established in 1995 by the WTO for international trade in goods, services and 
51 An example of this was NAFTA, which enshrined no less than seven forms of dispute settlement. In specific, the 
different forms were as follows: (1) Chapter 11B, DSMs dealing with investment disputes under Chapter 11A; (2) 
Chapter 14, DSMs for financial services disputes, which adopts the same approach as Chapter 20 but provides for 
panels made up of financial experts; (3) Chapter 19, a recourse to challenge domestic decisions imposing anti-
dumping and countervailing duties before a binational panel; (4) Chapter 20, the residual procedure based on the 
GATT panel model; (5) Art. 2002, recourse to the WTO Dispute Settlement System for the disputes that might fall 
under both NAFTA and the WTO agreements, and the possibility of recourse to arbitration and other alternative 
means of dispute resolution between the Parties; and (6) the “side agreements” on environmental and labour 
cooperation, complaints procedure for a private party before the respective Commissions, and a formal dispute 
settlement procedure available in limited circumstances to the three governments. For more analyses on these DSMs, 
see: Armand de Mestral, NAFTA Dispute Settlement: Creative Experiment or Confusion?, at: Lorand Bartels & 
Federico Ortino (eds.), Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 
361. 
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intellectual property. 52  The proposal for an international legal investment regime 
envisaged in the 1948 Havana Charter did not materialize. A number of later initiatives 
also failed, such as the ill-fated attempt towards the end of the 1990s to establish a 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment within the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) framework.53 Current international investment 
law primarily relies upon a large number of IIAs, which include IIAs and 
comprehensive economic agreements covering both trade and investment, aiming at 
encouraging foreign investment and intensifying economic ties among treaty parties as 
well as protecting foreign investments.54 
2.1.2 The Legal Framework for International Investment Dispute Settlement 
The interpretations of the term “international investment disputes” can vary 
significantly. Such disputes can be based on an alleged violation of IIAs, investment 
contracts or the domestic investment law of the host states.55 IIA-based investment 
disputes can be divided into two categories, according to the dispute parties involved: 
disputes between treaty parties and disputes between investors and host states. 
Successful dispute settlement is important in international investment. By addressing 
disputes in a constructive manner, it provides opportunities for meaningful dialogue 
and the development of stronger relationships. Investors may be awarded damages for 
their alleged loss and thereby minimize concerns about continuing investment activities 
with the same state. Host states could develop a reputation for being an investment-
friendly place, increase investors’ loyalty, and thus secure future investments. 
Furthermore, the effect of investment dispute settlement goes beyond specific disputes 
and the parties involved; it may provide predictability in international investment law 
as well.56 
In broad brushstrokes, the development of the legal framework of investment dispute 
settlement can be divided into two periods: the first period is characterized by inter-
state-based mechanisms and the second refers to the rise of investor-state arbitration.57  
During the first period, claims were made by home states on behalf of their investors 
by pursuing cases on a diplomatic basis or by using state-state adjudication, which is 
often based on customary international law and Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation 
treaties. In other words, in the IIAs drafted in this first period, state-state disputes were 
 
52 The WTO agreements cover some aspects of investment, especially in the field of trade-related investment 
measures, but only in a rudimentary manner. 
53 Peter Malanczuk, State-State and Investor-State Dispute Settlement in the OECD Draft Multilateral Investment 
Agreement, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 3, 2000, pp. 417-421. 
54 Saluka Investments BV (Neth.) v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 17.03.2006, para. 300. Despite the 
debate about the main goal of IIAs, the co-existence of various goals of an IIA is widely recognized. 
55 Wenhua Shan, The Legal Framework of EU-China Investment Relations: A Critical Appraisal, Hart Publishing, 
2005, p. 205. Considering the topic of the present thesis, only the disputes concerning potential breaches of IIAs are 
taken into consideration in the following analysis. 
56 Yongjie Li, Factors to be Considered for China's Future Investment Treaties, at: Wenhua Shan & Jinyuan Su 
(eds.), China and International Investment Law-Twenty Years of ICSID Membership, Brill | Nijhoff, 2015, p. 177. 
57 See e.g. Jason Webb Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in the Empirical Study of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law, Vol. 33, 2008, pp. 405-462. Andrew Newcombe & Lluís Paradell, Law and 
Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment Kluwer Law International, 2009, pp. 41-46. Kenneth J. 
Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and Interpretation, Thomas Jefferson School of Law 
Research Paper, Vol. 3022249, 2010, pp. 49-59. 
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often provided with two types of DSMs: diplomatic negotiation and international 
adjudication through ad hoc arbitration or litigation in the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ). Diplomatic negotiation was undertaken either by itself, in parallel with or as a 
precursor to international adjudication. IIAs normally only addressed the amicable 
settlement of disputes without providing detailed rules on the use of diplomatic 
negotiations. Unless specified in the IIA at issue, disputing parties decided the 
procedural rules for ad hoc arbitration. If the ICJ was chosen, then its procedural rules 
would apply. In general, during this period, investment dispute settlement was 
dominated by a public international law paradigm focused exclusively on treaty 
parties. 58  The home states of investors had complete discretion over the 
commencement, prosecution and settlement of claims, as well as the any damages 
awarded. 
In contrast, by incorporating investor-state arbitration in parallel with state-state 
arbitration, the second period of investment dispute settlement was dominated by an 
international commercial arbitration paradigm focused primarily on investor-state 
arbitration.59 The IIAs concluded in this period of time were largely drafted by capital-
exporting states which were primarily concerned with protecting their investors 
abroad.60 The right to bring cases directly against host states through international 
arbitration greatly enhanced investors’ power in dispute settlement. It is argued that the 
development of the legal framework for such arbitration started in 1965 with the 
adoption of the Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other State (hereinafter “ICSID Convention”) and the creation of the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).61 As of April 
2020, over 160 states have signed the ICSID Convention.62 ICSID mainly aims at 
establishing an international forum to address disputes that arise between foreign 
investors and their host states, and thereby promotes any given state’s investment 
climate and prospects for economic development.63 It does not engage in conciliation 
or arbitration by itself but facilities the conciliation commissions or arbitration tribunals 
constituted according to the ICSID Convention. ICSID jurisdiction is exclusive,64 and 
 
58 Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 107, 2013, pp. 58-63. 
59 Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of Interdependent Rights and 
Shared Interpretive Authority, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 55, 2014, pp. 2-3, 5. 
60 Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 107, 2013, pp. 75-76. As a result, the interest of home states was argued as being 
“largely ignored”. See: Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role 
of States, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 104, 2010, pp. 179-84. 
61 Aaron Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, at:  
Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law (Volume 136), Brill | Nijhoff, 1972, pp. 337-410. 
However, the first ISDS clause was not included in an IIA until 1969 with the Chad-Italy BIT. It was not until 1990 
that a tribunal asserted its jurisdiction under such a clause. See: Asian Agricultural Products Limited v. Democratic 
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award, 27.06.1990. 
62 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), Database of ICSID Member States, available 
at: https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx, last visited on 03.08.2020. 
63 Frauke Nitschke, The IBA’s Investor–State Mediation Rules and the ICSID Dispute Settlement Framework, ICSID 
Review, Vol. 29, 2014, p. 112. 
64 The ICSID Convention, Art. 26. However, a contracting state may require that local administrative and judicial 
remedies are exhausted as a precondition for its consent to ICSID arbitration. It may also provide for diplomatic 
protection or bring an international claim in respect of such a dispute when another contracting state has failed to 
abide by and comply with the award rendered therein. See: the ICSID Convention, Arts. 26, 27. 
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ICSID awards are binding and final.65 In addition to ICSID, there are other sets of 
arbitration rules that were incorporated with reference into IIAs. 66 In general, the 
procedural rules governing investor-state arbitration process are largely based on 
international commercial arbitration practice.67  
In recent decades, the appearance of the cases brought against capital-exporting states 
seems to have changed these states’ perception of “the ideal balance” reached in the 
second period dramatically.68 It was argued that a lack of gatekeeping by investors’ 
home states increased opportunities for tribunals to “assert and establish new legal 
norms”, going beyond what treaty parties intended or would have supported.69 As a 
result, a wave of new efforts were made to reform investment dispute settlement. This 
is reflected in newly concluded IIAs, the amendment of arbitration rules and the 
introduction of new rules particularly dealing with certain issues in investment dispute 
settlement, such as the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-
State Arbitration (hereinafter “UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency”).70 
In short, from the first stage when the focus was on states’ procedural rights in dispute 
resolution and state-state arbitration to the second stage when the attention was changed 
to investors’ procedural rights and investor-state arbitration, “the pendulum had swung 
from one extreme to the other”. 71  With the current reform process of investment 
dispute settlement, the pendulum seems to be dragged back to the middle ground. 
 
2.2 Dispute Settlement Systems under International Investment Agreements 
Nowadays, a state-state dispute settlement system and an investor-state dispute 
settlement system are normally provided in parallel to an IIA.72 The present section 
introduces these two systems respectively, focusing on the covered disputes, applicable 
claims and their relationship. Details of the DSMs often contained in these two systems 
are discussed separately in Section 2.3, infra. 
 
65 ICSID awards are not subject to appeal or to any other remedies except as provided for in the ICSID Convention. 
Every contracting state must recognize an ICSID award in its courts as if it were a final judgment of that state. See: 
the ICSID Convention, Art. 53. 
66 There are a limited set of rules in the field of investment arbitration. In addition to ICSID Arbitration Rules, the 
arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the International 
Arbitration Court of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) are often referred to in IIAs. 
67 Chiara Ragni, The Role of Amicus Curiae in Investment Disputes: Striking a Balance Between Confidentiality 
and Broader Policy Considerations, at: Tullio Treves & Francesco Seatzu & Seline Trevisanut (eds.), Foreign 
Investment, International Law and Common Concerns, Routledge, 2014, p. 86. 
68 Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 107, 2013, p. 78. 
69 Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 96-99. 
70 Reforming investor-state arbitration has been one of the key topics in the past decades in the field of international 
investment law. For more discussions on investor-state arbitration crisis and reform, see: Section 2.2.2.3, infra. 
71 Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of Interdependent Rights and 
Shared Interpretive Authority, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 55, 2014, p. 26. 
72 Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, State-State Dispute Settlement in Investment Treaties, 10.2014, available at: 
https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/best-practices-state-state-dispute-settlement-investment-
treaties.pdf, p. 1, last visited on 30.07.2020. 
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2.2.1 State-State Dispute Settlement Systems 
A state-state dispute settlement system under an IIA provides an important channel for 
treaty parties, namely the host state and the home state of investors, to re-engage with 
the investment treaty system through dispute settlement. As introduced above, at the 
initial development stage of international investment law, only state-state dispute 
settlement systems are available. In other words, these systems appeared long before 
the systems operating between investors and host states.  
2.2.1.1 Scope of Disputes 
Normally, the disputes covered by a state-state dispute settlement system are defined 
as “disputes” concerning the “interpretation” and/or “application” of treaty 
provisions.73 Two points in this definition deserve attention. First, different IIAs may 
use alternatives to “disputes”, such as “differences”, “divergences”, “matters”, and 
“questions”,74 all of which indicate the existence of different opinions of treaty parties. 
Second, “interpretation” and “application” respectively refer to “the meaning of 
particular provisions of an agreement in concrete or proposed situations” and “the 
extent to which the actions or measures taken or proposed by the contracting parties 
comply with the terms of an agreement, its object and purpose”.75 These two are 
closely related in the sense that their application is based on and in turn crystalizes the 
interpretation. The combination is arguably wide-ranging and any dispute arising from 
the investment covered by the underlying IIA to some extent relates to these two 
terms.76 
2.2.1.2 Acceptable Claims  
For the disputes that are covered by a state-state dispute settlement system, claims that 
may be raised by a treaty party can be divided into three groups: diplomatic protection 
claims, interpretive claims and declaratory relief claims.77  
First, in the context of investment dispute settlement, diplomatic protection deals with 
alleged injuries to the nationals of one treaty party that are foreign investors in another 
 
73 Id, p. 7. 
74 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Dispute Settlement: State–State (UNCTAD 
Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements), 2003, available at: 
http://unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20031_en.pdf, p. 13, last visited on 06.08.2020. Regarding the definition of “dispute”, 
it is noted that in the case concerning Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, the Permanent Court of International 
Justice defined a dispute as “a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between 
two persons” (P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, p. 11). This definition has since been recognized, applied and clarified on a 
number of occasions. 
75 Id, p. 14. 
76 Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, State-State Dispute Settlement in Investment Treaties, 10.2014, available at: 
https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/best-practices-state-state-dispute-settlement-investment-
treaties.pdf, p. 7, last visited on 30.07.2020. These two terms were argued to be derived from virtually identical 
provisions in Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, where the SSDS clauses were understood as 
permitting “a broad range of direct claims for violations suffered by a state and diplomatic protection claims for 
violations suffered by a state’s nationals”. See: Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A 
Hybrid Theory of Interdependent Rights and Shared Interpretive Authority, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 
55, 2014, p. 7. In addition, it is noticeable that the broad availability of state-state DSMs may be limited by certain 
carve-outs. For example, the 2012 US Model BIT carves out the matters relating to state’s obligations not to weaken 
its domestic environmental and labour laws to encourage investment. See: the US Model BIT (2012), Art. 37(5). 
77 Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of Interdependent Rights and 
Shared Interpretive Authority, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 55, 2014, pp. 1-70. 
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treaty party. Such protection is based on the recognition that an injury caused by the 
host state to the home state’s national is seen as an injury to the home state itself and 
thus the home state enjoys the right to assert international claims against the host state.78 
As Emmerich de Vattel said, “whoever ill-treats a citizen indirectly injures the State”.79 
In terms of its objective of securing the protection of and to obtain reparation for injured 
investors, these types of claims resemble ISDS.80 Such claims can be raised with or 
without the existence of an ISDS clause in the IIA at issue.81  
Second, when there is a dispute about treaty interpretation that has raised particular 
concerns and no “authentic interpretation” can be reached based on the agreement of 
treaty parties,82 a treaty party can seek clarification through the dispute settlement 
process by bringing an interpretive claim. Interpretive claims focus on proper 
interpretation of provisions in the IIA at issue, which could serve “either a general rule-
making purpose or the clarification of a treaty provision that is relevant to a specific 
dispute”.83 As evidenced by the Peru v. Chile case, such claims can be raised by 
investors’ home states after the appearance of a relevant ISDS case.84 
 
78 Robert Wisner & Neil Campbell, Bringing the Home State Back in: the Case for Home State Control in Investor-
State Dispute Settlement, International Bar Association, 14.02.2018, available at: 
https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=522de4cb-caa3-4656-8236-f1e13f261b86, last visited 
on 31.07.2020. In a general sense, the International Law Commission (ILC) Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection 
defines “diplomatic protection” as the “procedure employed by the state of nationality of the injured persons to 
secure protection of that person and obtain reparation for the internationally wrongful act inflicted”. See: The 2006 
ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 
2006, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 24. 
79 Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and to the 
Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns (1758) (Translated by Charles G. Fenwick), Carnegie Institution of Washington, 
1916, p. 136. 
80 The 2006 ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 2006, Vol. II, Part Two. 
81 As evidenced by the case US v. Cuba, where there is no ISDS clause in the Italy–the US Treaty of Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation (1948), the ICJ upheld its jurisdiction over the US’s diplomatic protection claim against 
Italy about the alleged injury to its investors based on the SSDS clause contained in the treaty at issue. See: 
Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy), ICJ, Judgment of 20 July 1989. In a more recent 
case, the ad hoc arbitral tribunal affirmed that, based on the SSDS clause contained in the Cuba-Italy BIT (1993), 
the investors’ home state Italy could file a diplomatic protection claim against Cuba where investor-state arbitration 
would have been an alternative option under the disputed treaty. See: Italian Republic v. Republic of Cuba, Ad hoc 
state-state arbitration, Final Award (sentence finale), 15.01.2008. 
82 According to the International Court of Justice, endorsing the position of the International Law Commission, an 
authentic interpretation can be a subsequent agreement between treaty parties “which must be read into the treaty 
for purposes of its interpretation”. See: Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana. v. Namibia), [1999] ICJ Rep 1045, para. 
49 (quoting Commentary of the International Law Commission (1966), 2 Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 221, para. 14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1). 
83 Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, State-State Dispute Settlement in Investment Treaties, 10.2014, available at: 
https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/best-practices-state-state-dispute-settlement-investment-
treaties.pdf, p. 10, last visited on 30.07.2020. 
84 Following a relevant ISDS proceeding, Empresas Lucchetti, S.A. and Lucchetti Peru, S.A. v. The Republic of Peru, 
after failing to reach an interpretive agreement on the point that was at the heart of the investor-state dispute with 
Chile, Peru launched a state-state claim under the UNCITRAL arbitration rules to clarify a provision. It is unknown 
whether the claim was pursued any further after the initiation of the state-state consultations. See: Luke Eric Peterson, 
ICSID Tribunal Declines to Halt Investor Arbitration in Deference to State-to-State Arbitration, International 
Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 19.12.2003, available at: 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment_investsd_dec19_2003.pdf, last visited on 05.08.2020. Nathalie 
Bernasconi-Osterwalder, State-State Dispute Settlement in Investment Treaties, 10.2014, available at: 
https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/best-practices-state-state-dispute-settlement-investment-
treaties.pdf, p. 11, last visited on 30.07.2020.  
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Third, declaratory relief claims aim at seeking a finding that certain measures taken by 
a treaty party have or have not violated the IIA at issue. Declaratory reliefs issued by 
tribunals could prevent or at least limit damages to treaty parties by resolving the 
problem before individual investors’ interests are harmed, and they could facilitate 
treaty parties to deal with all the relevant claims at once with a single award in a 
consistent and streamlined way. 85  In existing IIAs, this type of claim has been 
particularly provided to determine whether certain governmental measures violate 
treaty provisions, such as taxation and financial measures.86 It is worth noting that 
identifying specific injured investors was not considered a precondition for such claims 
by previous tribunals.87 
Despite how rarely they are used in practice, given the numerous concerns associated 
with investor-state arbitration and the trend towards full-fledged investment chapters in 
FTAs and comprehensive economic agreements, where elaborate provisions are 
included to resolve a wide range of state-state disputes,88 state-state dispute settlement 
systems are gaining renewed attention.89 At the same time, it is noted that some IIAs 
do not include investor-state DSMs, opting instead for SSDS only.90 
2.2.2 Investor-State Dispute Settlement Systems 
Traditionally, an investor aggrieved by the conduct of the host state could have recourse 
to the domestic courts of that state; when such local remedies have been exhausted 
without any satisfactory result, the investor’s only option is to apply to the home state 
for diplomatic protection.91 The investor-state dispute settlement systems in modern 
 
85 Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of Interdependent Rights and 
Shared Interpretive Authority, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 55, 2014, pp. 67-68. Nathalie Bernasconi-
Osterwalder, State-State Dispute Settlement in Investment Treaties, 10.2014, available at: 
https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/best-practices-state-state-dispute-settlement-investment-
treaties.pdf, p. 14, last visited on 30.07.2020. Martins Paparinskis, Investment Arbitration and the Law of 
Countermeasures, British Yearbook of International Law 2008, Vol. 79, 2008, p. 300. 
86 For instance, the China-Canada BIT (2012) provides that state-state arbitration shall be referred to to determine 
whether a disputed measure constitutes a prudential financial measure and thereby qualifies as an exception under 
the treaty. The decision made by the state-state arbitral tribunal shall be binding on the investor-state tribunal. See: 
the China-Canada BIT (2012), Art. 20(2). For some academic discussion on this issue, see: Nathalie Bernasconi-
Osterwalder, State-State Dispute Settlement in Investment Treaties, 10.2014, available at: 
https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/best-practices-state-state-dispute-settlement-investment-
treaties.pdf, pp. 14-15, last visited on 30.07.2020. 
87 For example, in the case Mexico v. US, Mexico brought a claim seeking a declaration that the US had breached 
its national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment obligations with respect to Mexico and potential Mexican 
investors. The tribunal upheld its jurisdiction over Mexico’s claims and determined that the US’s action was 
inconsistent with NAFTA provisions in the end. See: Mexico v. United States (in the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking 
Services), NAFTA Chapter 20 State-to-State arbitration, Final Report of the Panel, 06.02.2001, paras. 2, 15-24, 292. 
88 Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, State-State Dispute Settlement in Investment Treaties, 10.2014, available at: 
https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/best-practices-state-state-dispute-settlement-investment-
treaties.pdf, p. 1, last visited on 30.07.2020. 
89 See e.g. Michele Potestá, Republic of Italy v. Republic of Cuba, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 106, 
2012, pp. 341-347. Marcin Orecki, State-to-State Arbitration Pursuant to Bilateral Investment Treaties: the 
Ecuador-US Dispute, YoungICCA Blog, 2013, available at: http://www.youngicca-blog.com/state-to-state-
arbitration-pursuant-to-bilateral-investment-treaties-the-ecuador-us-dispute/, last visited on 05.08.2020. Clovis J. 
Trevino, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration and the Interplay with Investor–State Arbitration Under the 
Same Treaty, Journal of International Dispute Settlement, Vol. 5, 2014, pp. 199-233. 
90 See e.g. the Australia-US FTA (2004), the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (2006), and the 
Australia-Malaysia FTA (2012). 
91 Richard Happ, Why Investment Arbitration Contributes to the Rule of Law: Without Konwing Where We Came 
from We Cannot Know Where We are Heading, at: Loukas Mistelis & Nikos Lavranos (eds.), European Investment 
Law and Arbitration Review, Brill | Nijhoff, 2016, p. 280.  
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IIAs provide for an option for investors to have recourse to the international level for 
alleged wrongs by host states to be addressed directly , which was argued to be the 
“ultimate investor protection”.92 At the same time, host states may also profit from 
such mechanisms by creating a more favorable investment climate which helps to 
attract more foreign investment and thus generate local jobs and economic growth.93 
Such a system has been considered to be the most important accomplishment of the 
investment treaty regime by depoliticizing investment dispute settlement.94 
Although an IIA usually incorporates a state-state dispute settlement system at the same 
time, state obligations are always also enforced through ISDS.95 In fact, compared to 
state-state dispute settlement systems, which are commonly used for problems that are 
serious enough to have a systemic impact, investor-state dispute settlement systems are 
more suitable for resolving the vast majority of routine investment disputes. 96 
Although state-state dispute settlement systems can also be used for disputes where 
specific investors’ interests are at risk or have been injured, it would still be “the most 
responsive in the investment treaty context” to engage the investors in discussion and 
decision making directly.97 Furthermore, investor-state DSMs are in fact created to 
 
92 Norah Gallagher & Wenhua Shan, Chinese Investment Treaties: Policies and Practice, Oxford University Press, 
2009, p. 299. See also: An Chen, CHEN's Papers on International Economic Law (two volumes) (Vol. 1), Peking 
University Press, 2005.  
93 Wolfgang Koeth, Can the Investment Court System (ICS) Save TTIP and CETA?, European Institute of Public 
Administration Working Paper, Vol. 2016/W/01, 2016, p. 3. 
94 “Politicization” in the context of international investment, in general, was defined as “wherein the dispute features 
on the bilateral diplomatic agenda and state power and apparatus are leveraged on behalf of the private investor’s 
interest”. See: Geoffrey Gertz & Srividya Jandhyala & Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, Legalization, Diplomacy, and 
Development: Do Investment Treaties De-politicize Investment Disputes?, World Development, Vol. 107, 2018, p. 
240-241. 
In terms of the effect of investor-state arbitration on depoliticizing investment disputes, Kenneth argued that investor-
state dispute settlement systems led to the transformation from traditional international investment law to modern 
new liberalism international investment law. See: Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment 
Agreements, U.C.-Davis Journal of International Law & Policy, Vol. 12, 2005, pp. 174-175. Lowenfeld summarized 
that legal scholars had reached consensus on the essence of IIAs being “controversies between foreign investors and 
host states are insulated from political and diplomatic relations between states”. See: Corn Products International, 
Inc. v. Mexico, ICSID AF Case no ARB/(AF)/04/1, Decision on Responsibility, 15.01.2008, Separate Opinion of 
Arbitrator Lowenfeld, para. 1. Similarly, Reisman argued that the “central achievement” of the investment treaty 
regime was the insulation of investor-state claims from “the caprice of sovereign-to-sovereign politics”. See: 
Ecuador v. United States, Expert Opinion with Respect to Jurisdiction of Professor W. Michael Reisman, Permanent 
Court of Arbitration, 04.04.2012, pp. 20-21. For further academic discussion on this, see: Martins Paparinskis, The 
Limits of Depoliticisation in Contemporary Investor-State Arbitration, Select Proceedings of the European Society 
of International Law, Vol. 3, 2010, pp. 2-18. On the other hand, there are also arguments pointing out that the function 
of depoliticization of investor-state dispute settlement systems lacked empirical investigation. See e.g. Geoffrey 
Gertz & Srividya Jandhyala & Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, Legalization, Diplomacy, and Development: Do 
Investment Treaties De-politicize Investment Disputes?, World Development, Vol. 107, 2018, p. 239.  
In this regard, it was also pointed out that, given the goal of IIAs was not solely protecting foreign investment, 
depoliticizing investment disputes should likewise be understood as an important but not an absolute goal of ISDS. 
See: Martins Paparinskis, The Limits of Depoliticisation in Contemporary Investor-State Arbitration, Select 
Proceedings of the European Society of International Law, Vol. 3, 2010, pp. 271-282. 
95  Yongjie Li, Factors to be Considered for China's Future Investment Treaties, at: China and International 
Investment Law-Twenty Years of ICSID Membership, Brill | Nijhoff, 2015, p. 177. 
96 Cecilia Malmström, Remarks at the European Parliament on Investment in TTIP and Beyond, Meeting of the 
International Trade Committee of the European Parliament, Brussels, 06.05.2015. 
97 Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea K. Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation into Bilateral Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, Harvard Negotiation Law Review, Vol. 18, 2013, p. 132. 
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minimize home states’ intervention in investment disputes, 98  and there are good 
reasons that investors may actually wish to avoid diplomatic protection.99 
Mechanisms are available at the internal and international levels to resolve disputes 
directly between investors and their host states. The mechanisms are based on the 
domestic legal system of the host states. Since the present thesis focuses on IIAs, which 
provide rules on international DSMs possibly with a simple reference to local remedies, 
only the mechanisms at the international level are being considered in the following 
discussion of the present chapter. 
2.2.2.1 Scope of Disputes 
The disputes covered by an investor-state dispute settlement system are usually defined 
as any dispute between a claimant of one treaty party and the other treaty party 
concerning treatment alleged to breach the provisions of investment protection 
provided by the IIA at issue and to cause loss or damage to the claimant or its locally 
established enterprise.100 The exact scope depends on agreement of the treaty parties 
on the substantive obligations of host states stipulated in IIAs, which often involve 
activities associated with the nationalization of a business without fair compensation,101 
and, in recent decades, more subtle government conduct also became subject to 
dispute.102 Such disputes have quite distinctive features. For example, they are between 
a private party and a sovereign state governed by public international law in the form 
of treaties; the disputing parties are linked in a more or less permanent relationship and 
the amounts of money at stake in these disputes are often excessive.103  
2.2.2.2 Acceptable Claims 
Regarding the claims that can be brought by investors in investor-state dispute 
settlement systems, no specific categories have been established in the existing 
literature. However, it has become common practice that only monetary damages and 
returning the original property to investors can be decided by tribunals, which in turn 
shape the scope of possible claims raised by investors. 
In this regard, two specialties of the acceptable claims in ISDS deserve particular 
attention. First, such claims may involve a host state’s power to regulate, which are 
traditionally considered within constitutional or administrative law. In this sense, 
investor-state arbitration is comparable to a judicial review in international public 
 
98 Bernard Kishoiyian, The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Formulation of Customary International 
Law, Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, Vol. 14, 1993, p. 330. 
99 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and 
Alternatives to Arbitration, 2010, available at: http://unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia200911_en.pdf, pp. 6-7, last visited 
on 06.08.2020. 
100 See e.g. the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.1.1. 
101 See e.g. Elettronica Sicula, S.p.A (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy), ICJ, Judgment of 20 July 1989. 
102 For example, the implementation of an environmental regulation that has an adverse financial impact upon 
foreign investment (See e.g. Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Final Award of the 
Tribunal, 03.08.2015), and a change in the interpretation of tax law that decreases an anticipated refund (See e.g. 
Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The Republic of Ecuador, London Court of International 
Arbitration Administered Case No. UN 3467, 01.07.2014). 
103 Jeswald W. Salacuse, Is There a Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, Investor-State Dispute 
Resolution, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 31, 2007, p. 140. 
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law.104 Second, this type of claim is adjudicated under a procedural regime similar to 
international commercial arbitration, which is designed for equally-positioned private 
parties and thus reasonable concerns arise regarding its suitability to cases in which 
disputing parties are not in similar situations.105 
2.2.2.3 Recent Crisis 
The past decades have represented a tumultuous period for ISDS. The backlash against 
the investor-state dispute settlement system in general and investor-state arbitration in 
particular come from both academics and legal practitioners. More significantly, a 
number of states terminated their existing IIAs, withdrew from multilateral investment 
treaties, and abandoned the ratification process of the treaties that predecessor 
governments had negotiated.106  
A wide range of criticism was raised regarding both substantive and procedural 
aspects. 107  For substantive issues, a typical example is the striking number of 
compensation awarded to investors, which put huge financial pressure on host states108 
and exerted a “chilling effect” on regulation by governments. 109  Procedurally, 
investor-state arbitration is considered to be more problematic for various issues. First, 
lacking necessary transparency is a typical example.110 Since investor-state arbitration 
 
104 Qinglin Zhang 张庆麟, An Analysis of the EU's Reform of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism 欧
盟投资者-国家争端解决机制改革实践评析, Studies in Law and Business 法商研究, Vol. 3, 2016. In other words, 
tribunals are called to review host states’ measures acting in their public capacity and exercising their sovereign 
rights. See: Tomáš Fecák, International Investment Agreements and EU Law, Kluwer Law International, 2016, p. 
134. 
105 An alternative approach that emerged in recent years tends to take an opposite view, seeing investor-state 
arbitration as “a unique form of treaty-based public law adjudication”. See: Santiago Montt, State Liability in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration-Global Constitutional and Administrative Law in the BIT Generation, Hart Publishing, 
2009, p. 9. Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 45-
71. 
106 Robert Wisner & Neil Campbell, Bringing the Home State Back in: the Case for Home State Control in Investor-
State Dispute Settlement, International Bar Association, 14.02.2018, available at: 
https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=522de4cb-caa3-4656-8236-f1e13f261b86, last visited 
on 31.07.2020. 
107 Gloria Maria Alvarez et al., A Response to the Criticism Against ISDS by EFILA, Journal of International 
Arbitration, Vol. 33, 2016, pp. 4-42. 
108 For example, in a case against Ecuador, the tribunal ordered $1.77 billion compensation for the investor, which 
equalled to 5% or 6.3% of Ecuador’s yearly budget. See: Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental 
Exploration and Production Company v. The Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award, 05.10.2012. 
Another example is the Argentinean currency crisis of January 2002, which led 39 foreign investors to initiate claims 
under investment treaties for the economic harm they suffered from Argentina’s devaluation of the peso. This 
resulted in millions of damages. See: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Latest 
Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, IIA MONITOR No. 4, 2006, available at: 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//webiteiit20052_en.pdf, pp. 1, 3, last visited on 06.08.2020. For an academic 
discussion on this, see e.g. Shaotang Wang 王少棠, Legetimacy Crisis Resolved? Reconsideration of the EU's 
Reform of Investment Court System 正当性危机的解除?——欧盟投资争端解决机制改革再议, Studies in Law 
and Business 法商研究, Vol. 2, 2018, p. 164. 
109 The chilling effect coming from investor-state arbitration can be shown by, for example, the delayed issuance of 
plain packaging regulation in New Zealand, under the influence of the Phillip Morris v. Australia. See: Tariana Turia, 
Government Moves Forward with Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products, Beehive.govt.nz, 20.02.2013, available at: 
https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/government-moves-forward-plain-packaging-tobacco-products, last visited on 
06.08.2020. It is noted that arguments casting doubts on this effect also exist. For example, based on publicly 
available information on the existing investor-state arbitration cases, Wolfgang Koeth argued that it was not true that 
ISDS provisions tilted the balance of power away from governments. See: Wolfgang Koeth, Can the Investment 
Court System (ICS) Save TTIP and CETA?, European Institute of Public Administration Working Paper, Vol. 
2016/W/01, 2016, pp. 4-5. 
110 It was pointed out that investment arbitration transparency includes external and internal transparency. The 
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originally adopted the procedural regime of commercial arbitration, confidentiality is 
kept as a key feature. However, this has been criticized due to disputes being resolved 
“behind closed doors”.111 Second, the ISDS regime is causing a sense of frustration 
stemming from different decisions in similar situations.112 This can be partly ascribed 
to the use of diverse terms in IIAs,113 but, more significantly, concerns come from 
conflicting treaty interpretations and applications and varied decisions on apparently 
similar points of law or fact, as demonstrated by the infamous CME cases.114 Even in 
some cases, the same article in the same IIA was interpreted differently by different 
tribunals.115 Lacking consistency in decision making has coloured the whole system 
with unpredictability and unreliability.116 The public’s confidence in the independence 
 
former refers to procedural transparency, and the latter focuses on whether arbitral awards are intelligible for the 
public. See: Federico Ortino, Transparency of Investment Awards: External and Internal Dimensions, at: Junji 
Nakagawa (ed.), Transparency in International Trade and Investment Dispute Settlement, Routledge, 2013, pp. 136-
149. Extensive regulations on transparency normally involve six aspects, including the initiation of arbitration, 
publication of documents, public hearings, acceptance of amicus curiae, and exceptions. See: Nathalie Bernasconi-
Osterwalder & Lise Johnson, Transparency in the Dispute Settlement Process: Country Best Practices, Internatioanl 
Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 02.2011, available at: 
https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/transparency_dispute_settlement_processes.pdf, last visited on 
03.08.2020. Since the present thesis focuses on the procedural arrangements of the dispute settlement process, only 
the former will be covered.  
It is noted that there are arguments about the difference between “transparency” and “openness”, as well as 
“confidentiality” and “privacy”. See e.g. Julian D.M. Lew, Expert Report of Dr. Julian D.M. Lew (in Esso/BHP v. 
Plowman), Arbitration International, Vol. 11, 1995, pp. 283-296. Gary B. Born, International Commercial 
Arbitration (2nd edition), Kluwer Law International, 2014, p. 2781. For a complete analysis of tribunals’ discretion 
in transparency-related issues, the present work adopts a broad definition of “transparency”, which includes 
disclosing arbitration information to parties outside the arbitration proceedings as well as opening the proceedings 
to hear from non-disputing parties. 
111 Lise Johnson, The Mauritius Convention on Transparency: Comments on the Treaty and Its Role in Increasing 
Transparency of Investor-State Arbitration, Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, 09.2014, available at: 
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/08/Mauritius-Convention-Transparency-Paper-formatted-FINAL.pdf, last 
visited on 04.08.2020. 
112 Luis González García, Making Impossible Investor-State Reform Possible, at: Jean E. Kalicki & Anna Joubin-
Bret (eds.), Reshaping the Investor-State Dispute Settlement System: Journeys for the 21st Century, Brill | Nijhoff, 
2015, pp. 424-436. 
113  Joachim Pohl & Kekeletso Mashigo & & Alexis Nohen, Dispute Settlement Provisions in International 
Investment Agreements-A Large Sample Survey, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, Vol. 2, 2012, 
p. 40. 
114 In these cases, the same facts led to two arbitrations by related investors (a company and its main shareholder) 
against the Czech Republic. One tribunal found no liability and thus awarded no damages, and the other found 
liability and awarded over $350 million (equivalent to the Czech Republic’s annual healthcare budget). See: Ronald 
S. Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 03.09.2001; CME Czech Republic B.V. (Neth.) v. Czech 
Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 14.03.2003. Other typical examples include the different conclusions reached 
by the SGS tribunals about disputes concerning legal issues (as the meaning of umbrella clauses) and the different 
results obtained within the Argentina saga with regard to factual interpretations (as the assessment whether a state 
of necessity should prevail). See respectively: SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on Jurisdiction of 6 August 2003; SGS Société Générale de 
Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Jurisdiction of 29 January 
2004. MS Gas Transmission Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID ARB/01/8, Award, 12.05.2005; Enron 
Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, LP v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Award, 22.05.2007; 
Sempra Energy International v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB.02.16, Award, 28.09.2007; LG&E 
Energy Corp. LG&E Capital Corp and LG&E International Inc v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, 
Decision on Liability, 3.10.2006. 
115 See e.g. Kılıç İnşaat İthalat İhracat Sanayi ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/1, 
Award, 02.07.2013; İçkale İnşaat Limited Şirketi v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/24, Award, 08.03.2016. 
116 The system’s unpredictability and unreliability are essential for both states and investors, because they rely upon 
previous determinations to adjust the tone of their future specific actions and to negotiate better agreements. See: 
Eduardo Zuleta, The Challenge of Creating a Standing International Investment Court, at: Jean E. Kalicki & Anna 
Joubin-Bret (eds.), Reshaping the Investor-State Dispute Settlement System: Journeys for the 21st Century, 2015, 
pp. 11-15. 
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and impartiality of ISDS adjudicators has also been negatively affected by the “double 
hats” issue.117  
The unprecedented level of scrutiny of investor-state arbitration makes its reform a 
highly charged issue, and this actually serves as the basis for the worldwide ongoing 
ISDS reform. 118  In particular, recent decades have witnessed a public-minded 
revolution of investor-state arbitration to appease the legitimacy concerns. It was also 
argued that the recent changes in the practice of investor-state arbitration reveal the 
development trend towards the principal-agent relation theory, instead of the trust 
relation theory, by reserving more power for treaty parties than granting it to 
adjudicators. 119  Such a change has made investor-state arbitration more 
confrontational, more transparent and more akin to litigation and, as a result, aggressive 
positions are openly entrenched, and the final result can be unsatisfying even for a 
winning party. In brief, it is fair to say that we are “at a unique historical junction in the 
evolution of resolving investment-related conflict”, and investor-state arbitration “will 
no doubt be an important part of the puzzle”.120 
2.2.3 The Relationship between State-State Dispute Settlement Systems and 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement Systems 
The relationship between state-state dispute settlement systems and investor-state 
dispute settlement systems has been described as “extraordinarily complicated, yet little 
studied”.121  The theoretical dilemma is mainly contributed to by the inter-related 
disputes involved in these two types of systems, the correlated interests of disputing 
parties, the co-existence of state-state and investor-state DSMs, and the shared 
interpretative authority of state-state and investor-state tribunals. In practice, the 
potential conflicts between these two systems have not been highlighted in the sense 
that treaty parties seemed to have tried to avoid state-state arbitration, which can be 
 
117 The term “double hats” in ISDS refers to the situation where a person in one investment arbitration case serves 
as a counsel, and serves as an arbitrator in another that involves the same legal issue. 
118 In this regard, Anthea Roberts categorized the different attitudes towards investor-state arbitration reform into 
three camps, “loyalist”, “reformist” and “revolutionaries”. Specifically, the “loyalists” were states that “continue to 
actively champion investor-state arbitration as the primary form of dispute resolution”. The two primary examples 
of loyalists were the US and Japan. “Reformists” believed that the system needed more fundamental, institutional 
reform, like the introduction of an international investment court and/or an appellate mechanism, in order to salvage 
its legitimacy. The most widely recognized reformists were Canada and the EU. “Revolutionaries” rejected the 
wisdom of permitting investors to bring direct claims before international tribunals, preferring instead to require 
investors to pursue domestic remedies and/or limiting international dispute resolution to state-state arbitration. Two 
examples of this approach were Brazil and South Africa. See: Anthea Roberts, The Shifting Landscape of Investor-
State Arbitration: Loyalists, Reformists, Revolutionaries and Undecideds, EJIL: Talk!, 15.06.2017, available at: 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-shifting-landscape-of-investor-state-arbitration-loyalists-reformists-revolutionaries-
and-undecideds/, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
119  Regarding the relationship between treaty parties and the treaty-based international dispute settlement 
institutions, there are two main types of international relations theories: the principal-agent relation theory and the 
trust relation theory. The former purports that the dispute settlement institutions should serve the function of dispute 
settlement based on treaty parties’ intention since they are established mainly based on the treaty parties’ 
consideration of efficiency. On the other hand, the trust relation theory focuses more on the accountability and 
independence of the institutions, which thus enjoy more autonomy and discretion. See: Anthea Roberts, Power and 
Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States, American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 104, 2010, pp. 186-187. 
120 Susan D. Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems Design, Minnesota Law Review, 
Vol. 92, 2007, p. 229. 
121 Jarrod Wong, The Subversion of State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration, Columbia Journal of Transnational 
Law, Vol. 53, 2014, p. 8. 
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proven by the limited number of state-state investment arbitration cases and the 
relatively significant volume of investor-state arbitration. Despite this, relevant 
regulations in international treaties and the cases where SSDS and ISDS processes co-
exist with each other still exist, which reveals the status quo of this problematic issue. 
2.2.3.1 Theoretical Dilemma 
(i) Inter-related Disputes and Correlated Interests 
As introduced in Sections 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.2.1, supra, the disputes covered by state-state 
dispute settlement systems and investor-state dispute settlement systems are different, 
but nevertheless they are inter-related. The overlap arises from the issue of treaty 
interpretation. Namely, in ISDS, before applying the IIA at issue and making a decision, 
the initial step is to interpret the relevant provisions contained therein, which is also 
within the scope of SSDS. At the same time, establishing the facts and applying the law 
as interpreted to the facts are related. It is also very possible that a SSDS case is actually 
inspired by an injured investor or an existing ISDS case. 
In addition, in SSDS and ISDS, the three disputing parties involved, the investor, the 
investor’s home state and host state, have independent but inter-related interests which 
are granted by the underlying IIA. In ISDS, disputing parties, the investor and its host 
state, argue for their specific interests. Although it is not a party to the present dispute, 
the investor’s home state is reasonably willing to exert a certain influence, since its 
interests are also affected: on the one hand, it may have the intention to protect its 
national,122  while on the other hand, it may intend to safeguard a state’s right to 
regulate under the IIA at issue and prevent its relationship with the host state from being 
negatively affected by the ongoing investor-state dispute. Such correlated interests also 
exist in SSDS cases, which occur between treaty parties without the investors’ presence. 
However, the results would have the ultimate influence on specific investors. 
(ii) Co-existence of State-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms and Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
State-state dispute settlement mechanisms and investor-state dispute settlement 
mechanisms are often both provided for under the same IIA. As pointed out, especially 
the co-existence of state-state arbitration and investor-state arbitration without setting 
out a clear priority results in a hybrid investment dispute settlement.123 Such a hybrid 
has both positive and negative effects. On the one hand, these two types of DSMs can 
functionally complement each other in reaching an appropriate resolution of investment 
disputes. 124  SSDS may supplement ISDS in the sense that the scope of covered 
disputes and types of relief in SSDS are normally broader than the latter.125 At the same 
 
122 It is also possible that the investor and its home state have conflicting interests, and thus the home state may 
prefer a reaction that is not in the interest of its investor. 
123 Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of Interdependent Rights and 
Shared Interpretive Authority, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 55, 2014, p. 1. 
124 Shu Xv 徐树, The Conflicts and Coordination between the Dule Tracks of the Enforcement Mechanisms of 
International Investment Agreements 国际投资条约“双轨”执行机制的冲突及协调 , Studies in Law and 
Business 法商研究, Vol. 2, 2017, pp. 144-146. 
125 In state-state arbitration, one treaty party can ask the other to modify or repeal certain measures, which is not 
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time, as Article 27 of the ICSID Convention indicates, if the host state did not 
implement the investor-state arbitration decision, the investor’s home state may resort 
to diplomatic protection or bring an international state-state case. Furthermore, for the 
disputes that are covered by both state-state and investor-state DSMs, these two options 
give the parties involved the necessary flexibility to settle disputes in the way that suits 
their situation best.126 On the other hand, the state-state and investor-state arbitration 
proceedings triggered in parallel or in sequence may cause problems at different levels. 
Different tribunals may claim jurisdiction or supremacy over the matter, which leads to 
uncertainty and potential forum shopping.127 In addition, repetitive proceedings would 
not only be a waste of the time and energy of disputing parties and adjudicators, but it 
may result in conflicting decisions, double-compensation and difficulties and 
complexities in enforcement.  
Because of the potential problems brought about by the co-existence of state-state 
dispute settlement systems and investor-state dispute settlement systems, the theoretical 
exploration of their relationship has been pursued since the very beginning of their co-
existence. Since state-state arbitration and investor-state arbitration are the two that are 
more likely to end up with enforceable decisions, relevant analyses have focused on 
them, which can be categorized into three schools. One school prioritizes investor-state 
arbitration based on the argument that the purpose of creating investor-state arbitration 
protects investors and excludes political influence on investment dispute settlement.128 
Another school argues for the claims to be brought by “either the investor or the home 
state, but not generally by both”. 129  The third one suggests leaving this issue to 
tribunals in individual cases based on the doctrine of lis alibi pendens, the principle of 
res judicata and the principle of good faith.130 Despite the existence of such various 
opinions, this issue has not been thoroughly explored in theory and in practice, which 
results in unpredictability and potential instability.  
 
possible in investor-state arbitration where investors may only be awarded monetary compensation or the return of 
property. 
126 It is possible that, under certain situations, only one of them is in fact practicable and suitable. For instance, when 
there is a big number of aggrieved small investors, the home state getting involved in through SSDS can be a more 
effective and efficient way of resolving disputes. 
127  Kyung Kwak & Gabrielle Marceau, Overlaps and Conflicts of Jurisdiction between the World Trade 
Organization and Regional Trade Agreements, at: Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino (eds.), Regional Trade 
Agreements and the WTO Legal System, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 467. Although the authors here focused 
on the potential conflicting jurisdiction under WTO and FTAs, the theoretical analysis also applies to parallel state-
state dispute settlement mechanisms and investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms. 
128 It was argued that the primary rationale of the investor-state system is that “investment disputes should not be 
turned into diplomatic or state-state disputes, but be left exclusively to the investor to resolve with the host state”. 
See e.g. Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Analysis of the European Commission’s Draft Text on Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement for EU Agreements, 19.07.2012, available at: https://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/07/19/analysis-of-
the-european-commissions-draft-text-on-investor-state-dispute-settlement-for-eu-agreements/, last visited on 
30.07.2020. 
129 See e.g. Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of Interdependent Rights 
and Shared Interpretive Authority, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 55, 2014, p. 29. 
130 See e.g. August Reinisch, The Use and Limits of Res Judicata and Lis Pendens as Procedural Tools to Avoid 
Conflicting Settlement Outcomes, The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, Vol. 3, 2004, p. 50. 
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(iii) Shared Interpretive Authorities of State-State Tribunals and Investor-State
Tribunals
In investment dispute settlement, the responsibility for treaty interpretation is shared 
among treaty parties, investor-state tribunals and state-state tribunals.131 In order to 
discuss the relationship between state-state dispute settlement and investor-state dispute 
settlement systems, the focus here is on the shared interpretive authorities of the latter 
two. The interaction between treaty parties and tribunals on treaty interpretation is 
addressed in Section 11.4.3, infra. 
State-state tribunals’ interpretive authority has been described as “an important way for 
treaty parties to establish binding interpretations of their treaties”. 132  While for 
tribunals in ISDS, discharging the function of resolving specific investment disputes 
between investors and host states inevitably involves interpreting and applying the 
treaty. Regarding the relationship between the interpretive authorities of investor-state 
tribunals and state-state tribunals, some scholars argued that the former had wide 
jurisdiction to interpret and apply the substantive provisions of investment treaties, 
while the latter had limited jurisdiction over residual issues, such as the failure of a state 
to pay an investor-state award.133 This was later criticized by other academics.134 In 
general, the possible co-existence or overlap of the two types of authority of the 
tribunals to interpret the same or related provisions has been rarely discussed, which 
leaves the issue of how the decision made by one tribunal should be treated by the 
another unclear and uncertain. 
2.2.3.2 Existing Rules and Cases 
The extensive use of investor-state arbitration did not eliminate or replace state-state 
arbitration. In fact, recent years have witnessed the re-emergence of SSDS, especially 
in some newly concluded IIAs and recent cases. This sub-section analyses typical 
examples of the existing rules on the relationship between SSDS and ISDS, and it 
examines how tribunals dealt with this issue in practice. 
(i) Rules in the ICSID Convention and International Investment Agreements
Regarding rules regulating the relationship between SSDS and ISDS, the ICSID 
Convention Article 27 provides a starting point. This article gives priority to investor-
state arbitration by restricting the possibility for investors’ home states to give 
diplomatic protection or to bring an international claim if one of its nationals and 
another Contracting State have consented to submit or have submitted to arbitration 
131 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Interpretation of IIAs: What States Can 
Do?, 2011, available at: http://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia2011d10_en.pdf, p. 3, last visited on 06.08.2020. 
132 For instance, Anthea Roberts presented a different opinion, arguing that “interpretative authority should be 
understood as being shared between the treaty parties, investor-state tribunals, and state-to-state tribunals”, and thus 
bringing state-state arbitration back was necessary. See: Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: 
A Hybrid Theory of Interdependent Rights and Shared Interpretive Authority, Harvard International Law Journal, 
Vol. 55, 2014, p. 54. 
133 See e.g. Republic of Ecuador v. United States of America, PCA Case No. 2012-5, Expert Opinion with Respect 
to Jurisdiction in the Interstate Arbitration Initiated by Ecuador Against the United States (W. Michael Reisman), 
24.04.2012, p. 4. 
134 Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of Interdependent Rights and 
Shared Interpretive Authority, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 55, 2014, pp. 4-5, 10-20. 
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under the Convention, unless the host state has failed to abide by and comply with the 
award. Such an arrangement has been described as a sequencing approach, which is 
“consistent with the object and purpose of increasing the efficacy of investment treaty 
obligations by increasing opportunities for enforcement by arbitration”.135 However, it 
is worth noting that this simple rule leaves a host of situations untouched. For example, 
except for diplomatic protection claims, it is not clear whether interpretive claims and 
claims for declaratory relief are allowed. In addition, in cases under other arbitration 
venues, such as UNCITRAL, whether investor-state arbitration enjoys such a priority 
is still an open question. 
Although not often, some IIAs also contain provisions on the relationship between 
SSDS and ISDS. Some incorporate a provision repeating Article 27 of the ICSID 
Convention and thus give priority to ISDS process.136 The OECD Draft Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment goes further in this direction by preventing diplomatic 
protection claims if the dispute has been referred to any investor-state arbitration.137 
Some other IIAs take the opposite approach, stipulating that ISDS processes do not 
prejudice SSDS processes.138  
(ii) Cases 
Although the number is limited, there are some cases in which the relationship between 
SSDS and ISDS is addressed to a certain extent. Typical examples include Stephane 
Benhamou v. Uruguay, Italy v. Cuba, Lucchetti v. Peru and Peru v. Chile, Chevron v. 
Ecuador and Ecuador v. the US, as well as Mexico v. the US and CANACAR v. the US, 
which are introduced in turn in the following. 
First, in the case Stephane Benhamou v. Uruguay, pursuant to the France-Uruguay BIT 
(1993), a French investor, Stephane Benhamou, lodged a claim against Uruguay 
regarding the privatization of a Uruguayan bank. The investor-state tribunal eventually 
ruled in favour of Uruguay.139 During the ISDS process, Uruguay proposed to France 
to reach an agreement on the definition of “company” in the BIT concerned, one of the 
key issues in the ongoing investor-state arbitration, by formally invoking state-state 
consultations according to Article 10.1 of the France-Uruguay BIT (1993). Uruguay 
further argued that the investor-state tribunal should suspend the arbitral proceedings 
until the finalization of the discussion between treaty parties via diplomatic channels. 
However, the investor-state tribunal declined to postpone its decision, considering that, 
by virtue of the competence-competence principle, it had the authority to reach its own 
conclusion as long as the treaty parties had not reached an agreement on a binding 
interpretation. According to publicly available information, the consultations between 
 
135 Id, p. 47. 
136 See e.g. the Barbados-Germany BIT (1994), Art. 10(6); the US-Turkey BIT (1985), Art. VII. 
137 OECD Draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), Negotiating Text as of 24 April 1998, Part V, C1b. 
138 Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, State-State Dispute Settlement in Investment Treaties, 10.2014, available at: 
https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/best-practices-state-state-dispute-settlement-investment-
treaties.pdf, p. 18, last visited on 30.07.2020. For a breakdown of this kind of treaty provision, see: Martins 
Paparinskis, Investment Arbitration and the Law of Countermeasures, British Yearbook of International Law 2008, 
Vol. 79, 2008, pp. 284-285. 
139 Stephane Benhamou v. Uruguay, UNCITRAL, Award, 19.12.2002. 
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Uruguay and France seemed to end without any concrete result. Although Article 10.2 
of the France-Uruguay BIT (1993) permits a treaty party to have recourse to state-state 
arbitration if a dispute cannot be resolved within six months via diplomatic channels, it 
is not clear whether Uruguay ever invoked this provision and brought a state-state 
arbitration case against France. 
Second, in the case Italy v. Cuba, Italy brought a claim against Cuba on behalf of itself 
and several Italian investors under Article 10 of the Cuba-Italy BIT (1993), where 
investor-state arbitration would have been an alternative.140 Although there was no 
parallel or subsequent ISDS proceeding, the co-existence of state-state and investor-
state DSMs in the underlying BIT caused debates over a state’s right to bring a 
diplomatic protection claim. Cuba argued that the existence of the investor-state 
arbitration clause in the treaty prevented Italy from bringing a state-state proceeding on 
behalf of its nationals, while Italy contended that it had “double standing” to bring a 
direct claim (to vindicate its own substantive rights) and a diplomatic protection claim 
(to vindicate the rights of Italian investors).141 In the absence of any provision dealing 
with the relationship between SSDS and ISDS in the Cuba-Italy BIT (1993), the state-
state tribunal determined that, as long as no investor had brought an investor-state 
arbitration case, the home state could request diplomatic protection.142 In reaching its 
ruling, the tribunal referred to the view taken by the tribunal in CMS v. Argentina and 
drew an analogy with Article 27 of the ICSID Convention, holding that diplomatic 
protection is complementary to ISDS.143 
Third, two parallel cases were brought by Peru and its investors concerning the same 
dispute, Empresas Lucchetti, S.A. and Lucchetti Peru, S.A. v. Republic of Peru and Peru 
v. Chile. The former investor-state arbitration was initiated by Chilean investors based 
on the Chile-Peru BIT (2000).144 Peru v. Chile was brought thereafter and continued 
in parallel with the former. In specific, after Chilean investors started the investor-state 
arbitration, Peru approached Chile to try to reach an interpretive agreement on the 
provision that was at the heart of the ISDS case. Failing that, Peru raised state-state 
arbitration, requesting the tribunal to deliver a clarification of the contested 
provision.145  At the same time, it sought a suspension of the ongoing ISDS case, 
arguing that the subject of the concurrent state-state arbitration between Peru and Chile 
 
140 Italian Republic v. Republic of Cuba, Ad Hoc Arbitration, Interim Award, 15.03.2005; Italian Republic v. 
Republic of Cuba, Ad Hoc Arbitration, Final Award, 15.01.2008. See also: Michele Potestá, Republic of Italy v. 
Republic of Cuba, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 106, 2012, pp. 341-347. 
141 Italian Republic v. Republic of Cuba, Ad Hoc Arbitration, Interim Award, 15.03.2005, paras. 24-25.  
142 Id, para. 65. 
143 Id, para. 65. In the case CMS v. Argentina, the tribunal stated that “diplomatic protection is intervening as a 
residual mechanism to be resorted to in the absence of other arrangements recognizing the direct right of action by 
individuals”. See: CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID No. ARB/01/8, Decision of the Tribunal 
on Objections to Jurisdiction, 17.07.2003, para. 45. 
144 Empresas Lucchetti, S.A. and Lucchetti Peru, S.A. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/4, Award, 
07.02.2005. 
145  The documents in this case have not been published. Relevant information can be found in scholars’ 
commentaries. See e.g. Luke Eric Peterson, ICSID Tribunal Declines to Halt Investor Arbitration in Deference to 
State-to-State Arbitration, International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 19.12.2003, available at: 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment_investsd_dec19_2003.pdf, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
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was the same and the tribunal in the latter had interpretive authority.146 The tribunal 
declined this request for the suspension of the case because “the conditions for a 
suspension of the proceedings were not met”. 147  Since the investor-state tribunal 
finally decided in favour of Peru’s jurisdictional objection, Peru discontinued the state-
state arbitration, which left the question unanswered regarding the jurisdiction of the 
state-state tribunal in the situation where investor-state arbitration had been raised 
regarding the same dispute. 
Two more cases arose between a US investor, Ecuador and the US. Based on the 
Ecuador-US BIT (1993), Chevron, a US investor, initiated an investor-state arbitration 
case under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976) against Ecuador. In order to 
resolve the dispute, the investor-state tribunal delivered its interpretation of “effective 
means” contained in the underlying BIT, based on which it decided in favour of the 
investor.148 Being unsatisfied with the investor-state tribunal’s treaty interpretation, 
Ecuador first contacted the US diplomatically to try to reach a joint interpretation. 
Without receiving any concrete feedback from the US, it relied on the state-state 
arbitration provision in the same BIT, requiring a state-state tribunal to interpret the 
relevant provision. However, the US objected to the state-state tribunal’s jurisdiction 
on the basis that there was no dispute between treaty parties.149 In particular, it asserted 
that the treaty did not grant the state-state tribunal an “advisory jurisdiction” or establish 
“an appellate mechanism”.150 In the end, considering the US had not expressed any 
opinion on the treaty interpretation issue, the state-state tribunal denied its jurisdiction 
because of the absence of any “dispute”.151 This decision again left a crucial question 
unresolved, which is whether the interpretation of substantive provisions in the BIT 
should be reserved for investor-state track once that process has been engaged. 
Last, in the context of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), after 
several unsuccessful attempts to resolve the dispute through meetings of the NAFTA 
Free Trade Commission and bilateral consultations with the US, Mexico brought a case 
to seek a declaration that the US had breached its national treatment and most-favoured-
nation treatment obligations with respect to Mexico and potential Mexican investors.152 
 
146 Empresas Lucchetti, S.A. and Lucchetti Peru, S.A. v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/4, Award, 
07.02.2005, para. 7. 
147 Id, para. 9. 
148 Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Company v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 34877, Partial 
Award on the Track II, 30.08.2018, paras. 242-244. 
149 Republic of Ecuador v. United States of America, PCA Case No. 2012-5, Request for Arbitration, 28.06.2011, 
para. 1. 
150 Republic of Ecuador v. United States of America, PCA Case No. 2012-5, Statement of Defense of Respondent 
United States of America, 29.03.2012, pp. 11-12. Regarding this, Ecuador argued that the purpose of the claim was 
to clarify the meaning of the provision for future cases rather than to appeal the tribunal’s decision in the Chevron 
case. See: Luke Eric Peterson, United States Defeats Ecuador’s State-to-State Arbitration, IAReporter, 02.09.2012, 
available at: https://www.iareporter.com/articles/united-states-defeats-ecuadors-state-to-state-arbitration-will-
outcome-dissuade-argentine-copycat-case/, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
151 The tribunal’s award has not been publicly released, but it was reported that the majority declined its jurisdiction 
because there was no concrete dispute with practical consequences between Ecuador and the US, which was required 
in the state-state arbitration clause. See: Jarrod Hepburn & Luke Eric Peterson, US-Ecuador Inter-State Investment 
Treaty Award Released to Parties, IAReporter, 30.10.2012, available at: https://www.iareporter.com/articles/us-
ecuador-inter-state-investment-treaty-award-released-to-parties-tribunal-members-part-ways-on-key-issues/, last 
visited on 05.08.2020. 
152 Mexico complained that the US failed to lift a moratorium on processing applications by Mexican-owned 
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The US contended that Mexico could not make a claim on behalf of unidentified 
Mexican investors.153 In the end, the tribunal confirmed its jurisdiction and determined 
that the behaviour of the US was inconsistent with the NAFTA, “even if Mexico cannot 
identify a particular Mexican national or nationals”.154 Since the US did not implement 
the decision of the state-state tribunal, in 2009, a Mexican association of trucking 
companies brought an UNCITRAL investor-state arbitration case under Chapter 11 of 
the NAFTA seeking damages for the violation by the US of national treatment, most-
favoured-nation treatment and minimum standard of treatment regarding the same 
subject matter decided in Mexico v. the US. 155  It appears that this process was 
discontinued and a tribunal was never constituted.156 Relevant issues therefore remain 
open, such as whether the earlier state-state case precludes the later investor-state case 
and whether the investor-state tribunal would have been bound by the previous decision 
of the state-state tribunal. 
In brief, a typical problematic situation regarding the relationship between SSDS and 
ISDS is where state-state arbitration and investor-state arbitration are resorted to 
concurrently or subsequently. Key issues are related to the jurisdiction of the tribunals 
and the effect of their decisions in these two types of cases. To summarize the lessons 
from the typical cases introduced above, first, when both types of proceedings exist at 
the same time, the tribunal in Stephane Benhanou v. France failed to wait for the result 
of diplomatic consultations under SSDS process. Similarly, the tribunal in Lucchetti v. 
Peru failed to suspend investor-state arbitration because of the co-existence of state-
state arbitration. It can be inferred from the decision of the tribunal in Italy v. Cuba that, 
if the investor initiated investor-state arbitration on the same issue, its home state could 
not request diplomatic protection through a state-state process at a later stage. Second, 
no clear answer has been given regarding the effect of decisions in the situation where 
the interpretation of a substantive provision in an IIA is touched upon by an investor-
state tribunal and a state-state tribunal in turn. The Ecuador v. the US tribunal did not 
touch upon this issue, since it declined its jurisdiction at the beginning, leaving the 
effect of the investor-state tribunal’s decision unclear. The suspension of CANACAR v. 
the US left the question unanswered as to how the decision of the earlier state-state 
tribunal would have affected the decision of the later investor-state tribunal. Therefore, 
it is fair to say that the limited number of existing cases do not give much instruction 
on the potential problematic situations with regard to the relationship between SSDS 
and ISDS. Furthermore, it is uncertain how these cases would affect future tribunals 
considering the absence of a binding precedent until now.157 
 
trucking firms. See: Mexico v. United States (in the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services), NAFTA Chapter 20 
State-to-State Arbitration, Final Report of the Panel, 06.02.2001. 
153 Id, paras. 147, 283.  
154 Id, para. 292. 
155 CANACAR v. United States of America, Notice of Arbitration, 02.04.2009, para. 1. 
156 US Department of State, CANACAR v. United States of America, 04.02.2009, available at: 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c29831.htm, last visited on 21.05.2017. 
157 Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, State-State Dispute Settlement in Investment Treaties, 10.2014, available at: 
https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/best-practices-state-state-dispute-settlement-investment-
treaties.pdf, p. 17, last visited on 30.07.2020. 
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2.3 International Investment Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
DSMs are indispensable for international treaties in general and IIAs in particular. For 
both SSDS and ISDS, both amicable and adjudicative DSMs can be identified in 
existing practice, among which negotiation, consultations, mediation, conciliation, and 
adjudication frequently appear in IIAs.158 This section first generally discusses the 
functions of DSMs for IIAs and then introduces the basic procedural arrangements and 
main characteristics of these often-used mechanisms. 
2.3.1 Functions  
In addition to dispute settlement, DSMs arguably have a variety of other functions. First, 
DSMs should a priori deter the parties from violating the agreement.159 Second, DSMs 
serve as a way of providing new information to treaty parties by clarifying their 
obligations. Furthermore, by clarifying the interpretation and scope of certain terms and 
conditions of an agreement, DSMs lead to “a more coherent implementation”.160 Third, 
adjudicative DSMs can present how adjudicators deliberate and balance different legal 
principles, 161  providing inspirations not only to disputing parties but also other 
stakeholders in international investment law. In addition, effective DSMs can channel 
the productive forces of conflicts, maximize the satisfaction of stakeholders, realize the 
international rule of law, and enhance the legitimacy of the dispute resolution process.  
DSMs are related to each other. For example, mediation can be seen as a continuation 
of negotiation with the help of a third party. In this sense, arbitration and litigation in 
many cases may also be interpreted as a continuation of negotiation by other means to 
“a lesser but still important extent”.162 In addition, multiple types of DSMs often co-
exist.163 Ideally, they complement and cooperate with each other to offer disputing 
parties a list of choices, in order to satisfy their needs under diverse specific situations 
by taking advantage of the different features of each mechanism. They come together 
 
158 It is noted that ICSID also has a fact-finding facility as another DSM for ISDS, regulated by ICSID Fact-Finding 
(Additional Facility) Rules. According to these rules, provided both parties consent, a committee will be established 
to provide the parties with an impartial assessment of facts which, if accepted by them, resolve a conflict about 
specific factual issues. The Rules envisage that there will be oral proceedings, written submissions, evidence, witness 
testimony, and a report that “shall be limited to findings of fact [and] shall not contain any recommendations to the 
parties nor shall it have the character of an award,” and the parties will be “entirely free as to the effect to be given 
to the Report.” See: ICSID Fact-Finding (Additional Facility) Rules, Arts. 15, 16. However, this DSM has never 
been used since its inception in 1978. For more discussion on ICSID fact-finding facility, see: Ucheora O. 
Onwuamaegbu, The Role of ADR in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: The ICSID Experience, Transnational 
Dispute Management (TDM) in Mediation & ADR, Vol. 1, 2007, p. 13. 
159 Stefan Szepesi, Comparing EU Free Trade Agreements: Dispute Settlement, European Centre for Development 
Policy Management (ECDPM), 01.2004, available at: https://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/IB-6G-
Comparing-EU-Free-Trade-Agreements-Dispute-Settlement-2004.pdf, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
160 Id. 
161 Joost Pauwelyn & Manfred Elsig, The Politics of Treaty Interpretation: Variations and Explanations Across 
International Tribunals, at: Jeffrey Dunoff & Mark Pollack (eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International 
Law and International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 445-473. 
162 Jeswald W. Salacuse, Is There a Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, Investor-State Dispute 
Resolution, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 31, 2007, p. 155. 
163 Todd Allee & Manfred Elsig, Dispute Settlement Provisions in PTAs: New Data and New Concepts, at: Trade 
Cooperation: The Purpose, Design and Effects of Preferential Trade Agreements, Cambridge University Press, 2015, 
p. 327. 
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constituting a comprehensive dispute settlement system. A dispute settlement system 
that is palatable to treaty parties, attractive and practicable to potential users and 
functional to investment dispute resolution is essential to an IIA, without which the cost 
of resolving disputes would increase, investment risks will be amplified, investment 
disincentives would be generated, and even the success of an investment treaty regime 
could be undermined.164  
2.3.2 Common Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
There are different ways of recognizing and differentiating between DSMs.165 Two 
common categories are amicable mechanisms and adjudicative mechanisms. These two 
groups of DSMs normally have a distinct focus and hence distinct moralities—the 
former focuses on “optimum settlement” while the latter focuses on “a decision 
according to the law of the contract”.166 At the same time, it should also be noted that 
amicable and adjudicative DSMs are not mutually exclusive. Instead, they can be and 
often are used sequentially or in a customized combination.167 
Specifically, amicable DSMs provide solutions based on the interests of the disputing 
parties, which may not necessarily reflect their exact legal standing.168 Compared to 
adjudication, amicable mechanisms are normally confidential instead of transparent, 
more economic, less time-consuming, and contribute to the parties’ on-going 
cooperative relationship. Thus, both states and investors have incentives to at least first 
try to redress disputes through amicable DSMs.169 Such DSMs can be further grouped 
into bilateral mechanisms where only disputing parties are involved, such as negotiation 
 
164 Susan D. Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems Design, Minnesota Law Review, 
Vol. 92, 2007, pp. 183-184. For a further discussion on the significance of DSMs to IIAs, see: Timothy A. Steinert, 
If the BIT Fits: The Proposed Bilateral Investment Treaty between the United States and the People’s Republic of 
China, Columbia Journal of Asian Law, Vol. 2, 1988, p. 405. Barbara Koremenos, If Only Half of International 
Agreements Have Dispute Resolution Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining?, The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 
36, 2007, p. 209. Todd Allee & Manfred Elsig, Dispute Settlement Provisions in PTAs: New Data and New Concepts, 
at: Trade Cooperation: The Purpose, Design and Effects of Preferential Trade Agreements, Cambridge University 
Press, 2015, p. 319. 
165 For instance, one standard that was used for discussing the different DSMs in preferential trade agreements is 
the amount of delegation of dispute settlement authority states are willing to grant, namely, how much power or 
authority is delegated to a third party throughout the process. This can be reflected as ex ante control, such as the 
selection of panellists or court members, and on-the-spot control mechanisms, like interim reviews of the third 
party’s decisions. See: Todd Allee & Manfred Elsig, Dispute Settlement Provisions in PTAs: New Data and New 
Concepts, at: Trade Cooperation: The Purpose, Design and Effects of Preferential Trade Agreements, Cambridge 
University Press, 2015, pp. 341-342. 
166 Lon L. Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, at: Mark L. Kahn (ed.), Collective Bargaining and the 
Arbitrator’s Role: Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual Meeting-National Academy of Arbitrators, Bureau of 
National Affairs Inc., 1962, pp. 29-30. 
167 Id, at 7.   
168 Michael Cohen, Alternative Dispute Resolution, EuroExpert Symposium, Estoril/Portugal, 2003. Jeswald W. 
Salacuse, Is There a Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, Investor-State Dispute Resolution, Fordham 
International Law Journal, Vol. 31, 2007, p. 176. 
169 For investors, such incentives can come from the intention to continue the investment project in its host state. In 
terms of states, they may have concerns about facing a decision of failing to honour its investment treaty obligations. 
See: Jeswald W. Salacuse, Is There a Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, Investor-State Dispute 
Resolution, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 31, 2007, p. 153. However, it is admitted that there is little 
empirical evidence that generally described settlement rates, let alone whether settlement was influenced by the use 
of any particular amicable DSMs. In particular, as pointed out, governments are likely to have a political disincentive 
to take responsibility for their conduct if it is preferable to hold a tribunal responsible for a particular result. See: 
Susan D. Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems Design, Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 
92, 2007, p. 203. Todd Allee & Paul K. Huth, Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Adjudication as 
Domestic Political Cover, American Political Science Review, Vol. 100, 2006, p. 219. 
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and consultations, and trilateral mechanisms where disputes are referred to an external 
party to assist disputing parties in reaching a settlement, like mediation and conciliation. 
In a dispute settlement system, amicable mechanisms often exist as a complementary 
alternative which is available at any point during the whole dispute resolution process 
alongside adjudicative DSMs. Sometimes, they are set as a precondition to resorting to 
adjudication procedures with a requirement of minimum duration, which is referred to 
as the “cooling-off” period.170 Even if a complete settlement is not achieved, amicable 
DSMs may narrow issues for later adjudication or open lines of subsequent 
communication. Relevant treaty provisions may generally provide for amicable 
settlement without explicitly identifying specific DSMs.  
Existing practice usually adopts the form of institutional or ad hoc arbitration for 
adjudicative DSMs. Compared to amicable mechanisms, the need for dispute 
settlement procedures being perceived as legitimate in adjudication is much stronger.171 
In general, adjudicative DSMs enjoy the advantage of guaranteeing the resolution of 
disputes, contributing to the international rule of law and developing international 
jurisprudence. Their perceived weakness is reflected in high costs, long duration of time, 
potential frivolous and vexatious claims, etc.172 As mentioned in Section 2.2.2.3, supra, 
these shortcomings were particularly exaggerated in recent decades, which resulted in 
investor-state arbitration going through a “legitimate crises”.173 
2.3.2.1 Negotiation and Consultations 
Negotiation and consultations are sometimes used interchangeably, both of which refer 
the communications between disputing parties regarding possible solutions to their 
dispute. These two DSMs provide channels that permit parties to address issues 
informally before ratcheting up the costs and formality related to conflict resolution. 
The process can be subject to the power asymmetry between disputing parties with the 
absence of any neutral third party participation. They are the least informal DSMs, and 
thus normally no procedural rules are provided. There is a slight difference between 
negotiation and consultations in the extent of formality: state-state negotiation becomes 
consultations when it is conducted in a more formal form, as shown by the practice in 
the WTO Dispute Settlement System. 
In state-state disputes, negotiation and consultations address disputes through 
government-to-government communications and often result in a political settlement 
 
170  Joachim Pohl & Kekeletso Mashigo & & Alexis Nohen, Dispute Settlement Provisions in International 
Investment Agreements-A Large Sample Survey, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, Vol. 2, 2012. 
171 It was argued that such legitimacy had both internal and external dimensions, which meant that dispute settlement 
procedures should be generally accepted as fair and objective by users as well as the broader public. See: Ignacio 
Garcia Bercero & Paolo Garzotti, DSU Reform: Why Have Negotiations to Improve WTO Dispute Settlement Failed 
so far and What Are the Underlying Issues?, The Journal of World Investment & Trade, Vol. 6, 2005, p. 853. 
Although the author here focused on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, the theoretical arguments can be more 
generally applied in the area of international third-party adjudication. 
172 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and 
Alternatives to Arbitration, 2010, available at: http://unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia200911_en.pdf, last visited on 
06.08.2020. 
173 Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law 
Through Inconsistent Decisions, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 73, 2005, p. 1523. 
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rather than a determination based on the merits of the case.174 Such a pure diplomatic 
process can happen on an ad hoc basis for a specific dispute, or it can be realized 
through periodic meetings of the joint committee under the disputed IIA.175 Similarly, 
investor-state negotiation and consultations are also amicable and non-structured DSMs 
with low procedural predictability. The different nature of disputing parties as private 
parties and governments results in the communication in this case to be more affected 
by their power asymmetries. It is safe to say that, in practice, virtually all investor-state 
disputes go through a period of negotiations before reaching settlement or turning to 
other DSMs.176  
2.3.2.2 Mediation 
Mediation is often defined as a confidential, informal, structured, and voluntary 
mechanism, where disputes are resolved in an amicable and cost-effective process with 
assistance from a third party.177 It encourages disputing parties to be forward-looking 
and normally extra-legal interests are included in the discussion to permit the 
development of “integrative solutions”.178 In this way, mediation creates additional 
value by restructuring the parties’ relationship to make it as profitable as possible.179 
Compared to negotiation, the participation of a mediator to some extent increases the 
possibility of the disputes ending in settlement by providing assistance, addressing the 
influence of the power asymmetry, and letting parties “be realistic about their options” 
in a more organized process.180 The mediator’s role can be described as an “honest 
broker”, not a judge, but it is also noted that mediation can be interest-based pursuant 
to parties’ needs as well as rule-based according to applicable laws.181 Through the 
intervention of a skilful and well-intentioned third party, mediation could overcome 
174 Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in International Trade Law, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 92, 
2006, pp. 254-256. State-state negotiation and consultations have been labelled by existing academic discussions as 
“political”, the opposite of “legalization” in terms of dispute settlement design. See: Todd Allee & Manfred Elsig, 
Dispute Settlement Provisions in PTAs: New Data and New Concepts, at: Trade Cooperation: The Purpose, Design 
and Effects of Preferential Trade Agreements, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 346. 
175 Such a joint committee is normally composed of representatives from all treaty parties who are at a reasonably 
high political level. Despite lacking a systematic study of the overall efficacy, such meetings did succeed in resolving 
some disputes in the area of international economic law. See: William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in the WTO and 
RTAs: A Comment, at: Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino (eds.), Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal 
System, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 353. 
176 Jeswald W. Salacuse, Is There a Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, Investor-State Dispute 
Resolution, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 31, 2007, p. 166. 
177 Anna Spain Bradley, Integration Matters: Rethinking the Architecture of International Dispute Resolution, 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 32, 2010, p. 23. Robert B. Davidson, Initiating an 
International Mediation, at: Richard Chernick & Daniel M. Kolkey & Barbara Reeves Neal (eds.), Practitioner's 
Handbook on International Arbitration and Mediation (Third Edition), JurisNet, LLC, 2012, p. 479. 
178 Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow & Lela Porter Love & Jean R. Sternlight & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Dispute 
Resolution: Beyond the Adversarial Model (Second Edition), Aspen Publishers, 2010, pp. 270-296. 
179 Thomas Wälde, Efficient Management of Transnational Disputes: Mutual Gain by Mediation or Joint Loss in 
Litigation, Arbitration International, Vol. 22, 2006, p. 206. 
180 Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea K. Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation into Bilateral Investment 
Treaty Arbitration, Harvard Negotiation Law Review, Vol. 18, 2013, pp. 82-83. 
181 Interest-based mediation and rule-based mediation are used to describe a mediator’s function in the substantive 
aspect of dispute resolution—suggesting a resolution according to parties’ interests or making an assessment of 
parties’ positions based on the applicable law. See: Manon Schonewille & Jeremy Lack, Mediation in the European 
Union and Abroad: 60 States Divided by a Common Word?, at: Manon Schonewille & Fred Schonewille (eds.), The 
Variegated Landscape of Mediation: A Comparative Study of Mediation Regulation and Practices in Europe and the 
World, Eleven International Publishing, 2014, pp. 25-35. 
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various barriers to a negotiated settlement. 182  Furthermore, when properly done, 
mediation can effectively address fairness and justice.183 It is admitted that there is also 
an ongoing critique of mediation, such as that it lacks fair procedures in prioritizing 
settlement, hindering the development of jurisprudence in international investment law 
and reducing the inhibiting effect of arbitral awards on governments’ illegal 
behaviours.184 
Mediation can be scheduled to precede adjudication in the “cooling-off” process as an 
alternative or a compulsory step, and it is made available at any point during the process 
of other DSMs.185 Even if a complete settlement is not achieved, mediation may reduce 
the issues for later adjudication or open lines of communication for subsequent 
negotiation. As opposed to adjudication, the mediation process relies more on party 
autonomy. In addition to detailed procedural arrangements, particularly, entering into 
mediation depends on disputing parties’ agreement and the ultimate solution is subject 
to their mutual decision to hammer out the outcome or to accept the suggestion from 
the mediator.186 
Under IIAs, state-state mediation may not be explicitly mentioned, but there should be 
no doubt about its availability, since it can be covered by the general reference to 
making efforts to reach an amicable settlement. Nevertheless, state-state mediation is 
admittedly difficult to realize in practice. This can be contributed by a state’s general 
reluctance to initiating dispute settlement proceedings with another state. Furthermore, 
it does not happen very often that complaints from a private investor motivates its home 
state to initiate a dispute settlement process with another state; even when the 
motivation is strong enough, it would still be “the most responsive in the investment 
treaty context” to engage the investors directly in discussion and decision making.187 
At the same time, finding a proper mediator for state-state disputes is likely to be 
difficult.  
For ISDS, mediation is arguably more practicable and valuable. In an on-going 
investment project, when there is a dispute between the investor and its host state, 
resolving the dispute is critical, but restoring the relationship and ensuring the 
continued operation of the investment project are also often of paramount importance. 
As was pointed out by the tribunal in Achmea BV v. Slovakia, a black and white solution 
to a legal issue in which one side wins and the other side loses may not be the optimum 
 
182 Jeswald W. Salacuse, Is There a Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, Investor-State Dispute 
Resolution, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 31, 2007, p. 169. 
183 Hualing Fu, Mediation and the Rule of Law: The Chinese Landscape, at: Joachim Zekoll & Mortiz Bälz & Iwo 
Amelung (eds.), Formalisation and Flexibilisation in Dispute Resolution, Brill | Nijhoff, 2014, p. 108. 
184 Jeswald W. Salacuse, Is There a Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, Investor-State Dispute 
Resolution, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 31, 2007, p. 179. 
185 It was argued that offering mediation, conciliation and arbitration together may, in fact, be the most effective 
way to achieve sustainable investment dispute settlement and economic development. See: Frauke Nitschke, The 
IBA’s Investor–State Mediation Rules and the ICSID Dispute Settlement Framework, ICSID Review, Vol. 29, 2014, 
p. 132. 
186  Chang-fa Lo et. al., Concept Paper on the Creation of a Permanent "Asia-Pacific Regional Mediation 
Organization" for State-to-State (Economy-to-Economy) Disputes, Comtemporary Asia Arbitration Journal, Vol. 10, 
2017, p. 328. 
187 Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea K. Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation into Bilateral Investment 
Treaty Arbitration, Harvard Negotiation Law Review, Vol. 18, 2013, p. 132. 
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outcome in every ISDS case. 188  In this sense, by fostering the understanding of 
disputing parties, reconciling their interests, repairing the damaged relationship, 
contributing to further cooperation, mediation can add extra value to the dispute 
resolution process.189 Furthermore, with regard to addressing disputing parties various 
interests to reach a win-win solution, mediation increases the potential to offer a viable 
option than arbitration.190 Due to the level of confidentiality in mediation, published 
information on the existing investor-state mediation cases is very scarce and often 
limited to its occurrence without further details.191 Nevertheless, compared to investor-
state arbitration, mediation was inferred to have had less real use.192 This can be due 
to the fact that government officials, investors and lawyers are not often deeply 
knowledgeable about mediation process. Furthermore, government officials may be 
reluctant to agree to a mediated settlement “for fear of being accused of weakness in 
defending national interests against foreigners, or worse, corruption”. 193  Probably 
sparked by the rise in the number of investor-state disputes and the drawbacks of 
investor-state arbitration, interest in investor-state mediation has been growing in recent 
 
188 In this case, at the end of a hearing, the tribunal observed that the aims of both sides seemed to be approximately 
aligned, and a legal decision was not the optimum outcome. Thus, it recommended that the parties seek out somebody 
to act as a mediator to settle the dispute. See: Achmea BV v. Slovakia, PCA Case No 2008-13, Final Award, 
07.12.2012, pp. 14-15. 
189 Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea K. Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation into Bilateral Investment 
Treaty Arbitration, Harvard Negotiation Law Review, Vol. 18, 2013, pp. 116-117. 
190  Shahla Ali, Prospects of Utilizing Investor-State Mediation and UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency for 
Polycentric Environmental Disaster-Related Disputes: The Case of Vattenfall v. Germany, at: Muruga Perumal 
Ramaswamy & Jodo Ribeiro (eds.), Trade Development through Harmonization of Commercial Law, New Zealand 
Association of Comparative Law, 2015, p. 137. Shahla F. Ali & Odysseas G. Repousis, Investor-State Mediation 
and the Rise of Transparency in International Investment Law: Opportunity or Threat?, Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy, Vol. 45, 2016-2017, p. 235. 
191  For instance, a recent disclosed investor-state mediation took place between a French company and the 
Philippines under the France-Philippines BIT (1994). This case was filed under the IBA Rules for Investor-State 
Mediation (2012), with the assistance of the ICC-ADR Centre. It was brought by Systra SA and its local subsidiary 
Systra Philippines Inc., arising out of allegedly long overdue invoices for services and work performed on metro and 
rail projects. Other information about this case has not been made public. See: Luke Eric Peterson, In an Apparent 
First, Investor and Host-State Agree to Try Mediation under IBA Rules to Resolve an Investment Treaty Dispute, 
IAReporter, 14.04.2016, available at: https://www.iareporter.com/articles/in-an-apparent-first-investor-and-host-
state-agree-to-try-mediation-under-iba-rules-to-resolve-an-investment-treaty-dispute/, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
192 Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea K. Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation into Bilateral Investment 
Treaty Arbitration, Harvard Negotiation Law Review, Vol. 18, 2013, p. 144. Arguments supporting the possible 
frequent use of investor-state mediation also exist, which is mainly based on the fact that the number of cases ended 
with amicable settlement is around 28% of the total cases in the world. See: Shixi Huang 黄世席, The Investor-
State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in the EU's Investment Agreements: Together with the Discussion on Relevant 
Issues in a China-EU Bilateral Investment Treaty 欧盟投资协定中的投资者—国家争端解决机制——兼论中欧
双边投资协定中的相关问题, Global Law Review 环球法律评论, Vol. 5, 2015, p. 157. Furthermore, it was argued 
that third parties, other than formally designated “mediators” or “conciliators”, other entities might have been 
involved to help disputing parties in reaching settlement amicably, and therefore the real use of mediation could be 
broader than what has been reported. See: Jeswald W. Salacuse, Is There a Better Way? Alternative Methods of 
Treaty-Based, Investor-State Dispute Resolution, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 31, 2007, p. 174. 
193 Jeswald W. Salacuse, Is There a Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, Investor-State Dispute 
Resolution, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 31, 2007, p. 178. 
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years,194 which demonstrates “the existence of an appetite for mediation as a new 
process choice”.195 
2.3.2.3 Conciliation 
Conciliation resembles mediation in the sense that it is an amicable process in which 
disputing parties try to negotiate a settlement with assistance from a third party. 
Regarding the differences between mediation and conciliation, traditionally, 
conciliation implies a rule-based process with a high level of institutionalization, while 
mediation implies a facilitative process with little institutional management.196 It was 
summarized that “mediators work on process, communications, and substance of 
disputes”, while “conciliators focus almost exclusively on the substance of the 
dispute”.197  
In particular, investor-state conciliation in practice is represented by ICSID conciliation 
proceedings,198 which is a lengthy and arbitration-like framework.199 Among the scant 
eight ICSID conciliation cases that have been concluded, at least two of them lasted for 
 
194 This is evidenced by the clear reference to investor-state mediation in newly concluded IIAs and the efforts in 
promoting their real use by international institutions. In terms of the former, the integration of mediation into an 
investor-state dispute settlement system is more frequently reflected in IIAs. The incorporation is often quite simple, 
such as in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTTP), while more 
detailed mediation rules can be found in certain recently concluded IIAs, such as the EU-Singapore IPA (2018). 
Regarding the latter, international institutions have made various efforts to promote the use of mediation for ISDS, 
which are represented by adopting tailored mediation rules, issuing guides and establishing centres for using 
investor-state mediation, and providing professional training for potential mediators. For instance, the International 
Bar Association (IBA) adopted its IBA Rules for Investor-State Mediation in 2012, providing detailed and practical 
guidelines for the conduct of investor-state mediation. More recently, on 19 July 2016, the Energy Charter 
Conference endorsed a Guide on Investment Mediation, recognizing investor-state mediation as “a helpful, voluntary 
instrument to facilitate the amicable resolution of investment disputes”. ICSID also proposes a separate set of 
investor-state mediation rules in its ongoing rules amendment process. 
195 Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea K. Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation into Bilateral Investment 
Treaty Arbitration, Harvard Negotiation Law Review, Vol. 18, 2013, p. 84. 
196  Robert B. Davidson, Initiating an International Mediation, at: Practitioner's Handbook on International 
Arbitration and Mediation (Third Edition), JurisNet, LLC, 2012, p. 521. Esmé Shirlow, The Rising Interest in the 
Mediation of Investment Treaty Disputes, and Scope for Increasing Interaction between Mediation and Arbitration, 
Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 29.09.2016, available at: http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/09/29/the-rising-interest-
in-the-mediation-of-investment-treaty-disputes-and-scope-for-increasing-interaction-between-mediation-and-
arbitration/, last visited on 05.08.2020. For more discussions on the distinction between mediation and conciliation, 
see: Jeremy Lack, Appropriate Dispute Resolution (ADR): the Spectrum of Hybrid Techniques Available to the 
Parties, at: Arnold Ingen-Housz (ed.), ADR in Business: Practice and Issues Across Countries and Cultures-Volume 
II, Kluwer Law International, 2011, pp. 339-379. Jeremy Lack & François Bogacz, The Neurophysiology of ADR 
and Process Design: A New Approach to Conflict Prevention and Resolution?, Cardozo Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol. 4, 2012, pp. 33-80. 
197 Jeswald W. Salacuse, Is There a Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, Investor-State Dispute 
Resolution, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 31, 2007, p. 173. In ISDS, conciliators make reports proposing 
appropriate settlement based on disputing parties’ views, which may be accepted or rejected by parties, and, in this 
sense, conciliation was argued as “a kind of non-binding arbitration”. See: Ucheora O. Onwuamaegbu, The Role of 
ADR in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: The ICSID Experience, Transnational Dispute Management (TDM) in 
Mediation & ADR, Vol. 1, 2007. 
198 Such proceedings took place under the auspices of the World Bank by applying ICSID Conciliation Rules or 
ICSID Conciliation (Additional Facility) Rules. 
199 Frauke Nitschke, The IBA’s Investor–State Mediation Rules and the ICSID Dispute Settlement Framework, 
ICSID Review, Vol. 29, 2014, pp. 113-114. Shahla F. Ali & Odysseas G. Repousis, Investor-State Mediation and the 
Rise of Transparency in International Investment Law: Opportunity or Threat?, Denver Journal of International Law 
and Policy, Vol. 45, 2016-2017, p. 237. The ICSID conciliation procedures are similar to arbitration in many aspects, 
while admittedly having two key differences: first, conciliation procedures are more informal, less expensive and, 
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p. 342. 
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about three years and appear to have taken the form of hard-fought trials.200 As stated 
by Lord Wilberforce as the conciliator in an ICSID conciliation case, the role of a 
conciliator was conceived as “to examine the contentions raised by the parties, to clarify 
the issues, and to endeavour to evaluate their respective merits and the likelihood of 
their being accepted, or rejected, in Arbitration or Court proceedings”.201 
2.3.2.4 Adjudication 
International investment adjudication is realized through arbitration or litigation in 
international courts like the ICJ. In contrast to amicable DSMs, adjudication often 
comes with pre-established procedural rules. Decisions reached by qualified 
professionals through adjudication are rule-based and binding. 202  This DSM is an 
important tool to ensure an authoritative interpretation of the rules and norms of an 
IIA.203 At the same time, through observing the basic standards of accountability and 
due process, the procedural design of adjudication contributes to procedural justice in 
international dispute resolution.204 
State-state investment adjudication has been rarely used in reality, regardless of the 
form of arbitration or litigation.205 This may be contributed to by a reluctance by states 
to initiate such a contentious process against others. The possibility is likely to be 
further decreased by the availability and convenience of investor-state DSMs.  
In contrast, investor-state adjudication has been one of the hottest topics in academic 
discussion and has been widely used in practice in the past decades. In fact, the 
important innovation that most commentators attribute to modern IIAs is possibility for 
investors to bring direct claims against host states in international arbitration.206 Since 
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conciliation, Counsel for ICSID notes that “the Centre has recently begun to remind parties of the existence of the 
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Robles, Political & Quasi-Adjudicative Dispute Settlement Models in European Union Free Trade Agreements-Is 
the Quasi-adjudicative Model A Trend Or Is It Just Another Model?, World Trade Organization Economic Research 
and Statistics Division-Staff Working Paper ERSD-2006-09, 11.2006, available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd200609_e.pdf, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
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Agreements, Harvard University Press, 1998, p. 24. 
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Professors Posner and Yoo, California Law Review, Vol. 93, 2005, pp. 904, 914. 
205 In terms of adjudication through litigation, the number of cases being heard by the ICJ is limited. Based on the 
collection on Italaw, there have been five investment cases brought to the ICJ. For more information on these cases, 
see: italaw, Other Investment Cases, available at: https://www.italaw.com/other-investment-cases, last visited on 
03.08.2020. There are fewer existing cases of investment adjudication through state-state arbitration than investor-
state arbitration cases. For a further discussion on typical examples of such cases, see: Section 2.2.3.2, supra, and 
Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, State-State Dispute Settlement in Investment Treaties, 10.2014, available at: 
https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/best-practices-state-state-dispute-settlement-investment-
treaties.pdf, pp. 7-16, last visited on 30.07.2020. Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A 
Hybrid Theory of Interdependent Rights and Shared Interpretive Authority, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 
55, 2014, pp. 2-70.  
206 José E. Alvarez & Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The BIT Program: A Fifteen-Year Appraisal, Proceedings of the 
Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), Vol. 86, 1992, p. 538. 
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the late 1980s, the vast majority of IIAs coupled their substantive investment protection 
with recourse to investor-state arbitration. 207  This DSM commercializes the 
administrative disputes between investors and host states, granting certain international 
status to individual investors so that they could enjoy procedural and substantive rights 
in international law.208 It provides foreign investors who think that any administrative, 
regulatory or judicial measures violate investment protection standards agreed upon in 
the relevant IIA with an effective means to bring their claims before an international 
tribunal to ensure the enforcement of international law without the backing from the 
governments of their home states. Investor-state arbitration makes it possible for private 
investors to challenge host states and, in this sense, it furthers the rule of law.209 This 
is particularly important for foreign investment in states “with a high level of corruption, 
systems of political patronage and weak institutions”, since their local courts are taken 
as “an unreliable means to solve investment-related disputes”.210 In practice, investor-
state arbitration has been used very often as a mechanism to obtain redress for 
grievances in the area of international investment law. It has been developing since the 
1960s, and it is now contained in virtually all of the more than 3,000 IIAs in place.211 
At the same time, the caseload of investor-state arbitration is continually increasing.212 
It is fair to say that investor-state arbitration has progressively emerged as the one of 
the most common means for investment dispute settlement. 
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208 Xiantao Wen 温先涛, Discussion on "China Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (Draft)" 《中国投资保护协定
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Law International, 2016, pp. 1, 5. 
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Administration Working Paper, Vol. 2016/W/01, 2016, p. 3. Furthermore, it is often the case that international law 
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treatment which the state has accepted in the international investment treaty will in fact be provided. See: European 
Commission, Establishment of a Multilateral Investment Court for Investment Dispute Resolution, DG Trade – F2, 
01.08.2016. 
211 In particular, EU Member States are parties to some 1,400 of these IIAs. See: European Commission, A New 
System for Resolving Dispute between Foreign Investors and States in a Fair and Efficient Way, available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/september/tradoc_156042.pdf, last visited on 31.07.2020. 
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Part 2 Comparison between the Legal Culture in the Dispute Settlement of 
China and the EU 
Introduction to Part 2 
Understanding the connection between legal culture and practice in dispute settlement 
can enrich our capacity to understand the underlying reasons for a party’s particular 
choices. In other words, legal culture reveals the important values and principles that 
the practice in dispute settlement intends to preserve and develop. China and the EU 
each enjoy a distinctive legal culture, which has influenced various aspects of society 
and the legal system in each party, including their perspectives on dispute settlement. 
Part 2 of this thesis conducts a comparison of their approaches to dispute settlement 
from a legal cultural perspective. 
This part includes three chapters, Chapters 3-5. Chapter 3 analyses the legal cultural 
characteristics of dispute settlement in China from two perspectives: dispute settlement 
under traditional Chinese philosophies and contemporary Chinese ideology and the 
DSMs in China’s domestic legal system. Thereafter, it provides an interpretation of the 
procedural features of these DSMs from a legal cultural perspective, in order to examine 
whether and, if so, how China’s legal cultural characteristics of dispute settlement are 
reflected in its current domestic practice. Chapter 4 puts the attention on the EU and 
identifies the characteristics of legal culture in dispute settlement and internal DSMs 
within the EU. Compared to China, the situation in the EU is more complex, because 
of its special nature as a Union comprised of 27 Member States. As a result, in order to 
draw a conclusion on the EU’s legal culture in dispute settlement, both the Union’s 
measures on regulating DSMs and its Member States’ practices deserve attention and 
thus are included in the scope of analysis. Like the analysis conducted for China, a legal 
cultural interpretation of the DSMs in the EU Member States and the Union’s relevant 
regulating measures is provided thereafter. Chapter 5 makes a comparison of the 
research results reached in Chapters 3 and 4, in order to examine the similarities and 
differences between the legal culture of China and that of the EU in dispute settlement 
and, how their internal dispute settlement systems have been affected by legal culture.  
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Chapter 3 Legal Cultural Characteristics of Dispute Settlement in China 
In Chinese history, traditional Chinese philosophies exerted great influence on Chinese 
society. In relation to dispute settlement, it can be said that it was those traditional 
philosophies, instead of the legal systems, that regulated the society. After thousands 
of years of turbulent developments, contemporary Chinese ideology replaced the role 
of traditional philosophies and continued to affect dispute settlement in Chinese society. 
Different from the previous situation, with the establishment of a new, but gradually 
maturing, legal system in China, the DSMs play an indispensable role in resolving 
conflicts in China. 
This chapter aims at providing an overview of China’s legal cultural characteristics of 
dispute settlement under traditional Chinese philosophies, contemporary Chinese 
ideology and China’s current legal system, as well as the relationship between the two. 
In order to realize this, it first presents a picture of traditional Chinese philosophies, 
especially including influential Confucianism, to assess the legal traditions in dispute 
resolution in China under the influence of those philosophies. The focus then turns to 
contemporary Chinese ideology, introducing its contents and comparing it with 
traditional Chinese philosophies. To resolve disputes, including foreign investment 
disputes, the DSMs in China’s current legal system play an indispensable role, which 
is addressed in detail in Section 3.2. After laying out the key features of dispute 
settlement in China, Section 3.3 provides an interpretation of China’s domestic dispute 
settlement system from the perspective of Chinese legal culture, with a view to 
examining the similarities and differences between traditional Chinese philosophies, 
contemporary Chinese ideology and the mechanisms in China’s current legal system 
for dispute settlment. 
 
3.1 Dispute Settlement in Chinese Legal Culture 
Traditional Chinese philosophies have played a significant role in regulating the 
behaviour of individuals as well as governing the whole state in Chinese history, which 
also arguably has spin off effects on contemporary society in China. This section starts 
with an introduction to those traditional Chinese philosophies. Due to the undebated 
dominant position of Confucianism, after briefly addressing the widely recognized 
influential traditional Chinese philosophies, the analysis focuses on the core values and 
teachings of Confucianism and especially its guidelines on dispute settlement. 
Nowadays, contemporary Chinese ideologies have replaced the role of traditional 
philosophies, and therefore Section 3.1.2 analyses the features of contemporary 
Chinese ideologies, also with a focus on the issue of dispute settlement, examining what 
it has inherited from and/or how it deviates from traditional philosophies. 
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3.1.1 Traditional Chinese Philosophies 
In ancient China, traditional philosophies, in particular Confucianism, exerted great 
influence on the Chinese society. The core values, basic principles and mottos regulated 
diverse aspects of people’s lives, including the issue of dispute settlement. In general, 
there are three widely recognized influential traditional Chinese philosophies: 
Confucianism, Legalism and Taoism. Among these three, Confucianism has had the 
most far-reaching effect and thus its core values and principles, as well as its approach 
to dispute settlement, will be given particular attention here. 
3.1.1.1 Confucianism and Other Influential Traditional Chinese Philosophies  
Traditional Chinese philosophies exerted great influence on society in Chinese history. 
Among these philosophies, Confucianism (Rújiā, 儒家), Taoism (Dàojiā, 道家) and 
Legalism (Fǎjiā, 法家 ) particularly played indispensable roles. 213  In fact, their 
function in Chinese society went beyond the mere philosophical. 
There is no doubt that Confucianism has played a significant role in the development 
of basic values in Chinese society.214 In view of the general influence over time, this 
traditional Chinese philosophy is arguably the one that has enjoyed a predominant 
position throughout Chinese history. Confucianism provides philosophical teachings 
regulating individuals’ behaviour as well as the general social order based on the ethics 
and values that it promotes. There were even periods of time that, instead of law, 
Confucian teachings regulated individuals and governed the state.215 A typical feature 
of Confucianism is that maintaining harmony in the communities is prioritized over 
other goals. Confucian teachings can be briefly described as “regulations” based on 
virtue, benevolence, social rightness, and morality, with harmony at the centre.216 The 
core values and principles of Confucianism are discussed in more detail in Section 
3.1.1.2. 
Two other philosophies, Taoism and Legalism, have also contributed to the 
construction of the social order in Chinese history. Similar to Confucianism, Taoism 
advocates harmony as the ultimate goal, but it focuses more on a harmonious 
relationship between humans and nature. Taoism strongly opposes the use of force, in 
particular, and this position is argued as being at the root of mediation in China.217 
Legalism, on the other hand, emphasizes the role of Fǎ in governing the society, which 
 
213 It is admitted that, as evidenced by Theodore de Bary, traditional Chinese philosophies are not static sets of 
notions, but they enjoy dynamic processes that vary greatly over time. See: William Theodore de Bary, The Trouble 
with Confucianism, Harvard University Press, 1996, pp. 131-184. Considering the purpose of the present section 
being to provide a general picture of Confucianism, Taoism and Legalism, the discussion here is limited to the 
common grounds and the main characteristics during their development.  
214 Tony Fang, Negotiation: the Chinese Style, Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, Vol. 21, 2006, p. 53. 
215 Sébastien Billioud, Confucianism, "Cultural Tradition" and Official Discourses in China at the Start of the New 
Century, 2007, available at: http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/2033, pp. 1-3, last visited on 
30.07.2020. 
216 Albert H.Y. Chen, Toward a Legal Enlightenment: Discussions in Contemporary China on the Rule of Law, 
Pacific Basin Law Journal, Vol. 17, 1999, p. 130. 
217  Low Sui Pheng, The Influence of Chinese Philosophies on Mediation and Conciliation in the Far East, 
Arbitration, Vol. 61, 1996, pp. 11-20. 
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is similar to law but limited to criminal law and/or administrative law.218 In addition, 
Fǎ has been used as an instrument for dominance, which contrasts with the modern 
concept of law as a tool to protect individuals’ rights.219 
Compared to Taoism and Legalism, Confucianism takes a middle-ground position in 
various aspects. For example, Confucianism does not allow as much freedom as Taoism 
or provide as harsh punishments as Legalism does; at the same time, it proposes an 
active attitude, which is in contrast to the passive and radical approaches advocated by 
Taoism and Legalism respectively. Despite these differences, it is noticeable that these 
three traditional Chinese philosophies have some common views on promoted values 
and teachings. For instance, Taoism is in line with Confucianism with regard to the 
pursuit of harmony; Legalism and Confucianism share a proactive attitude towards 
national governance, although the tools used are different; Confucianism emphasizes 
humanism and courtesy for individuals, as well as hierarchy and harmony within the 
community, which are also recognized, to some extent, by the other two philosophies.  
3.1.1.2 Confucian Values and Teachings 
Rén (benevolence, 仁) and Lǐ (ritualism, 礼) are commonly taken as representatives 
of the values advocated by Confucianism.220 Rén requires everyone to be kind to others 
and to create conciliatory relationships, upon which the whole society should be 
constructed.221 Lǐ stipulates the moral rules that function as regulations in the society, 
which oblige individuals to fulfil their social responsibilities and to respect the 
hierarchies in families, clans and the society.222 Although Lǐ does not have formal legal 
effects, it was taken as being effective as law by the public. In other words, it played a 
role similar to civil law in western legal systems, but it mostly stipulated obligations of 
individuals and not rights. 
In addition to Lǐ, Confucianism also recognizes the regulatory role played by Fǎ as 
another element used to ensure social order. Different from Lǐ, Fǎ has a binding effect 
and punitive nature. Fǎ is limited to punishing criminal acts instead of protecting civil 
rights.223 Scholars even described Fǎ as an evil in ancient China.224 Compared to Lǐ, 
 
218 H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law (Fifth Edition), Oxford University 
Press, 2014, p. 326. 
219 Haiwen Zhou, Confucianism and the Legalism: A Model of the National Strategy of Governance in Ancient 
China, Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA) Paper, Vol. 81944, 2017, pp. 7-9. 
220 Confucianism is characterized by the promotion of Five Constants (wǔ cháng, 五常), namely, Rén (benevolence, 
仁), Yì (loyalty, 义), Lǐ (ritualism, 礼), Zhì (wisdom, 智), and Xìn (sincerity, 信). See: Anne Isabel Kraus, 
Chinese-European Dispute Resolution in China: Towards Culturally Matching Procedures, Centrum für angewandte 
Politikforschung (C·A·P), 09.2007, available at: https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-
library/publications/publication.html/39874, last visited on 03.08.2020. Junwu Pan, Chinese Philosophy and 
International Law, Asian Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, 2011, pp. 233-234. Low Sui Pheng, The Influence of 
Chinese Philosophies on Mediation and Conciliation in the Far East, Arbitration, Vol. 61, 1996, p. 2. Mark 
Juergensmeyer, Religion in Global Civil Society, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 70.  
221  Low Sui Pheng, The Influence of Chinese Philosophies on Mediation and Conciliation in the Far East, 
Arbitration, Vol. 61, 1996, p. 3. 
222 Edwin H. W. Chan, Amicable Dispute Resolution in the People's Republic of China and Its Implications for 
Foreign-related Construction Disputes, Construction Management and Economics, Vol. 15, 1997, p. 540. 
223 Junwu Pan, Chinese Philosophy and International Law, Asian Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, 2011, p. 234. 
224 Xingzhong Yu, Legal Pragmatism in the People's Republic of China, Cornell Law Faculty Publications, Vol. 993, 
1989, p. 32. 
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Fǎ is relatively unimportant and it is meant to be used only for base persons but not for 
gentlemen (Fǎ bèi xiǎo rén, bù fáng jūn zǐ, “法备小人, 不防君子”).225 Thus, the role 
of Fǎ was looked down upon and even unnecessary. Extensive pieces of legislation 
were considered unnecessary because the legislation was rarely used.226 In brief, Lǐ is 
“persuasive, preventive and enforced by social sanction”, while Fǎ is “compulsive, 
punitive and enforced by legal sanction”.227 It can be said that Lǐ and Fǎ constitute the 
two primary components of historic Chinese legal culture.228 Both of them contributed 
to regulating individuals’ behaviour and maintaining social order, and the preference 
was obvious: Lǐ was much more preferable to Fǎ in Confucianism.229 It is even argued 
that “[l]aw was never perceived as a means of preserving rights, freedom, and justice, 
since these were completely alien concepts in ancient China”.230 Bodde compares Lǐ 
and Fǎ to natural law and positive law in the Western legal history.231 However, it 
would go too far to consider Lǐ and Fǎ to be true equivalents to natural law and positive 
law.232  
In Confucianism, the permanent and ultimate goal of pursuing harmony supersedes all 
other values.233 The concept of harmony under the Confucian tradition was argued to 
be “the promotion of tolerance and conciliation among people with different thoughts 
and backgrounds, thereby creating a peacefully interpersonal relationship”.234 The two 
main regulatory tools, Lǐ and Fǎ, serve the purpose of a harmonious relationship among 
individuals and constructs an overall harmonious society. Confucianism mainly relied 
on education to realize this goal and adopted the concept of Fair Education for All (Yǒu 
jiào wú lèi, “有教无类”).235 Bearing in mind the ultimate goal of social harmony, 
 
225 Junwu Pan, Chinese Philosophy and International Law, Asian Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, 2011, p. 234. 
For more discussion on the meaning of “base persons” and “gentlemen” in Confucianism, see: Paul R. Goldin, 
Confucianism, Routledge, 2014. Roger T. Ames & Henry Rosemont Jr. (Translators), The Analects of Confucius: A 
Philosophical Translation, Random House Publishing Group, 2010. 
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227 Junwu Pan, Chinese Philosophy and International Law, Asian Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, 2011, p. 234. 
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behave properly. Furthermore, Lǐ is more beneficial to the construction of social harmony. 
230 Zhiping Liang, Explicating “Law”: A Comparative Perspective of Chinese and Western Legal Culture, Journal 
of Chinese Law, Vol. 3, 1989, p. 89. 
231 Derk Bodde, Evidence for "Laws of Nature" in Chinese Thought, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, Vol. 20, 
1957, pp. 709-727. 
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234 Mo Zhang, The Socialist Legal System with Chinese Characteristics: China's Discourse for the Rule of Law and 
a Bitter Experience, Temple International & Comparative Law Journal, Vol. 24, 2010, p. 45. 
235 The main underlying reason for such a preference for education is that education has the function of prevention, 
while Fǎ can only deter wrongdoers from violating criminal codes (instead of promoting the good ones) and improve 
what has already happened. See: Zhiping L., The Past, the Present and the Future of Chinese Law: A Critical 
Retrospect of a Kind of Culture, Study of Comparative Law, Vol. 17, 1987, pp. 19-20. 
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preventing undesired behaviour and conflicts had priority rather than dealing with 
undesired behaviour afterwards.  
In brief, under Confucianism, the community has priority over individuals, social 
responsibility is more important than freedom, and morality plays the role of regulating 
the society. Most importantly, harmony is prioritized and takes the central position.  
3.1.1.3 Confucian Guidelines on Dispute Settlement 
Harmony of the community is promoted by Confucianism as the ultimate goal of a 
society and has priority over other things and which requires every effort from each 
member of society.236 While pursuing the overall goal of harmony, the main purpose 
of interaction is to establish conflict-free interpersonal relationships. As a result, 
conflicts are unpleasant disturbances, which detract from the ultimate goal and should 
be avoided.237 Furthermore, there is always a deep concern about being regarded as a 
“trouble-maker”. Being involved in disputes is considered to result in “losing face” 
(miànzi, “面子”) and negatively affecting one’s self-esteem, while maintaining respect 
is considered essential.238 Therefore, for this reason more efforts are put into avoiding 
disputes at an earlier stage rather than dispute settlement after the fact.  
The emphasis on harmony leads to an emphasis on maintaining amicable or at least 
conflict-free interpersonal and social relationships. 239  This requires individuals to 
focus on personal development and to act as responsible contributors to the shared goal 
of a moral society.240 In other words, every member of the society should be well-
behaved and maintain perfectly functional relationships to avoid the occurrence of any 
dispute. The goal of maintaining harmonious relationships also applies to businesses, 
for example when entering into a contract. 241  The ultimate goal of business 
negotiations is to build a reliable long-term relationship, rather than merely finalizing 
a once-off deal. A carefully built relationship is considered to be the way to ensure the 
implementation of contracts, as opposed to relying on the legal system, even when 
disputes arise.  
When disputes are unavoidable, DSMs, where only disputing parties are involved, are 
preferred, and a settlement is expected to be reached in the form of mutual 
concessions.242 As a result, skipping negotiations and directly seeking help from a third 
236 Guiguo Wang, Chinese Mechanisms for Resolving Investor-State Disputes, Jindal Journal of International Affairs, 
Vol. 1, 2011, p. 222. 
237 Guo-Ming Chen & Jensen Chung, The Impact of Confucianism on Organizational Communication, The Annual 
Meeting of the Speech Communication Association (79th), Miami, 18-21.11.1993. 
238 Caifen Jiang 姜彩芬, The Origin and Social Function of Mianzi Culture 面子文化产生根源及社会功能, 
Guangxi Social Science 广西社会科学, Vol. 3, 2009, p. 117. See also: Zhongying Cheng 成中英, The Concept of 
"Face" and Its Confucian Origin 脸面观念及其儒学根源, Chinese Social Psychological Review 中国社会心理
学评论, Vol. 2, 2006, p. 43. 
239  Low Sui Pheng, The Influence of Chinese Philosophies on Mediation and Conciliation in the Far East, 
Arbitration, Vol. 61, 1996, p. 3. 
240 Id. 
241 Jiachu K. & Shifi Z. & Li L., International Business Negotiations in the People’s Republic of China, at: James 
R. Silkenat & Jeffrey M. Aresty (eds.), The ABA Guide to International Business Negotiations-A Comparison of 
Cross-Cultural Issues and Successful Approaches (3rd Edition), ABA Publishing, 2000, p. 200.
242 Under Confucianism, it is considered that “disputes should be dissolved rather than resolved”. See: Xingzhong 
Yu, Legal Pragmatism in the People's Republic of China, Cornell Law Faculty Publications, Vol. 993, 1989, p. 29.
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party would probably be understood as a lack of goodwill and courtesy. In addition, 
during the process of reaching an amicable settlement, there is a greater appreciation 
for a harmonious relationship rather than the parties’ rights and interests under 
contractual provisions. As was summarized, “balancing and harmonization were 
considered more important than determining who was right and who was wrong”.243 
Therefore, it is necessary to avoid adversarial posturing to ensure continued goodwill 
between parties. In accordance with this line of thinking, people are encouraged to 
compromise, instead of seeking justice.  
If an intermediary for dispute resolution is unavoidable, win-win instead of win-lose 
oriented DSMs are recommended, since the former are more beneficial for repairing 
relationships. 244  This is usually achieved through informal mechanisms, such as 
mediation, which ensure an amicable environment to restore the relationship. Using a 
formal mechanism to resolve disputes, such as litigation, means that there has been a 
relationship failure. As mentioned above, in ancient China, there was a general 
resentment towards litigation and courts, because they were connected to imposing 
severe punishment rather than seeking justice.245 Furthermore, a lawsuit was regarded 
as negative, since it prioritizes individuals’ interests over the overall benefits to society. 
More importantly, a litigious society leads to an unpleasant, uncomfortable and even 
unacceptable situation, because it goes against the general goal of harmony. Therefore, 
resolving disputes through a lawsuit is considered to be a lose-lose scenario, and any 
form of litigious activity is “an indication of selfishness” and “a threat to universal 
cosmic harmony”.246 In a nutshell, bringing a dispute to a formal DSM, or even just 
threatening legal action, is not considered a good choice; instead, taking extra-legal 
efforts to address problems has suited the Chinese environment better. 
3.1.2 Contemporary Chinese Ideology 
In contemporary Chinese ideology, Confucian morality has been replaced by socialist 
morality. Considering the domination of traditional philosophies in China over time, 
how traditional moralities have been inherited or changed by socialist morality 
undoubtedly deserves attention, especially with regard to the core values and its 
influence on dispute settlement. 
3.1.2.1 Inheriting the Pursuance of Harmony 
Mainly as a result of the implementation of the “Reform and Opening up” policy 
initiated in 1979, China’s value system has been exposed to the influence of other 
states. 247  The influence of traditional Chinese philosophies in particular has been 
affected by Western values. At the same time, the development of the political and 
 
243 Werner Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context: The Legal Systems of Asia and Africa (2nd Edition), 
Cambridege University Press, 2009, p. 557. 
244 Tony Fang, Negotiation: the Chinese Style, Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, Vol. 21, 2006, p. 55. 
245 Junwu Pan, Chinese Philosophy and International Law, Asian Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, 2011, p. 237. 
246 Werner Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context: The Legal Systems of Asia and Africa (2nd Edition), 
Cambridege University Press, 2009, p. 547. 
247 The “Reform and Opening up” Policy refers to the programme of economic reforms termed “Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics”, which was introduced in December 1978 by reformists within the Communist Party of 
China, led by Xiaoping Deng. 
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economic environment has caused a further change to Chinese ideologies. Although 
traditional Chinese philosophies have influenced society for thousands of years, as was 
also the case in some other states,248 China may embrace other values from foreign 
societies rather than purely sticking to its own ones. In order to examine this, two 
questions are assessed in particular: (i) to what extent have socialist core values been 
affected by those in traditional Chinese philosophies and, in particular, does the goal of 
harmony continue to enjoy a predominant position in contemporary Chinese ideology; 
and (ii) in terms of dispute settlement, has the traditional preference for non-adjudicated 
solutions been inherited. 
In modern Chinese society, socialist morality has replaced Confucian morality, and has 
resulted in a contemporary Chinese ideology. After years of turbulent developments, 
and particularly under the influence from the West, socialist morality arguably differs 
greatly from Confucian morality. However, it is noticeable that respecting traditional 
values is taken as part of the basis of designing the new socialist values in modern 
Chinese ideology and, in particular, the ultimate goal of this socialist construction is to 
create a “harmonious socialist society”, which has clearly been inherited from the 
Confucian ideal of the pursuit of harmony.249 The idea of a harmonious society in 
essence is “the continuity of the national heritage bestowed by the Confucian tradition 
of promoting harmony”.250 In particular, in 2004, the Chinese Communist Party, the 
founding and ruling political party of China, launched a campaign for the creation of a 
harmonious society 251  and, two years later, it passed a resolution making the 
construction of a harmonious socialist society in China a goal that should be achieved 
by 2020.252 Furthermore, social harmony has become a strong ideological force that is 
being integrated into the development of the socialist rule of law and the Chinese legal 
system as a guiding principle.253 In turn, it is imperative that “the rule of law be geared 
toward creating and enhancing social harmony”.254 As a result, similar to the situation 
 
248 Taking Singapore as an example, it shares a similar legal cultural background with China, but it has accepted the 
Western legal ideologies to a large extent, especially with regard to dispute settlement. For a further discussion on 
this, see: P. Brooker & A. Lavers, Perceptions of the Role of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Settlement of 
Construction Disputes: Lessons from the UK and US Experience, at: P. In Fenn (ed.), Proceedings of CIB TG15 
Meeting: Construction Conflict: Management and Resolution, E. & F. N. Spon, 1994, pp. 49-69. 
249 The Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 中国共产党
第十六届中央委员会第六次全体会议, Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on 
Several Major Issues of Building a Harmonious Socialist Society 中共中央关于构建社会主义和谐社会若干重
大问题的决定, 11.10.2006. 
250 Mo Zhang, The Socialist Legal System with Chinese Characteristics: China's Discourse for the Rule of Law and 
a Bitter Experience, Temple International & Comparative Law Journal, Vol. 24, 2010, p. 44. 
251  Joseph Fewsmith, Promoting the Scientific Development Concept The China Leadership Monitor, 2004, 
available at: http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/clm11_jf.pdf, last visited on 01.08.2020. 
252 Xin Hua News Agency, China Publishes Resolution on Building Harmonious Society, Press Release, 18.10.2006, 
available at https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2006/10/china-publishes-resolution-on-building-harmonious-society-
xinhua/, last visited on 22.07.2018. 
253 Lin Li 李林, The Role of People's Congress System in the Building of the Harmonious Society 人民代表大会
制度在建设和谐社会中的作用, at: Lin Li (ed.) 李林（编）, Ruling Country According to Law and the Building 
of Harmonious Society 依法治国与和谐社会建设, China Legal Publishing House 中国法制出版社, 2007, pp. 
157-159. Mo Zhang, The Socialist Legal System with Chinese Characteristics: China's Discourse for the Rule of 
Law and a Bitter Experience, Temple International & Comparative Law Journal, Vol. 24, 2010, pp. 44-46. 
254 Mo Zhang, The Socialist Legal System with Chinese Characteristics: China's Discourse for the Rule of Law and 
a Bitter Experience, Temple International & Comparative Law Journal, Vol. 24, 2010, pp. 45-46. 
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under traditional Chinese philosophies, individuals are expected to self-police and 
forego their interests for a harmonious environment for the society. In other words, the 
interest of the community continues to enjoy priority. Based on this, in terms of dispute 
settlement, the avoidance of adversarial posturing still exists, including the use of 
litigation, although it is to a lesser extent that in former times. It is noticeable that, due 
to the establishment of the modern Chinese legal system and an enhanced legal 
consciousness of individuals, reference to adjudicative DSMs such as arbitration and 
litigation for dispute resolution is recognized more frequently and it is becoming more 
common.255 
In summary it can be argued that, although the values originate in ancient times and are 
subject to various counterweights, the core values of traditional Chinese philosophies 
have been arguably inherited by contemporary Chinese ideology.256 This is especially 
reflected in the goal of constructing a harmonious socialist society. Against this 
background, non-adjudicated resolutions to disputes through amicable mechanisms 
continue to be the preferred choice. 
3.1.2.2 Elevating the Role of Law 
As noted above, legal tradition remains “a vibrant and official part” of modern Chinese 
legal culture. At the same time, it is noted that the importation of Western legal elements 
constitutes another significant but very different component of contemporary Chinese 
ideologies.257 In general, Chinese legal culture today can be described as “a mix of 
many different and often contradictory modern and ancient strands that exist side-by-
side”,258 and each of them exists “to different degrees in different legal fields and 
institutions”.259 
Beginning with Yan Fu’s translation of “The Meaning of Law” and continuing with 
Sun Yat-sen’s “five-powers constitution”, modern Western legal thought and legal 
systems have been introduced in China.260 As a result, a clear enhancement of the 
status of law under modern Chinese ideologies can be identified, which deviates from 
traditional Chinese philosophies. In addition, improving China’s domestic legal system 
and strengthening the public’s legal consciousness have been considered to be an 
indispensable part of the socialist construction. President Xi Jinping explained the 
interaction between law and virtue as “law governs the state, while virtue moistens 
 
255 More discussion on the DSMs in China’s legal system is provided in Section 3.2, infra. 
256 James A. R. Nafziger & Ruan Jiafang, Chinese Methods of Resolving International Trade, Investment and 
Maritime Disputes, Willamette Law Review, Vol. 23, 1987, p. 624. 
257 Colin B. Picker, China, Global Governance & Legal Culture: The Example of China & the WTO, at: China and 
Global Economic Governance: Ideas and Concepts, The University of Tokyo-Institute of Social Science (ISS) 
Research Series No.45, 2011, p. 82. 
258  These strands include Confucianism, Legalism, Marxism, Rationalism, and significant legal cultural 
characteristics imported from the Western world. See: Lisa C. Toohey, Rule of Law Discourse and the Accession of 
Transitional Economies to the World Trade Organization, to obtain the PhD Degree at The University of Queensland, 
2008, p. 165. 
259 Colin B. Picker, China, Global Governance & Legal Culture: The Example of China & the WTO, at: China and 
Global Economic Governance: Ideas and Concepts, The University of Tokyo-Institute of Social Science (ISS) 
Research Series No.45, 2011, pp. 75-76. 
260 The “five-powers constitution” was a government organization envisioned by Sun Yat-sen, composing five major 
branches: executive, legislative, judiciary, examination, and censoring (or control). See: James E. Sheridan, China 
in Disintegration: The Republican Era In Chinese History 1912-1949, The Free Press, 1975, pp. 145, 208. 
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people’s heart” and “law is the hard copy of virtue, while virtue is the law inside 
people’s heart” (“法安天下，德润人心”, “法律是成文的道德，道德是内心的法律”). 
Furthermore, the overall goal of constructing a socialist legal system with Chinese 
characteristics and the adherence to the combination of law and virtue to govern the 
state (依法治国和以德治国相结合) are emphasized.261 In order to realize this, it is 
important to insist on the Socialist Core Value System (社会主义核心价值体系), in 
which the Socialist Concept of Honor and Disgrace (社会主义荣辱观 ) is an 
indispensable part.262 
Socialist legality incorporates the rule of law, emphasizing the creation of social 
harmony and the legality of adjudication at the same time.263 Thus, the previous lack 
of a rule of law in China has been changed by implementing the socialist rule of law, 
which is also considered one of the basic principles of building a harmonious socialist 
society.264 Echoing former Chinese President Hu Jintao’s remarks, many in China 
advocate for the idea that a harmonious society is a rule of law society, believing that 
law is the aggregate of rules of conduct necessary for social harmony.265 However, it 
deserves attention that the “socialist rule of law” is different from the notion of the “rule 
of law” that is generally recognized in Western legal systems.266 Evidence for this can 
be found in the striking contrast between the definition provided in the 2004 UN 
Secretary-General’s report on the rule of law and transnational justice267 and the one 
proposed by the Chinese delegate in the General Assembly Sixth Committee’s debate 
in 2007.268 It was argued that the Chinese interpretation of the rule of law omits the 
essence of the rule of law, such as accountability, and, furthermore, the Chinese 
 
261 Jinping Xi 习近平, Sticking to the Combination of the Rule of Law and the Rule of Virtue 坚持依法治国和以
德治国相结合, www.xinhuanet.com 新华网, 10.12.2016, available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2016-
12/10/c_1120093133.htm, last visited on 07.08.2020. 
262 Jinping Xi 习近平, Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and 
Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era 决胜全面建成小康社会 夺
取 新 时 代 中 国 特 色 社 会 主 义 伟 大 胜 利 , www.xinhuanet.com 新 华 网 , 27.10.2017, available at: 
http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/19cpcnc/2017-10/27/c_1121867529.htm, last visited on 07.08.2020. 
263 Fu Hualing & Richard Cullen, From Mediatory to Adjudicatory Justice: The Limits of Civil Justice Reform in 
China, at: Margaret Y. K. Woo & Mary E. Gallagher (eds.), Chinese Justice: Civil Dispute Resolution in 
Contemporary China, Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 51-52. 
264 The Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 中国共产党
第十六届中央委员会第六次全体会议, Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on 
Several Major Issues of Building a Harmonious Socialist Society 中共中央关于构建社会主义和谐社会若干重
大问题的决定, 11.10.2006. 
265 Liming Wang 王利明, A Harmonious Society Should be a Rule of Law Society 和谐社会应当是法治社会, 
Legal Science 法学, Vol. 5, 2005, p. 211. 
266 Liming Wang 王利明, Discussion on Procedural Justic from the Perspective of Socrates 从苏格拉底之死谈
程序正义, aisixiang.com 爱思想, 08.07.2014, available at: http://www.aisixiang.com/data/76135.html, last visited 
on 07.08.2020. 
267 The 2004 UN Secretary-General’s report about the rule of law and transnational justice provides a contemporary 
definition of the rule of law: “[The rule of law] refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions 
and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, 
equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms 
and standards.” See: Report of the Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Societies, UN Doc. S/2004/616, para. 6. 
268 The definition of the rule of law proposed by the Chinese delegate in the General Assembly Sixth Committee’s 
debate in 2007 goes as follows: “rule of law [is] a universal goal for all nations and the effective instrument for 
establishing and maintaining social order, promoting social justice and achieving social progress.” See: UN Doc. 
A/C.6/62/SR.14 (2007), para. 35. 
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definition claims a top-down definition of law, which is “the very signature of the rule 
by law”. 269  In other words, the socialist rule of law has a clear pragmatic 
characteristic,270 which views law from an instrumentalist perspective: what the law 
can do for China’s development and modernization.271 Law does not have independent 
values, instead, the emphasis on law serves the construction of a harmonious socialist 
society.272 
In short, law has been considered by China to be an indispensable part of the socialist 
construction and much effort has been made to improve the state’s legal system and to 
strengthen the public’s legal consciousness. However, the enhancement of the status of 
law is secondary to the theme of socialist harmony and the socialist rule of law is 
viewed from an instrumentalist perspective. 
 
3.2 Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in China’s Domestic Legal System 
Various DSMs have been established to resolve various types of disputes in China’s 
domestic legal system. These DSMs provide important channels as local remedies for 
the resolution of disputes arising from foreign investment in China. This section 
provides an overview of the DSMs in China’s legal system that are available for foreign 
investment disputes. First, as in many other states in the world, mediation, arbitration 
and litigation are made avaiable. At the same time, it is noticeable that amicable 
settlement through negotiation is explicitly required as a step in dispute settlement in 
many Chinese legal texts. With regard to the disputes between investors and 
administrative organs on certain administrative decisions, administrative 
reconsideration is available as an additional option or it is required to be used first in 
certain situations. Furthermore, a special DSM called complaints coordination for 
foreign investment has been created for foreign investors to settle their disputes in 
China. Thus, in total, there are six main DSMs that can be used to resolve foreign 
investment disputes: negotiation, mediation, arbitration, complaints coordination for 
foreign investment, administrative review, and litigation. Their key procedural features 
are introduced in the following. 
 
269  Jean Yves Heurtebise, Understanding Non-Trade Concerns Through Comparative Chinese and European 
Philosophy of Law, at: China's Influence on Non-Trade Concerns in International Economic Law, Routledge, 2016, 
pp. 290-291. 
270 The Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Major Issues Pertaining to Comprehensively Promoting the 
Rule of Law stresses that building a state under the rule of law should be based on China’s actual conditions. See: 
The Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 中国共产党第十八届
中央委员会第三次全体会议, Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major 
Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform 中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定, 
12.11.2013. 
271 Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law: Context and Transformations, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008, p. 38. Pitman B. 
Potter, The Chinese Legal System-Globalization and Local Legal Culture, Routledge, 2001, pp. 2, 10.  
272 The State Council-The People's Republic of China, Communique of the Sixth Plenum of the 16th CPC Central 
Committee, 11.10.2006, available at: http://www.gov.cn/english/2006-10/11/content_410436.htm, last visited on 
22.05.2020. See also: Mo Zhang, The Socialist Legal System with Chinese Characteristics: China's Discourse for 
the Rule of Law and a Bitter Experience, Temple International & Comparative Law Journal, Vol. 24, 2010, p. 42. 
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Before going into a detailed analysis, it is important to note that, with regard to 
procedural affairs, a divergence between the approach to domestic and foreign-related 
cases has been adopted in China’s legal system.273 Under the same DSM, domestic and 
foreign-related cases are sometimes subject to different procedural rules. If a case is 
qualified as a foreign-related case, special regulations in various procedural laws can 
apply. 
3.2.1 Negotiation 
Negotiation refers to an informal process without defined procedures or rules, where 
disputing parties discuss the disputes in order to reach a mutually acceptable solution 
without any intervention from a third party.274 Negotiation is normally not regulated in 
the law, but this is not the case in China’s legal system. The use of negotiation is 
mentioned specifically in Chinese legal texts in two ways. First, negotiation is required 
as a prerequisite before resorting to other DSMs.275 Second, Chinese procedural laws 
often explicitly stress the availability of negotiation during the process of formal 
DSMs.276 The clear provisions in the legal texts recommending and even requiring 
negotiation indicate to the negotiation-friendly attitude of China’s legal system. Only a 
limited number of regulations are provided referring to negotiation procedures, 277 
which was argued as leaving considerable room for Chinese legal tradition to exert its 
influence on the negotiation process.278  
 
273 According to Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the 
People’s Republic of China (2015), a foreign-related case is defined as a case where at least one of the following 
situations is satisfied: (1) either party or both parties are foreigners, stateless persons, foreign enterprises or 
organizations; (2) the habitual residence of either party or both parties is located outside the territory of China; (3) 
the subject matter is outside the territory China; (4) the legal fact that leads to the establishment, change or 
termination of civil relationship occurs outside the territory of China; (5) any other circumstances under which a 
case may be determined as a foreign-related civil case. See: Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of 
China, Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s 
Republic of China 最高人民法院关于适用《中华人民共和国民事诉讼法》的解释 (enforced on 04.02.2015), 
Art. 522. This unofficial translation is available at: http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=242703&lib=law, last 
visited on 22.05.2020. Given that there are some inaccuracies in this translation, the author has made corrections 
wherever necessary. See also: Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China, Interpretations of the 
Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning Application of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
Choice of Law for Foreign-Related Civil Relationships (I) 最高人民法院关于适用《中华人民共和国涉外民事
关系法律适用法》若干问题的解释(一) (enforced on 07.01.2013), Art. 1. 
274 Robert Mnookin, Alternative Dispute Resolution, Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics 
and Business Discussion Paper Series, Vol. 232, 1998, p. 5. 
275 For instance, the General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China (2009) provides that, if 
there is any unclear provision in a contract, contracting parties are required to negotiate informally before bringing 
a case before a people’s court. See: General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China 中华人
民共和国民法通则 (enforced on 01.01.1987, as amended on 27.08.2009), Art. 88. 
276 For example, according to Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (2012), in litigation, parties 
can reach a settlement through negotiation at any time unless the enforcement is completed. See: Civil Procedure 
Law of the People’s Republic of China 中国人民共和国民事诉讼法 (enforced on 09.04.1991, as amended on 
31.08.2012), Arts. 50, 230. 
277 Shuliang Wang, Introduction to International Trade Dispute Settlement in China, at: Pitman B. Potter & Ljiljana 
Biuković, Globalization and Local Adaptation in International Trade Law, UBC Press, 2011, p. 228.  
278 Ndapwilapo Shimutwikeni, The Impact of Culture in International Business Negotiations: Special Reference to 
China and United States of America, CEPMLP Annual Review, Vol. 14, 2009, p. 1. For example, during negotiations, 
Chinese parties usually focus on repairing the relationship, instead of arguing for their rights based on contractual 
provisions. For a further discussion on the characteristics of negotiation with Chinese parties from a cultural 
perspective, see: Anne Isabel Kraus, Chinese-European Dispute Resolution in China: Towards Culturally Matching 
Procedures, Centrum für angewandte Politikforschung (C·A·P), 09.2007, available at: 
https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/publications/publication.html/39874, last visited on 03.08.2020. 
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As analysed in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, supra, under traditional Chinese philosophies 
and contemporary Chinese ideologies, amicable DSMs are preferred. The promotion of 
negotiation in China’s legal system, which is a typical example of an amicable and 
informal DSM, can be considered a reflection of how the preference for and the 
recognition of the importance of maintaining harmonious relationships has been 
inherited by the current system.  
3.2.2 Mediation 
Like negotiation, mediation is also a confidential, informal, and voluntary process, 
where disputes are resolved in an amicable environment, however with the assistance 
of a third neutral party.279 It combines the disputing parties’ willingness to bargain and 
the mediator’s coordinating skills, in order to foster understanding by the parties, 
reconcile their interests, repair the damaged relationships, and thus contribute to their 
further cooperation.280  
The development of mediation in China went through some ups and downs.281 Now, 
mediation plays a significant role in China’s legal system in resolving disputes, in the 
forms of independent mediation and in combination with other DSMs.282 There are 
four ways that mediation can take place. First, mediation can be hosted by commercial 
mediation and arbitration commissions.283 Second, administrative mediation is offered 
by the State Administration of Industry and Commerce, which uses its branches as 
mediators to resolve disputes between economic organizations.284 Third, mediation 
can be conducted during an arbitration process, which is known as the “Arb-Med” or 
 
279 Anna Spain Bradley, Integration Matters: Rethinking the Architecture of International Dispute Resolution, 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 32, 2010, p. 23. Robert B. Davidson, Initiating an 
International Mediation, at: Practitioner's Handbook on International Arbitration and Mediation (Third Edition), 
JurisNet, LLC, 2012, p. 479. 
280 OLO De Witt Wijnen, ADR, the Civil Law Approach, Arbitration, Vol. 61, 1995, pp. 38-42. 
281 Mediation became a formalized method of civil dispute settlement since the 1950s in China’s legislation. See: 
Stanley B. Lubman, Bird in a Cage-Legal Reform in China after Mao Standford University Press, 2000, p. 49. 
Randall Peerenboom, China's Long March Toward Rule of Law, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 38-39. It 
was the predominant form of dispute resolution in China before the legal reform initiated in the late 1970s. As 
Chinese legal reform progressed throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the use of mediation dropped significantly in both 
judicial and extra-judicial processes. Another sudden change of direction happened in the early 2000s when the 
Communist Party aggressively began to promote the use the mediation to solve disputes in judicial and extra-judicial 
settings. See: Carl F. Minzner, China’s Turn against Law, American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 59, 2011, p. 
935. Hualing Fu, Mediation and the Rule of Law: The Chinese Landscape, at: Formalisation and Flexibilisation in 
Dispute Resolution, Brill | Nijhoff, 2014, p. 115. 
282 Under Chinese laws, mediation and conciliation are often used interchangeably, although it is noted that some 
scholars differentiate between these two by arguing that mediation was referred to as “conciliation” when it was 
conducted in other legal proceedings, such as arbitration. See: Jingzhou Tao, Arbitration in China, at: Philip J. 
McConnaughay & Thomas B. Ginsburg (eds.), International Commercial Arbitration in Asia (Second Edition), Juris 
Publishing, 2006, p. 54. Xuan Gu, The Combination of Arbitration and Mediation in China, to obtain the Master 
Degree at University of Geneva & University of Lausanne, 2008, p. 1. The present Chapter 3 follows the normal 
practice, using mediation and conciliation interchangeably. 
283 In theory, this type of mediation can also be hosted by people’s mediation commissions. However, in practice, 
people’s mediation commissions are rarely used to resolve foreign investment disputes. Therefore, this chapter only 
focuses on mediation conducted by commercial mediation and arbitration commissions in China. 
284 The phrase “economic organizations” are defined as legal person, individual partnership, individual industrial 
and commercial households, lease-holding farm household and other economic organizations. (“法人、个人合伙、
个体工商户、农村承包经营户以及其他经济组织”). See: Administration of Administrative Mediation of 
Contract Dispute by the State Administration for Industry and Commerce of the People’s Republic of China 国家工
商行政管理总局合同争议行政调解办法 (enforced on 03.11.1997, repealed on 02.11.2017), Art. 6. 
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“Oriental Experience”. 285  Finally, mediation can also be combined with litigation 
proceedings. All of these are introduced in the following sections. 
3.2.2.1 Mediation Conducted by Commercial Mediation and Arbitration 
Commissions 
Since 2009, the position of commercial mediation has been officially enhanced in 
China.286 Efforts on promoting the use of mediation have also been made by Chinese 
arbitration commissions. For example, many arbitration commissions began to accept 
mediation cases and created their own mediation rules.287 In addition, international 
cooperation was created aiming at providing services for mediating international 
business disputes. 288  For example, the China Council for the Promotion of 
International Trade (CCPIT)/China Chamber of International Commerce (CCOIC) 
Conciliation Centre, which is the first and largest professional mediation organization 
in China, signed cooperation agreements with mediation centres from over ten countries, 
including some EU Member States, in order to create an international mediation 
network. 289  All of these innovative measures emphasize China’s firm belief that 
mediation is “the primary means to resolve transnational disputes while maintaining an 
ongoing business relationship”.290 
Regarding the procedural regulations for this type of mediation, first, the principles of 
voluntariness and confidentiality are often required to be followed.291 If a settlement 
agreement is reached successfully, the mediator will deliver a mediation statement, 
which constitutes a new contract.292 Then disputing parties are given several options 
to ensure the implementation of the new contract, including applying to the competent 
people’s court to confirm the settlement agreement, 293  having such an agreement 
 
285 Edna Sussman, Developing an Effective Med-Arb/Arb-Med Process, New York Dispute Resolution Lawyer, Vol. 
2, 2009, pp. 71-74. 
286 This is realized particularly through the issuance of the “Several Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on 
Establishing a Sound Conflict and Dispute Resolution Mechanism that Connects Litigation and Non-litigation”. In 
this document, commercial mediation is explicitly put on an equal footing with people’s mediation, mediation by 
people’s courts and administrative investigation and mediation. See: Several Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court 
on Establishing a Sound Conflict and Dispute Resolution Mechanism that Connects Litigation and Non-litigation 最
高人民法院印发《关于建立健全诉讼与非诉讼相衔接的矛盾纠纷解决机制的若干意见》的通知 (issued on 
24.07.2009, enforced on 24.07.2009). 
287 An example is the Beijing Arbitration Commission, which issued its mediation rules in 2001. See: Beijing 
Arbitration Commission Mediation Center Mediation Rules (enforced on 28.09.2011). 
288 James K. Lockett, Dispute Settlement in the People’s Republic of China: The Developing Role of Arbitration in 
Foreign Trade and Maritime Disputes, George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics, Vol. 16, 
1982, p. 262. 
289 CCPIT/CCOIC Conciliation Center is dedicated to mediating international commercial disputes and promoting 
transnational cooperation; the cases dealt with here involve more than 50 countries and regions. See: China Council 
for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT)/China Chamber of International Commerce (CCOIC) Mediation 
Center 中国国际贸易促进委员会/中国国际商会调解中心, Introduction of the Center 中心简介, 05.03.2019, 
available at: https://adr.ccpit.org/articles/25, last visited on 07.08.2020. 
290 Anne Judith Farina, "Talking Disputes into Harmony" China Approaches International Commercial Arbitration, 
American University International Law Review, Vol. 4, 1989, p. 157. 
291 See e.g. CCPIT/CCOIC Mediation Rules (enforced on 01.05.2012), Art. 4. 
292 Several Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on Establishing a Sound Conflict and Dispute Resolution 
Mechanism that Connects Litigation and Non-litigation 最高人民法院印发《关于建立健全诉讼与非诉讼相衔接
的矛盾纠纷解决机制的若干意见》的通知 (issued on 24.07.2009, enforced on 24.07.2009). 
293 See e.g. CCPIT/CCOIC Mediation Rules (enforced on 01.05.2012), Art. 26. This is confirmed by Chinese Civil 
Procedure Law. See: Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (enforced on 09.04.1991, as amended 
on 31.08.2012), Art. 194. 
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notarized,294 and transferring the case to an arbitration commission for an arbitral 
award in line with the content of the settlement agreement.295 
3.2.2.2 Mediation Conducted by Administrative Organs 
Disputing parties can choose administrative mediation for dispute resolution for 
contractual disputes between economic organizations that have not been brought before 
a people’s court or an arbitration commission.296 Administrative organs, which are 
usually industry and commerce administrative authorities, mediate such disputes based 
on the consent of disputing parties,297 which can be terminated at any time upon the 
request of one party.298 The process is not open to the public.299 If the dispute is 
successfully resolved through administrative mediation, disputing parties shall sign a 
mediation agreement or a new contract.300 After that, like the mediation agreement 
reached in commercial mediation, parties can bring such agreements or contracts before 
the competent people’s courts or notarial institutions to have it recognized or notarized. 
It is noted that, to facilitate disputing parties in confirming the result of administrative 
mediation, cooperation has been established among some branches of the State 
Administration of Industry and Commerce in order to connect administrative mediation 
with judicial confirmation from the people’s courts.301 
3.2.2.3 Mediation in Administrative Reconsideration 
Mediation is also available during the process of administrative reconsideration when 
settling foreign investment disputes.302 Like other types of mediation, mediation in 
administrative reconsideration is also conducted based on the principle of 
voluntariness. 303  Where disputing parties reach a settlement in the end, the 
administrative reconsideration organ shall make a written administrative 
reconsideration mediation agreement.304 Such an agreement begins to have legal effect 
294 See e.g. CCPIT/CCOIC Mediation Rules (enforced on 01.05.2012), Art. 27. This is confirmed by Chinese 
Notaraization Law. See: Notaraization Law of the People’s Republic of China (enforced on 01.03.2006, as amended 
on 24.04.2015), Art. 37. 
295 See e.g. CCPIT/CCOIC Mediation Rules (enforced on 01.05.2012), Art. 28. In addition, if the settlement 
agreement only involves the payment of debts, parties can also apply to the competent people’s court to issue an 
enforceable payment warrant. See e.g. CCPIT/CCOIC Mediation Rules (enforced on 01.05.2012), Art. 27. 
296 Administration of Administrative Mediation of Contract Dispute by the State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (enforced on 03.11.1997), Art. 8. 
297 Id, Arts. 2, 3, 8. 
298 Id, Art. 17. 
299 Id, Art. 5. 
300 Id, Art. 19. 
301 See e.g. www.china.com.cn 中国网, Beijing Industry and Commerce Bureau Xicheng Branch: Connecting 
Administrative Mediation of Contract Disputes and Judicial Confirmation 北京市工商局西城分局合同纠纷行政
调解对接司法确认, 29.10.2012, available at: http://finance.china.cn/roll/20121029/1098465.shtml, last visited on 
06.08.2020. 
302 Administrative reconsideration applies to the situation where a citizen, legal person or any other organization 
considers that its lawful rights and interests have been infringed upon by a specific administrative act and applies to 
an administrative organ for administrative reconsideration. See: Administrative Reconsideration Law of the People’s 
Republic of China 中华人民共和国行政复议法 (enforced on 01.10.1999, as amended on 27.08.2009), Art. 2. For 
further information of administrative reconsideration, see Section 3.2.5, infra. 
303 Regulations on the Implementation of the Administrative Reconsideration Law of the People’s Republic of China
中华人民共和国行政复议法实施条例 (enforced on 01.08.2007), Art. 50. 
304 Ibid. 
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upon being signed by the disputing parties and can be further enforced by competent 
administrative organs or by the people’s courts.305 
3.2.2.4 Mediation in Arbitration 
In China, the creation of mediation in arbitration, which is often referred to as “Arb-
Med”, “Oriental Model” or “Oriental Experience”, can be traced back to the 1950s.306 
During the past decades, this practice has constantly developed in law and in practice. 
When China started to host foreign-related arbitration, “Arb-Med” was also 
implemented in that context. 
“Arb-Med” combines two DSMs by conducting mediation during an arbitration process 
when there is the consent of the disputing parties. It is mainly regulated by the Chinese 
Arbitration Law (2009) and the arbitration rules chosen by the parties. According to the 
Chinese Arbitration Law (2009), a tribunal shall carry out mediation prior to delivering 
an arbitration award if both parties voluntarily refer to it. 307  In practice, Chinese 
arbitrators often take the initiative to ask the disputing parties whether they would like 
the tribunal to assist them in achieving an amicable settlement.308 When mediation is 
consented to by the disputing parties and conducted during an arbitration process, there 
is no clear distinction between the proceedings under the two DSMs.309 If mediation 
successfully leads to a settlement agreement, the disputing parties may withdraw their 
claims or request the arbitral tribunal to render a written mediation statement or an 
arbitral award in accordance with the content of the settlement agreement.310 Such 
written mediation statements and arbitral awards have the same legal effect.311 It is 
noticeable that, where disputing parties wish to mediate but hesitate to have the same 
 
305 Where an agreement is not reached after mediation or either party goes back on his words before the written 
administrative reconsideration mediation agreement takes effect, the administrative reconsideration organ shall issue 
a timely administrative reconsideration decision. See: Ibid. 
306 China’s practice of combining mediation with arbitration was originally developed by China International 
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) and China Maritime Arbitration Commission (CMAC) in 
the 1950s. Although there was no clear regulation on “Arb-Med” in Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission (FTAC, 
the predecessor of CIETAC) Provisional Rules (1956), the existence of such a practice was implied from Art. 31 of 
this set of rules. This could also be shown by the arbitration practice of this commission during that time. See: China 
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission 中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会, Selected Works of 
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Awards (1963-1988) 中国国际经济贸易仲裁
裁决书选编（1963-1988）, China Renmin University Press 中国人民大学出版社, 1993, p. 1. 
307 Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China 中华人民共和国仲裁法 (enforced on 01.09.1995, as 
amended on 27.08.2009), Art. 51. 
308 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Fan Kun, Integrating Mediation into Arbitraiton: Why It Works in China, Journal 
of International Arbitration, Vol. 25, 2008, p. 487. 
309 This is different from the practice in other mediation-friendly states. For example, in South Korea and Indonesia, 
an arbitrator only attempts to mediate at the outset of arbitration and an arbitrator will suspend the arbitration if the 
parties agree to mediation during the course of arbitral proceedings. See: M. Scott Donahey, Seeking Harmony: Is 
the Asian Concept of the Conciliator/Arbitrator Applicable in the West?, Dispute Resolution Journal, Vol. 50, 1995, 
p. 74. 
310 See e.g. CIETAC Arbitration Rules (2015), Art. 47.5. 
311 Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China 中华人民共和国仲裁法 (enforced on 01.09.1995, as 
amended on 27.08.2009), Art. 51. Like a normal arbitral award, the written mediation statement shall be signed by 
the arbitrators, sealed by the arbitration commission, and then served to both parties. The only difference between a 
mediation statement and an arbitral award based on a settlement agreement exists in the time when the document 
becomes effective. A written conciliation statement shall become legally effective after both parties have signed for 
receipt thereof, while arbitral awards shall be legally effective as of the date on which it is made. See: Arbitration 
Law of the People’s Republic of China 中华人民共和国仲裁法  (enforced on 01.09.1995, as amended on 
27.08.2009), Arts. 52, 57. 
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tribunal acting as both arbitrators and mediators, it is possible for them to receive 
assistance from another independent mediator.312 If mediation is unsuccessful, the 
arbitration process continues and an arbitral award is made promptly.313 In such a 
situation, disputing parties cannot refer to the information used during the “Arb-Med” 
process and they must keep such information confidential.314 
“Arb-Med” has been considered by Chinese parties to be very satisfactory and has 
drawn much attention from the rest of the world. 315  According to the China 
International Commercial Arbitration Annual Report (2017), 58 per cent of the 
arbitration cases in China were finally settled through mediation.316 It is also noted that 
there has been some lingering doubts about the fairness and propriety of “Arb-Med”.317 
However, this was refuted by Lijun Cao in his research paper “CIETAC as A Forum 
for Resolving Business Disputes”, where he proved the substantive fairness and 
procedural integrity of CIETAC arbitration by analysing the procedural features and 
the success rates by foreign parties.318 
3.2.2.5 Mediation in Litigation 
Mediation in litigation, or in-court mediation, which has been in place since the 
founding of the People’s Republic of China, went through three stages of 
development:319 “Mediation as the Leading Method of Civil Litigation” (tiáojiě wéizhǔ, 
调 解为 主 ), 320  “Emphasizing Mediation, Voluntary Mediation and Legitimate 
Mediation”(zhuózhòng tiáojiě hé zìyuàn héfǎ tiáojiě, 着重调解和自愿合法调解),321 
 
312 See e.g. CIETAC Arbitration Rules (2015), Art. 47.8. 
313 Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China 中华人民共和国仲裁法 (enforced on 01.09.1995, as 
amended on 27.08.2009), Art. 51. 
314 See e.g. CIETAC Arbitration Rules (2015), Art. 47.9. 
315 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Fan Kun, Integrating Mediation into Arbitraiton: Why It Works in China, Journal 
of International Arbitration, Vol. 25, 2008, pp. 479-492. Edna Sussman, Developing an Effective Med-Arb/Arb-Med 
Process, New York Dispute Resolution Lawyer, Vol. 2, 2009, pp. 71-74. Thomas J. Stipanowich et al., East Meets 
West: An International Dialogue on Mediation and Med-Arb in the United States and China, Pepperdine Dispute 
Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 9, 2009, pp. 379-414. Shengchang Wang 王生长 , The Theory and Practice of 
Combining Arbitration with Mediation 仲裁与调解相结合的理论与实务, Publishing House of Law 法律出版社, 
2001, pp. 81-82. However, it is admitted that both the popularity and the effectiveness of the application of “Arb-
Med” in foreign-related arbitration cases were doubted. See: James V. Feinerman, The History and Development of 
China's Dispute Resolution System, at: Chris Hunter (ed.), Dispute Resolution in the PRC–A Practical Guide to 
Litigation and Arbitration in China, Asia Law & Practice Ltd., 1995, pp. 5-21. 
316 China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission 中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会, China 
International Commercial Arbitration Annual Report 2016 中国国际商事仲裁年度报告 2016, 2017, available at: 
http://www.cietac.org/Uploads/201710/59df3824b2849.pdf, p. 13, last visited on 07.08.2020. 
317 Weixia Gu, The Delicate Art of Med-Arb and its Future Institutionalisation in China, UCLA Pacific Basin Law 
Journal, Vol. 31, 2014. Matthew Gearing, The Dangers of Arb-Med, Allen & Overy, 20.04.2011, available at: 
http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/The-dangers-of-arb-med-.aspx, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
318 Lijun Cao, CIETAC as a Forum for Resolving Business Disputes, The Foundation for Law, Justice and Society, 
24.01.2008, available at: http://www.fljs.org/sites/www.fljs.org/files/publications/FLJ%2BS%20Cao%20pb_c.pdf, 
last visited on 03.08.2020. 
319 Jianlong Yu 于健龙, Discussion on the Chinese Legal System of Commercial Mediation 论中国商事调解法律
制度, to obtain the Doctor Degree at University of International Business and Economics 对外经济贸易大学, 2013, 
p. 47. 
320 During this stage, disputing parties had no other choice but to follow the mediation process led by judges, so 
there was no real litigation in practice. See: Weiping Zhang 张卫平, Reflection on Returning Back to Xiwu Ma 回
归马锡五的思考, Modern Law Science 现代法学, Vol. 31, 2009, pp. 139-140. 
321 During the second stage, the voluntariness of reaching a mediation agreement was stressed, but the initiation of 
mediation was still mandatory. See: Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (For Trial 
Implementation) 中华人民共和国民事诉讼法(试行) (enforced on 01.10.1982, expired on 09.04.1991), Art. 97. In 
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and “Giving Priority to Mediation, Combining Mediation with Judgment, Constructing 
the ‘Triune’ Big Mediation System of People’s Mediation, Administrative Mediation 
and Judicial Mediation”( tiáojiě yōu xiān, tiáopàn jiéhé, zhuólì tuīdòng rénmín tiáojiě, 
xíngzhèng tiáojiě, sīfǎ tiáojiě “sānwèiyītǐ” de dàtiáojiě, 调解优先，调判结合, 着力
推动人民调解、行政调解、司法调解‘三位一体’的大调解).322 In particular, the link 
between promoting mediation and realizing the goal of the socialist construction was 
pointed out: giving priority to mediation helps realize social harmony.323  
People’s courts are required to conduct mediation based on the principles of the free 
will of disputing parties and legality.324 During litigation, mediation can be referred to 
in three stages: before case registration, after case registration but before a hearing, and 
during or after a hearing but before the issuance of the final judgment. During the first 
stage, if parties reach an agreement, they could apply to the competent people’s court 
for a mediation agreement to be issued,325 or they can go to a notarial office to have 
the agreement notarized.326 Without confirmation from a people’s court or notarization, 
the settlement agreement has the same effect as a normal contract. If the consent 
statement is reached by disputing parties and issued by the people’s court during the 
second stage, it would have the same effect as a judgment, which means that one party 
can directly apply for enforcement. 327  If mediation fails, the court shall enter a 
judgment in a timely manner. 328  Finally, before the final judgment is delivered, 
mediation could still be undertaken to reach a potential settlement. The settlement 
agreement reached during this stage has a similar effect to those in the second stage.329  
Instead of justice, in China, serving the people constitutes the overarching principle 
pursued by the judiciary (sīfǎwèimín,司法为民).330 In other words, adjudication is 
considered to be a service that is provided to disputing parties, with a view to meeting 
the disputing parties’ needs to the greatest extent possible and resolving disputes 
effectively and efficiently. Thus, if there is any chance to resolve the dispute and bring 
 
addition, mediation agreements were made according to “a clear distinction between right and wrong”. See: Ibid, 
Art. 97. In 1991, the issuance of Chinese Civil Procedure Law brought full voluntariness to mediation, including 
both the initiation of mediation and the content of the mediation statement, and mediation was changed from a 
recommended choice to a voluntary choice. 
322 Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Issuing Several Opinions on Further Implementing the Working 
Principle of "Giving Priority to Mediation and Combining Mediation with Judgment" 最高人民法院印发《关于
进一步贯彻“调解优先、调判结合”工作原则的若干意见》的通知, 07.06.2010, Art. 1.1.2. This document 
contains a list laying out the types of cases where mediation should be given priority, where investment disputes 
may very likely fall under some of the categories and thus be promoted to be resolved through in-court mediation. 
See: ibid. 
323 Ibid. 
324 Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China 中华人民共和国民事诉讼法(enforced on 09.04.1991, 
as amended on 31.08.2012), Art. 9. 
325 Id, Arts. 194-195. 
326 Notary Law of the People’s Republic of China 中华人民共和国公证法 (enforced on 01.03.2006, as amended 
on 24.04.2015), Art. 37. 
327 Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China 中华人民共和国民事诉讼法 (enforced on 09.04.1991, 
as amended on 31.08.2012), Arts. 97, 236. 
328 Id, Art. 9. 
329 Id, Art. 142. 
330 Rong Liu 刘嵘, Establishing the Idea of the Judiciary Serves the People and Implementing the Theme of Justice 
and Efficiency: Note of the National Conference for Presidents of the Higher Courts 树立司法为民思想，践行公
正与效率主题——记全国高级法院院长座谈会, People's Judicature 人民司法, Vol. 9, 2003, pp. 14-15. 
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the dispute to an end through mediation, which is relatively faster, this will be tried. 
Furthermore, it was argued that mediation in litigation is not only a key component of 
this people-based or service-based doctrine, but it is closely linked to the creation of a 
harmonious society,331 since, in this way, disputes are settled without going through 
the formal and adversarial litigation process. Therefore, this practice can be seen as 
another reflection of China’s traditional preference for the amicable settlement of 
disputes. At the same time, the wide use of mediation in litigation in China is a 
“reluctant response to political demands to maintain social stability”, which means 
harmony in society; in fact, judges are required to always consider the law as well as 
keep the likely social impacts of their decisions in mind, even during litigation.332 
3.2.3 Complaints Coordination for Foreign Investment Related Disputes 
In 2006, the Ministry of Commerce of China created interim measures to deal with 
foreign investment disputes, which allows foreign-invested enterprises or foreign 
investors that deem their legitimate rights or interests as having been infringed by an 
administrative authority to file complaints with the complaint acceptance authority for 
coordination or settlement.333  
This DSM is available for disputes that have not gone through judicial procedures, 
administrative reconsideration, or arbitral procedures, and they have not been accepted 
by the department of disciplinary inspection, supervision or credit investigation.334 
After receiving the complaint, the relevant organ will try to settle the dispute through 
administrative coordination, by considering the real situation, setting forth suggestions, 
opinions or claims, or transferring the dispute to the local complaint acceptance organ 
or relevant department for handling,335 which is a process that can be described as a 
quasi-mediation process.336 In the recently issued Foreign Investment Law of China, 
Article 26 expressly made complaints coordination an available DSM for foreign 
investors to resolve their investment disputes within China.337  
 
331 Weiping Zhang 张卫平, Court Mediation: Analysis and Reflection of the Current Situation 诉讼调解：时下
态势的分析与思考, Law Science 法学, Vol. 5, 2007, pp. 18-27. Fu Hualing & Richard Cullen, From Mediatory to 
Adjudicatory Justice: The Limits of Civil Justice Reform in China, at: Chinese Justice: Civil Dispute Resolution in 
Contemporary China, Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 50. 
332 Fu Hualing & Richard Cullen, From Mediatory to Adjudicatory Justice: The Limits of Civil Justice Reform in 
China, at: Chinese Justice: Civil Dispute Resolution in Contemporary China, Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 
51. The preference for mediation is also argued as a result of the claimed failure of adjudicatory justice and the 
perceived effectiveness of mediatory justice, and judges have been relegated to settling private disputes, instead of 
serving a more public and general role of norm finding and application. See: id, p. 49. 
333 Interim Measures of the Ministry of Commerce for the Work Relating to the Complaints of Foreign-funded 
Enterprises 商务部外商投资企业投诉工作暂行办法 (enforced on 01.10.2006), Art. 2. 
334 Id, Art. 9. 
335 Id, Arts. 2, 11. 
336 Guiguo Wang, Chinese Mechanisms for Resolving Investor-State Disputes, Jindal Journal of International Affairs, 
Vol. 1, 2011, p. 211. Compared to administrative litigation and administrative reconsideration, complaints 
coordination is more amicable and efficient. For more information on administrative litigation and administrative 
reconsideration, see Sections 3.2.5 and 3.2.6, infra. 
337 Foreign Investment Law of the People’s Republic of China (issued on 15.03.2019, coming into effect on 
01.01.2020), Art. 26. 
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3.2.4 Commercial Arbitration 
In China, arbitration shall be carried out independently, free from interference from 
administrative organs, social organizations or individuals. 338  The precondition for 
referring a dispute to arbitration is having a valid arbitration agreement, 339  and 
challenges to the arbitration agreement can be submitted to the arbitration commission 
or to the competent people’s court. If one party make a request to the arbitration 
commission and the other party applies to the competent people’s court to decide 
whether an arbitration agreement is valid or not, the people’s court shall deliver the 
ruling.340 This can be taken as the evidence that China does not completely recognize 
the doctrine of “competence-competence”.341 In principle, arbitration is held in camera, 
and disputing parties are free to make other agreements unless state secrets are 
involved. 342  Parties are free to choose foreign arbitrators and foreign lawyers in 
foreign-related arbitration cases.343 It should be noted that ad hoc arbitration is not 
allowed in China.344 The underlying reason for such a prohibition is argued the be the 
fear of recourse to ad hoc arbitration becoming out of control and that the Chinese legal 
system would suffer from its flexibility.345 This corresponds with the high level of 
institutional management in Chinese arbitration institutions. 346  Furthermore both 
reflect the traditional value that the collective is more recognized than individuals.  
Notably, regarding the enforcement of international arbitral awards, an internal 
reporting system has been established in response to the concerns about possible local 
protectionism and the limited experience of judges in foreign-related cases in local 
338 Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China 中华人民共和国外商投资法 (enforced on 01.09.1995, as 
amended on 27.08.2009), Arts. 8, 14. 
339 A valid arbitration agreement shall: “(1) be in written form; (2) contain an expression of intention to apply for 
arbitration, matters for arbitration, and a designated arbitration commission; (3) be within the range of arbitrable 
matters as specified by law”. See: Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China 中华人民共和国仲裁法 
(enforced on 01.09.1995, as amended on 27.08.2009), Arts. 3, 16, 17. 
340 Id, Art. 20. 
341 The term “competence-competence” refers to the power/competence of an arbitral tribunal to decide upon its 
own jurisdiction/competence, which has been accepted as a basic doctrine in international arbitration. See: Nigel 
Blackaby & Constantine Partasides & Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter (eds.), Redfern and Hunter on International 
Arbitration (Sixth Edition), Oxford University Press, 2015, para. 5.105. 
342 Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China 中华人民共和国仲裁法 (enforced on 01.09.1995, as 
amended on 27.08.2009), Art. 40. 
343 Id, Art. 67. Compared to Chinese lawyers, foreign lawyers are only prohibited from giving opinions on the 
application of Chinese laws. See: Regulations on Administration of Representative Offices of Foreign Law Firms in 
China 外国律师事务所驻华代表机构管理条例 (issued on 22.12.2001, enforced on 01.01.2002), Art. 15. 
344 Chinese law does not give any definition of ad hoc arbitration. This type of arbitration usually refers to the 
situation where “there is no formal administration by any established arbitral agency; instead the parties have opted 
to create their own procedures for a given arbitration”. See: Gerald Aksen, Ad Hoc Versus Institutional Arbitration, 
the ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin, Vol. 10, 1991, p. 8. 
Although ad hoc arbitration is not allowed to be conducted in China, the arbitral awards of ad hoc arbitration made 
outside of China are considered in the same way as awards of foreign institutional arbitration with regard to 
recognition and enforcement in China. See: Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on the Application of the 
Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (enforced on 04.02.2015), Art. 545. 
345 Lijun Cao, CIETAC as a Forum for Resolving Business Disputes, The Foundation for Law, Justice and Society, 
24.01.2008, available at: http://www.fljs.org/sites/www.fljs.org/files/publications/FLJ%2BS%20Cao%20pb_c.pdf, 
last visited on 03.08.2020. 
346 This is evidenced by the significant role in arbitration case management played by CIETAC compared to other 
main international arbitration institutions in the world. A typical reflection is the large scope of arbitration work that 
CIETAC arbitration secretaries are involved in. As a result, there are concerns about CIETAC secretariat’s ultra vires. 
See: id, p. 5.  
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people’s courts.347 Specifically, lower courts are required to report to the higher courts, 
including ultimately the Supreme People’s Court, whenever they deny the recognition 
of the enforcement of a foreign award.348 This internal reporting system is evidence 
typical of China’s increasing acceptance of international arbitration as a means to 
resolve international commercial disputes.349  
Compared to litigation, arbitration is less aggressive and keeps more procedural factors 
within the parties’ hands. In this vein, considering the consistent preference for 
amicable DSMs and the general understanding of DSMs as a service to disputing parties, 
arbitration is arguably more favoured in China than litigation. 
3.2.5 Administrative Reconsideration 
Administrative reconsideration is another way of resolving disputes between investors 
and administrative authorities. It applies to the situation in which a citizen, legal person 
or any other organization considers that its lawful rights and interests have been 
infringed upon by a specific administrative act and applies for administrative 
reconsideration to an administrative organ. 350  In general, administrative 
reconsideration organs enjoy power similar to courts and the process of administrative 
reconsideration is similar to litigation. The process starts with the applicant’s 
application to the competent administrative organs, 351  after which the respondent 
replies and provides relevant documents to prove the basis for the specific 
administrative act that has been undertaken. 352  In principle, administrative 
reconsideration refers to an examination based on written submissions, but, if there is 
a need, the administrative reconsideration organ may investigate facts among the 
organizations and citizens concerned and listen to the views of the applicant, respondent 
and third parties. 353  In the end, the administrative reconsideration organ makes a 
decision, which can be enforced directly.354 Party autonomy does not play as big a role 
347 This system was created and completed gradually through three documents. See: China Academy of Arbitration 
Law 中国仲裁法学研究会, China International Commercial Arbitration Annual Report (2014) 中国国际商事仲
裁年度报告（2014）, 2015, available at: http://www.cietac.org/Uploads/201602/56cbb883901f0.pdf, pp. 22, 49, 
last visited on 07.08.2020. The three documents are: Notice on People's Courts' Dealing with Foreign-related 
Arbitration and Foreign Arbitration 关于人民法院处理与涉外仲裁及外国仲裁事项有关问题的通知 (issued on 
28.08.1995); Notice on People’s Courts Setting Aside Foreign-related Arbitral Awards 关于人民法院撤销涉外仲
裁裁决有关事项的通知 (issued on 23.04.1998); and Regulations on Charges and Review Period of Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 关于承认和执行外国仲裁裁决收费及审查期限问题的规定 (issued 
on 21.10.1998).  
348 Jingzhou Tao, Arbitration in China, at: International Commercial Arbitration in Asia (Second Edition), Juris 
Publishing, 2006, pp. 18-19. The implementation of this system has led to a great decrease in the number of cases 
where foreign arbitral awards were set aside or rejected in relation to recognition and enforcement. See: China 
Academy of Arbitration Law 中国仲裁法学研究会, China International Commercial Arbitration Annual Report 
(2014) 中 国 国 际 商 事 仲 裁 年 度 报 告 （ 2014 ） , 2015, available at: 
http://www.cietac.org/Uploads/201602/56cbb883901f0.pdf, p. 49, last visited on 07.08.2020. 
349  Won Kidane, China-Africa Dispute Settlement: The Law, Economics and Culture of Arbitration, Seattle 
University School of Law Legal Research Paper Series, Vol. 12-16, 2011, pp. 72–73, 165–188. 
350  Administrative Reconsideration Law of the People’s Republic of China 中华人民共和国行政复议法 
(enforced on 01.10.1999, as amended on 27.08.2009), Art. 2. 
351 Id, Arts. 11-15. 
352 Id, Art. 23. 
353 Id, Art. 22. See also: Regulations on the Implementation of the Administrative Reconsideration Law of the 
People’s Republic of China 中华人民共和国行政复议法实施条例 (enforced on 01.08.2007), Arts. 33-34. 
354 Administrative organs can use administrative power to force private parties to follow the decision or use the 
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in administrative reconsideration as it does in other DSMs. For example, although 
negotiation and mediation are available to disputing parties during administrative 
reconsideration, it is the administrative organ that decides whether a case can be 
withdrawn if any settlement agreement has been reached.355 
3.2.6 Litigation 
Foreign investment disputes can also be resolved through litigation in China, which 
includes civil litigation and administrative litigation. 356  The following issues 
concerning process deserve particular attention for the present analysis. First, as a 
special feature of foreign-related litigation cases in China, the principle of “counter-
treatment” is adopted regarding the procedural rights and obligations of foreign 
disputing parties. Specifically, as a principle, foreign parties enjoy national treatment 
in people’s courts; where the courts of a foreign state impose any restriction on the civil 
procedural rights of Chinese parties, the people’s courts shall apply the principle of 
reciprocity to the civil procedural rights of parties of that foreign state.357 Second, if a 
foreign party needs to be represented by a lawyer as its agent ad litem in a people’s 
court, a Chinese lawyer is required.358 Third, the publication of a litigation process is 
considered as a basic requirement and exceptions are provided for situations in which 
state secrets, individual privacy, business secrets, and other elements otherwise 
prescribed by laws are involved.359 Fourth, even during the period of enforcement of a 
judgment, parties still have the opportunity to reach a settlement.360 In other words, in 
addition to undertaking mediation during litigation, this is another attempt at a possible 
amicable settlement of disputes at the very last stage. Last but not least, although it is 
neither explicitly stated in legal texts nor evidenced by other official documents, it was 
argued that, in practice, the satisfaction of parties was the major criterion in measuring 
 
effect of internal hierarchy to allow the involved administrative organ to alter the disputed actions. See: 
Administrative Reconsideration Law of the People’s Republic of China 中华人民共和国行政复议法 (enforced on 
01.10.1999, as amended on 27.08.2009), Arts. 31-33.  
355 Id, Art. 25. See also: Regulations on the Implementation of the Administrative Reconsideration Law of the 
People’s Republic of China 中华人民共和国行政复议法实施条例 (enforced on 01.08.2007), Art. 38. 
356 When the dispute has a contractual nature, the process will be commercial litigation and Chinese Civil Procedure 
Law will apply. Where the dispute happens between foreign investors and local administrative authorities on issues 
like license authorization and expropriation, the process will be administrative litigation governed by Chinese 
Administrative Procedure Law. The general procedure of administrative litigation is similar to that of foreign-related 
commercial litigation, with subtle differences to suit the specific nature of administrative disputes. For easy reference, 
the following analysis is mainly based on Chinese Civil Procedure Law. 
357 Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China 中国民事诉讼法 (enforced on 09.04.1991, as amended 
on 31.08.2012), Art. 5. 
358 For litigation in people’s courts, foreign lawyers need to cooperate with Chinese lawyers and cannot provide 
opinions on interpretation of Chinese legal documents. See: id, Art. 263. 
359 Id, Art. 134. 
360 Where this happens, the enforcement personnel shall record the provisions of the settlement agreement in the 
enforcement transcripts, to which both sides shall affix their signatures or seals. Such a settlement agreement means 
an end to the process of enforcement. If, later, one party acts against their settlement agreement reached during 
enforcement, the people’s court will resume execution based on an application. See: id, Art. 230. Civil Procedure 
Law of the People’s Republic of China 中国民事诉讼法 (enforced on 09.04.1991, as amended on 31.08.2012), 
Art. 230. Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s 
Republic of China 最高人民法院关于适用《中华人民共和国民事诉讼法》的解释 (enforced on 04.02.2015), 
Art. 467. 
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the outcome of the trial,361 which seems to be in clear contrast to the goal generally 
recognized in Western legal systems that adjudication aims to realize justice. 
3.2.7 Dispute Settlement Mechanisms under the “One Belt One Road” Initiative 
Against the background of China’s current investment development strategy, the “One 
Belt One Road” (OBOR) Initiative no doubt deserves special attention. 362  This 
Initiative was first launched by President Jinping Xi during his visit to central and 
southeast Asian states in 2013. In 2015, “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk 
Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road” was jointly issued by the 
National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, with the State Council’s 
authorization, which created the blueprint for further development. The OBOR 
Initiative envisages an investment of more than $1 trillion “so as to promote 
international policy coordination, infrastructure facilities connectivity, unimpeded 
trade, financial integration as well as human ‘people-to-people bonds’ among more than 
65 countries”.363 
Even though the design of the OBOR Initiative seems to have evolved pragmatically, 
its legal coherence and legitimacy require proper DSMs.364 Many scholars have been 
working on this and many constructive suggestions have been made. Some scholars 
recommended that the dispute settlement system under the OBOR Initiative should be 
built upon existing DSMs by using the WTO Dispute Settlement System and ICSID as 
the basis to be further facilitated with certain flexible diplomatic mechanisms and other 
arrangements under FTAs and IIAs. 365  Others argued for establishing a new 
comprehensive multi-fold dispute settlement centre providing consultation, mediation, 
arbitration, and litigation. 366  In particular, building a comprehensive system for 
effective dispute settlement under the OBOR Initiative also appeared in various policy 
documents issued by different entities, in which the promotion of alternative dispute 
resolution was stressed in particular.367 The promotion of alternative dispute resolution 
 
361 Lei Zhao 赵蕾, The Biggest Controversy over Judicial Reform: the Revival of Xiwu Ma 司法改革最热争议 
马锡五复活, infzm.com 南方周末网, 10.06.2009, available at: http://www.infzm.com/content/29885, last visited 
on 07.08.2020. 
362 The OBOR Initiative is composed of a “Silk Road Economic Belt” and a “21st Century Maritime Silk Road”. 
363 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Trade and Investment Adjudication Involving ‘Silk Road Projects’: Legal Methodology 
Challenges, European University Institute Working Papers, Vol. 2, 2018, p. 1. Uniview (UNV), The Belt and Road 
Initiative, 29.09.2018, available at: http://en.uniview.com/News/News/201809/804999_169683_0.htm, last visited 
on 06.08.2020. 
364 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Trade and Investment Adjudication Involving ‘Silk Road Projects’: Legal Methodology 
Challenges, European University Institute Working Papers, Vol. 2, 2018, p. 1. 
365 See e.g. Li Liao 廖丽, Innovative Study on the Dispute Settlement Mechanism under the 'One Belt One Road' 
Initiative: From International Law and Comparative Law Perspectives “一带一路”争端解决机制创新研究—
—国际法与比较法的视角, Law Review 法学评论, Vol. 2, 2018, p. 166. 
366 See e.g. Heqisheng Research Group 何其生课题组, Discussion on the Construction of China International 
Commercial Court 论中国国际商事法庭的构建, Wuhan University International Law Review 武大国际法评论, 
Vol. 3, 2018. Shaotang Wang 王少棠 , Legetimacy Crisis Resolved? Reconsideration of the EU's Reform of 
Investment Court System 正当性危机的解除?——欧盟投资争端解决机制改革再议 , Studies in Law and 
Business 法商研究, Vol. 2, 2018, p. 170. 
367 See e.g. Several Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on Providing Judicial Services and Safeguards for the 
Construction of the “Belt and Road” by People’s Courts 最高人民法院关于人民法院为“一带一路”建设提供司
法服务和保障的若干意见 (issued on 16.06.2015, entered into force on 16.06.2015); Instrumentalities of the State 
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can be understood as encouraging the use of non-governmental actors as judicial 
promoters of justice, the rule of law and other public goods.368 Although such “legal 
innovations” of China’s OBOR Initiative raise questions of justice and legal 
methodology, it is also suggested that “[t]he Chinese traditions favouring alternative 
dispute resolution methods (like mediation and conciliation procedures) should be 
institutionalized at national and regional levels of OBOR cooperation”.369 Until now, 
many efforts have been made and the development of the construction of the dispute 
settlement system under the OBOR Initiative can be seen. One such piece of evidence 
is the establishment of the Xi’an and Shenzhen international commercial courts.370 In 
addition, for investment arbitration, CIETAC issued its Investment Arbitration Rules 
in 2017, in which the practice of combining mediation with arbitration continues. As 
argued, future practice in relation to the construction of DSMs in the implementation 
of the OBOR Initiative “will help to discover comparative advantages and ‘best 
practices’ of alternative judicial, mediation and conciliation procedures and multilevel 
institutions for dispute settlement”.371  
 
3.3 A Legal Cultural Interpretation of China’s Domestic Dispute Settlement 
Mechanisms 
As revealed in the above analysis, each DSM has its own features and, at the same time, 
they come together to constitute the whole picture of China’s legal system for the 
resolution of foreign investment disputes. There are various elements that affect the 
procedural design of these DSMs and the way they cooperate with each other, but it 
seems that they are branded with characteristics originating from contemporary 
Chinese ideology, which can be further traced back to influential traditional Chinese 
philosophies.  
This section explores the potential connection between traditional Chinese philosophies 
and contemporary Chinese ideology analysed in Section 3.1, supra, on the one hand, 
and the procedural features of the DSMs discussed in Section 3.2, supra, on the other. 
It aims to interpret China’s domestic dispute settlement system from a legal cultural 
perspective, which would provide a better understanding of the underlying values and 
principles that the DSMs intend to protect and preserve. 
 
Council, General Office of the State Council, Opinions on the Construction of the “One Belt One Road” Initiative 
International Commercial Dispute Settlement Mechanisms and Organizations 中共中央办公厅、国务院办公厅
印发《关于建立“一带一路”国际商事争端解决机制和机构的意见》 (issued on 06.01.2018, entered into force 
on 06.01.2018). 
368 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Trade and Investment Adjudication Involving ‘Silk Road Projects’: Legal Methodology 
Challenges, European University Institute Working Papers, Vol. 2, 2018, p. 16. 
369 Id, pp. 1, 16. 
370 These courts are a part of the Supreme People’s Court. For more information on these courts, see: China 
International Commercial Court, A Brief Introduction of China International Commercial Court, 28.06.2018, 
available at: http://cicc.court.gov.cn/html/1/219/193/195/index.html, last visited on 31.07.2020. 
371 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Trade and Investment Adjudication Involving ‘Silk Road Projects’: Legal Methodology 
Challenges, European University Institute Working Papers, Vol. 2, 2018, p. 15. 
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3.3.1 Restoring Harmony through the Promotion of Amicable Dispute Settlement 
Mechanisms 
China’s dispute settlement system presents a clear and explicit welcoming attitude 
towards amicable and informal DSMs, from negotiation, mediation to complaints 
coordination, all of which constitute a wide net for possible settlements. First of all, the 
explicit reference to negotiation in legal texts and the great freedom given to disputing 
parties to resort to this mechanism in other DSMs shows how the use of this DSM is 
encouraged. Second, the availability of different types of independent mediation and 
the creative combination of mediation and other formal DSMs increase the possibility 
that they are used. Third, for foreign investment disputes, a special type of DSM, 
complaints coordination, which is procedurally similar to mediation, has been 
established. This further enhances the possibility of disputes raised by foreign investors 
being resolved amicably. Fourth, the design of China’s whole dispute resolution system 
shows an intended reluctance to use formal or adversarial mechanisms. Different modes 
of alternative DSMs limit the use of litigation, and, even when litigation is referred to, 
it is still very likely to be “disturbed” by in-court mediation. As has been pointed out, 
“Chinese societies and legal arrangements over disputes point towards social patterns 
of dispute resolution rather than state-sponsored official fora”. 372  Facing various 
amicable options in China’s legal system, the willingness of disputing parties to settle 
disputes through non-judicial mechanisms can be promoted in turn. In this sense, the 
combination of mediation with arbitration and litigation may be especially effective, 
since adjudicators’ suggestions are expected to have a great influence or even put 
pressure on disputing parties. It can be summarized that the ultimate goal of building a 
“harmonious socialist society” has been clearly reflected in the procedural design of 
China’s dispute settlement system. 
Informal DSMs are beneficial to the re-establishment of a harmonious relationship 
between disputing parties and the pursuit of social harmony, which is at the centre of 
the value system of traditional and contemporary Chinese ideologies. Amicable and 
informal mechanisms are considered to be more honourable than confrontational 
mechanisms. This is because disputes are regarded as abnormal and constitute a factor 
of instability which needs to be eliminated, instead of being exaggerated in adversarial 
DSMs. It is admitted that there are other elements that contribute to the preference for 
non-adjudicative methods in China,373 but the incentives that originate in Chinese 
ideologies are clear. Although the drawbacks of these DSMs also exist in the case of 
China, such as not contributing to the jurisprudence,374 they seem to be light when 
 
372 Werner Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context: The Legal Systems of Asia and Africa (2nd Edition), 
Cambridege University Press, 2009, p. 517. 
373 For a further discussion on other elements, such as political ones, see: Guiguo Wang, Chinese Mechanisms for 
Resolving Investor-State Disputes, Jindal Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 1, 2011, p. 224. Hualing Fu, Mediation 
and the Rule of Law: The Chinese Landscape, at: Formalisation and Flexibilisation in Dispute Resolution, Brill | 
Nijhoff, 2014, pp. 117-118. 
374 There is extensive discussion on the pros and cons of alternative dispute resolution. See e.g. Owen M. Fiss, 
Against Settlement, Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, Vol. 1, 1984, p. 1088. 
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weighed against the theme of resolving disputes effectively and efficiently and 
reinstating interpersonal and community harmony and stability. 
In short, the existing legal apparatus in China’s dispute settlement system has been 
greatly influenced by the long-standing harmony-centred tradition and the preference 
for the amicable settlement of disputes.375 Such an effect is expected to continue to 
exist. The DSMs in China’s legal system reflect the harmonious society rhetoric and, 
in turn, contribute to the preference for a non-adversarial means of settling disputes. In 
other words, the design of China’s dispute settlement system is both reflective of and 
beneficial for the Chinese legal culture. 
3.3.2 Satisfying Various Legal Cultural Needs through Extensive Use of Mediation 
As presented in Section 3.2.2, supra, mediation plays a significant role in China’s 
dispute resolution system by existing as an independent DSM as well as being 
combined with other DSMs. In particular, when it comes to foreign investment disputes, 
the creation of complaints coordination demonstrates China’s firm belief that mediation 
represents “the primary means to resolve transnational disputes while maintaining an 
ongoing business relationship”. 376  As mentioned in Section 3.2.2.5, supra, the 
preference for mediation was explicitly pointed out by a Notice of “Giving Priority to 
Mediation, Combining Mediation with Judgment, Constructing the ‘Triune’ Big 
Mediation System of People’s Mediation, Administrative Mediation and Judicial 
Mediation” issued by the Supreme People’s Court in 2010. 377  It can be said that 
“Mediation First” has been established as a basic principle of dispute resolution in 
China’s legal system, which reinforces the general preference for amicable DSMs. 
Although there are some doubts particularly regarding the appropriateness of 
conducting mediation in other DSMs, the success of this “oriental experience” in China 
has proven its value and, at the same time, has drawn much attention from around the 
world.378 
Chinese mediation has deep cultural roots. In Chinese legal culture, the encouragement 
for using amicable means of dispute resolution, the consistent pursuit of harmony, 
 
375  Stanley B. Lubman & Gregory C. Wajnowski, International Commercial Dispute Resolution in China: A 
Practical Assessment, The American Review of International Arbitration, Vol. 4, 1993, pp. 107, 115. 
376 John Farina, The Study of Spirituality: Some Problems and Opportunities, US Catholic Historian, Vol. 8, 1989, 
p. 157. 
377 Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Issuing Several Opinions on Further Implementing the Working 
Principle of “Giving Priority to Mediation and Combining Mediation with Judgment” 最高人民法院印发《关于
进一步贯彻“调解优先、调判结合”工作原则的若干意见》的通知 (issued on 07.06.2010), Art. 1.1.2. 
378 For example, from 2011 to 2017, Shanghai Commercial Mediation Center accepted 493 cases entrusted by 
people’s courts, and 262 cases of them were successfully resolved through mediation (the success rate was 68%); in 
2019, 18.27% arbitration cases administered by the Beijing International Arbitration Center ended in mediation. See: 
www.legaldaily.com.cn 法制网, The Blossom of the Oriental Flower: The Current Status, Problems and Solutions 
Regarding Mediation in China 东方之花的绽放——调解在中国的发展现状、问题及对策 , 21.11.2018, 
available at: http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/Arbitration/content/2018-11/21/content_7690176.htm, last visited on 
07.08.2020. Beijing Arbitration Commission & Beijing International Arbitration Center 北京仲裁委员会 & 北京
国际仲裁中心, The Conference on BIAC 2019 Report Was Successfully Held 北仲“2019 年工作报告会”成功
举办, 20.01.2020, available at: http://www.bjac.org.cn/news/view?id=3653, last visited on 31.07.2020. There is also 
an academic discussion on this topic, see e.g. Thomas J. Stipanowich et al., East Meets West: An International 
Dialogue on Mediation and Med-Arb in the United States and China, Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, 
Vol. 9, 2009, pp. 379-414. 
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individuals’ negative sentiment towards litigation,379 and their concerns about losing 
face because of being known as being involved in conflicts can all be satisfied by 
mediation. Furthermore, mediation is a means to make society less individualist and 
more relational,380 which again resonates with the emphasis on community in Chinese 
legal culture. It was argued that Chinese mediation “draws on a collectivist view of the 
world”, which means that the dispute is not just an issue for the disputing parties, but it 
is relevant for the community, and thus mediation contributes to “the restoration of 
harmony in the sense of social stability and status quo to the community affected by the 
conflict”.381 Although extensive use of mediation reasonably raises the question of 
“loss of law”, including the loss of precedents and the absence of norm-setting 
functions,382 this does not seem to be a big issue in Chinese society, probably because 
of the positive consideration of mediation in Chinese legal culture and the possibility 
for its development. In brief, the basic principles and features of Chinese mediation are 
in line with traditional values, and those beliefs and teachings in legal culture have 
guided the Chinese community towards mediation. 
3.3.3 Combining the Construction of the Socialist Rule of Law and the Pursuit of 
Harmony 
With the construction of the modern Chinese legal system, the rule of law is also being 
established. In terms of dispute settlement, this leads to the increased legal awareness 
of individuals and relatively common recourse to litigation where procedural justice 
should be respected and the decision is expected to be reached by a neutral judicial 
organ based on the applicable law.383 
However, as introduced in Section 3.1.2, supra, the socialist rule of law has been 
promoted, which is arguably different from the rule of law perceived by Western legal 
systems. Because of the combination of the pursuit of harmony and the construction of 
the socialist rule of law, the overall objective of dispute settlement in China is more 
about resolving conflicts and restoring the relationship between disputing parties, rather 
than seeking justice by reaching decisions regarding which party is right or wrong under 
the law. In this regard, it is necessary to differentiate social justice from personal justice 
in dispute settlement under China’s legal system. Specifically, social justice stresses 
379 A Chinese saying that is referred to often is that “it is better to be vexed to death than to bring a law suit”. For 
more discussion on this, see: Urs Martin Lauchli, Cross-cultural Negotiations, With a Special Focus on ADR with 
the Chinese, William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 26, 2000, p. 1062. Carlos de Vera, Arbitrating Harmony: “Med-
Arb” and the Confluence of Culture and Rule of Law in the Resolution of International Commercial Disputes in 
China, Columbia Journal of Asian Law, Vol. 18, 2004, p. 149. 
380  Robert A. Baruch Bush & Joseph P. Folger, The Promise of Mediation: Responding to Conflict through 
Empowerment and Recognition, Jossey-Bass, 1994, pp. 255, 259. Oscar G. Chase, Law, Culture, and Ritual–
Disputing Systems in Cross-Cultural Context, New York University Press, 2005, pp. 135-136. 
381 Nadja Alexander, The Mediation Meta Model: Understanding Practice Around the World, Conflict Resolution 
Quarterly, Vol. 26, 2008, p. 99. Here, the author is introducing the categorization given by Bush and Folger in: Robert 
A. Baruch Bush & Joseph P. Folger, The Promise of Mediation: Responding to Conflict through Empowerment and
Recognition, Jossey-Bass, 1994, pp. 236-248.
382 Sundaresh Menon, Mediation and the Rule of Law, The Law Society Mediation Forum, Singapore, 10.03.2017.
383 However, as pointed out, litigation is still an undesired DSM. Chinese parties will not resort to litigation unless
all other avenues have been exhausted, since lawsuits can signify a complete severance of relations between
disputing parties. See: Liyu Han & Henry Gao, China's Experience in Utilizing the WTO Dispute Settlement
Mechanism, at: Gregory C. Shaffer & Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz (eds.), Dispute Settlement at the WTO: The
Developing Country Experience, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 165-166.
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amicable settlement so as to maintain the harmonious conditions in society, while 
personal justice focuses on the realization of legal rights and obligations. Considering 
the established central theme of maintaining harmony, it is arguable that social justice 
has played a relatively greater role in dispute settlement, which has influenced the 
various DSMs in China’s legal system. As pointed out, “law is but one means, far from 
the most important means, of resolving disputes and obtaining justice”.384 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
Traditional philosophies, especially Confucianism, created the ideological foundation 
of Chinese legal culture. Instead of law, the advocated values and teachings played a 
significant role in regulating the ancient Chinese society. Under Confucianism, 
community came before individuals, social responsibility was more important than 
freedom and, most importantly, harmony was prioritized and took a central position. 
Dispute settlement focused on restoring harmonious relationships through amicable 
informal DSMs. Bringing a dispute to a formal DSM like litigation was not desired and 
was even resented.  
Concerning contemporary Chinese legal culture, a mix of modern and ancient elements 
that exist side-by-side can be identified.385 On the one hand, although coming from 
ancient times, it can be argued that the core values of traditional Chinese philosophies 
have been inherited by contemporary Chinese ideologies, and this is especially reflected 
in the goal of constructing a harmonious socialist society. Against this background, 
non-adjudicated solutions to disputes through amicable mechanisms is consistently the 
preferred solution. On the other hand, law has been taken by China as an indispensable 
part of socialist construction, and the socialist rule of law is established. However, this 
is subject to the overall theme of socialist harmony.  
For the resolution of disputes arising from foreign investment, six DSMs act as the main 
mechanisms in the Chinese legal system: negotiation, mediation, arbitration, 
complaints coordination for foreign investment, administrative review, and litigation. 
In general, the whole system has a clear preference for amicable DSMs, especially 
mediation. However, a different development from the situation in the past is that now 
adjudication is increasingly recognized.  
While influenced by the practice in Western legal systems, the DSMs in China’s legal 
system are arguably tainted with elements from Chinese ideologies, which can be taken 
as the ideological foundation of China’s dispute resolution system. Such elements affect 
the procedural design of each DSM and the general structure of China’s dispute 
 
384 Ethan Michelson, Popular Attitudes Towards Dispute Processing in Urban and Rural China, The Foundation 
for Law, Justice and Society, 24.01.2008, available at: http://www.fljs.org/content/popular-attitudes-towards-
dispute-processing-urban-and-rural-china, last visited on 04.08.2020. 
385 Albert Hung-yee Chen, An Introduction to the Legal System of the People’s Republic of China (1st edition), 
Butterworths Asia, 1992, p. 2. It is pointed out that many of such modern components “remain in a state of flux, 
struggling to thrive in rather adverse conditions”. See: Colin B. Picker, China, Global Governance & Legal Culture: 
The Example of China & the WTO, at: China and Global Economic Governance: Ideas and Concepts, The University 
of Tokyo-Institute of Social Science (ISS) Research Series No.45, 2011, p. 75. 
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settlement system that is made up of those mechanisms. The promotion of amicable 
DSMs aims at restoring harmony between disputing parties as well as in society; the 
extensive use of mediation resonates with the requirement of various legal cultural 
elements; even the construction of the socialist rule of law is combined with the pursuit 
of harmony. As a result, social justice is considered of greater weight than personal 
justice, which means that the harmonious and stable condition of the society is more 
important than legal rights and obligations of the disputing parties. 
In summary, from traditional Chinese philosophies to contemporary Chinese ideology, 
the core values have been insisted upon and, in particular, the amicable settlement of 
disputes has been consistently preferred. Such an inheritance from the legal tradition is 
further formally expressed by the institutional construction of China’s domestic dispute 
settlement system. The design of each DSM in China’s legal system for foreign 
investment disputes and the features of the whole dispute settlement system resonate 
with the virtues present in contemporary Chinese ideology under the influence of 
traditional philosophies. All of the mechanisms nudge the disputing parties in the same 
direction, to aim at retaining a harmonious socialist society. 
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Chapter 4 Legal Cultural Characteristics of Dispute Settlement in the EU 
This chapter aims at conducting a parallel analysis of the EU regarding its legal cultural 
characteristics of dispute settlement. Therefore, the three main perspectives that have 
been taken into consideration in Chapter 3 are analysed: dispute settlement according 
to the legal tradition, the DSMs in the internal legal system, and interpreting the DSMs 
in the internal legal system from a legal cultural perspective. This chapter also serves 
as the basis of the examination of the EU’s approach to investment dispute settlement 
at the international level in Chapter 7, infra. 
However, various differences between China and the EU lead to it being impossible to 
formulate an exact parallel analysis. In particular, since the EU is a Union comprising 
27 states,386 rules on DSMs can be categorized into two levels: one from EU Member 
States and the other from the Union. Although the relationship between the rules at 
these two levels is complicated,387 it is clear that the former constitutes part of the 
foundation of the latter and the latter influences the former. In addition, when the Union 
represents its Member States in the negotiations of investment dispute settlement 
systems in prospective IIAs, including the one with China, the situation in the Member 
States and the requirements of EU Member States are borne in mind by the Union. This 
confirms that it is also necessary to consider the situations of EU Member States. 
Furthermore, according to Opinion 2/15 issued by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU), the Union only has “shared competence” with EU Member States in 
relation to a dispute settlement system in an investment treaty.388 Namely, agreement 
from EU Member States is necessary for any treaty on investment. This shows that, for 
the present analysis, it is necessary to take both levels into account. 
Specifically, the discussion in this chapter is divided into five sections. Section 4.1 
explores the characteristics of dispute settlement in European legal culture, including 
the designated constants and other notable European legal cultural characteristics 
related to dispute settlement. Moving on to the design of current DSMs, considering 
that it is not feasibe to provide a complete description of all DSMs in each EU Member 
State in the present thesis, Section 4.2 offers a general description of the main DSMs 
that can be often referred to to resolve foreign investment disputes in EU Member States. 
These include mediation, arbitration and litigation. Section 4.3 assesses the efforts 
made to regulate DSMs that operate at the Union level.389 After that, in Section 4.4, an 
assessment of the DSMs in the EU Member States and the Union’s relevant regulating 
 
386 In June 2016, the United Kingdom held a referendum on its membership of the EU, resulting in 51.89% of votes 
cast in favour of leaving. After that, on 29 March 2017, it formally initiated the withdrawal process. On 31 January 
2020, the United Kingdom officially left the EU, making the total number of EU Member States now 27. 
387 For more information on the interaction between EU law and national laws of EU Member States, see e.g. Paul 
Craig & Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law–Text, Cases, and Materials (Sixth Edition), Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 
266-315. 
388 The Court of Justice of the European Union, Opinion 2/15 of the Court (Full Court), 16.05.2017. 
389 Considering the subject of this thesis, similar to the discussion on China, only the DSMs that are relevant to 
investment related dispute settlement are taken into consideration, which applies to both Section 4.2 and Section 4.3. 
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measures is conducted from a legal cultural perspective. The final Section 4.5 
summarizes and concludes. 
4.1 Dispute Settlement in the European Legal Culture 
This section explores the features of dispute settlement in the European legal culture. It 
first discusses three identified constants in the European legal tradition. This builds the 
necessary basis and offers important inspiration for the next section, which focuses on 
the European legal cultural characteristics of dispute settlement, especially those that 
are in contrast with the legal cultural characteristics of dispute settlement in Chinese 
legal culture. 
In brief, there are five different epochs of European legal history: the Middle Ages (C.E. 
500-1000), the late Middle Ages (C.E. 1000-1453), the early Modern Age (1453-1648),
the Modern Age (1648-1914), and the post-Modern Age (1914-2004).390 Although the
whole development process is complicated, what needs to be summarized here, in the
interest of the following analysis, is that, in European legal history, the focus on
individuals, which was mainly inspired by liberalism, appeared together with the
emphasis on law, and the development of both aspects was intertwined.391 Despite the
ups and downs in this development, law was mainly designed to protect individuals’
rights and ensured the proper use of power by the government or parliament.392
4.1.1 Constants in the European Legal Tradition 
In the development of European legal history, according to Franz Wieacker and Edgar 
Boenheimer, three elements can be depicted as constants in the European legal tradition: 
personalism, legalism and intellectualism. These three elements were generally 
recognized as the common characteristics among EU Member States that continuously 
existed throughout the historical development, and thus they constitute the essential 
constants in European legal culture.393 
Personalism is the first identified constant. Compared to the communitarian spirit, 
which can be described as “with one another”, the nature of human relationships in 
Europe should be described as having a “vis-à-vis” character.394 In other words, instead 
390 See e.g. Randall Lesaffer, European Legal History: A Cultural and Political Perspective, Cambridge University 
Press, 2009. Franz Wieacker & Edgar Boenheimer, Foundations of European Legal Culture, The American Journal 
of Comparative Law, Vol. 38, 1990, pp. 11-19. Bart Wauters & Marco de Benito, The History of Law in Europe: An 
Introduction, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017. It is noted that different years were used by different scholars to divide 
the stages, but there is no substantial divergence. Here, the author follows the approach used by Randall Lesaffer in 
“European Legal History: A Cultural and Political Perspective”, since the perspective used for analysis there is 
relevant for the present work. 
391 For more discussion on this, see e.g. Randall Lesaffer, European Legal History: A Cultural and Political 
Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 348, 354-357, 447-448, 464, 476. Charles de Secondat baron 
de Montesquieu-The Spirit of Law (Volume I), Thomas Ruddingman, 1793, p. 154. Heather M. Campbell (ed.), The 
Britannica Guide to Political and Social Movements That Changed the Modern World, Britannica Educational 
Publishing, 2010, p. 59. 
392 For a further discussion on this, see e.g. Randall Lesaffer, European Legal History: A Cultural and Political 
Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 484-485, 498. 
393 Id. 
394 Franz Wieacker & Edgar Boenheimer, Foundations of European Legal Culture, The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, Vol. 38, 1990, pp. 11-19. 
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of placing importance on the fusion of “I” into “we”, European legal culture focuses on 
the individualism of each member of the society. The root of this tradition can be traced 
back to the appearance of humanism in the early Modern Age. Inspired by classical 
philosophy, such as Platonism, Stoicism and Scepticism, humanism shifted the focus 
from “the static and the collective to the dynamic and the individual”, and it opened the 
door to the individualization and mutability of society.395  As a result, freedom of 
decision and responsibility, and liberum arbitrium, complemented each other.396 It can 
be noted that, unlike in other jurisdictions, the effect of the combination of individuals 
and the ultimate goal of the whole society together is not clear when coming from this 
individualist approach.  
The second element is legalism, which is represented by the separation between law 
and extrinsic social values. 397  In fact, legalism is taken as the feature that “most 
distinguishes European civilization from that of other cultures, in which law emanates 
from an accepted social ethic as it did in classical China”.398 Specifically, positive legal 
norms enjoy independence from other relevant elements and guarantee that the 
benchmark for decisions is the law.399 Legalism determines the role of law as the 
primary basis of judicial decisions in dispute settlement, assuring legal certainty against 
the potential arbitrariness of decision makers. 
Intellectualism is the third identified constant. It is regarded as “a figure of formal 
thinking”, the peculiar way in which law is understood and it is “closely connected with 
the specific structures and traditions of the European thinking”. 400  Intellectualism 
provides European jurists with the creation of concepts and a general systematization 
of legal phenomena in a general idea of justice.401 
In brief, these three constants confirm the emphasis on individuals instead of the 
community, reveal the separation between law and social values and recognize the role 
of law and justice in dispute settlement in the European legal tradition. 
4.1.2 The European Legal Cultural Characteristics of Dispute Settlement 
Although the EU is a “supranational entity which has a state-like character”,402 the 
interactions between national and European patterns of legal culture lead to an overall 
 
395 Bart Wauters & Marco de Benito, The History of Law in Europe: An Introduction, Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2017. 
396 Randall Lesaffer, European Legal History: A Cultural and Political Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 
2009, p. 186. 
397 Such a separation came from the growth of a specific professional administration of justice in ancient Rome. It 
was re-established and intensified by the separation of morality and law at the end of the 17th century and ultimately 
led to the jurisprudential formalism and the statutory positivism of the modern constitutional state. See: id, p. 169. 
398 Franz Wieacker & Edgar Boenheimer, Foundations of European Legal Culture, The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, Vol. 38, 1990, pp. 11-12. 
399 Based on this, legalism has been argued as a pillar of European legal culture. However, it is noticeable that the 
separation between law and moral virtues does not mean excluding constructing statutes in the light of social 
objectives. See: id, pp. 237, 283. 
400 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition, Harvard University Press, 
1983, p. 38. 
401 Franz Wieacker & Edgar Boenheimer, Foundations of European Legal Culture, The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, Vol. 38, 1990, pp. 265, 270-271. 
402 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition, Harvard University Press, 
1983, p. 38. 
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complex system, which is characterized by self-sufficiency, hybridization, conflict, and 
resistance, as well as convergence.403 Bearing this in mind, this section does not aim 
at providing a complete overview of the legal culture in the European dimension. 
Instead, it tries to provide a general picture of the widely recognized common features 
of the EU legal culture in relation to dispute settlement based on the common heritage 
of values and aims, especially those that differ greatly from those of Chinese legal 
culture. 
4.1.2.1 Perception of Law—Justice, Fairness and Legal Rights 
As revealed by the constants in the European legal tradition addressed above, the law 
plays an indispensable role in dispute settlement. There are different perceptions of the 
law among various legal theories, where natural law and legal positivism are the most 
important.404 Natural law is a reflection of rationalism in legal scholarship.405 The 
term “law” is understood in an anthropological way: social order should emerge from 
the informal institutionalization of ethical behaviours. 406  Thus, law consists of a 
number of moral-legal principles that are considered to be natural and reasonable by a 
reasonable person,407 and the concept of individual “natural rights” is advocated.408 
Similarly, natural justice is argued as existing beyond the laws implemented by states 
and should apply to all human beings. In contrast with natural law, legal positivism 
focuses on the investigation of valid law and is not so concerned with morally correct 
law.409 There is no need to test law for its justness or social utility, since “the formal 
laws of a parliamentary democracy ensure that the law is automatically in accordance 
with justice and general welfare”.410 In addition, it is noticeable that the overarching 
 
403 Randall Lesaffer, European Legal History: A Cultural and Political Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 
2009, p. 348. 
404 The debate between natural law and legal positivism was argued as echoing the debate between Chinese 
Confucianism and Legalism. See e.g. Id, p. 354. id, pp. 354-357. There are also scholars who criticized such a 
comparison. See e.g. Id, p. 447. 
405 The tradition of natural law goes back to ancient Greece and Rome, where Socrates and his followers Plato and 
Aristotle argued for the existence of natural justice. See: id, p. 464. For more discussions regarding natural law, see 
e.g. Charles de Secondat baron de Montesquieu-The Spirit of Law (Volume I), Thomas Ruddingman, 1793, p. 154. 
Randall Lesaffer, European Legal History: A Cultural and Political Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2009, 
p. 476. id, p. 448. Heather M. Campbell (ed.), The Britannica Guide to Political and Social Movements That 
Changed the Modern World, Britannica Educational Publishing, 2010, p. 59. Randall Lesaffer, European Legal 
History: A Cultural and Political Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 484-485. 
406 Randall Lesaffer, European Legal History: A Cultural and Political Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 
2009, p. 498. 
407 Id, p. 485. 
408 “Natural rights” have since become one of the basic principles in Western legislation. For instance, the Code of 
Frederick the Great of Prussia, the 1804 French Civil Code, the 1896 German Civil Code, and the 1907 Swiss Civil 
Code all included the idea of protecting individual rights and individual freedom, equality and security. See: Franz 
Wieacker & Edgar Boenheimer, Foundations of European Legal Culture, The American Journal of Comparative 
Law, Vol. 38, 1990, p. 20. id. 
409 The origin of legal positivism can be traced back to the Greek sophists. It was continuously developed by a series 
of leading thinkers who generally developed three versions of legal positivism: the command theory of law (by 
Jeremy Bentham and John Austin), the norm theory of law (by Hans Kelsen), and the rule theory of law (by Herbert 
Lionel Adolphus Hart). Despite the differences among these three versions, the investigation of valid law is shared 
among them. See: Randall Lesaffer, European Legal History: A Cultural and Political Perspective, Cambridge 
University Press, 2009, pp. 348-349. For a further discussion on legal positivism, see e.g. Franz Wieacker & Edgar 
Boenheimer, Foundations of European Legal Culture, The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 38, 1990, p. 
21. id, pp. 23-24. id, p. 24. 
410 Franz Wieacker & Edgar Boenheimer, Foundations of European Legal Culture, The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, Vol. 38, 1990, p. 23. 
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position of law does not keep law away from society; on the contrary, law is portrayed 
as accessible and not unduly hierarchical.411 In brief, according to natural law, social 
order should emerge from the informal institutionalization of ethical behaviours,412 
while legal positivism views positive law as the sole legitimate authority.413 
At the same time, it is important to note that natural law and legal positivism do not 
completely contradict each other. Law is at the same time taken as the guarantor of 
rights and the extent of freedom by both natural law and legal positivism. As a result 
of the development of Western civilization based on “social compromise between 
pluralistic groups”, law in fact has the role of balancing the power of the ruler.414 This 
has been carried down into the legal systems in modern Europe. According to the 
empirical research done by Åse B. Grødeland & William L. Miller, attitudes towards 
the understanding of law in societies in Europe are similar: law is equated with justice, 
fairness and legal rights.415 
4.1.2.2 The Rule of Law—Law’s Supremacy and Benchmark Function 
In addition to arriving at a common understanding of law, agreement is also reached on 
the concept of the rule of law between natural law and legal positivism,416 which 
constitutes an important element of the European legal tradition. Despite the existence 
of different schools of thought relating to the rule of law,417 it is fair to say that this 
notion presupposes the supremacy of law.418 In other words, the rule of law signifies 
the “imperium legume”, i.e. “the empire of laws and not of men”,419 and it requires that 
private and public power should be regulated by the law.420 Furthermore, everybody is 
equal before law and the law acts as the guarantor of individuals’ civil rights.421 Under 
this notion, the law governs each individual and the entire society, and it brings all 
411 Id, pp. 25-26. 
412 Id, p. 26. 
413 Hans W. Micklitz, The (Un)-Systematics of (Private) Law as an Element of European Culture, at: Geneviève 
Helleringer & Kai Purnhagen (eds.), Towards a European Legal Culture, Hart Publishing, 2014, p. 85. id. 
414 Id, p. 82. 
415 Paolo Davide Farah, L’influenza Della Concezione Confuciana Sulla Costruzione del Sistema Giuridico e 
Politico Cinese (The Influence of Confucianism on the Construction of the Chinese Political and Juridical System), 
at: Giovanni Bombelli & Bruno Montanari (eds.), Identità Europea e Politiche Migratorie, Vita e Pensiero, 2008, pp. 
193-226. Åse B. Grødeland & William L. Miller’s research revealed that the attitudes of citizens in Eastern and
Western Europe towards law and what law was all about were remarkably similar, whereas perceptions of “law in
practice” differed by state and often correlated with GDP per capita and country ranking in rule of law indices.
416  Jean Yves Heurtebise, Understanding Non-Trade Concerns Through Comparative Chinese and European 
Philosophy of Law, at: China's Influence on Non-Trade Concerns in International Economic Law, Routledge, 2016, 
p. 289. The author also pointed out that such a synthesis did not exist between Confucianism and Legalism or in 
China’ legal tradition.
417 There were three major schools of the rule of law existing in European historical development, which constituted
the root of the rule of law in Europe: British, French and German schools of the rule of law. For a further discussion
on these three schools, see: Kenneth Winston, The Internal Morality of Chinese Legalism, Singapore Journal of
Legal Studies, Vol. 12, 2005, pp. 313-347.
418 Mehmet Ruhi Demiray, Natural Law Theory, Legal Positivism, and the Normativity of Law, The European
Legacy, Vol. 20, 2015, p. 808.
419 Jacques Martain (translated by Doris C. Anson), The Rights of Man and Natural Law, Gordian Press, 1971. 
During its historical development in Europe, this notion was continuously developed by various scholars, like John
Locke, Cesare Beccaria and Walter Hallstein. For more information on the arguments of these scholars, see: John 
Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Right, Clarendon Press, 1980.
420 Heinrich A. Rommen (translated by Thomas R. Hanley & Russell Hittinger), The Natural Law: A Study in Legal 
and Social History and Philosophy, Liberty Fund Inc, 1998.
421 Mark C. Murphy, Natural Law in Jurisprudence and Politics, Cambridge University Press, 2006.
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social life within an impersonalized framework. 422  The main elements that are 
recognized as composing the rule of law can be summarized as “legality, or supremacy 
of the law”, “legal certainty”, “prohibition of arbitrariness”, “access to justice before 
independent and impartial courts”, “respects for human rights”, and “non-
discrimination and equality before the law”.423 
In addition to identifying the role of law, in terms of dispute settlement in particular, 
the rule of law requires law to be taken as the benchmark in making evaluations and 
judgments. It also presents the basic requirements of a judicial system, such as the 
existence of an accessible and independent body to resolve disputes according to the 
law424 and compliance with substantial and procedural justice. 
4.1.2.3 The Attitude towards Litigation—Seeking Rights and Procedural Justice 
The development of litigation in Europe is argued to be a result of an amalgam of law 
and culture, tradition, and ritual; particularly, access to litigation stemmed historically 
from a commitment to democratic governance.425 In general, litigation ensures the 
protection and realization of individuals’ rights. Rule makers approach the evolution of 
civil litigation to equip litigants better and to encourage them as rights seekers.426  
Procedural justice is considered indispensable in the litigation process. As the often-
quoted saying goes, justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.427 Procedural justice 
in Europe has its origin in natural justice and is linked to protecting human rights.428 
Among the well-recognized components of procedural justice, transparency, in 
particular, exists as part of the European legal tradition.429 Based on the principle of 
transparency, the public is educated, judges, litigants and lawyers are supervised, and 
422 Tony Burns, Aristotle and Natural Law, History of Political Thought, Vol. 19, 1998. 
423 These elements were based on the observation of two definitions by Maravall and by Tom Bingham, as well as 
the Rechtsstaat concept of the rule of law. See: Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, Yale University Press, 1969, p. 
23. For more literature on the definition of the rule of law, see: Randall Lesaffer, European Legal History: A Cultural 
and Political Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 449. Edger Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence-The
Philosophy and Method of the Law, Harvard University Press, 1974, pp. 58-59. Kun Fan, Arbitration in China: A 
Legal and Cultural Analysis, Hart Publishing, 2013, p. 192. Mehmet Ruhi Demiray, Natural Law Theory, Legal 
Positivism, and the Normativity of Law, The European Legacy, Vol. 20, 2015, p. 813. W. J. Waluchow, Inclusive
Legal Positivism, Clarendon Press, 1994. Michael D.A. Freeman, Legal Theory at the End of the Millennium, Oxford
University Press, 1998.
424 The need for a judicial system can also be explained from the perspective of individualism: individualists
promoted the establishment of legal institutions as private guardians. See: Robert P. George, The Autonomy of Law: 
Essays on Legal Positivism, Oxford University Press, 1999.
425 In Europe, the development of democracy affected the need for, the access to, and the mode of adjudication; in
return, the “triumphant expansion of adjudication” was “a touchstone of thriving democracy”. See: Randall Lesaffer,
European Legal History: A Cultural and Political Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 463. Judith 
Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication, Boston University Law Review, Vol. 86, 2006, p. 1126.
426 It is not denied that there was also a promotion of using amicable DSMs in European legal history at certain
stages. For example, according to the Roman historian Tacitus (Publius Cornelius Tacitus, c.AD 55-120), 
traditionally, the Germans brought and resolved their disputes before the assembly. The tribal leaders would
generally seek to persuade the parties to resolve the dispute rather than to impose a judgment. However, this
promotion was more of an incident instead of anything consistent. See: Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, Yale
University Press, 1969, p. 23.
427 This is also stated as not only must justice be done; it must also be seen to be done.
428  Randall P. Peerenboom, Law and Morality in Ancient China: The Silk Manuscripts of Huang-Lao, State
University of New York Press, 1993.
429 This came together with the insisted opposition to secretive adjudication processes. See: Yang Shang (translated
and noted by J.J.L. Duyvendak), The Book of Lord Shang: A Classic of the Chinese School of Law, The Lawbook
Exchange, Ltd., 1963, p. 170.
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knowledge of legal requirements is disseminated.430 In addition, in litigation, judges 
are expected to deliver judgments according to the applicable law, instead of merely 
helping disputing parties to settle disputes. Courts throughout Europe aim at “protecting 
fundamental rights of citizens and transnational rule of law based on coherent 
‘principles of justice’ respecting the legitimacy of ‘constitutional pluralism’ and of 
legal diversity”.431 
 
4.2 Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in the EU Member States 
Considering the unfeasibility of conducting a complete analysis of the DSMs in each 
EU Member State, within the scope of this thesis, this section instead offers a general 
description of the main DSMs used by EU Member States for foreign investment 
disputes, which include mediaiton, arbitration, and litigation, with a view to presenting 
the main common procedural features of these DSMs under the laws at level of the EU 
Member States. 
4.2.1 Mediation 
The historical development of mediation in Europe can be traced back to Ancient 
Rome,432 after which the Middle Ages brought about the development of the modern 
concept and methodology of mediation procedures. As society moved into the 
Industrial Age, the increasing number of cases and the complexity of the disputes made 
states realize the necessity of promoting mediation and encouraging disputing parties 
to reach a settlement.433 Subsequently, in the post-industrial society, there was a trend 
of using mediation as an important mechanism by dispute resolution institutions, 
including judicial bodies. 434  However, the “institutionalization of mediation” was 
argued to have taken place only a few decades ago, and even just a few years ago in 
some EU Member States.435  
The development of mediation and its status quo in the EU Member States is diverse. 
Some states, such as the Netherlands, embraced mediation earlier than others, and they 
consider this DSM an essential part of their dispute settlement systems;436 some other 
states, such as Germany, have a relatively short history of mediation legislation, but 
rule-making is carried out based on extensive comparative research; there are also EU 
 
430 Kun Fan, Arbitration in China: A Legal and Cultural Analysis, Hart Publishing, 2013, p. 193. 
431 It was also pointed out that the legal and judicial traditions in many Asian states were different and could 
legitimately prioritize alternative dispute resolution methodologies. See: Åse B. Grødeland & William L. Miller, 
European Legal Cultures in Transition, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 123. 
432  Jean Yves Heurtebise, Understanding Non-Trade Concerns Through Comparative Chinese and European 
Philosophy of Law, at: China's Influence on Non-Trade Concerns in International Economic Law, Routledge, 2016, 
pp. 289-290. 
433 For example, the first French Constitution prescribed compulsory mediation and conciliation as prerequisites for 
disputes being heard by courts. 
434 Alessia Azzini & Alban Heron, The Meaning of the Rule of Law, Seminar Towards European Constitutionalism, 
23-24.05.2016. 
435 Åse B. Grødeland & William L. Miller, European Legal Cultures in Transition, Cambridge University Press, 
2015, p. 83. 
436 The 2011 study of the Netherlands Mediation Institute (NMI) “De stand van Mediation in Nederland” estimated 
that a total of 51,690 mediation cases had been conducted by persons affiliated with the NMI in the year 2011. 
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Member States, such as Bulgaria, where mediation is still in its infancy.437 In addition, 
the regulatory approach towards mediation also differs among EU Member States: 
some opt for extensive regulatory measures; some prefer very little legislation to ensure 
flexibility and creativity; while others trying to solve the tension between voluntariness 
and the possible abuse of freedom through selected regulations.438 Such differences 
among EU Member States are partly due to their diverse legal environments.439 For 
example, if the duration of litigation before the first instance courts is long, and/or the 
courts’ caseloads are excessive, legislation may push disputing parties to use out-of-
court resolution procedures. In recent years, as a reaction to the EU’s Directive on 
Mediation adopted in 2008, many EU Member States now promote a comprehensive 
reform of mediation law and have moved towards more extensive and more intensive 
regulations.440 
4.2.2 Arbitration 
Arbitration in Europe was initially developed as a reaction to the need to resolve 
disputes about transactions at merchant fairs. 441  During the Post-Classical period, 
arbitration became increasingly popular because of its expediency and the intrinsic 
commercial expertise, as well as the deficiencies of national courts at that time, which 
were characterized as “unreliable, cumbersome and costly, and faced particular 
difficulties in international and other cross-border matters”.442 However, there was also 
opposition to arbitration, for example from France.443  
A study was carried out in 2015, upon the request of the European Parliament, regarding 
the current law and practice of arbitration across the EU.444 In this study, various issues 
of arbitration were examined based on the factual situations in the EU Member States. 
Those that are relevant to the present analysis are summarized as follows: 1. Distinction 
between domestic and international arbitration. The majority of jurisdictions do not 
 
437 In Bulgaria, mediation is still in its infancy stage with several 100 mediations per year. See: Mortimer Sellers, 
What Is the Rule of Law and Why Is It So Important?, at: Flora A.N.J. Goudappel & Ernst M.H. Hirsch Ballin (eds.), 
Democracy and Rule of Law in the European Union–Essays in Honour of Jaap W. de Zwaan, T.M.C. Asser Press, 
2016, p. 4. 
438 Alessia Azzini & Alban Heron, The Meaning of the Rule of Law, Seminar Towards European Constitutionalism, 
23-24.05.2016. 
439 Mortimer Sellers, What Is the Rule of Law and Why Is It So Important?, at: Democracy and Rule of Law in the 
European Union–Essays in Honour of Jaap W. de Zwaan, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016, p. 6. 
440 Åse B. Grødeland & William L. Miller, European Legal Cultures in Transition, Cambridge University Press, 
2015, p. 83. The EU’s Directive on Mediation is further discussed in the following Section 4.3.1.2. 
441 Zhiping Liang, Explicating “Law”: A Comparative Perspective of Chinese and Western Legal Culture, Journal 
of Chinese Law, Vol. 3, 1989, p. 154. 
442 Alessia Azzini & Alban Heron, The Meaning of the Rule of Law, Seminar Towards European Constitutionalism, 
23-24.05.2016. The author did not give any definition of the period referred to as the “Post-Classical period” in this 
book. The Post-Classical period often runs from about 500 CE to 1450 CE, characterized by the expansion of 
civilizations in different areas and the development of trade networks between them. See e.g. Gottfried Dietze, Two 
Concepts of the Rule of Law, Liberty Fund, 1973. 
443 During the French Revolution, the revolutionaries presented great hostility towards arbitration by opposing its 
use, essentially because they believed “parties should be protected against the advance and abstract waiver of access 
to judicial protection and guarantees”. As Born pointed out, “[t]he Edict of 1560 and merchant practice led to 
widespread use of arbitration for resolving commercial disputes in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries [but] the French 
Revolution changed this like much else”. See: Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1986.  
444 Franz Leopold Neumann, The Rule of Law: Political Theory and the Legal System in Modern Society, Berg 
Publishers Ltd., 1986. 
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make a difference between domestic and international arbitration, but this co-exists 
with the fact that some leading arbitral states like France have adopted such a split 
approach; 2. Competence-competence doctrine. All EU Member States allow 
arbitrators to decide their own jurisdiction, but some also grant national courts the 
power to decide on the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals; 3. Arbitrators’ qualification. 
Almost all EU Member States do not require arbitrators to possess a certain 
qualification. However, being independent and impartial is explicitly prescribed; 4. Ad 
hoc vs. institutional arbitration. Disputing parties are free to choose ad hoc or 
institutional arbitration, although some EU Member States restrict the establishment of 
arbitral institutions, while some others make ad hoc arbitration less attractive through 
legislation; 5. Appeal and setting aside. Arbitral awards generally cannot be appealed, 
but they can be set aside. EU Member States overwhelmingly adopted the approach 
that a very limited number of situations relating to procedural unfairness and public 
policy constitute the basis of setting aside.445 In general, substantial harmonization has 
been reached regarding the current situations of arbitration in EU Member States, 
including legislation and legal practice, 446  which at the same time is in line with 
international arbitration practice.447 
4.2.3 Litigation 
Most domestic legislation of EU Member States on DSMs focuses on litigation.448 This 
DSM forms part of the EU Member States’ and the EU’s legal tradition, reflecting their 
conviction about the “proper organization of the courts’ judicial system in delivering 
timely and fair judgments”.449 Detailed regulations on litigation, which are normally 
contained in the EU Member States’ civil procedural regimes, differ greatly, which 
makes it difficult to provide a general description.450 
Aside from such differences, common fundamental procedural principles are reflected 
in most EU Member States’ judicial systems, which can be confirmed by the Joint ELI-
UNIDROIT Project recently initiated by the European Commission, “From 
Transnational Principles to European Rules of Civil Procedure”. This project aims at 
establishing European rules of civil procedure based on the recognized minimum 
principles of civil procedure common to EU Member States. Since this project is part 
 
445 Buyun Li 李步云, Discussion on The Rule of Law 论法治, Social Sciences Academic Press 社会科学文献出
版社, 2008. 
446 Leonardo Morlino & Gianluigi Palombella (eds.), Rule of Law and Democracy: Inquiries into Internal and 
External Issues, Brill, 2010, p. 47.  
447 This resonates with the argument that contemporary international arbitration has its roots in the dominant 
Western legal tradition. See: European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Rule of 
Law Checklist, Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 106th Plenary Session, Venice, 11-12.03.2016. 
448 Kun Fan, Arbitration in China: A Legal and Cultural Analysis, Hart Publishing, 2013, pp. 185-186. 
449 Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication, Boston University Law Review, Vol. 86, 2006, pp. 1108, 
1154. See also: Judith Resnik, For Owen M. Fiss: Some Reflections on the Triumph and the Death of Adjudication, 
University of Miami Law Review, Vol. 10, 2003. 
450 Randall Lesaffer, European Legal History: A Cultural and Political Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 
2009, pp. 164-165. See also: Franz Wieacker & Edgar Boenheimer, Foundations of European Legal Culture, The 
American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 38, 1990, p. 29. Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication, 
Boston University Law Review, Vol. 86, 2006, p. 1114. For more detailed information on litigation in EU Member 
States’ civil procedural laws, see: Judith Resnik, Due Process: A Public Dimension, The University of Florida Law 
Review, Vol. 39, 1987, pp. 405-426. 
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of the efforts made at the Union level on regulating DSMs, more information is 
provided in the following Section 4.3.3.3. 
 
4.3 Rules on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms at the Union Level 
This section presents the characteristics of the rules on DSMs at the Union level, 
especially those that are in line with the EU’s legal culture on dispute settlement 
identified in Section 4.1.2, supra. Specifically, it first investigates relevant legislative 
measures taken by the Union. Following that, as the judicial body of the EU and the 
highest judicial decision maker regarding EU law, the CJEU’s practice, including its 
procedural rules, rulings on procedural justice and other relevant practice, deserves 
attention and thus is also assessed. Then Section 4.3.3 explores the Union’s other efforts 
that have had some regulative effect on DSMs in the EU, which include the Union’s 
accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, its supervision of the EU 
Member States’ national legal systems and the Joint ELI-UNIDROIT Project.451 
As a supranational body, the Union only has authority where this has been granted by 
its Member States. The Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) stipulate the authority of and general 
guidance for the Union to regulate civil procedure in its Member States, which includes 
DSMs. According to the explicit provisions in these two treaties, the main purpose of 
relevant rules has been defined as ensuring effective access to justice and creating an 
area of freedom, security and justice.452 Following this general guidance, with the EU’s 
transformation from the original common market project to a diverse constitutional 
entity, both economic and non-economic elements play a role in further justifying the 
Union’s efforts in regulating DSMs within the EU.453 As an example of the effect of 
economic elements, reinforcing market integration promoted the Union’s legislative 
measures on cross-border litigation. 454  In terms of the effects of non-economic 
elements, European citizenship, which encompasses a right to knowledge of the law 
and procedure and participating in legal processes in available and accessible 
 
451 In order to limit the discussion to a manageable scope, the creation of the EU by the Treaty of Maastricht (signed 
on 07.02.1992, came into force on 01.11.1993) is taken as the starting point for setting the scope of relevant measures 
that are taken into consideration by the present analysis. 
452 The Treaty on the European Union (TEU), Art. 3.2; the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Arts. 67, 
81.2. 
453 Four elements were discerned as widely acknowledged justifications: market integration, efficiency, European 
citizenship, and fundamental human rights. More detailed analyses of these four elements can be found in the 
literature, which also pointed out other possible elements of justification. See e.g. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Trade 
and Investment Adjudication Involving ‘Silk Road Projects’: Legal Methodology Challenges, European University 
Institute Working Papers, Vol. 2, 2018, p. 9. Here, the author selects those that are widely recognized and relevant 
for the subject of the present thesis. 
454 Accordingly, efficiency, a requirement emanating from the market, acted as a guiding principle. See: Randall 
Lesaffer, European Legal History: A Cultural and Political Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 164-
165. This related to various aspects of the rules on civil procedure, such as the duration of proceedings, clearance 
rate and the number of pending cases. See: Davydenko Dmitry Leonidovich, Amicable Dispute Resolution in the 
European Legal Tradition, Infotropic Media Publishing House, 2013. 
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institutions,455 as well as the promotion of fundamental rights in the EU,456 are taken 
an indispensable part of building the area of freedom, security, and justice, and 
especially in ensuring access to justice.457 Thus, they also justify the Union’s efforts 
making regulations in the field of civil procedure. 
4.3.1 The Legislative Measures of the Union in Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
The sources of EU law are generally divided into three levels: primary law, secondary 
law and supplementary law. 458  Regarding the legislative measures on DSMs, the 
relevant primary law is identified as the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (CFREU); secondary legislation includes the Directive on Mediation and two 
Regulations on specific kinds of disputes; and for the analysis of supplementary law, 
the focus is put on the practice of the CJEU, which is discussed separately in Section 
4.3.2, infra.  
4.3.1.1 Primary law 
In primary law, the Union regulates civil procedure mainly from the perspective of 
ensuring that European citizens have access to proper civil procedure to resolve 
potential disputes and to protect their fundamental rights. This should be in line with 
personalism, legalism, and a consistent pursuit of individual’s rights especially with 
reference to adjudication in dispute settlement in the EU’s legal tradition.  
A key legal instrument in this respect is the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (CFREU).459  Article 47 of the CFREU establishes the minimum 
procedural standards of the dispute settlement process under the right to “a fair trial” 
enshrined in the concept of “effective access to justice”. These standards include the 
right to an effective remedy before a tribunal, the right to a fair and public hearing 
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously 
established by law, the right to be advised, defended and represented, and the right to 
legal aid for those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is necessary to 
ensure effective access to justice.460 This Article clearly echoes Article 6 of the ECHR, 
as both of them resonate with each other on protecting procedural justice in civil 
 
455 Some legislative measures, such as the Legal Aid Directive, the Small Claims Regulation, have illustrated the 
wish to support lay litigants and contribute to citizen participation in the legal process. See: Felix Steffek, Mediation 
in the European Union: An Introduction, Europa.eu, 06.2012, available at: https://e-
justice.europa.eu/fileDownload.do?id=b3e6a432-440d-4105-b9d5-29a8be95408f, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
456 Id, pp. 13-14. This is in particular evidenced by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(CFREU). 
457 This is enshrined in Art. 9 of the TEU and Art. 20 of the TFEU. The formal introduction of EU citizenship was 
preceded by several prior attempts, such as the direct elections to the European Parliament. See: id, p. 14. 
458 Primary law is the supreme source of EU law and consists mainly of the Treaties of the EU; secondary law, 
which includes legal instruments based on the Treaties; supplementary sources that designate the unwritten sources 
of EU law as opposed to the primary and secondary sources. See: id. 
459 The advent of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU), proclaimed in Nice in 
December 2000, brought the fundamental rights protected in the EU together in a single document. See: id, p. 13. It 
became legally binding on the EU institutions and EU Member States with the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon in 2009. See: Francis M. Burdick, What Is the Law Merchant?, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 2, 1902, pp. 
472-475. In particular, Article 6 of the TEU confers the same legal force on the CFREU as that of the Treaty itself. 
This means that the CFREU is at the top of the EU legal hierarchy and applies to the situation where EU law is 
implemented. See: Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edition), Kluwer Law International, 
2014, pp. 29, 31. 
460 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 326 (entered into force on 18.12.2000), Art. 47. 
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procedure.461 As pointed out, the fundamental right to a fair trial encapsulated in the 
CFREU stems from a shared value of EU Member States’ legal histories, which 
constitutes part of the European legal foundation and provides the basis for further 
legislation on dispute settlement procedures.462 
4.3.1.2 Secondary Legislation 
Recent years witnessed the emergence of an increasing number of harmonized legal 
rules adopted by the Union in the area of civil procedure, which address dispute 
settlement processes.463 The necessity of such rules at the Union level arises mainly 
from the fact that the differences among the EU Member States’ procedural rules create 
problems in cross-border cases, and effective access to justice in certain EU Member 
States is not guaranteed. 464  As was pointed out, “[m]aintaining national civil 
procedural rules that impede litigants from having access to effective remedies and fair 
adjudication of their rights is unacceptable in the EU remit”. 465  As a result, it is 
considered necessary that the Union lays down a number of minimum procedural 
standards in these legislative measures. 466  Such secondary legislative measures 
particularly include the EU Directive on Mediation and two other regulations on 
specific types of disputes.467 Since the focus of these two Regulations is on protecting 
certain groups through simplifying procedures to ensure the efficiency of dispute 
settlement process, these legal instruments are not very helpful for exploring the general 
procedural features of dispute settlement promoted by the Union and therefore are not 
discussed in detail in the present work.  
 
461 In fact, Art. 52.3 of the CFREU explicitly states that Charter rights corresponding to the ECHR rights should 
generally have the same meaning and scope. 
462 Peter N. Stearns, Periodization in World History: Challenges and Opportunities, at: Weller R. Charles (ed.), 
21st-Century Narratives of World History: Global and Multidisciplinary Perspectives, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, 
pp. 83-110. 
463 The harmonization of civil procedure traces back to the Storme’s report presenting the result of a study on the 
approximation of EU Member States’ rules of civil procedure. See: Gary B. Born, International Commercial 
Arbitration (2nd edition), Kluwer Law International, 2014, pp. 35-41. For a more complete analysis of the EU 
Regulations and Directives on civil procedure (as of 31 December 2011), see: European Parliament-Directorate 
General for Internal Policies-Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Legal Instruments 
and Practice of Arbitration in the EU, 2014, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/509988/IPOL_STU(2015)509988_EN.pdf, last visited 
on 01.08.2020. 
464 This may be due to the long duration, high cost and other drawbacks of domestic judicial systems. For example, 
a long duration of civil proceedings is typical seen in Italy, where the average length of first instance proceedings is 
3.3 years, whereas the appeal process can stretch the final decision by several more years. In terms of legal fees, 
taking lawyers’ fees as an example, it can be very expensive in some states, such as France, Spain, and Switzerland. 
See: European Parliament-Directorate General for Internal Policies-Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs, Legal Instruments and Practice of Arbitration in the EU, 2014, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/509988/IPOL_STU(2015)509988_EN.pdf, last visited 
on 01.08.2020.  
465 Id. 
466 Won L. Kidane, The Culture of International Arbitration, Oxford University Press, 2017, pp. 286-287. 
467  They are the European Regulation on Small Claims Procedure, and the Legal Framework for Consumer 
Alternative and Online Dispute Resolution. See: Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 11 July 2007 establishing a European Small Claims Procedure, OJ L 199, 31.7.2007; European 
Commission, Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on alternative 
dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation, (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC, 
OJ L 165, 18.06.2013; European Commission, Regulation (EU) No 524/2013 of The European Parliament and of 
the Council of 21 May 2013 on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation, (EC) No 
2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC, OJ L 165, 18.06.2013. 
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The EU Directive on Mediation aims at facilitating access to alternative dispute 
resolution and promoting the amicable settlement of disputes “by encouraging the use 
of mediation and by ensuring a balanced relationship between mediation and judicial 
proceedings”. 468  Guided by the principles of flexibility and predictability, 469  the 
Union adopted “Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 21 May 2008 on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters”.470 
This Directive applies to intra-EU mediation,471 which includes mediation conducted 
by a judge who is not responsible for any judicial proceedings concerning the dispute 
in question.472 According to this Directive, mediation is a structured process, whereby 
two or more parties to a dispute attempt to reach an agreement, by themselves, on a 
voluntary basis, on the settlement of their dispute with the assistance of a mediator.473 
Mediators are required to conduct mediation in an effective, impartial and competent 
way, 474  and it is considered important for them to follow the European Code of 
Conduct for Mediators.475 Mediation is supposed to be confidential. Article 7.2 of the 
EU Directive on Mediation expressly entitles EU Member States to enact stricter 
measures to protect the confidentiality of mediation.476 At the same time, this Directive 
also covers the enforcement of the agreed solution from mediation, requiring EU 
Member States to guarantee the possibility of the enforcement of settlement agreements 
with the explicit consent of the disputing parties.477 Although EU Member States are 
obliged to achieve the objectives set out in the Directive, since it is a Directive and not 
a Regulation, they have discretion as to how to achieve those objectives.478 Thus, EU 
468 European Parliament, Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on 
Certain Aspects of Mediation in Civil and Commercial Matters, Directive 2008/52/EC, 24.05.2008, Art. 1. 
469 European Parliament resolution of 13 September 2011 on the implementation of the directive on mediation in 
the Member States, its impact on mediation and its take-up by the courts [2011/2026[INI]]. 
470 This Directive came into force on 13 June 2008. It requires EU Member States (except Denmark) to bring into 
force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive before 21 May 
2011. See: European Parliament, Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 
2008 on Certain Aspects of Mediation in Civil and Commercial Matters, Directive 2008/52/EC, 24.05.2008, Art. 12. 
471 Id, Arts. 1, 2. 
472 Id, Art. 3(a). This excludes attempts made by the court or the judge to settle a dispute in the course of judicial 
proceedings concerning the dispute in question. 
473 Id, Art. 3(a). 
474 Id, Art. 3(b). 
475 Id, Art. 4.1. This Code of Conduct sets out a number of principles, covering main areas of mediation, including 
competence, advertising, impartiality, and fees, to which individual mediators can voluntarily decide to commit. It 
is intended to be applicable to all kinds of mediation in civil and commercial matters. For more information on this, 
see: Felix Steffek, Mediation in the European Union: An Introduction, Europa.eu, 06.2012, available at: https://e-
justice.europa.eu/fileDownload.do?id=b3e6a432-440d-4105-b9d5-29a8be95408f, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
476 European Parliament, Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on 
Certain Aspects of Mediation in Civil and Commercial Matters, Directive 2008/52/EC, 24.05.2008, Art. 7.2. 
477 Id, Art. 6.1. 
478 A “directive” is a legislative act that sets out a goal that all EU Member States must achieve. However, it is up 
to the individual EU Member States to devise their own laws on how to reach these goals. See: Konstantinos D. 
Kerameus, Procedural Harmonization in Europe, American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 43, 1995, pp. 404-
405. Furthermore, it deserves attention that the provisions in this Directive do not have the same binding force. Some
articles set concrete rules for EU Member States to transpose them into their national laws, such as Art. 6, while
others are designed in a soft way and only express a desire, such as Art. 4. There are also issues that were left
untouched, for example, the liability of mediators and the regulation of professional mediator associations. This can
be read as a reflection of the divergence among EU Member States regarding the different approaches to regulating
mediation and the fact that mediation is still in the process of development within the EU area. See: Hugh Collins, 
European Private Law and the Cultural Diversity, European Review of Private Law, Vol. 3, 1995, p. 364.
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Member States are “left free to develop a culturally-shaped and nationally-biased view 
of what the word ‘mediation’ means”.479 
The Union’s efforts in promoting mediation by providing relevant rules is based on the 
increased awareness of the function of alternative dispute resolution in improving 
access to justice.480 As pointed out by EU legislators, “the concept of access to justice 
does not only refer to courts, but should also include all proceedings that are suitable 
for resolving disputes”.481 At the same time, such alternatives can lessen the increasing 
workload of courts, reduce the legal costs of disputing parties and help them reach 
amicable settlements. 
The adoption of the EU Directive on Mediation undoubtedly increased the awareness 
of and incentivized the use of mediation to a certain extent. Regarding the practical 
influence of this Directive, empirical research revealed that “[d]espite its proven and 
multiple benefits, mediation in civil and commercial matters is still used in less than 1% 
of the cases in the EU”.482 This is probably due to many factors, including hesitation 
from disputing parties to refer to mediation because of its low effectiveness in ending 
disputes, general anti-mediation culture and ineffective implementation by some EU 
Member States.483 Another report issued in 2010 confirmed how little mediation is 
used and further argued that mediation in Europe can be described as a high quality 
product that was rarely used.484  
4.3.2 The Practice of the Court of Justice of the European Union on Procedural 
Justice 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is the judicial body of the EU and 
where disputes concerning EU law are finally decided. The discussion in this section 
aims at exploring procedural justice from the prism of the practice of the CJEU, mainly 
based on its applicable procedural rules and its rulings on procedural justice. 
4.3.2.1 Procedural Rules 
The procedural rules of the CJEU come from the Statute of the CJEU and the procedural 
rules of each of the EU courts.485 Based on the requirements provided in these rules, 
 
479  Stephen Goldstein, On Comparing and Unifying Civil Procedural Systems, at: Roger Cotterrell (ed.), 
Butterworth Lectures 1994: Process and Substance, Butterworths, 1995, pp. 3-28. 
480 Pierre Legrand, On the Unbearable Localness of the Law: Academic Fallacies and Unseasonable Observations, 
European Review of Private Law, Vol. 1, 2002, p. 61. 
481 Alan Uzelac, Reforming Mediterranean Civil Procedure: Is There a Need for Shock Therapy?, at: C. H. van 
Rhee & Alan Uzelac (eds.), Civil Justice between Efficiency and Quality: From Ius Commune to the CEPEJ, 
Intersentia, 2008, p. 71. 
482  europa.eu, The European Judicial Network in Civil and Commercial mMatters, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/index_en.htm, last visited on 06.08.2020. 
483 Based on an analysis of the situations of mediation in all EU Member States, it was summarized that “[t]he 
Directive’s intended purpose to stimulate cross-border mediation has been impeded by the way it has been conceived, 
implemented and regulated”. See: Eva Storskrubb, Civil Procedure and EU Law: A policy Area Uncovered, Oxford 
University Press, 2008, pp. 78, 278-283. 
484  This conclusion is based on a paradox comprised of two numbers: based on the ratio of the number of 
mediations/the number of litigated cases in Europe, an average use of mediation was 0.5%, but the average settlement 
rate in mediation was 75%. See: Fernández Arroyo DP, Exorbitant and Exclusive Grounds of Jurisdiction in 
European Private International Law: Will They Ever Survive?, at: Heinz P Mansel et al. (eds.), Festschrift für Erik 
Jayme, Sellier, 2004, p. 182. 
485 The CJEU is composed of the Court of Justice (ECJ), the General Court, and the specialized courts. The present 
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several features deserve attention. First, according to Article 18 of the Statute of the 
CJEU, judges are allowed to adjudicate cases involving their home states.486 This is in 
line with the assumption that judges are completely independent and they do not 
represent any particular state.487 Second, a public hearing is a basic principle. The 
Statute of the CJEU Article 31 explicitly provides for a public hearing, 488 and an 
exception applies only when “serious reasons” appear.489 This is “designed to prevent 
a secret justice and to enhance public confidence in the European judicial system”.490 
Third, although most EU Member States share a civil law tradition, after 1973, when 
common-law judges joined the CJEU, the Court started to cite its previous judgments 
more frequently.491 It was argued that the use of precedents employed by the CJEU is 
where common and civil law traditions meet.492 Fourth, regarding the particular issue 
of the relationship between out-of-court mediation and court proceedings, the CJEU 
holds that EU directives and general principles do not prevent national law from 
providing for mandatory out-of-court mediation procedures as a condition of 
admissibility to court proceedings.493  
4.3.2.2 Rulings on Procedural Justice 
The rulings from the CJEU on procedural justice are significant in supplementing the 
application of relevant legislation. It is even argued that the most important standards 
 
discussion takes the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice as the example for the examination. See: European 
Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Central 
Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions—The 2017 EU Justice 
Scoreboard, COM(2017) 167 final, 2017, p. 7. 
486 The Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Art. 18. 
487 However, in practice, since the CJEU in most cases sits in a chamber of three judges, party judges are not very 
common. 
488 The Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Art. 31. As Advocate General Maduro noted in his 
Opinion in Sweden and Others v. API and Commission, the practice of various international tribunals suggests that 
there should be no reason to fear a disclosure of documents relating to judicial process and that all submissions 
should be public unless there are exceptional reasons to keep them confidential. See: Robin White, Lawyers and the 
Courts, at: Robert Blackburn (ed.), Rights of Citizenship, Mansell Publishing, 1993, p. 236. 
489 Such “serious reasons” include the protection of the private life of parties that is at issue and the protection of 
individual interests when they prevails over the principle of a transparent judiciary. See: Court of Justice of the 
European Union-the Court of Justice, Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, 29.09.2012, Art. 79. It was argued 
that “[e]xcluding the public from the oral hearing is an exceptional measure and must thus be interpreted narrowly”. 
See: European Parliament, European Parliament Recommendation to the Council and to the European Council on 
the Future of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice as well as on the Measures Required to Enhance the 
Legitimacy and Effectiveness Thereof (2004/2175(INI)), P6_TA(2004)0022, 07.07.2005, p. 24. 
490 Derek Heater, A Brief History of Citizenship, Edinburgh University Press, 2004, p. 103. 
491  EUR-Lex, Sources of European Union Law, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Al14534, last visited on 01.08.2020. Prior to 1973, the Court basically just 
repeated its decisions without indicating that it had ruled on the issue before. See: Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union, OJ C 326 (entered into force on 18.12.2000), p. 1. 
492 The Common Law prevailed in only two EU Member States, the United Kingdom and Ireland. See: European 
Commission, Justice-Building a European Area of Justice, Rule of Law, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/rule-of-law/index_en.htm, last visited on 30.05.2020. Currently, as stated 
above, with the United Kingdom leaving the EU, Ireland is the only EU Member State now that has a common law 
background. 
493 Specifically, the CJEU found that, mandatory out-of-court mediation before court proceedings did not hurt the 
principle of effective judicial protection, as long as four requirements were satisfied. Namely, the procedure: 1. does 
not result in a decision that is binding on the parties; 2. does not cause a substantial delay in bringing legal 
proceedings; 3. suspends the period for the time-barring of claims; and 4. does not give rise to more than minimal 
costs for the parties. See: European Parliament & Council of the European Union & European Commission, 
Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2007/C 303/02, 12.12.2007. 
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are not found in EU instruments, but have mainly been developed by the case law of 
the CJEU.494 In addition, the basic values and the fundamental rights codified in the 
EU legislative instruments are guaranteed through the complete system of legal 
procedures that permit the CJEU to review the legality of measures adopted by the 
Union and by EU Member States.495 
According to the CJEU’s rulings on procedural justice, the following three points are 
of interest in the present analysis. First, the notion of access to justice is confirmed as a 
fundamental requirement.496 As stated by Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, 
access to justice is taken as one of the constitutive elements of the EU based on the rule 
of law, which “entails not only the commencement of legal proceedings but also the 
requirement that the competent court must be seized of those proceedings”.497 Second, 
the CJEU expressly recognizes the value of procedural fairness as a common value 
shared by EU Member States. In particular, in the Krombach judgment, the CJEU 
transformed “public policy, traditionally a vector of inward-looking national values 
even in a European context”, to “the very cornerstone of the edification of common 
European values”, which is particularly with respect to the fundamental right to 
procedural fairness.498 Such guarantees with regard to a fair trial in courts has been 
further expanded to be relevant for arbitration bodies.499 Third, general principles of 
procedural law are taken as making up an indispensable part of the primary law of the 
 
494 Franz Wieacker & Edgar Boenheimer, Foundations of European Legal Culture, The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, Vol. 38, 1990, p. 29. Marcel L. Storme (ed.), Rapprochement du droit judiciaire de l'Union 
Européenne/Approximation of Judiciary Law in the European Union, Kluwer Law International, 1994. 
495 Mª Pía Calderón Cuadrado & José Luis Iglesias Buhigues, Mediation as an 'Alternative' to Jurisdiction: Directive 
2008/52, at:  European Civil Procedure, Thomoson Reuters, 2011, pp. 249-264. 
496 Rule of law was first mentioned by the CJEU in the Case Les Verts in 1986 before its appearance in the official 
legislative documents of the EU, by stating that the “European Economic Community was a community based on 
the rule of law”. See: Adrian A. S. Zuckerman (ed.), Justice in Crisis: Comparative Dimensions of Civil Procedure, 
Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 9-10. 
497  Anthony Ogus, Competition between National Legal Systems: A Contribution of Economic Analysis to 
Comparative Law, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 48, 1999, p. 408. 
498 Viviane Reding, Strengthening Mutual Trust: Towards a True European Area of Civil Justice, 25.03.2014, 
available at: https://www.mpi.lu/fileadmin/mpi/medien/news/2014/4/Speech_VP_Reding.pdf, last visited on 
05.08.2020. It was argued that “the Court also took a substantive methodological step, a ‘merger of values’, 
combining the economic interests of the Community with the human rights values of the Council of Europe”. See: 
Center for Effective Dispute Resolution, EU Launches Code of Conduct for Mediators, 21.07.2004, available at: 
https://www.cedr.com/news/?item=EU-launches-Code-of-Conduct-for-Mediators, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
499 europa.eu, Regulations, Directives and Other Acts, available at: https://europa.eu/european-union/eu-law/legal-
acts_en, last visited on 01.08.2020. Namely, in this regard, arbitration bodies are “equally obliged to deliberate under 
the same conditions as a court”. See: Felix Steffek, Mediation in the European Union: An Introduction, Europa.eu, 
06.2012, available at: https://e-justice.europa.eu/fileDownload.do?id=b3e6a432-440d-4105-b9d5-29a8be95408f, 
last visited on 05.08.2020. 
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EU,500 which include access to a fair legal process,501 the right of defence,502 equal 
treatment,503 etc. These rights are considered similar to constitutional rights common 
to the EU Member States,504 and they apply even if there is no specific legislative 
provision to that effect.505 
4.3.3 The Union’s Other Efforts in Regulating Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
In addition to the legislative instruments discussed above, the Union’s intention to 
regulate DSMs is also mirrored by other efforts. Typical examples include the EU’s 
accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, its supervision of the national 
justice systems of the EU Member States, and the Joint ELI-UNIDROIT Project “From 
Transnational Principles to European Rules of Civil Procedure”. 
4.3.3.1 The Union’s Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights 
Required under the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU’s accession to the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) was intended to be “a landmark in European legal 
history”.506 However, the accession entered into a deadlock because of the negative 
opinion of the CJEU, as it was concerned that the accession would give an external 
body the power to review the application of EU law.507 Although the Union has not 
joined the ECHR, the adoption of this Convention by all EU Member States arguably 
reflects the “important commonalities in the underlying historical, political, and 
 
500 Manon Schonewille & Jeremy Lack, Mediation in the European Union and Abroad: 60 States Divided by a 
Common Word?, at: The Variegated Landscape of Mediation: A Comparative Study of Mediation Regulation and 
Practices in Europe and the World, Eleven International Publishing, 2014, pp. 20-21. 
501 See e.g. Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Civil and 
Commercial Law (presented by the Commission), COM(2002) 196 final, 19.04.2002, pp. 5, 9-10. Mª Pía Calderón 
Cuadrado & José Luis Iglesias Buhigues, Mediation as an 'Alternative' to Jurisdiction: Directive 2008/52, at: 
European Civil Procedure, Thomoson Reuters, 2011, pp. 249-250. European Parliament-Directorate-General for 
Internal Policies-Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 'Rebooting' the Mediation 
Directive: Assessing the Limited Impact of Its Implementation and Proposing Measures to Increase the Number of 
Mediations in the EU, 2014, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/493042/IPOL-JURI_ET(2014)493042_EN.pdf, 
last visited on 31.07.2020. 
502 See e.g. Manon Schonewille & Jeremy Lack, Mediation in the European Union and Abroad: 60 States Divided 
by a Common Word?, at: The Variegated Landscape of Mediation: A Comparative Study of Mediation Regulation 
and Practices in Europe and the World, Eleven International Publishing, 2014, p. 20. ADR Center for Development, 
The Costs of Non ADR-Surveying and Showing the Actual Costs of intra-Community Commercial Litigation, Project 
Timeline: 12.2008-04.2010, available at: https://www.adrcenterfordevelopment.com/2018/06/08/eu-member-states-
the-costs-of-non-adr-surveying-and-showing-the-actual-costs-of-intra-community-commercial-litigation/, last 
visited on 31.07.2020. 
503 See e.g. Court of Justice of the European Union-the Court of Justice, Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, 
29.09.2012; Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Joined Cases C-514/07 P, C‑528/07 P and C‑532/07 
P, Kingdom of Sweden v. Association de la presse internationale ASBL (API), Association de la presse internationale 
ASBL (API) v. Commission of the European Communities, Commission of the European Communities v. Association 
de la presse internationale ASBL (API), 01.09.2009, available at: 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&text=&pageIndex=0&part=1&mode=lst&
docid=72663&occ=first&dir=&cid=1210687, para. 26, last visited on 30.07.2020. 
504 See e.g. Bertrand Wägenbaur, Court of Justice of the European Union: Commentary on Statue and Rules of 
Procedure, C.H. Beck·Hart·Nomos, 2013, p. 96. 
505 Id, p. 31. 
506 This is mainly because such an accession would make it possible for individuals and undertakings to apply to 
the European Court of Human Rights for a review of the acts of EU institutions. See: Henry G. Schermers & Denis 
Waelbroeck, Judicial Protection in the European Communities (Fourth Edition), Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers, 1987, p. 86. 
507 Lisa J. Conant, Justice Contained: Law and Politics in the European Union, Cornell University Press, 2002, pp. 
64-65. 
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cultural substratum of European legal traditions”.508 The adoption of the CFREU, 
which was discussed in Section 4.3.1.1, supra, confirms this point. It is noted that in 
the ECHR, Article 6 “Right to a fair trial” demands that an adjudicatory system can 
conduct “a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law”.509 This was argued as reinforcing “what is 
already deeply rooted in the popular understanding of civil justice” in the EU.510 
4.3.3.2 Supervision of EU Member States’ National Procedural Justice Systems 
In addition to ensuring compliance with EU law through the CJEU, the Union has also 
taken other measures to supervise its Member States’ national justice systems. First, a 
Commissioner for Justice and Fundamental Rights was appointed within the European 
Commission, which shows that the European Commission understands its mission as 
including improving the efficiency and independence of national court systems.511 
Second, the European Commission adopted a Rule of Law Framework in 2013. This 
Framework set out a structured process for the European Commission to react to 
indications of any systemic threat to the rule of law,512 which could further guarantee 
access to justice and fundamental procedural rights. Moreover, the EU Justice 
Scoreboard has been published annually since 2013.513 This Scoreboard provides an 
annual comparative overview of the independence, quality and efficiency of EU 
Member States’ national justice systems.514 
 
508 Manon Schonewille & Jeremy Lack, Mediation in the European Union and Abroad: 60 States Divided by a 
Common Word?, at: The Variegated Landscape of Mediation: A Comparative Study of Mediation Regulation and 
Practices in Europe and the World, Eleven International Publishing, 2014, p. 20. This fundamental right also has its 
constitutional equivalent in the EU Member States, such as Art. 111 of the Italian Constitution on ‘diritto al giusto 
processo’ and Art. 24 on ‘diritto di azione’. 
509 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the judicial body of the ECHR, has explained this Article in 
reports as well as in decisions in specific cases. For a more explanation of this Article, see e.g. Judgment of the Court 
(Fourth Chamber), Rosalba Alassini v. Telecom Italia SpA (C-317/08), Filomena Califano v. Wind SpA (C-318/08), 
Lucia Anna Giorgia Iacono v. Telecom Italia SpA (C-319/08) and Multiservice Srl v Telecom Italia SpA (C-320/08), 
Joined cases C-317/08, C-318/08, C-319/08 and C-320/08, 18.03.2010. 
510  Adrian A. S. Zuckerman, Court Adjudication of Civil Disputes: A Public Service to be Delivered with 
Proportionate Resources, within a Reasonable Time and at Reasonable Cost, at: C.H. van Rhee & D. Heirbaut & M. 
Storme (eds.), The French Code of Civil Procedure (1806) after 200 Years: the Civil Procedure Tradition in France 
and Abroad, Kluwer, 2008, p. 438. 
511 Directorate General for Internal Policies-Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, The 
European Law Institute/UNIDROIT Civil Procedure Projects as a Soft Law Tool to Resolve Conflicts of Law, 2016, 
available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/556972/IPOL_IDA(2017)556972_EN.pdf, 
p. 6, last visited on 30.07.2020. 
512 Francesco Pesce, International and EU Perspective on Mediation: Mediation and Fundamental Right of Access 
to Justice, at: Francesco Pesce & Dana Rone, Mediation to Foster European Wide Settlement of Disputes, Aracne, 
2016, pp. 165-166. 
513 Judgment of the Court, Parti écologiste "Les Verts" v. European Parliament Case 294/83, 23.04.1986, para. 2.23. 
514 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters - Preliminary 
References - Jurisdiction of the Court - Definition of ‘Dispute’ - Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 - Service of 
extrajudicial documents in the absence of legal proceedings - Notarial act, 05.03.2009, para.29. It is worth pointing 
out that this EU Justice Scoreboard shows that there are big differences in the national legal systems of the EU 
Member States, especially when it comes to access to justice for foreign investors and timeframes for delivering and 
implementing justice. See: Dieter Krombach v. André Bamberski, Case C-7/98, 28.03.2000. Horatia Muir Watt, 
Evidence of an Emergent European Legal Culture: Public Policy Requirements of Procedural Fairness under the 
Brussels and Lugano Conventions, Texas International Law Journal, Vol. 36, 2001, pp. 539, 549, 554. 
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4.3.3.3 The Joint ELI-UNIDROIT Project “From Transnational Principles to 
European Rules of Civil Procedure” 
In 2013, UNIDROIT and the European Law Institute (ELI) started to cooperate to 
produce a model of European rules of civil procedure,515 which would include a set of 
uniform procedural rules regarding dispute settlement. The common legal tradition in 
EU Member States, together with the CFREU and other relevant texts, principles, and 
soft law, formed the starting point of this project.516  
On 21 December 2015, the Committee on Legal Affairs of the European Parliament 
proposed that, in line with the European Commission’s past initiatives and the 
preliminary result of the joint projects of the ELI and UNIDROIT, the time was ripe 
for a legislative proposal setting out common minimum standards.517 During the past 
ELI-UNIDROIT joint meetings, eight procedural issues were discussed, such as court 
settlements and third-party funding.518 In addition, this project was showcased at a 
conference held in November 2018, where various aspects of the draft of the legislative 
proposal provided by the Project Working Groups were discussed under the theme of 
“Structure of civil proceedings – towards a coherent model law”. As of 30 May 2020, 
this project is still in progress. Although there has not been any concrete result from 
this project until now, its initiation and the progress made thereunder confirm the 
existence of common elements shared within the EU regarding the legal tradition of 
civil justice. 
 
4.4 An Interpretation of the Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in the EU Member 
States and the Union’s Relevant Regulating Measures—From a Legal Cultural 
Perspective 
Various elements can be expected to have affected the procedural design of the DSMs 
within the EU, especially considering its nature as a Union comprised of 27 Member 
States and the corresponding two-tiered regulation structure. This section takes a legal 
culture perspective and explores the potential connection between the European legal 
cultural characteristics on dispute settlement discussed in Section 3.1, supra, on the one 
hand, and the features of the DSMs in the EU Member States and the EU’s relevant 
rules introduced in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, supra, on the other. 
 
515 Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber), Samuel Sidney Evans v. The Secretary of State for the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions and The Motor Insurers' Bureau, Case C-63/01, 04.12.2003. 
516 The EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, Commentary of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, 2006, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-
rights/files/networkcommentaryfinal_en.pdf, p. 367, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
517 Bertrand Wägenbaur, Court of Justice of the European Union: Commentary on Statue and Rules of Procedure, 
C.H. Beck·Hart·Nomos, 2013, pp. 4-5. See also: Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), Salzgitter Mannesmann 
GmbH v. Commission of the European Communities, Case C-411/04 P, 25.01.2007, paras 40-41. 
518 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), Study LXXVIA - Transnational Civil 
Procedure - Formulation of Regional Rules: ELI – UNIDROIT Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure, available at: 
https://www.unidroit.org/work-in-progress-eli-unidroit-european-rules, last visited on 06.08.2020. 
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4.4.1 Consistent Pursuance of the Rule of Law in Dispute Settlement 
The most notable feature of the dispute settlement practice of the EU is arguably the 
respect for the rule of law, which in fact constitutes the basis of other characteristics. 
This is evidenced by EU Member States’ practice on dispute settlement as well as the 
Union’s measures on regulating civil procedure in its Member States, which at the same 
time echoes the important role of the rule of law in European legal culture in general.  
Guided by the rule of law, law has its own value and enjoys priority,519 instead of being 
simply a tool for or only used in combination with realizing other political or social 
objectives. In other words, the separation between law and extrinsic social values is 
clear. In addition, individuals’ rights are emphasized and protected by law, instead of 
being sacrificed for the community’s interests. In dispute settlement, the rule of law 
requires the law to be taken as the benchmark, so as to guarantee the realization of 
substantive and procedural justice. Regarding the former, law is intended to protecting 
individuals’ rights from being infringed by others and it ensures procedural justice and 
due process, etc. This resonates with the EU’s legal tradition of requiring the law to 
protect individuals’ rights and to ensure the proper use of power by the government or 
parliament, as well as its traditional emphasis on individuals instead of the community. 
It is fair to say that, as reflected concretely in the practice of dispute settlement in the 
EU Member States and the Union, the rule of law, which originates from European 
legal history, has been firmly applied, developed and has become an indispensable and 
important element of European legal culture. 
4.4.2 Common Use of Litigation for Realizing Justice 
Litigation is a commonly used DSM in the EU, if not the one that is resorted to most 
frequently. In addition, most domestic legislation of EU Member States on DSMs 
focuses on litigation. Furthermore, common fundamental procedural principles have 
been reached and reflected in most EU Member States’ judicial systems. In fact, 
resorting to litigation for dispute settlement is argued to form part of the EU Member 
States’ and the Union’s legal tradition, mirroring their convictions about the “proper 
organization of the courts’ judicial system in delivering timely and fair judgments”.520 
In particular, procedural justice is required to be realized and has its independent 
significance. Namely, not only the result of dispute resolution, but also the process are 
indispensable elements of the fundamental notion of justice.521 
It deserves attention that, in addition to resolving disputes, more importantly, litigation 
is taken as a way to protect individuals’ fundamental procedural and substantive rights. 
 
519 It is also noted that arguments claiming  that the function of law to realize other objectives also exists. For 
example, it was pointed out that access to justice “is bound to the European integration process”, where social values, 
if any, are realized in a pick-a-pack procedure tied to market integration. However, this should not affect the fact that 
“[s]ocial justice, in the sense of distributive justice, plays limited role only”. See: Judgment of the Court, Regina v. 
Kent Kirk, Case 63/83, 10.07.1984, para. 22.  
520  Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber), Siemens v. European Commission, Case T-110/07, 
03.03.2011, paras. 189, 199. See also: Jean-E. Humblet v. Belgian State, Case C-6/60, 16.12.1960, para. 1. 
521 Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), Nuova Agricast Srl and Cofra Srl v. European Commission, Case C-
67/09 P, 14.10.2010, para. 65. 
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This resonates with the EU’s consistent reliance on the rule of law. As revealed by the 
2011 Report on the Rule of Law of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, 
access to justice before independent and impartial courts and the independence and 
impartiality of the judiciary are necessary elements of the rule of law.522 The rule of 
law requires access to justice, procedural justice and due process, which can all be 
properly realized in litigation. In particular, the practice of the CJEU gives a 
concentrated expression of the detailed requirements of procedural justice in litigation, 
such as a public hearing. It also explicitly confirmed the notion of access to justice as a 
fundamental requirement, as well as general principles of procedural law as being an 
indispensable part of the primary law of the EU. In litigation, adjudicators are expected 
to fulfil the role of delivering judgments according to the law. In brief, adjudication in 
courts is taken as a normal and common way of settling disputes throughout Europe, 
aiming at ensuring the fundamental rights of citizens and the transnational rule of law. 
4.4.3 Increasing the Use of Mediation to Ensure Access to Justice  
Recent years witnessed increasing efforts of some EU Member States as well as the 
Union in promoting mediation and other alternative DSMs other than litigation.523 
From a practical perspective, this appeared as a response to the increasing number of 
cases in domestic courts, the lengthy duration of litigation, and ever-more complicated 
disputes. Ideologically, the promotion of mediation is supported by the idea that this 
DSM provides another way to have access to justice. In fact, the justification of any 
regulatory measure on alternative DSMs goes back the fundamental rule of law, in 
particular access to justice. This is typically evidenced by the CJEU’s decision that 
mandatory out-of-court mediation before court proceedings is allowed and is based on 
the fact that this does not negatively affect the principle of effective judicial protection.  
This may constitute a kind of deviation from the traditional preference for adjudication 
in pursuing justice. It is advocated by the European Commission that alternative dispute 
resolution can play an integral part in improving access to justice and can complement 
the traditional judicial procedures, thereby “helping the parties enter into a dialogue 
and constituting a means of achieving social harmony”. 524  Similarly, but more 
pragmatically, the European Parliament emphasized that the complexity and technical 
nature of the issues facing the potential litigant can be mitigated by recourse to quicker 
and less stressful alternative dispute resolution routes.525 Therefore, on the one hand, 
the promotion of the use of alternative dispute resolution by the EU is a reaction to the 
practical difficulties related to using adjudication and it is still guided by the general 
traditional aim of ensuring access to justice; on the other hand, some other elements, 
 
522 In its search for the content of the rule of law, the Venice Commission based its analysis on the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights, the developments with respect to the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
as well as in the context of the OSCE, the OECD and the EU. See: Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber), Paula 
Gomez-Rivero v. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, Case C-211/97, 03.06.1999, para. 1. 
523 Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Third Chamber), Jungbunzlauer AG v. Commission of the European 
Communities, Case T-43/02, 27.09.2006. 
524 Bertrand Wägenbaur, Court of Justice of the European Union: Commentary on Statue and Rules of Procedure, 
C.H. Beck·Hart·Nomos, 2013, pp. 4-5. 
525 European Parliament, Report on the Green Paper on alternative dispute resolution in civil and commercial 
matters, T5 841/2003, Report published as legislative resolution, OJ C-61 E, 10.03.2004, 20.02.2003, p. 6. 
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such as social effects, procedural economy and the significance of mutual recognition, 
play an increasingly important role. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
Regarding the traditional values that have been preserved throughout European legal 
history, three constants can be identified: personalism, legalism and intellectualism. 
These constants, in particular, formed the basis of the European legal culture in dispute 
settlement. Against this background, the law is considered as the guarantor of justice, 
fairness and legal rights; the insistence on the rule of law ensures the supremacy of law 
and the law’s function as the benchmark in resolving disputes. As a usual way of 
resolving disputes, litigation focuses on preserving substantive rights and procedural 
justice and, therefore, judges must make decisions according to the law and must follow 
due process. As summarized, after hundreds of years of changes in European legal 
history, some elements of the traditional legal culture are still clearly discernible.526  
The commonly available DSMs for investment disputes in EU Member States are 
identified as mediation, arbitration and litigation. As a result of the various legal 
traditions in EU Member States, the current legislative situations in each Member State 
are quite different in terms of the general attitude towards mediation and the detailed 
procedural rules. Legislation on arbitration is less diversified and consensus has been 
reached generally on basic principles and key points, such as the principle of 
competence-competence, arbitrators’ qualification and conditions for appealing and 
setting aside arbitral awards. With regard to litigation, although procedural rules are 
different in their details, basic values are shared and consensus on fundamental 
principles on procedural issues has been reached in relation to the minimum standards, 
such as due process and equal treatment, which have their roots in the European legal 
tradition and are a reflection of European legal culture.527 
Alongside the relevant rules in the EU Member States, the Union has also taken 
legislative measures as well as other efforts to regulate civil procedure, which include 
rules on DSMs. From primary law, secondary legislation, the CJEU’s practice on 
procedural justice, to the Union’s other efforts, a common underlying motivation that 
is visible in all of them is to preserve the individual’s right to access to justice, effective 
remedy and fair trial, and establishing the European area of justice,528 which can be 
 
526  European Court of Human Rights, Accession of the European Union, available at: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=basictexts/accessionEU&c=, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
527 It was pointed out that “the rule of law” and “due process” are at the core of the substantive protection of 
individuals and, as such, form an ancient achievement of law. See: Opinion 2/13 of the Court (Full Court), Opinion 
pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU — Draft International Agreement — Accession of the European Union to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms — Compatibility of the Draft 
Agreement with the EU and FEU Treaties, 18.12.2014, paras. 181, 185, 210. In addition, as was argued by the British 
former Member of the European Parliament, Glyn Ford, “genuine partnership (in Europe) can only develop on the 
basis of shared common values—in particular, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human and civil rights”. 
See: Mary Ann Glendon & Paolo G. Carozza & Colin B. Picker, Comparative Legal Traditions in a Nutshell (4th 
Edition), West Academic Publishing, 2016, p. 60. 
528 European Court of Human Rights, Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 30.04.2013, 
available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_6_ENG.pdf, last visited on 23.08.2016. 
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traced back to the principle of the rule of law and the protection of human rights. In 
other words, the value-oriented identity of the EU has acted as an impetus in the Union 
to implement measures that are expressly built upon common values and principles 
arising from the constitutional tradition shared by EU Member States. 
By analysing the DSMs in the EU Member States and the Union’s relevant regulating 
measures from a legal cultural perspective, three points deserve attention. First, a 
consistent pursuit of the rule of law can be identified in dispute settlement. Second, 
litigation has been commonly used, which focuses on realizing substantive and 
procedural justice. Third, recently increased attention on mediation is based on the 
recognition of its function in ensuring access to justice. In brief, the relevant practice 
of the EU Member States and the Union to a large extent reflects the EU legal cultural 
characteristics in dispute settlement, which, in turn, arguably reinforce the 
corresponding underlying values and principles. 
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Chapter 5 Comparison of the Legal Culture on Dispute Settlement in China and 
the EU 
Based on the discussion in Chapters 3 and 4 on the legal culture of and internal DSMs 
for foreign investment disputes in China and the EU, this chapter compares the features 
of both. While there are commonalities evident in the two systems,529 considering the 
main goal of the present analysis, the focus here will be on their differences. As such, 
the comparison in this chapter is presented from two perspectives. Section 5.1 analyses 
the legal cultural characteristics of dispute settlement, including the key elements of 
legal culture, the perception of law, the role of law, and the objective of dispute 
settlement. Section 5.2 identifies two issues regarding the DSMs in the internal legal 
systems, the focuses of dispute settlement systems and the promotion of mediation in 
China and the EU. 
 
5.1 Legal Cultural Characteristics in Dispute Settlement 
China and the EU each have a different legal culture. Focusing on dispute settlement, 
this section addresses four relevant issues in which the situation in China and that of 
the EU present noticeable differences to a certain extent. These include the key aspects 
of legal culture, the perception of law, the role of law, and the objective of dispute 
settlement, all of which are analysed in turn in the following. 
5.1.1 The Key Aspects of Legal Culture 
Traditional Chinese philosophies played the role of regulating the society in ancient 
China and such traditional philosophies still have a great effect on modern Chinese 
ideologies. Under their influence, a clear importance of collectivism can be identified. 
The community is viewed as a whole, and individuals are expected to follow the overall 
goal of the society to preserve harmony and the interests of the individual are secondary 
to those of the community. Traditional Chinese philosophies neglect individual rights 
and have a vision of the society where “individual lives were led within hierarchies and 
social distinctions and proper behavior derived from an individual’s status in those 
hierarchies”.530 Furthermore, the notion of subordinating individuals’ rights and duties 
to collective interests “continues to inform many Chinese and Marxist conceptions of 
individual rights in modern China”.531 
 
529 Despite the difference in legal traditions, there are efforts made by scholars in looking for a correspondence and 
compatibility of ancient Chinese and Confucian thought with ancient European and Christian thought. See e.g. Janne 
Nijman, A Universal Rule of Law for a Pluralist World Order: Leibniz’s Universal Jurisprudence and his Praise of 
the Chinese Ruler, Amsterdam Center for International Law (ACIL) Research Paper, Vol. 16, 2016, pp. 24-28. 
530 Stanley B. Lubman, Bird in a Cage-Legal Reform in China after Mao Standford University Press, 2000, pp. 15-
16, 19. 
531 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Trade and Investment Adjudication Involving ‘Silk Road Projects’: Legal Methodology 
Challenges, European University Institute Working Papers, Vol. 2, 2018, p. 3. (citing: Joseph Chan, Confucian 
Perfectionism: A Political Philosophy for Modern Times, Princeton University Press, 2014.) 
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In contrast, individualism can be considered the cornerstone of the relevant situation in 
the EU, where the focus has been on individuals instead of the community. This means 
that, instead of being subject to or submerged in the pursuit of the society’s goals, 
individuals’ rights are greatly respected. Such rights are based on “the fundamental 
dignity and equality of every human being”,532 being protected as “constituent powers” 
and “democratic principles”.533 
Therefore, comparing to the legal culture in Western society, Chinese legal culture is 
described as follows: community is more important than individuals, morality is more 
important than law, responsibility is more important than freedom, obligations are more 
important than rights, people’s livelihood is more important than democracy, order is 
more important than liberty, and harmony is more important than disputes.534 
5.1.2 The Perception of Law 
The perception of law constitutes part of the basis of a legal system, the recognition of 
which provides more context to understand the features of the DSMs made available in 
that legal system. On this issue, the difference between China and the EU regarding 
how the law is perceived in the legal culture deserves attention. 
For a long time in Chinese history, traditional Chinese philosophies acted as the source 
of regulations, which resulted in the inclusion of morality in those regulations.535 For 
most civil matters, it was not law, but the teachings from traditional Chinese 
philosophies that provided the basis for rules. Law meant punishment and was used as 
a tool of suppression and control by the ruler, which led to the society’s rejection of the 
law in general. The nature of the law has changed in modern times, having moved away 
from being only of a punitive nature and having become a source of regulations on 
people’s daily life. The perception of law has changed in contemporary Chinese 
ideologies to a certain extent, but the negative connotations deriving from the 
traditional understanding of law as a tool of punishment can still be traced. Although 
contemporary Chinese ideologies incorporate and recognize the importance of the law 
in protecting individuals’ legal rights, it is noticeable that the law at the same time is 
used as a tool to realize extrinsic social values. It can be said that the law can be seen 
as having an instrumental purpose, existing with its own values and at the same time 
serving the overall goal of pursuing harmony. 
This was not the case in European legal culture. Historically, the law was also once 
focused on punishment and power or tied with morality and religious beliefs, but the 
influence of this aspect is relatively limited. Law enjoys its own value and fundamental 
importance and is fundamentally separated from social ideologies. Furthermore, the 
 
532 Stanley B. Lubman, Bird in a Cage-Legal Reform in China after Mao Standford University Press, 2000, pp. 15-
16, 19. 
533 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Trade and Investment Adjudication Involving ‘Silk Road Projects’: Legal Methodology 
Challenges, European University Institute Working Papers, Vol. 2, 2018, pp. 2-3. 
534 Lai Chen 陈来, The Core Values of Chinese Civilization 中华文明的核心价值, Joint Publishing (H.K.) 三联
书店（香港）, 2016, pp. 1, 4. See also: Dainian Zhang & Yishan Cheng 张岱年 & 程宜山, Cultural Spirits of 
China 中国文化精神, Joint Publishing (Hong Kong) 三联书店（香港）, 2016, pp. 55-134. 
535 Franz Wieacker & Edgar Boenheimer, Foundations of European Legal Culture, The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, Vol. 38, 1990, p. 4. 
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general systematization of legal phenomena founded in a general idea of justice can be 
traced far back in the EU’s legal history. Law restricts the power of the ruler, rather 
than functioning as the ruler’s tool of realizing its controlling powers. Equally 
important, the law is viewed as a protector of individuals’ rights and, in turn, it supports 
social life within “an impersonalized framework”.536 In this regard, in contrast to the 
situation in China, with the legal culture in the EU there has been a significant gap 
between law and morality.537 
5.1.3 The Role of Law 
Regarding the role of law in a legal system, a clear difference exists between “rule by 
law” and “rule of law”. In general, the “rule by law” means “the control by the 
government over the governed”, while the “rule of law” refers to “the control over the 
governance of the government”.538 In other words, the former means that the law 
should stand above political power as a value to be respected, while the latter, in 
contrast, connotes the instrumental use of law as a tool of political power. In addition, 
rule by law and rule of law relate to another two norms operating in a legal system: 
authoritarian and democratic governance. Rule by law is a typical feature of 
authoritarian or totalitarian regime, while democratic societies are characterized by a 
reliance on the rule of law.539 
Any concept of the rule of law should be assessed with due regard for the socio-political 
and historical context from which it emerged. This inspires the exploration of the 
meaning of the same term in the context of China or the EU, beyond the terminology. 
In the Chinese legal tradition, the rule by law was the approach adopted the majority of 
the time. The ancient Chinese political system was argued as “rule of man” or “rule by 
law”, where the law served as the extended arm of the ruler.540 This model of governing 
corresponds with the formula “man→law→man”. 541  Although this situation has 
changed to a great extent in modern China, some remnants can still be traced in the 
concept of “socialist rule of law”. Under contemporary Chinese ideologies, it is the 
“socialist rule of law” with Chinese characteristics that determine the role of the law.542 
It was argued that China faces difficulties “when it comes to formulating a concept of 
the rule of law entailing a clear distinction from the rule by law”.543 This is typically 
536 Zhiping Liang, Explicating “Law”: A Comparative Perspective of Chinese and Western Legal Culture, Journal 
of Chinese Law, Vol. 3, 1989, p. 88. 
537 It was argued that law determined “what is necessary and therefore required to prevent domination and promote 
the public good”, while morality reflected “what is useful in advancing the good of society as a whole, but may not 
be required”. See: Mortimer Sellers, What Is the Rule of Law and Why Is It So Important?, at: Democracy and Rule 
of Law in the European Union–Essays in Honour of Jaap W. de Zwaan, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016, p. 6. 
538  Jean Yves Heurtebise, Understanding Non-Trade Concerns Through Comparative Chinese and European 
Philosophy of Law, at: China's Influence on Non-Trade Concerns in International Economic Law, Routledge, 2016, 
p. 288.
539 Id. 
540 Zhiping Liang, Explicating “Law”: A Comparative Perspective of Chinese and Western Legal Culture, Journal 
of Chinese Law, Vol. 3, 1989, p. 89.
541  Jean Yves Heurtebise, Understanding Non-Trade Concerns Through Comparative Chinese and European 
Philosophy of Law, at: China's Influence on Non-Trade Concerns in International Economic Law, Routledge, 2016, 
p. 288.
542 Jinping Xi 习近平, Accelerating the Establishment of Socialist Rule of Law in China 加快建设社会主义法治
国家, Qiu Shi 求是, Vol. 1, 2015. The original paper is in Chinese and the translation was carried out by the author. 
543  Jean Yves Heurtebise, Understanding Non-Trade Concerns Through Comparative Chinese and European 
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evidenced by the combination of law and the goal of constructing a harmonious 
socialist society promoted by the Chinese Communist Party as a key aspect of 
contemporary Chinese ideology. 
On the side of the EU, the rule of law arguably constitutes “part of Europe’s DNA”,544 
and thus the supremacy of law is an indispensable part of the European legal tradition. 
As a result, individuals and authorities should be bound by and entitled to the benefits 
of laws “publicly made, prospectively promulgated and publicly administered in the 
courts”.545 The formula of legality is “law→man→law”.546 This approach has come 
from the EU’s legal history and constitutes a significant feature of the EU’s current 
legal culture. Its significance is evidenced by legislation at both the EU Member States 
and the Union levels. 547  Furthermore, it was argued that European integration 
transformed the rule of law from a widely recognized philosophy into “a structural part 
of the EU legal system” and “a fundamental value”.548 
5.1.4 The Objective of Dispute Settlement 
The key aspects and characteristics of legal culture establish the context of the practice 
of dispute settlement and especially the overall objective of dispute settlement.  
In Chinese legal culture, as a consequence of the pursuit of harmony, DSMs function 
as a tool to resolve disputes and, more importantly, to restore the relationship between 
disputing parties and to keep harmony within the society. The focus is on the ultimate 
effect of dispute settlement and not on the process. As a result, at times, the evaluation 
of substantive decisions and procedural matters are based on the final social effect 
according to criteria outside the scope of positive law. In this sense, it can be said that 
social justice plays a role in dispute settlement, in parallel with individual justice, while 
it can be said that social justice can overrule the latter. Thus, unless resorting to 
litigation is unavoidable, it is preferable to settle through amicable mechanisms. 
As a result, resorting to litigation is normal practice, where substantial and procedural 
justice is guaranteed by the rule of law. At the same time, this also contributes to the 
 
Philosophy of Law, at: China's Influence on Non-Trade Concerns in International Economic Law, Routledge, 2016, 
p. 290. 
544 European Commission, The European Union and the Rule of Law, Keynote speech at Conference on the Rule of 
Law, Tilburg University, 31.08.2015. 
545  Thomas Bingham, “The Sixth Sir David Williams Lecture: The Rule of Law” (16.11.2006), Cambridge 
University: Centre for Public Law, p. 5; Kun Fan, Arbitration in China: A Legal and Cultural Analysis, Hart 
Publishing, 2013, pp. 185-186. 
546  Jean Yves Heurtebise, Understanding Non-Trade Concerns Through Comparative Chinese and European 
Philosophy of Law, at: China's Influence on Non-Trade Concerns in International Economic Law, Routledge, 2016, 
p. 288. 
547 A typical evidence of this is the preamble of the TFEU, which speaks of EU Member States “drawing inspiration 
from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of 
the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law 
[emphasis added]”. 
548 European Commission, The European Union and the Rule of Law, Keynote speech at Conference on the Rule of 
Law, Tilburg University, 31.08.2015. As has been pointed out by the ex-president of the European Commission, José 
Manuel Durão Barroso, “...the rule of law is not just an inspiration; it is also an aspiration—a principle that guides 
both our internal and external actions; it is what we are and what we want to be”. See: José Manuel Durão Barroso, 
The Rule of Law as Inspiration and Aspiration, Press Release, European Commission, 28.05.2013, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_13_469, last visited on 30.07.2020. 
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development of jurisprudence, which is another significant element within the notion 
of the rule of law. 
 
5.2 Internal Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
As presented in Sections 3.2, 4.2 and 4.3, supra, both China and the EU have 
established internal dispute settlement systems that are composed of various DSMs. 
The features of the general structure of these two systems and detailed procedural 
designs of each mechanism contained therein are different, where their legal cultural 
characteristics play a role together with other contributing elements. The discussion in 
this section generally compares the different focus of the internal dispute settlement 
systems in China and the EU and addresses specific points regarding the various 
reasons underlying the similar promotion of mediation in both jurisdictions. 
5.2.1 The Focus of the Dispute Settlement Systems 
Various DSMs are available for dispute resolution in the current Chinese legal system 
for foreign investment related disputes, , including negotiation, mediation, arbitration, 
complaints coordination for foreign investment, administrative reconsideration, and 
litigation. As particularly evidenced by the practice of combining mediation with other 
DSMs, the whole dispute settlement system shows a strong preference for pursuing 
amicable settlements through social channels rather than through state-sponsored 
official fora. The core objective of these DSMs is to resolve disputes, restore 
relationships, and maintain social harmony. This clearly resonates with China’s legal 
culture. It can be said that the harmony-centred tradition has greatly affected, if not 
dominated, the use of DSMs in China’s legal system.  
In the EU, rules on DSMs, both at the level of EU Member States and the Union, need 
to be taken into consideration. At the level of the EU Member States, although detailed 
rules on the three main DSMs, mediation, arbitration and litigation, are diverse, 
consensus has been reached on fundamental values and principles, such as due process. 
Regarding relevant measures at the Union level, both legislative and other efforts have 
been taken, including primary law and secondary legislation, the CJEU’s practice of 
procedural justice, as well as other relevant efforts, such as supervising its Member 
States’ dispute settlement systems on procedural arrangements. In general, the focus 
has been on the use of litigation, especially in upholding the rule of law. Under the 
theme of ensuring the rule of law, litigation is preferable than other DSMs for realizing 
substantive and procedural justice, preserving individuals’ fundamental rights and 
developing jurisprudence. 
Another difference presented by China and the EU’s dispute settlement systems that 
deserves to be mentioned here is China’ service-based doctrine and the EU’s justice-
based doctrine of dispute settlement. In general, the DSMs in China’s legal system have 
the aim of providing a service to disputing parties to resolve their disputes, while in the 
EU DSMs are used as a method to ensure the disputing parties’ access to justice, 
including substantive and procedural justice. Such a difference in doctrine can provide 
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an explanation for and is confirmed by the various detailed arrangements in some 
DSMs, such as mediation, which is illustrated in the following section. 
5.2.2 The Promotion of Mediation 
The promotion of mediation as a mechanism of alternative dispute resolution can be 
found in the current legal system of China and also in the EU. Typical examples include  
the combination of mediation with other DSMs in China and the adoption of the EU 
Directive on Mediation in the EU. However, despite such a similarity in this promotion 
of mediation, a different motivation can be identified in each jurisdiction.549 
The promotion of mediation in China’s legal system is consistent with its traditional 
pursuit of harmony. Compared to litigation and arbitration, mediation provides a more 
desirable environment for dispute resolution through reaching a satisfactory settlement 
amicably and informally. In turn, mediation helps to realize the supreme goal of 
building a harmonious socialist society. Against this motivation, the procedure used in 
mediation is not important and it is rarely regulated in legislation. In contrast, the 
promotion of mediation in the EU is based on the perception that mediation is an 
alternative means to adjudication to ensure access to justice.550 Relevant efforts made 
by the Union and its Member States are a rational response to the factual situations that 
hinder the realization of this pursued goal, such as the increasing caseload of national 
courts. This results in the fact that the basic requirements coming from procedural 
justice are also reflected in mediation.551  
The difference between the underlying reasons for the promotion of mediation is likely 
to also come from China’s service-based doctrine and the EU’s justice-based doctrine 
of dispute resolution. The different practice of selecting of mediators can be taken as 
an example to show this. Chinese parties prefer to choose “insider mediators known to 
both parties who do not necessarily have formal mediation qualifications”, which could 
assist disputing parties resolve their disputes and restore the previous harmonious 
relationship; while, on the side of the EU, outsider mediators possessing “formal 
mediation qualifications and a high level of knowledge and skill in relation to managing 
conflict” are the normal choice, which are expected to facilitate the access to justice in 
a professional manner.552 
 
 
549 It is noted that the rise of alternative dispute resolution can be a product of various factors, such as institutional 
demands, political manoeuvring and cultural movement. Here, the analysis focuses on the contribution of the legal 
culture in dispute settlement, which is one of the key elements in the promotion of mediation in the case of China 
and that of the EU. 
550 As argued by scholars, access to justice should be understood as a common element tying European legal culture 
together. See e.g. Hans W. Micklitz, The (Un)-Systematics of (Private) Law as an Element of European Culture, at: 
Towards a European Legal Culture, Hart Publishing, 2014, p. 82. 
551 This can be evidenced by the procedural requirements of mediation and the quality of mediators stipulated in 
rules issued by the EU Member States and the Union. 
552 Nadja Alexander, The Mediation Meta Model: Understanding Practice Around the World, Conflict Resolution 
Quarterly, Vol. 26, 2008, p. 100. Here the author is introducing: Cris Currie, Mediating off the Grid, Dispute 
Resolution Journal, Vol. 59, 2004, pp. 11-14. 
100
 
· 
5.3 Conclusion  
China and the EU enjoy diverse legal cultural characteristics in dispute resolution, 
which range from the key aspects of legal culture, the perception of law, the role of law, 
to the objective of dispute settlement. In general, in contrast to the role of collectivism 
presented in Chinese legal culture, where individuals are required to act in line with the 
overall goal of the society to preserve harmony and where individual interests are 
secondary to the collective goals, the legal culture of the EU shows clear signs of 
individualism, where individuals’ rights are respected and protected as constituent 
rights and democratic principles. Regarding the perception of law, contemporary 
Chinese ideologies recognize the importance of law in setting rules and protecting 
individuals’ legal rights, but there is a negative connotation coming from the traditional 
understanding of law as a tool for punishment that can still be identified. Furthermore, 
the “socialist rule of law” combines law with and even takes law as a tool of realizing 
extrinsic social values, with a view to constructing a harmonious socialist society. On 
the side of the EU, the law protects individuals’ rights and balances the power of the 
ruler. It enjoys its own value and fundamental importance, which is also separated from 
morality. The rule of law constitutes “part of the Europe’s DNA”, and thus the 
supremacy of law is an indispensable part of the European legal tradition. In Chinese 
legal culture, under the overall pursuit of harmony, the objective of dispute settlement 
can be described as resolving disputes, restoring the relationship between disputing 
parties and preserving social harmony. However, the practice of dispute settlement in 
the EU has its focus on realizing individual procedural and substantive justice and 
developing jurisprudence. 
The legal cultural characteristics in dispute settlement in China and those in the EU 
have respectively affected the focus of their dispute resolution systems in general and, 
in particular, their approaches to mediation. In terms of the former, China’s dispute 
settlement system shows a strong preference for amicable DSMs, while in the EU the 
focus has been on the use of litigation, especially its conformity with the rule of law. In 
addition, China arguably adopts a service-based doctrine of dispute settlement, using 
DSMs to provide a service to disputing parties. This seems to be different from the 
approach of the EU, which takes a justice-based approach, using DSMs to realize 
justice. With regard to the latter, both China and the EU have made efforts to enhance 
the use of mediation in dispute settlement, but the underlying motivations are different: 
the EU takes mediation as an alternative way of realizing access to justice, instead of 
being based on the pursuit of personal and social harmony, which is the case of China. 
While the existence or non-existence of certain characteristics is not always clear-cut, 
the differences between China and the EU regarding the legal cultural characteristics in 
dispute settlement and the design of internal DSMs are certainly clearly identifiable, 
and these differences may lead to difficulties when the two parties try to reach an 
agreement on relevant issues in negotiating an IIA.  
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Part 3 Approaches to International Investment Dispute Settlement in China and 
the EU 
Introduction to Part 3  
There should be no doubt that not all investment disputes can be resolved in domestic 
legal systems. For state-state disputes, domestic DSMs cannot play a role at all. The 
role of domestic remedies in investor-state dispute settlement is also often limited, 
particularly because of the doubts investors have surrounding the integrity of a foreign 
legal system and potential intention of the adjudicators in domestic DSMs to protect 
the local interests involved in investment disputes. Even when such issues do not exist, 
DSMs at the international level could be preferable for other reasons, such as efficiency. 
Thus, it is necessary to have both domestic and international DSMs for investment 
dispute settlement. In fact, this has become the general practice of many states, 
including China and the EU. Part 2 discussed the internal DSMs in China and the EU, 
and Part 3 will now focus on the approaches of both parties to investment dispute 
settlement at the international level. 
For investor-state dispute settlement, the basis for the exploration of the practice in 
China and in the EU is relatively simple and straightforward, and it includes the IIAs 
China and the EU have concluded and the cases brought thereunder. While for state-
state dispute settlement, in addition to IIAs, similar DSMs can also be found in FTAs 
and the WTO system in the area of international trade law, which is another key element 
in international economic law. In particular, recent years have witnessed the trend of 
combining trade and investment in one comprehensive economic agreement, where the 
same set of state-state DSMs is provided, covering disputes in both areas. Furthermore, 
the design of state-state DSMs, including investor-state DSMs, in separate IIAs seems 
to gain inspiration from the relevant practice under FTAs and the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System. As a result, the state-state DSMs in a state’s IIAs are likely to be 
affected by its performance in the area of international trade dispute resolution. Such 
an influence can be identified particularly in practice in China and the EU. Therefore, 
for a better understanding of the practice in state-state investment dispute settlement, 
the analysis in this part covers the state-state DSMs in China’s and the EU’s IIAs and 
FTAs, as well as their performance in the WTO Dispute Settlement System. 
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Chapter 6 China’s Approach to International Investment and Trade Dispute 
Settlement 
In terms of dispute settlement at the international level, it is noticeable that China used 
to have a quite resistant attitude towards international adjudication. This has affected 
its behaviour on the international plane in various aspects, including in investment 
dispute settlement. Therefore, this chapter starts with an introduction of China’s 
traditional attitude to international law and international adjudication, in order to 
provide the background for the following analysis. Regarding China’s engagement in 
international investment dispute settlement, Section 6.2.1 first looks at the historical 
development of China’s IIAs, providing background information on China’s 
investment development strategy at various stages. Then Section 6.2.2 and Section 
6.2.3 focus on China’s practice of SSDS and ISDS respectively, analysing relevant 
provisions in its concluded treaties and existing cases thereunder. In addition, 
considering the ongoing worldwide process of ISDS reform, the opinions expressed by 
China in various international fora are also examined. In the end, Section 6.3 
summarizes and provides the conclusion. 
 
6.1 China’s Traditional Attitude towards International Law and International 
Adjudication 
Looking into Chinese history, the “century of humiliation”, between the first Opium 
War starting from 1840 and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 
1949, left China with various “unequal treaties”,553 which resulted in China’s dramatic 
negative perception of international law and a traditional resistance to international 
adjudication.554 Following the “Reform and Opening up” policy,555 China began to 
open its doors to the world in 1978, but the effect brought about by such a change to its 
perception of international law and international adjudication seems to be limited. From 
 
553 In general, “unequal treaties” refers to “a historical category of bilateral treaties concluded in the late 19th and 
early 20th century between European states, the United States of America (USA) or Latin American countries (states 
that fulfilled the standards of ‘civilization’), and Asian or African states (perceived as ‘uncivilized’). Most of these 
treaties were signed after military defeat or as a consequence of such a threat and often provoked dissatisfaction, as 
they were establishing a system of benefits for the ‘civilized’ powers, while restricting the sovereignty of the 
‘uncivilized’ and subordinate states”. See: Elena Conde Pérez & Zhaklin Valerieva Yaneva, Unequal Treaties in 
International Law, Oxford Bibliographies, 25.03.2020, available at: 
https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-0131.xml, last 
visited on 06.08.2020. 
554 As Hanqin Xue, the Chinese judge at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), pointed out, the victimization 
period under the strong-armed foreign powers left a lasting impact on China’s view of international law. See: Hanqin 
Xue, Chinese Contemporary Perspectives on International Law: History, Culture and International Law, The Pocket 
Books of the Hague Academy of International, Vol. 15, 2012, p. 14-15. 
555 The “Reform and Opening up” Policy refers to the programme of economic reforms termed “Socialism with 
Chinese characteristics” in China, which was introduced in December 1978 by reformists within the Communist 
Party of China, led by Xiaoping Deng. 
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its foundation in 1949 until 2001, the jurisdiction of only two international dispute 
settlement systems has been accepted by China. 
First, in 1993, China signed the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention). 556  Under this 
Convention, China agreed to submit disputes to the International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID). However, it should be noted that signing this 
Convention is not equal to accepting the jurisdiction unconditionally: written consent 
to the ICSID’s jurisdiction is still required in each case.557 In fact, after signing the 
ICSID Convention, China did not subject all of its newly negotiated IIAs to the 
jurisdiction of the ICSID, leaving some treaties signed without any reference to it at all. 
Moreover, when China ratified the ICSID Convention, it entered a notification pursuant 
to Article 25(4) of the ICSID Convention, stating that China would only consider 
submitting to the jurisdiction of ICSID “disputes over compensation resulting from 
expropriation and nationalization”.558 
Second, in 1996, China gave its consent to another international dispute settlement 
system by ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 
Article 287 of this Convention stated the possible mechanisms for the settlement of 
disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention, among which 
a state shall be free to choose. 559  Although often described as compulsory, the 
argument that this dispute settlement system is consent-based is also strong.560 Even a 
UNCLOS tribunal once suggested that “UNCLOS falls significantly short of 
establishing a truly comprehensive regime of compulsory jurisdiction entailing binding 
decisions”.561 At the same time, China excluded certain disputes from this dispute 
settlement system through a declaration in 2006.562 
Based on the only two cases before 2001 where an international dispute settlement 
system was accepted by China, the intention to avoid international adjudication was 
 
556 The ICSID Convention entered into force for China on 6 February 1993. For more information, see: International 
Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), ICSID Membership-Designations and Notifications_China, 
available at: https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/MembershipStateDetails.aspx?state=ST30, last visited on 
31.07.2020. 
557 ICSID Convention, Art. 25(1). This can be realized by incorporating such acceptance into IIAs or contracts. 
558 On 7 January 1993, China submitted its Notifications Concerning a Class or Classes of Disputes Which the 
Contracting State Would or Would Not Consider Submitting to the Jurisdiction of the Centre (Article 25(4)). See: 
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), ICSID Membership-Designations and 
Notifications_China, available at: 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/MembershipStateDetails.aspx?state=ST30, last visited on 31.07.2020. 
559 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art. 287. The options are: “(a) the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea established in accordance with Annex VI; (b) the International Court of Justice; (c) an arbitral 
tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII; (d) a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with 
Annex VIII for one or more of the categories of disputes specified therein”. 
560 See e.g. Natalie Klein, Dispute Settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Cambridge University 
Press, 2005, p. 3. 
561 The Arbitration Tribunal Constituted under Annex VII of UNCLOS, Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v. 
Japan, Australia v. Japan), 39 ILM 1359, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 04.08.2000. This is cited in: 
Natalie Klein, Dispute Settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Cambridge University Press, 2005, 
p. 3. 
562 Oceans & Law of the Sea-United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Declarations Made 
Upon Signature, Ratification, Accession or Succession or Anytime Thereafter, 13.02.2020, available at: 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm#China after ratification, last 
visited on 04.08.2020. 
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quite clear. China’s historical experience contributes to its stance as an enthusiastic 
champion of the principle of sovereignty. 563  In fact, the protection of national 
sovereignty has long been China’s top foreign policy goal.564 However, this policy can 
come under threat in international adjudication. This was argued as being a primary 
concern of China when interpreting its rejection of international adjudication, because 
it considered that a decision from an international tribunal regarding the 
appropriateness of a state’s actions would be seen as an intrusion into its domestic 
affairs.565 
Another possible legacy of China’s historical experience is the concern about the 
independence and impartiality of international bodies. Until the beginning of the 
People’s Republic China, China had come to consider international courts as “biased 
courts dominated by the West”566 and the decisions of international courts or arbitral 
organs as being subject to the manipulation of “big capitalist powers”.567 After the 
foundation of the People’s Republic China, China has continuously remained outside 
the international legal system for the most part. As a result, its unfamiliarity with the 
content of international legal texts and their application, taken together, which further 
causes China to distrust and avoid international law and international adjudication 
wherever possible. 
In addition to the contribution from historical events, China’s reticence is also possibly 
influenced by its philosophical tradition. As noted in Chapter 2, supra, traditional 
philosophies, especially Confucianism, have greatly affected the aversion to litigation 
in Chinese society. Under Confucian doctrines, litigation is an unpleasant process, 
because it is harmful to the existing relations and is against the pursued condition of 
harmony. What is worse, such procedures are unhelpful and may even have an adverse 
effect on resolving disputes. Thus, the Western style of adjudication, which dominates 
 
563 Hanqin Xue, Chinese Perspectives on International Law: History, Culture and International Law, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2012, p. 95. 
564 The desire to protect sovereignty is clearly enshrined in the preamble of China’s Constitution, which states that 
“China consistently carries out an independent foreign policy and adheres to the five principles of mutual respect 
for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, 
equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence in developing diplomatic relations and economic and cultural 
exchanges with other countries”. For a further discussion on this, see: Allen Carlson, More Than Just Saying No: 
China’s Evolving Approach to Sovereignty and Intervention Since Tiananmen, at: Alastair Iain Johnston & Robert S. 
Ross (eds.), New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy, Stanford University Press, 2006, pp. 217–241. 
Marcia Don Harpaz, Sense and Sensibilities of China and WTO Dispute Settlement, Journal of World Trade, Vol. 44, 
2010, p. 19.  
565 See e.g. Marcia Don Harpaz, China and International Tribunals: Onward from the WTO, at: Lisa Toohey & 
Colin B. Picker & Jonathan Greenacre (eds), China in the International Economic Order: New Directions and 
Changing Paradigms, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 47. Liyong Jiang, WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
and China's Participation, at: Henry Gao & Donald Lewis (eds.), China's Participation in the WTO, Cameron May, 
2005, p. 304. Julian Ku, China and the Future of International Adjudication, Maryland Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 27, 2012, pp. 157, 171-172. 
566 Pasha L. Hsieh, China's Development of International Economic Law and WTO Legal Capacity Building, 
Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 13, 2010, p. 1001. 
567 Ying Tao, Recognize the True Face of Bourgeois International Law from a Few Basic Concepts, at: Jerome Alan 
Cohen & Hungdah Chiu (eds.), People’s China And International Law: A Documentary Study, Princeton University 
Press, 1974, pp. 70-71. Julian Ku, Enforcement of ICSID Awards in the People's Republic of China, Contemporary 
Asia Arbitration Journal, Vol. 6, 2013, pp. 33-34. 
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the process of dispute resolution in international courts and arbitral organs, is by 
comparison overly confrontational and litigious in China’s view.568  
All these factors have caused China to avoid resolving disputes using those “dubious” 
international bodies which operate under unfamiliar and litigious rules. However, the 
need for economic development in recent decades required greater international 
cooperation with other states, deeper involvement in the world’s economic system, and 
recognizing more international dispute settlement systems in order to boost confidence 
from its trade and investment partners as well as to complete China’s own legal system. 
In 2001, China’s accession to the WTO resulted in its acceptance of the compulsory 
dispute settlement system of the WTO, which is a milestone on the way to becoming a 
player in international dispute settlement.569 
In brief, under the strong influence of its historical experience and traditional 
philosophies, China was doubtful of international law and treated international 
adjudication with caution or even hostility for a long period of time, jealously guarding 
its sovereignty against other states and international tribunals. Although China began 
to participate in a few binding international dispute settlement systems in recent 
decades, it has generally been careful to limit the scope of its obligations and the 
jurisdiction of such international bodies.570 To the extent China made a commitment 
to such an international dispute settlement system, it has done so only when the treaty 
itself made that mandatory. Past decades witnessed relevant changes in China’s 
performance, but its unique historical experience and traditional attitude to international 
law and international adjudication still should not and cannot be neglected when 
analysing its performance at the international level, particularly its performance in 
international dispute settlement.  
 
6.2 China’s Engagement in International Investment Dispute Settlement 
Based on the understanding of China’s traditional attitude towards international law 
and international adjudication, this section focuses on China’s engagement in 
international investment dispute settlement. It first introduces the historical 
development of China’s IIAs to provide the necessary background to analyse the 
 
568 Justice Robert F. Utter, Dispute Resolution in China, Washington Law Review, Vol. 62, 1987, p. 392. 
569 Joining ICSID Convention and ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) are 
arguably not comparable to accepting the jurisdiction of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement System. This is because, 
under the former two, a disputing state party maintains a certain control over the constitution of the tribunal, which 
is not the case under the latter. See: Julian Ku, China and the Future of International Adjudication, Maryland Journal 
of International Law, Vol. 27, 2012, p.167. In specific, the composition of WTO panels depends on the consent of 
the parties, while the composition of the Appellate Body division in a specific case is completely outside the 
influence of disputing parties. This is in contrast with international arbitration, where a disputing party can often 
choose its own arbitrator. 
570 In addition to the two examples analysed in this section, it is also noticeable that when China ratified the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties in 1997, it made a reservation regarding Art. 66 on submitting disputes to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). See: United Nations, Treaties and International Agreements Registered or Filed 
and Recorded with the Secretariat of the United Nations, I. Nos. 34026-34034, 1997, Volume 1989, I. Nos. 34026-
34034, p. 540. After that, China continued to enter reservations regarding the dispute settlement provisions in most 
of its other international agreements. See: Liyong Jiang, WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism and China's 
Participation, at: China's Participation in the WTO, Cameron May, 2005, p. 303. 
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approach China adopted to resolve the disputes under the IIAs. The two types of DSMs 
that are often regulated under IIAs, state-state DSMs for resolving disputes about the 
interpretation and application of treaty provisions and investor-state DSMs for 
investors to bring cases against their host states regarding alleged damages to their 
investment, are discussed in turn in Section 6.2.2 and Section 6.2.3. After analysing the 
procedural designs of these DSMs, considering the ongoing ISDS reform in the world, 
Section 6.2.4 looks at China’s positions in various fora. The last section provides a 
summary and concludes. 
6.2.1 Historical Development of China’s International Investment Agreements 
Since the first BIT was signed with Sweden in 1982, China has built a dense network 
of IIAs. As of 7 June 2019, it has entered into 146 BITs and 23 other IIAs, among which 
26 are concluded with EU Member States.571  
From an overview of these IIAs, their development can be generally divided into three 
generations.572 The first generation was between 1982-1989, during which China’s 
position was predominantly as an investment recipient. It focused on promoting inward 
rather than outward investment, and correspondingly more efforts were made in 
protecting China as a host state instead of addressing Chinese investors that went 
abroad. China’s first and second Model BITs were drafted in 1984 and 1989 
respectively. China’s IIAs entered into the second generation during 1990-1997. 
Compared to the previously concluded IIAs, two changes can be particularly identified 
in the IIAs signed in this period of time: first, national treatment was required to be 
provided by host states and, second, reference to the ICSID for resolving investor-state 
disputes became available. Such changes reflect “the increasing role of outward 
investment in China’s economic development and the corresponding interest in 
effective investor protection rules and procedures for Chinese investments abroad”.573 
China’s third Model BIT was released during this stage. Since 1998, China’s IIAs have 
entered into the third generation. In this period of time, China gradually changed from 
mainly importing investment to also substantially exporting capital. In order to protect 
 
571 For a list of IIAs concluded by China, see: UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements Navigator_China, 
available at: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/countries/42/china, last 
visited on 26.05.2020. In terms of the number of IIAs that are in force, China is second only to Germany, although 
the gap “has been closing in recent years and China looks set to overtake Germany for the top place soon”. See: 
Norah Gallagher, China's BIT's and Arbitration Practice: Progress and Problems, at: Wenhua Shan & Jinyuan Su 
(eds.), China and International Investment Law: Twenty Years of ICSID Membership, Brill | Nijhoff, 2014, p. 182. 
572 The three generations of China’s IIAs are widely recognized in the literature, but differences exist in the specific 
starting and ending years of each generation. Based on the similarity in the perspective of the analysis, here the 
author adopts the opinion stated in: Norah Gallagher & Wenhua Shan, Chinese Investment Treaties: Policies and 
Practice, Oxford University Press, 2009, 35-43. For a further discussion on these three generations, see: Cai 
Congyan, China–US BIT Negotiations and the Future of Investment Treaty Regime: A Grand Bilateral Bargain with 
Multilateral Implications, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 12, 2009. Axel Berger, Investment Rules in 
Chinese Preferenctial Trade and Investment Agreements: Is China Following the Global Trend Towards 
Comprehensive Agreements, German Development Institute Discussion Paper, Vol. 7, 2013, pp. 6-12. Wenhua Shan 
& Sheng Zhang, The Potential EU-China BIT: Issues and Implications, at: Marc Bungenberg & August Reinisch & 
Christian Tietje (eds.), EU and Investment Agreements: Open Questions and Remaining Challenges, Hart Publishing, 
2013, p. 1. Marc Bungenberg & Catharine Titi, The Evolution of EU Investment Law and the Future of EU-China 
Investment Relations, at: Wenhua Shan & Jinyuan Su (eds.), China and International Investment Law: Twenty Years 
of ICSID Membership, Brill | Nijhoff, 2015, pp. 348-351. 
573 Peter Malanczuk, China and the Emerging Standard of Transparency in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), 
New Zealand Association for Comparative Law, Vol. 19, 2015, p. 85. 
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· 
its investors’ interests abroad and further induce inward investment, China accepts 
some high-standard protection of international investment in its IIAs, such as a 
minimum standard of treatment.574 In 2010, China’s fourth Model BIT was drafted, 
but it has not been officially published yet.575  
It is noticeable that the IIAs concluded by China in the last decade seem to indicate a 
new trend. These Agreements contain more state-friendly provisions, providing host 
states with more room to regulate.576 Under the currently prosperous “One Belt One 
Road” Initiative, more IIAs are expected to be concluded with advanced substantive 
and procedural rules based on China’s experience and the recent development in the 
area of international investment law. Therefore, the fourth generation of China’s IIAs 
is arguably coming or even has already started. 
6.2.2 China’s Practice of State-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms  
State-state DSMs are designed to resolve disputes between treaty parties on the 
interpretation and application of certain provisions in the underlying IIAs. This section 
first addresses the rules on such mechanisms in China’s Model BITs, followed by an 
examination of China’s concluded treaties, including IIAs and FTAs. Since there is no 
publicly available information of any case under these Agreements, the analysis is only 
based on relevant treaty provisions. As explained in the Introduction to Part 3, supra, 
considering the existing practice of adopting the WTO DSU as the model for drafting 
provisions on state-state DSMs in IIAs and FTAs, China’s practice in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System is also relevant in the context of the present analysis and thus is 
examined accordingly. 
6.2.2.1 The State-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in China’s Model Bilateral 
Investment Treaties 
Each of China’s Model BITs incorporates mechanisms for SSDS. TABLE 6.2.2.1 
provides an overview of the procedural designs of these DSMs. Based on the 
comparison shown in this TABLE, it is clear that barely any substantive change took 
place from China’s first Model BIT to the fourth one. Only the China Model BIT (1997) 
refines the language of some of the provisions, making them more concise and clearer. 
All China’s Model BITs provide a two-step system to resolve disputes between 
contracting states concerning the interpretation and application of certain provisions: 
first, any dispute “shall, as far as possible, be settled with consultation through 
diplomatic channel”.577 If it cannot be settled within six months, then, as the second 
step, any disputing party may resort to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal. Such a tribunal should 
 
574 It was argued that China’s third generation IIAs are the equivalent of the global new generation of IIAs, which 
was launched with the US and Canadian Model BITs. See: Catharine Titi, The Arbitrator as a Lawmaker: 
Jurisgenerative Processes in Investment Arbitration, Journal of World Investment & Trade, Vol. 14, 2013, p. 15. 
575 China Model BIT (2010) has not been officially published, but the content can be found in an academic article. 
The discussion on this Model BIT in the present thesis is based on the information disclosed in this article. See: 
Xiantao Wen 温先涛, Discussion on "China Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (Draft)" 《中国投资保护协定范
本》(草案)论稿, Journal of International Economic Law 国际经济法学刊, Vol. 18 & 19, 2011. 
576 José E. Alvarez, The Return of the State, Minnesota Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, 2011, pp. 237-238. 
577 China Model BIT (1997), Art. 8.1. 
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· 
be composed of three arbitrators: each party chooses one and the chairman is appointed 
by an agreement by the parties or by the President of the ICJ. Tribunals enjoy the power 
and discretion to establish detailed procedural arrangements during the dispute 
resolution process. The awards shall be reached in accordance with the involved IIA 
and generally recognized international law by a majority of votes, and they shall be 
final and binding on disputing parties. Each disputing party bears the cost of its 
appointed arbitrator and representation, and other costs are to be borne by them equally. 
There is no provision that addresses the implementation of awards made by the 
tribunals. 
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6.2.2.2 The State-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in China’s International 
Investment Agreements 
From an overview of the state-state DSMs in China’s concluded IIAs, few differences 
can be identified among the provisions of most of China’s IIAs signed before 2015. 
They actually resemble the provisions in China’s Model BITs. According to the legal 
texts, in general, the scope of this type of DSM is defined as disputes “concerning the 
interpretation and application” of the treaty; consultation through the diplomatic 
channels shall be resorted to first, which is possibly followed by ad hoc arbitration; the 
tribunal is to be made up of three arbitrators with each disputing party selecting its own 
and the chair is chosen jointly by the two arbitrators; the tribunal enjoys the power to 
determine the arbitration procedures in each case, and no further guidance is provided 
for arbitrators in this sense. In addition, these IIAs are silent as to whether the arbitration 
process shall require any degree of publicity.  
Despite the similarities, from a chronological perspective, some differences can also be 
identified. For example, newly concluded treaties often include more detailed 
procedural rules than those signed in the past, which can be as a result of China’s 
accumulated experience in treaty drafting. Another noteworthy change is the 
disappearance of certain diplomatic elements. For example, when no agreement can be 
reached between disputing parties, the designated authority to appoint the chairman of 
a tribunal changed from the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which is a 
position of a diplomatic nature, to persons in international adjudication institutions with 
a judicial nature, such as the President of the ICJ.580 In addition, the requirement in 
many early IIAs that the chairman of the tribunal should be selected with the approval 
of the two treaty parties has disappeared in some newly concluded IIAs. 581  The 
disappearance of these diplomatic elements can be interpreted as China’s increasing 
confidence in international adjudication. It is noted that the conclusion of the China-
Canada BIT (2012) brought more innovations in China’s IIAs. For instance, when 
treaty parties fail to reach a decision on the manner in which they resolve their disputes 
within 60 days of the decision of an arbitral tribunal, the party bringing the dispute 
“shall be entitled to receive compensation of equivalent value to the arbitral tribunal’s 
award”.582 This gives tribunals the power to award financial damages, as opposed to 
merely answering abstract questions of treaty interpretation and application. This 
development can also constitute a further step in China’s increasing trust in 
international adjudication. 
The practice of using the two-step system composed of amicable negotiation and ad 
hoc arbitration continued until China concluded the comprehensive economic 
 
580 It is also noted that, in one recently concluded BIT, the China-France BIT (2007), the relevant choice goes back 
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. See: the China-France BIT (2007), Art. 10.4. 
581 See e.g. the China-Netherlands BIT (2001), Art. 9.3. 
582 The China-Canada BIT (2012), Art. 15.8. This article may pertain to the arbitration of diplomatic protection 
claims, and/or disputes about a state’s non-compliance with an earlier investor-state decision. See: Luke Eric 
Peterson, Analysis: A Closer Look at the Dispute Settlement Provisions of the China-Canada Investment Treaty, 
Including Its State-to-State Mechanism, 26.09.2012, available at: https://www.iareporter.com/articles/analysis-a-
closer-look-at-the-dispute-settlement-provisions-of-the-china-canada-investment-treaty-including-its-state-to-state-
mechanism/, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
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agreement covering both trade and investment with Australia in 2015. Under this treaty, 
a system which echoes the WTO Dispute Settlement System was established for SSDS. 
Specifically, in addition to a general reference to amicable settlement,583 consultations 
are required as the precondition for resorting to adjudication.584 Each disputing party 
is supposed to select its own arbitrator and the two arbitrators should jointly select a 
third one as the chair; if any member of the tribunal is not appointed on time, either 
party may request the Director-General of the WTO to designate an arbitrator.585 Each 
stage of the proceedings must take pace withing a certain time limit.586 After hearing 
the case, the tribunal issues an initial report for the disputing parties to review and 
comment upon, which is followed by issuing a final report. 587  Guidance on the 
implementation and the review of compliance with the tribunals’ reports is also 
provided. 588  At the same time, optional amicable mechanisms, like good offices, 
mediation and conciliation, are available for disputing parties.589  
Using a quasi-WTO dispute settlement Dispute Settlement System for SSDS in the 
China-Australia FTA (2015) is likely affected by the comprehensive nature of this 
treaty. Thus relevant practice that can be found in FTAs is used to resolve both trade 
and investment SSDS here. At the same time, it also indicates to the confidence of both 
parties in the functioning of the WTO Dispute Settlement System in resolving disputes 
between states. 
The state-state DSMs in the IIAs between China and EU Member States are of great 
relevance and deserve detailed discussion. An analysis of these DSMs is conducted in 
the following Chapter 8 on the China-EU investment relationship. 
There has been no case under the state-state DSMs in China’s IIAs. This is not an 
unusual situation and, in fact, under other IIAs in the world, such DSMs have also been 
rarely used. This is understandable, considering that the disputes concerning specific 
investors are not often considered worthwhile for a state to initiate an inter-state process. 
In addition, the existence of investor-state DSMs, which are considered more 
convenient and effective in resolving disputes between investors and host states, seem 
to be sufficiently functional.590 A particular reason for China can be that China’s trade 
and investment treaties were concluded on the basis of inter-state political relationships, 
and thus diplomatic negotiation is expected to be referred to normally when disputes 
arise instead of adjudication.591 
 
583 The China-Australia FTA (2015), Art. 15.1. 
584 Id, Art. 15.5. 
585 Id, Art. 15.7. 
586 For example, the arbitral tribunal “shall present the Parties with its initial report within 90 days of appointment 
of the final arbitrator”. See: id, Art. 15.12. 
587 Id. 
588 Id, Arts., 15.13-15.17. 
589 Id, Art. 15.6. 
590 Xiantao Wen 温先涛, Discussion on "China Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (Draft)" 《中国投资保护协定
范本》(草案)论稿, Journal of International Economic Law 国际经济法学刊, Vol. 18 & 19, 2011, pp. 58-59. 
591 Wenhua Shan, The Legal Framework of EU-China Investment Relations: A Critical Appraisal, Hart Publishing, 
2005. 
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6.2.2.3 The State-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in China’s Free Trade 
Agreements 
China started to work on its FTAs since the beginning of the 19th century.592 From the 
Framework Agreement of China-ASEAN FTA in 2002, as of 20 April 2020, China has 
signed and implemented 16 FTAs and another 24 FTAs are under construction, which 
include pure trade deals as well as comprehensive economic agreements covering both 
trade and investment with developing and developed states.593 
All of China’s concluded FTAs incorporate intergovernmental systems for resolving 
potential disputes between treaty parties regarding interpretation and application of 
treaty provisions. Based on their nature, these dispute settlement systems can be divided 
into two categories: diplomatic systems, which exist in the Special Arrangements with 
Hong Kong, Macau and Taipei,594 and those that combine diplomatic negotiation and 
ad-hoc arbitration, which appear in China’s FTAs with other states. Considering the 
administrative relationship between mainland China and Hong Kong, Macau and 
Taipei, the value of these dispute settlement systems for the present thesis is limited 
and thus will not be further analyzed. 
Despite being concluded with different states with various economic and legal 
backgrounds over diverse periods of time, there is a remarkable resemblance among 
dispute settlement systems that combine diplomatic negotiation and ad-hoc arbitration: 
they are built upon the structure of the WTO Dispute Settlement System with necessary 
amendments.595 Similar to what can be seen under the China-Australia FTA (2015), 
the dispute resolution process starts with consultations, followed by an ad hoc panel 
process, which ends with a report delivered by the panel regarding the resolution of the 
 
592 For a further discussion on the development of China’s FTAs in the past 20 years, see: Lin Zhang 张琳, The 
New Developments in China ’ s FTAs 中国区域自由贸易协定的新发展 , 10.02.2015, available at: 
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ftazixun/201502/20454_1.html, last visited on 07.08.2020. Shuchao Henry Gao, 
China’s Strategy for Free Trade Agreements: Political Battle in the Name of Trade, Asian Regional Workshop on 
Free Trade Agreements: Towards Inclusive Trade Policies in Post-crisis Asia, Bangkok, 08-09.12.2009. Jun Zhao & 
Timothy Webster, Taking Stock: China’s First Decade of Free Trade, University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 33, 2011, pp. 65-119. Qingjiang Kong, China’s Uncharted FTA Strategy, Journal of World 
Trade, Vol. 46, 2012. Tyler Cohen & David Schneiderman, The Political Economy of Chinese Bilateral Investment 
Treaty Policy, The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 5, 2017. 
593 More information on these treaties can be found at: Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, 
China FTA Network, available at: http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.shtml, last visited on 31.07.2020. 
594 Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (signed on 29.06.2003, entered into force 
on 29.06.2003), Art. 19.3; Mainland and Macau Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (signed on 29.10.2004,  
entered into force on 29.10.2004), Art. 19.5; Cross-Straits Economic Framework Agreement (signed on 29.06.2010, 
entered into force on 12.09.2010), Arts. 10, 11. 
595 Marcia Don Harpaz, China and International Tribunals: Onward from the WTO, at: China in the International 
Economic Order: New Directions and Changing Paradigms, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 54. Francis 
Snyder, The Creation of New Sites of Governance: China, Regional Trade Agreements and WTO Law, at:  The EU, 
the WTO and China: Legal Pluralism and International Trade Regulation, Hart Publishing, 2010, p. 365. Compared 
to the WTO Dispute Settlement System, the ones in China’s FTAs are less formal in terms of the lack of an 
institutional dispute settlement body and a permanent appellate body, and they are much less detailed than the WTO 
equivalent. See: Weidong Zhu, The Dispute Settlement Mechanism of ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and Its 
Implications for SADC, The first International Conference on Regional Integration and SADC Law, Maputo, 23-
25.04.2008. Francis Snyder, The Creation of New Sites of Governance: China, Regional Trade Agreements and WTO 
Law, at: The EU, the WTO and China: Legal Pluralism and International Trade Regulation, Hart Publishing, 2010, 
p. 387-388. It is also suggested that a possible alternative template of the DSMs in China’s FTAs could be the one 
under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). See: id, p. 370. 
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dispute.596 If the content of the report is not implemented within a reasonable period 
of time, compensation and the suspension of concessions and obligations will be 
allowed.597 The panels’ final reports shall be made public.598 It is noticeable that, in 
addition to encouraging the amicable settlement of disputes through consultation or 
mediation, as is available in the DSU,599 a provision stressing the use of amicable 
DSMs is always provided at the beginning of the dispute settlement chapter.600 This is 
described as the “Chinese Model”601 and it is considered as giving priority to stronger 
and deeper economic cooperation and high level contact.602 No case has been brought 
under China’s FTAs or at least no information has been reported on such complaints. 
Thus, it is hard to judge the function of these DSMs from a practical perspective.  
The adoption of a WTO panel proceedings model for SSDS under FTAs can be seen as 
evidence of China’s confidence and trust in that system.603 In fact, joining the WTO, 
especially accepting its compulsory dispute settlement system, is argued as being the 
turning point in China’s approach to international economic dispute settlement.604 
6.2.2.4 China’s Practice in the WTO Dispute Settlement System 
The WTO is not only a forum for promulgating and upholding international trade law, 
but it also provides an outstanding mechanism for resolving international trade disputes 
between its Member States, which is widely regarded as “the jewel in the crown”.605 
Since China was admitted into the WTO in 2001,606 as of 9 June 2019, it became an 
active participant in the WTO Dispute Settlement System, participating as a disputing 
party in 63 cases and reserving its third party rights in another 172 cases.607 For the 
purpose of the present analysis, certain features of China’s participation in the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System deserve attention.  
 
596  See e.g. Agreement on Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive 
Economic Co-operation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China 
(signed on 04.11.2002, entered into force on 01.07.2003), Arts. 4, 6-9. 
597 See e.g. id, Arts. 12-13. 
598 See e.g. id, Art. 9.9. 
599 See e.g. id, Arts. 5, 8. The relevant provision in the DSU is Art. 5. 
600 See e.g. the China-Pakistan FTA (2009), Arts. 53.1, 54.1; the China-Iceland FTA (2013), Art. 105. 
601 Guiguo Wang, China’s FTA Practices and Prospects, Asian WTO Research Network Seoul Meeting 2010, Seoul, 
22.05.2010.  
602 Rajesh Sharma, China-India FTA: Is the Future Imperfect?, Journal of World Trade, Vol. 48, 2014, p. 941. 
603 Kuik Cheng-Chwee, Multilateralism in China’s ASEAN Policy: Its Evolution, Characteristics, and Aspiration, 
Contemporary Southeast Aisa, Vol. 27, 2005. 
604 Marcia Don Harpaz, China and International Tribunals: Onward from the WTO, at: China in the International 
Economic Order: New Directions and Changing Paradigms, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 53. 
605  World Trade Organization, WTO Disputes Reach 400 Mark, Press Release, 06.11.2009, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres09_e/pr578_e.htm, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
606 Although China had been seeking to resume its status as a Contracting Party to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) (1947) since 1986, the repeated rejection of its application by certain states meant that it only 
managed to do so in 1994. For more information on China’s accession negotiation, see: Henry Gao, China's 
Participation in the WTO: A Lawyer's Perspective, Singapore Year Book of International Law, Vol. 11, 2007, pp. 1-
8. 
607 China was in the position of a complainant in 20 cases and a respondent in 43 cases. See: World Trade 
Organization, Disputes by Member, available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
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First, China has always preferred to resort to amicable mechanisms in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System, including negotiation and consultations.608 A good example of the 
efforts made to resolve disputes through negotiation is the case about certain measures 
affecting renewable energy generation between China and the EU, where China’s 
Premier at that time, Keqiang Li, played a decisive role in pushing forward the 
negotiation process and resolving the dispute eventually through amicable 
settlement.609 If negotiation did not work, China would continue to make full use of 
consultations. As stated by the MOFCOM spokesman, China was very serious about 
consultations.610 Although in some cases going through adjudication was unavoidable, 
this only happened after the Chinese government had exhausted all possible amicable 
avenues to eliminate differences, regardless whether China was a complainant or a 
respondent. 611  In addition to the effectiveness and efficiency of negotiation and 
consultations in resolving disputes, a special impetus may have played a role in the case 
of China.612 Considering that the WTO Dispute Settlement System is arguably the first 
international adjudication system with compulsory jurisdiction that China has accepted, 
China’s traditional distrust of international adjudication may nevertheless have had an 
impact on its reluctance to refer disputes to the WTO Dispute Settlement System.613 
China’s avoidance of adjudication must also have been affected by its legal culture of 
pursuing harmony, and as a result, resorting to adjudication means a shameful failure 
of and will further cause irreparable harm to relationships. 614  As argued, such a 
tradition should have exerted a “psychological burden” on the Chinese government 
when it decided to initiate a new case.615 
Second, in the past 20 years, China transformed from an outsider to a main player in 
the WTO Dispute Settlement System. The growth of China’s experience seemed to 
bring about a change in its perception of this system: at the beginning, China was more 
comfortable with the diplomatic DSMs, namely, negotiation and consultations. 
608 In the context of the WTO Dispute Settlement System, “negotiation” often refers to the communication between 
disputing parties, usually in the form of political dialogue, which may happen at any time, even before the request 
for consultations is raised; while the term “consultations” refers to the mandatory first stage before an adjudication 
process. 
609 Just before the EU Commission released its preliminary decision on an anti-dumping investigation with regard 
to Chinese relevant products, China’s Premier at that time, Keqiang Li, phoned the European Commission President, 
José Manuel Barroso, showing his concern about the economic interests involved and expressing the hope to resolve 
the trade frictions through dialogue in lieu of a trade war and, in the end, peaceful settlement was reached. See: 
cn.chinadaily.com.cn 中国日报网, Foreign Media: Keqiang Li Promoted China-EU Negotiations on Solar to 
Achieve Success 外 媒 ： 李 克 强 促 使 中 欧 光 伏 谈 判 取 得 成 功 , 05.08.2013, available at: 
http://caijing.chinadaily.com.cn/2013-08/05/content_16870071.htm, last visited on 07.08.2020. 
610 www.chinanews.com 中国新闻网, The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) Researches on the Request for 
Consultations from the US and the Dispute Regarding Subsidy May Take Two Years 商务部研究美方磋商请求 补
贴 争 端 可 能 耗 时 两 年 , 06.02.2007, available at: http://www.chinanews.com/cj/gncj/news/2007/02-
06/868895.shtml, last visited on 07.08.2020. 
611 Yenkong Ngangjog Hudu  Qi Zhang, The Political Economy of WTO Implementation and China's Approach to 
Litigation in the WTO, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016, p. 132. 
612 It is admitted that the impetus to use negotiation and consultations must have been balanced by practical concerns, 
such as the importance of China’s affected interests. See: id, p. 131. Wenhua Ji & Cui Huang, China's Path to the 
Center Stage of WTO Dispute Settlement: Challenges and Responses, Global Trade and Customs Journal, Vol. 5, 
2010, p. 373. 
613 X. Jiang & S. Tan, Non-litigation Tradition in China, Legal System and Society, Vol. 4, 2008, p. 239. 
614 Id. 
615 Liyu Han & Henry Gao, China's Experience in Utilizing the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, at: Dispute 
Settlement at the WTO: The Developing Country Experience, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 166. 
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Gradually, the adjudication by panels and the Appellate Body became more acceptable 
to China. In other words, the WTO Dispute Settlement System began to be considered 
by China as a normal tool to adjust unhealthy trade relations instead of “a means of 
political assault”.616  China’s acceptance of and participation in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System was further deemed to be a “distinct departure from its past policy 
of avoiding international adjudication”.617 Through taking part in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System, China learned how to bear its international obligations and, more 
importantly, how to make full use of international adjudication to protect its legitimate 
rights. 618  China’s integration in the WTO also explains its growing legal 
assertiveness.619 Its successful experience in the WTO Dispute Settlement System is 
likely to affect its approaches in other areas of international economic law. 
Third, China’s compliance with the rulings adopted by panels and the Appellate Body 
has been laudable, which deserves attention particularly because of its traditional 
reticence to accepting international adjudication and former refusal to implement 
international obligations.620 In the WTO Dispute Settlement System, China has a good 
record of compliance with no authorized retaliation or compensation.621 This can be 
explained by the theory of reputation costs,622 which is particularly relevant when seen 
 
616 Id, p. 168. Deming Chen 陈德铭, An In-depth Implementation of the Seventeenth Party Congress’s Spirits and 
a Comprehensive Inauguration of the Commercial Cause: Report by the Minister of Commerce Deming Chen  at 
the 2008 National Business Working Conference (Exerpt) 深入贯彻党的十七大精神 全面开创商务工作新局面
——商务部部长陈德铭在 2008 年全国商务工作会议上的报告（摘要）, Ministry of Commerce of the People's 
Republic of China 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 商 务 部 , 21.01.2008, available at: 
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ae/ai/200801/20080105344851.html, last visited on 07.08.2020. 
617 Marcia Don Harpaz, China and International Tribunals: Onward from the WTO, at: China in the International 
Economic Order: New Directions and Changing Paradigms, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 46. 
618 Guohua Yang & Xiaoli Shi (eds.) 杨国华、史晓丽 编, We Are Practicing in the WTO: Collection of Essaies 
on Participation in the WTO Hearings 我们在 WTO 打官司——参加 WTO 听证会随笔集, Intellectual Property 
Publishing House 知识产权出版社, 2014.  
619 Marcia Don Harpaz, Sense and Sensibilities of China and WTO Dispute Settlement, Journal of World Trade, Vol. 
44, 2010, pp. 1155-1186. 
620 Regarding the assessment of a WTO Member’s implementation performance, scholars have raised two issues: 
timeliness and quality. See: William J. Davey, Compliance Problems in WTO Dispute Settlement, Cornell 
International Law Journal, Vol. 42, 2009, p. 119. The present judgment of China’s implementation performance is 
based on these two factors. Although it should be positively recognized, China’s performance is not flawless. It was 
argued that, after 2009, the quality of China’s implementation deteriorated. See: Timothy Webster, China's 
Implementation of WTO Decisions, at: Lisa Toohey & Colin B. Picker & Jonathan Greenacre (eds.), China in the 
International Economic Order: New Directions and Changing Paradigms, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 101. 
William J. Davey, Compliance Problems in WTO Dispute Settlement, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 42, 
2009, pp. 103-109. 
621 Other major trading WTO Members, such as the EU, the US and Japan, have been challenged in compliance 
proceedings for the WTO consistency of their measures to implement rulings. See e.g. European Communities-
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS 26; US–Measures Relating to Zeroing and 
Sunset Reviews, WT/DS 322; Japan-Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, WT/DS 245. It was argued that, 
compared to its international obligations in other areas, China had taken the compliance with WTO rulings as the 
“standard conduct to follow”, which can be described as outstanding. See: Marcia Don Harpaz, China and 
International Tribunals: Onward from the WTO, at: China in the International Economic Order: New Directions and 
Changing Paradigms, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 60. Marcia Don Harpaz, China and International 
Tribunals: Onward from the WTO, at: Lisa Toohey & Colin Picker & Jonathan Greenacre (eds.), China in the 
International Economic Order - New Directions and Changing Paradigms, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 60. 
Timothy Webster, China's Implementation of WTO Decisions, at: China in the International Economic Order: New 
Directions and Changing Paradigms, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 110. 
622 It was pointed out that reliability is communicated through action and reputation is constructed based on 
consistent reliable behaviour, which works especially well in the context of multilateral treaties. See: Joel Sobel, A 
Theory of Credibility, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 52, 1985, pp. 557-573. In terms of the easy flow of 
information and public discussion nowadays, the reputation costs of violating international obligations are arguably 
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in the context of Confucianism to explain China’s performance.623 Under the influence 
of Confucianism, China has a tradition of “saving face”, which is closely related to 
reputation. International reputation is a significant element that the Chinese government 
cares about, thus a bad reputation coming from non-compliance would cause the 
Chinese government to feel humiliated and “lose face”. 
At the same time, China’s legal culture on dispute settlement may also explain three 
other phenomena: China’s frequent appearance as a third party, the passive 
participation of Chinese private entities in WTO-related affairs,624 and China’s attitude 
towards transparency in the WTO Dispute Settlement System. First, China has been 
actively participating in the WTO Dispute Settlement System as a third party. In 
addition to the need to learn at the beginning,625 China’s appearance in almost all 
relevant cases may also be attributed to its traditional preference for avoiding 
confrontational ways of resolving disputes.626 Second, the passive participation of 
Chinese industries could be explained by the consistent pursuit of harmony, the 
traditional reluctance to be “trouble-makers”, and their view of participating in WTO 
dispute settlement as being the job of the Chinese government and outside the remit of 
private parties’ business.627 This can also be supported by the fact that the Chinese 
government seldom released information on its own legal arguments in WTO cases, 
citing confidentiality concerns.628 In this vein, the Chinese government’s rejection of 
greater transparency in the WTO Dispute Settlement System should also be 
understandable:629 the Dispute Settlement System is an inter-governmental system and 
 
increasing. See: John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations 
(2nd Edition), The MIT Press, 1997, p. 170. 
623 Yenkong Ngangjog Hudu  Qi Zhang, The Political Economy of WTO Implementation and China's Approach to 
Litigation in the WTO, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016, pp. 81-88. 
624 This can be evidenced by how rare it is for Chinese private entities to resort to the trade barrier investigation 
(TBI) mechanism established by the Chinese government. China’s TBI mechanism was initially created in 2002 by 
learning from the experience of other WTO Members, especially the EU and the US. Through participating in the 
procedures of gathering, processing and prioritizing information, domestic industries could collaborate with the 
government to challenge foreign trade barriers through this mechanism. Until now, China’s TBI mechanism was 
only resorted to once, in 2004. 
625 According to the DSU, third parties undertake no potential responsibility or compulsory work, thus frequent 
participation as a third party was a great opportunity for China to gain knowledge of the substantive and procedural 
laws in the WTO. 
626 Acting as a third party gives China the chance to express its relevant concerns without directly being up against 
other WTO Members. 
627 Wenhua Ji & Cui Huang, China's Path to the Center Stage of WTO Dispute Settlement: Challenges and 
Responses, Global Trade and Customs Journal, Vol. 5, 2010, p. 376. It is noticed that, in recent years, there seems to 
be an increase of the indirect participation of Chinese companies or industry associations in WTO cases, which 
resonates with the increasing legal awareness of Chinese society, although how such a change would operate in 
concrete WTO cases remains to be seen. 
628 Liyu Han & Henry Gao, China's Experience in Utilizing the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, at: Dispute 
Settlement at the WTO: The Developing Country Experience, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 165. 
629 According to the DSU, dispute settlement proceedings are confidential for the disputing parties and third parties 
to a dispute. See: Understanding on rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes, Arts. 17.10, 18. 
Transparency in the WTO Dispute Settlement System means opening up the dispute resolution proceedings either 
to the public or to other WTO Members. See: World Trade Organization, Hong Kong Briefing Notes-Briefing Notes 
on the Ministerial and the Main Issues, 2005, available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/brief_e/brief00_e.htm, last visited on 05.08.2020. During 
the Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong in 2005, the issue of transparency in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System was listed in the draft legal text circulated by the chairman of the negotiations and was actively 
negotiated by WTO Members. However, China found the proposal of increasing transparency unacceptable. See: 
Bryan Mercurio, Improving Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization: The Dispute Settlement 
Understanding Review-Making it Work?, Journal of World Trade, Vol. 38, 2004, p. 847. 
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thus it should not be open to the public in any regard.630 Such an objection to enhancing 
transparency in the WTO Dispute Settlement System may also relate to China’s practice 
of “saving face” through reducing the exposure of existing disputes to the public.  
6.2.3 China’s Practice of Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
In addition to state-state DSMs, IIAs may also provide investors with mechanisms to 
resolve investment disputes with their host states directly. Both China’s Model BITs 
and its concluded IIAs follow this practice. In addition, different from the situation of 
state-state DSMs, cases under China’s IIAs are also introduced and illustrated in the 
this section. Last but not least, against the background of the ongoing worldwide ISDS 
reform, China’s attitude towards the various issues that have been presented also 
deserves attention in this analysis. 
6.2.3.1 The Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in China’s Model 
Bilateral Investment Treaties 
All China’s four Model BITs incorporate mechanisms for ISDS. Different from the 
similarity among the state-state DSMs, a clear divergence can be identified in China’s 
Model BITs regarding investor-state DSMs. The transformation of investor-state DSMs 
in China’s Model BITs mirrors the generational changes that are consistent with 
China’s evolving foreign investment aspirations.631 TABLE 6.2.3.1 provides details of 
the relevant provisions and presents a comparison of them. The key features of each of 
these Model BITs are analysed in the following. 
(i) China’s Model Bilateral Investment Treaties (1984 & 1989) 
China’s first and second Model BITs were adopted in 1984 and 1989 respectively. 
Regarding the provisions on ISDS, these two versions include exactly the same Article 
9. According to this Article, settlement through negotiation is stressed as the 
compulsory first step in resolving any investment dispute between an investor and its 
host state, which shows a desire for an amicable settlement. If the dispute cannot be 
settled through negotiation, after six months, either party is entitled to submit the 
dispute to the competent court of the host state. Investor-state arbitration is only 
available for disputes in relation to amounts of compensation for expropriation which 
have not already been brought before the competent domestic court. As a result, the 
door to international arbitration is only open for a very limited group of disputes, while 
other issues are left to the jurisdiction of domestic courts. This approach shows that 
China had quite a cautious attitude towards investor-state arbitration at that time. The 
underlying reasons for this may include China’s perception of arbitral awards relating 
to expropriation as “an infraction on its sovereignty”.632 Furthermore, since China was 
not a member of the ICSID Convention when its first and second model BITs were 
 
630  Bryan Mercurio, Improving Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization: The Dispute Settlement 
Understanding Review-Making it Work?, Journal of World Trade, Vol. 38, 2004, p. 847. 
631 Leon E. Trakman, Geopolitics, China, and Investor-State Arbitration, at: Lisa Toohey & Colin Picker & Jonathan 
Greenacre (eds.), China in the International Economic Order: New Directions and Changing Paradigms, Cambridge 
University Press, 2015, p. 271. 
632 Id, p. 272. 
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drafted, only ad hoc arbitration was mentioned. Article 9 also provides basic procedural 
rules on certain aspects of investor-state arbitration proceedings, such as composition 
of tribunals, applicable law, decision making, and allocation of costs. 
(ii) China’s Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (1997) 
In 1997, China published its third Model BIT. This Model BIT basically inherits the 
structure of the provision on ISDS in China’s first two Model BITs, providing 
negotiation, domestic remedies and international arbitration as possible options. 
Specifically, first, the importance of amicable settlement through negotiation is 
recognized and it is considered a compulsory stage. Second, for the disputes which 
cannot be settled through bilateral mechanisms within six months, the right to choose 
from the competent court of the host state and ICSID is granted to the aggrieved 
investors through a fork-in-the-road clause, 633  subject to possible domestic 
administrative review procedures specified by the laws and regulations of any treaty 
party as a precondition to initiating arbitration. It is noticeable that the limit on the 
subject matter for international arbitration is eliminated. In other words, this Model BIT 
accepts investor-state arbitration for all legal disputes, instead of limiting the scope to 
disputes related to the amount of compensation for expropriation. This represents a new 
era of the practice of ISDS in China, reflecting its enhanced readiness to endorse 
international mechanisms for liberalizing investment. One possible reason for this 
change is that China’s outflow investment had increased quickly and substantially. As 
a result, the focus of ISDS is not only on protecting China as a host state, but it is also 
on providing Chinese investors with sufficient protection for their investments abroad. 
The rules on applicable law and the binding effect of awards are the same as those 
stated in China’s first two Model BITs. Other procedural issues are not particularly 
regulated, probably because they are already covered by ICSID Arbitration Rules. Thus, 
Articles 9.4-9.8 from China’s Model BITs (1984 & 1989) are not available in China’s 
Model BIT (1997).  
(iii) China’s Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2010) 
In the China’s Model BIT (2010), Article 13 establishes rules on ISDS. Compared to 
China’s previous Model BITs, this 2010 version is more detailed. 634  First, the 
compulsory six-month period for amicable settlement as the initial step in dispute 
settlement is still provided. It is noticeable that this 2010 Model BIT expressly pointed 
out the possibility of realizing settlement through mediation, which was not available 
in the previous versions. For any dispute that cannot be settled in six months, the 
investor can resort to the competent court of the host state, ICSID arbitration, ad hoc 
arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, or other arbitration or ad hoc 
 
633 A “fork-in-the-road” clause in IIAs refers to the regulation providing that investors must make a choice between 
pursuing their claims either through international arbitration, local courts or other venues provided for in the relevant 
agreement. See: Norton Rose Fulbright, Fork-in-the-Road Clauses-Divergent Paths in Recent Decisions, 10.2015, 
available at: https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/0bd10ad8/fork-in-the-road-clauses, 
last visited on 01.08.2020. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Second 
Edition), 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 267-268. 
634 Xiantao Wen 温先涛, Discussion on "China Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (Draft)" 《中国投资保护协
定范本》(草案)论稿, Journal of International Economic Law 国际经济法学刊, Vol. 18 & 19, 2011, p. 58.  
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tribunals based on agreement by the parties.635 Such a choice shall be final. This Model 
BIT continues the practice of China’s Model BIT (1997) by opening international 
arbitration to all legal disputes. However, at the same time, a time limit of three years 
“since the investor first knew or should have known the event that the dispute arose 
from” is introduced as a precondition for submitting a dispute to international 
arbitration. One noticeable change in the applicable law is that party autonomy is 
recognized, which means tribunals shall first look at the law chosen by the disputing 
parties. In the absence of such an agreement, “the law of the Contracting Party to the 
dispute accepting the investment including its rules on the conflict of laws, as well as 
the applicable international law, especially this Agreement” will come into play. In the 
case where any conflict exists between the disputed IIA and applicable arbitration rules, 
the regulation in the IIA shall prevail. If any violation of the IIA is found, tribunals may 
only award monetary damages with suitable interest and/or require the original property 
to be returned to investors. This excludes the possibility of requiring host states to 
change the disputed regulating measures. The award shall be final and binding upon 
both disputing parties and treaty parties shall commit to the enforcement of awards. 
Regarding allocation of costs, the practice of equal allocation used in China’s previous 
Model BITs is kept as the default rule, with some additional discretion granted to 
tribunals, especially when it finds that the claims or objections raised by one disputing 
party are reckless. 
 
635 Some scholars described this as “a traditional European model”. See: Jun Xiao, How Can a Prospective China-
EU BIT Contribute to Sustainable Investment: In Light of the UNCTAD Investment Policy Framework for 
Sustainable Development, Journal of World Energy Law and Business, Vol. 8, 2015, p. 526. 
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6.2.3.2 The Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in China’s 
International Investment Agreements 
In general, the differences among the investor-state DSMs in China’s various IIAs 
respond to the transformation in China’s Model BITs, symbolically reflected in the 
change of China’s attitude towards investor-state arbitration.638 According to China’s 
different attitudes to international arbitration for ISDS, the development process of the 
investor-state DSMs in China’s IIAs can be divided into three stages: before 1996, 
1997-2009 and after 2010. 
This section aims at providing an overview of the key features of the IIAs concluded 
by China at the three development stages. As state-state DSMs, the IIAs between China 
and EU Member States are more relevant to the subject of the present thesis and thus 
deserve a separate analysis, which can be found in Section 9.3.2, infra. 
(i) Stage One: No or Limited Acceptance of Investor-State Arbitration (1982-1996) 
The primary goal of investor-state DSMs as protecting China as a host state are 
reflected not only in China’s first and second Model BITs but also in the IIAs concluded 
during its first development stage from 1982 to 1996. Regarding the provisions on ISDS 
in the IIAs concluded by China at this stage, a clear similarity to China’s Model BITs 
(1984 &1989) can be identified. This is typically evidenced by the fact that investor-
state arbitration is only available for disputes about the amount of compensation for 
expropriation, while other disputes should be resolved locally. Foreign investors’ 
limited rights in this regard indicate China’s lack of sufficient impetus for making 
efforts in protecting investors, as well as its cautious attitude towards international 
adjudication. 
Regarding other issues in ISDS, the regulations on the applicable law in these early 
BITs deserve attention. Some of them are silent on this issue. Some provide that the 
disputes should be governed by the domestic law of the host state, provisions of the 
BIT at issue and generally accepted principles of international law adopted by both 
parties. It was argued that the qualifying phrase of “adopted by both parties” shows that 
“traditional’ rules of international law, in which China had not participated, would not 
be applied”.639 Some later BITs signed at this stage made improvements on this issue 
by simply stipulating “principles of international law” without the qualifying phrase 
used before.640 Such a development was argued as being of great significance, “as it 
shows that China has become more confident in and more willing to accept general 
international law”.641  
 
638 The change of China’s attitude towards investor-state arbitration was argued to be the watershed, or at least an 
important landmark in China’s IIA development. See: Jun Xiao 肖军 , The Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism in a China-EU BIT: A Comparative Analysis Based on the China-Canada BIT and CETA 中欧 BIT 的
投资者-东道国争端解决机制——基于中加 BIT 与 CETA 的比较分析, Journal of Xidian University (Social 
Science Edition) 西安电子科技大学学报(社会科学版), Vol. 25, 2015, p. 77. 
639 Wenhua Shan, The Legal Framework of EU-China Investment Relations: A Critical Appraisal, Hart Publishing, 
2005, p. 216. 
640 See e.g. the China-Morocco BIT (1995), Art. 9.6. 
641 Wenhua Shan, The Legal Framework of EU-China Investment Relations: A Critical Appraisal, Hart Publishing, 
126
 
· 
(ii) Stage Two: Overall Acceptance of Investor-State Arbitration (1997-2009) 
China’s new membership of the ICSID Convention since 1993 and the overall 
acceptance of international arbitration without limiting the subject matter of the 
disputes brought about changes to corresponding provisions in China’s IIAs. The first 
IIA in which international arbitration was expanded to all investment disputes is the 
China-Barbados BIT (1998), after which adopting international arbitration for ISDS, 
particularly ICSID arbitration, seems to have become China’s mainstream practice. In 
particular, the 11 IIAs concluded between China and EU Member States at this stage 
reflect China’s approach to investor-state arbitration without exception. The 
elimination of restrictions on the subject matter and the overall adoption of ICSID 
started a new era of ISDS under China’s IIAs. 
(iii) Stage Three: Revised Acceptance of Investor-State Arbitration (2010-) 
In general, compared to China’s practice in the past, most of the IIAs that belong to this 
third stage provide more detailed regulations.642  The features of the investor-state 
DSMs in China’s Model BIT (2010) are reflected in some of its IIAs signed after 2010, 
such as the China-Uzbekistan BIT (2011). However, different from the situation in the 
past, more differences among the IIAs can be identified at this stage. More noticeably, 
some IIAs concluded between China and certain developed countries present great 
differences with the China Model BIT drafted in this period of time. For example, in 
2012, China concluded a comprehensive and progressive BIT with Canada,643 which 
was described by MOFCOM as “different from the other existing investment treaties 
between China and other parties, reflecting the trend of international investment 
agreement”.644 The provisions on ISDS in this treaty have many similarities with the 
Canadian Model Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (hereinafter 
“Canadian Model FIPA”),645 which thus presents China’s general open and flexible 
attitude towards accepting its treaty partners’ preferred practice.646 
 
2005, p. 216. 
642  For instance, they often contain specific provisions on tribunal constitution, consolidation, costs, and 
transparency. See: Elodie Dulac, The Emerging Third Generation of Chinese Investment Treaties, Transnational 
Dispute Management, 2010, available at: https://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/article.asp?key=1636, last visited on 01.08.2020.  
643 For a further discussion on selected substantive and procedural provisions in the China-Canada BIT (2012), see: 
Luke Eric Peterson, China-Canada Bilateral Investment Treaty Unveiled: A First Look at the Provisions of Long-
delayed Pact, 26.09.2012, available at: https://www.iareporter.com/articles/china-canada-bilateral-investment-
treaty-unveiled-a-first-look-at-the-provisions-of-long-delayed-pact/, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
644 Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Interpretation of China-Canada Bilateral Investment 
Protection Agreement by An Official from the Department of Treaty and Law of MOFCOM, 13.09.2012, available 
at: http://English.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/Cocoon/201209/20120908359187.shtml, last visited on 
31.07.2020. 
645 For example, certain tax measures, environmental measures and cultural industries are carved out of the investor-
state dispute settlement system. For more discussion on this, see: Norah Gallagher, China's BIT's and Arbitration 
Practice: Progress and Problems, at: China and International Investment Law: Twenty Years of ICSID Membership, 
Brill | Nijhoff, 2014, p. 185.  
646 This can also be evidenced by the different rules on the same issue in China’s other IIAs. For example, whether 
investors are allowed to submit disputes to international arbitration after they resort to domestic courts but withdraw 
such a reference before a binding decision is issued is regulated differently in the China-New Zealand FTA (2008) 
and the China-Japan-Korea Investment Agreement (2012), and the relevant provisions seem to follow the preferred 
approaches of New Zealand, and Japan and Korea. 
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More recently, the conclusion of the China-Australia FTA (2015) further introduces 
some new practices into China’s IIAs. First, the jurisdiction of the investor-state DSMs 
under this treaty is relatively limited.647 This is understandable considering the fact that 
this Agreement was negotiated at a time of strong resistance in Australia to the inclusion 
of an ISDS clause in FTAs or IIAs.648 At the same time, China’s acceptance of such 
an approach may be caused by other elements, such as the inexperience of Chinese 
investors in investment arbitration. 649  Second, this Agreement provides for a 
compulsory consultation process for ISDS, if necessary, to be followed by an arbitration 
under ICSID, the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, UNCITRAL arbitration rules, or 
any other rules agreed upon by parties.650 In addition, the treaty specifies that, except 
for certain exceptions, arbitral proceedings shall be conducted in public, and third 
parties may make amicus curiae submissions.651 There is also a provision for claims 
to be subject to preliminary objections and disposed of promptly.652 Furthermore, this 
treaty envisions the establishment of an appellate mechanism, which constitutes a 
further step regarding the recognition of international adjudication in practice in 
China.653   
6.2.3.3 Investment Cases under China’s International Investment Agreements 
China’s fast progress in negotiating and concluding IIAs did not equally bring about its 
active participation in investor-state arbitration, even with the overall acceptance of this 
DSM in its IIAs in the late 1990s. Although the caseload of investor-state arbitration 
worldwide exploded since 2000,654 as of 30 April 2020, there are only eight publicly 
available treaty-based investor-state arbitration cases involving China or Chinese 
investors (including the cases in which investors come from mainland China, Hong 
Kong, Macau, and Taiwan).655 Among these eight cases, two cases were discontinued; 
one case is pending, and the other five cases have been concluded with awards. TABLE 
 
647 Under the China-Australia FTA (2015), investor-state DSMs are limited to breaches of national treatment which 
result in alleged loss or damage. Measures that are non-discriminatory and for the legitimate public welfare 
objectives are not eligible to be brought to international arbitration. Under such circumstances, the respondent may 
serve a “public welfare notice” to the complaining party so as to trigger a state-state consultation process and exclude 
the application of ISDS. See: the China-Australia FTA (2015), Arts. 9.11, 9.18. Regarding more discussion on this, 
see: Ashurst Australia, Bull in a China Shop? The Investor-State Dispute Settlement Provisions of the China-
Australia Free Trade Agreement, 23.06.2015, available at: https://www.ashurst.com/en/news-and-insights/legal-
updates/bull-in-a-china-shop/, last visited on 30.07.2020. 
648 For a further discussion on Australia’s policy changes on ISDS, see e.g. Jürgen Kurtz, Australia’s Rejection of 
Investor-State Arbitration: Causation, Omission and Implication, ICSID Review, Vol. 27, 2012, p. 65. Leon E. 
Trakman, Investor-State Arbitration: Evaluating Australia’s Evolving Position, The Journal of World Investment & 
Trade, Vol. 15, 2014, p. 152. 
649 For a further discussion on the reasons of China’s reluctance to resort to investor-state arbitration, see: Karl P. 
Sauvant & Michael D. Nolan, China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment and International Investment Law, 
Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 18, 2015, pp. 931-933. 
650 The China-Australia FTA (2015), Arts. 9.11, 9.12. 
651 Id., Arts. 9.16.3, 9.17. 
652 Id., Art. 9.16.5. 
653 Id., Art. 23. 
654 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), The ICSID Caseload-Statistics (Issue 2016-
1), 2016, available at: https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202016-
1%20(English)%20final.pdf, last visited on 03.08.2020. 
655 The statistics here are based on the information published by the ICSID’s and Italaw’s websites, which may not 
count in all the existing investment arbitration cases involving China or Chinese investors, since information on ad 
hoc arbitration is not always public. 
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6.2.3.3 provides the basic information of these cases, and a detailed discussion is 
provided in the following. 
(i) Cases against China 
1. Ekran Berhad v. People’s Republic of China 
The first ICSID case ever brought against China was the Ekran case, filed in May 
2011.656 Ekran, a Malaysian construction and development company, claimed a breach 
of the China-Malaysia BIT (1988) because of a revocation by a local government of its 
construction license, which was argued amounted to expropriation. However, just two 
months after filing the claim, the case was suspended by mutual agreement even before 
a tribunal was nominated, and two years later the dispute was finally settled privately.657 
The terms of the settlement are not known to the public.658 Given the absence of a 
public statement concerning the reasons for the settlement of the case and the 
withdrawal of the claim, it is difficult to draw a definitive conclusion. However, it was 
argued that one clear inference here is that “inbound investors may perceive that China 
would be a tenacious adversary, that China could protract and raise the costs of investor 
claims, and that it could invoke its regulatory authority to terminate a claimant’s 
investment in China”.659 
2. Ansung Housing Co. Ltd. v. People’s Republic of China 
The second case against China was brought on 4 November 2014 by Ansung Housing 
Co. Ltd., a South Korean property developer. 660  Ansung had invested in the 
development of a golf and country club and condominiums in various Chinese cities. It 
alleged that the provincial government frustrated its investment plan and illegally 
deprived it of its investment and thus breached the China-Korea BIT (2007). On the 
other side, China referred to ICSID Arbitration Rule 41(5) arguing for an early 
dismissal of the claims since they were “manifestly without legal merit” and asked the 
tribunal to render an award under ICSID Arbitration Rule 41(6). On 9 March 2017, the 
tribunal decided that Ansung’s claims were time-barred and thus the case was 
dismissed.661 
3. Hela Schwarz GmbH v. People’s Republic of China 
 
656 Ekran Berhad v. People’s Republic of China, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/15. For an academic discussion on this 
case, see e.g. Tong Qi, How Exactly Does China Consent to Investor-State Arbitration: On the First ICSID Case 
against China, Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal, Vol. 5, 2012, pp. 265-291. 
657 On 16 May 2013, the Secretary-General of ICSID issued a procedural order taking note of the discontinuance of 
the proceeding pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rule 43(1). 
658 Had the arbitration claim proceeded, the tribunal would need to determine issues including whether it had 
jurisdiction to decide the compensation claim arising from an expropriation. 
659 Leon E. Trakman, Geopolitics, China, and Investor-State Arbitration, at: China in the International Economic 
Order: New Directions and Changing Paradigms, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 279. 
660 Ansung Housing Co. Ltd. v People’s Republic of China, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/25. For some academic 
discussions on this case, see: Alison Ross & Lacey Yong, China Faces Second ICSID Claim, Global Arbitration 
Review (GAR), 07.11.2014, available at: https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1033850/china-faces-second-
icsid-claim, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
661 Ansung Housing Co, Ltd v People’s Republic of China, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/25, Award, 9 March 2017. 
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On 21 June 2017, a German spice products company, Hela Schwarz GmbH, registered 
a case under ICSID Convention and Arbitration Rules against China.662 Hela had been 
operating in the city of Jinan since 1996 as a joint-venture with a local meat processing 
company, which was transferred to German ownership in 1999. This case is currently 
pending. The recent update of this case is the tribunal’s Procedural Order No. 4 
concerning Hela’s request to amend the request for arbitration. No information about 
the content of the claims has been released to the public. 
(ii) Cases brought by Chinese Investors 
1. Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru 
The first instance involving a Chinese investor is Tza Yap Shum v. Peru based on an 
alleged breach of the China-Peru BIT (1994).663 Tza Yap Shum is a Hong Kong 
resident with Chinese nationality, 664  investing and doing business as a fish flour 
manufacturer and exporter in Peru. In this case, Tza Yap Shum alleged that a number 
of measures taken by the tax authority of Peru constituted an indirect expropriation of 
his investment. Interesting jurisdictional issues were raised before the process 
proceeded to substantive disputes, including whether a Hong Kong resident was 
qualified to rely on investor protection under the China-Peru BIT (1994), whether the 
prescribed waiting period of six months for an amicable settlement had taken place, and 
whether the claimant was required to exhaust local remedies before proceeding to 
investor-state arbitration under the applicable treaty. The tribunal affirmed its 
jurisdiction in 2009 and ultimately rendered a final award on merits in 2011. It adopted 
an activist stance in ruling that the provision in Article 8(3) of the China-Peru BIT 
(1994) “involving the amount of compensation for expropriation” included a 
determination of whether the property was actually expropriated and awarded Tza Yap 
Shum a fraction in damages and interest of the amount claimed.665 The annulment 
request initiated by Peru was dismissed on 12 February 2015, which brought the case 
to an end.666 
 
662 Hela Schwarz GmbH v. People's Republic of China, ICSID Case No. ARB/17/19. 
663 Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6. 
664 Although Hong Kong’s autonomy in economic affairs includes the competence to conclude BITs internationally, 
in this case there was no Hong Kong BIT with Peru on which the investor could have sought to rely. For more 
information about Hong Kong’s autonomy in economic affairs, see: Peter Malanczuk, Hong Kong, at: Rüdiger 
Wolfrum (ed.), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, 2012, Vol. IV, 
pp. 958-980. 
665 Mr. Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, 
19.06.2009; Award on Merits, 07.07.2011. For some academic discussion on this award, see: Guiguo Wang, Consent 
in Investor-State Arbitration: A Critical Analysis, Chinese Journal of International Law, Vol. 13, 2014, pp. 349-352. 
Such a decision plainly digresses from earlier investment jurisprudence having interpreted similar provisions. See 
e.g. Berschader v. Russia, SCC Case No. 080/2004, Award, 21.04.2006, para. 153; Austrian Airlines v. Slovak 
Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 20.10.2009. Therefore, this is likely to have significant ramifications for 
investors covered under China’s BITs that contain similarly restrictive investment arbitration provisions.  
666 Mr. Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, Decision on Annulment, 12.02.2015. For 
some academic discussions on this award, see: Kyriaki Karadelis, Peru Fails to Annul Chinese Treaty Award, Global 
Arbitration Review (GAR), 04.03.2015, available at: https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1034270/peru-fails-
to-annul-chinese-treaty-award, last visited on 03.08.2020. 
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2. China Heilongjiang International Economic & Technical Cooperative Corp., Beijing 
Shougang Mining Investment Company Ltd., and Qinhuangdaoshi Qinlong 
International Industrial Co. Ltd. v. Mongolia 
In this case, three Chinese investors turned to arbitration in 2010 following the 
cancellation of a key license in 2009.667 The tribunal declined jurisdiction over the 
claim. Although the award is not public, it appears from a public statement that the 
tribunal’s rejection was based on a “narrow” reading of the jurisdictional clause in the 
China-Mongolia BIT (1991), allowing for arbitration only in relation to the amount of 
compensation due for an established expropriation.668 If this is the case, such a decision 
would constitute a deviation from the decision made by the earlier Tza Yap Shum 
tribunal regarding the interpretation of similar provisions on the jurisdiction clause in 
China’s oldest BITs. 
3. Sanum Investments Limited (Macau) v. Lao 
The Macau-incorporated company Sanum made investments in the gaming and 
hospitality industry in Laos in 2007. As a result of allegedly unfair and discriminatory 
taxes imposed by the Lao government, Sanum commenced arbitration proceedings 
under the China-Laos BIT (1993) in 2012. 669  On 13 December 2013, the arbitral 
tribunal rendered a preliminary award upholding its jurisdiction, finding that the China-
Laos BIT (1993) applied to a legal entity incorporated in Macau and the subject matter 
of the claim which related to the propriety of state taxation measures fell within the 
scope of the disputed BIT that only permitted arbitration in “a dispute involving the 
amount of compensation for expropriation”.670 The Lao government then challenged 
the decision in proceedings before the High Court in Singapore, which granted the Lao 
government’s application to vacate the award. However, this was later reversed by the 
Singapore Court of Appeal, which decided that the China-Laos BIT (1993) applied to 
Macau and accepted a broad interpretation of the jurisdiction clause, based on the 
specific context of the disputed BIT.671 
4. Ping An Life Insurance Company of China, Limited and Ping An Insurance (Group) 
Company of China, Limited v. Kingdom of Belgium 
This is the first case in which an investor from mainland China resorted to ICSID to 
resolve an investment dispute,672 which represented “a turning point in the readiness 
 
667 China Heilongjiang International Economic and Technical Cooperative Corp. et al. v. Mongolia, PCA Case No. 
2010-20. 
668 Luke Eric Peterson, Mongolia Prevails in Long-Running Chinese BIT Arbitration, as Arbitrators Distinguish 
Their Reading of Constricted Jurisdiction Clause From More Generous Readings in Prior Cases, IAReporter, 
07.07.2017, available at: https://www.iareporter.com/articles/mongolia-prevails-in-long-running-chinese-bit-
arbitration-as-arbitrators-distinguish-their-reading-of-constricted-jurisdiction-clause-from-more-generous-
readings-in-prior-cases/, last visited on 05.08.2020. For some academic discussions on this case, see: Leon E. 
Trakman, Geopolitics, China, and Investor-State Arbitration, at: China in the International Economic Order: New 
Directions and Changing Paradigms, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 284. 
669 Sanum Investments Limited v. Lao People’s Democratic Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2013-13. 
670 The China-Laos BIT (1993), Art. 8(3). 
671 This included issues like whether it expressly demarcated the determination of the legitimacy of the expropriation 
from the amount of compensation and whether there was a “fork-in-the-road” provision. 
672 Ping An Life Insurance Company of China, Limited and Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, Limited 
v. Kingdom of Belgium, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/29. For more background information about this case, see: 
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of large Chinese companies to bring substantial claims against China’s BITs 
partners”. 673  After losing approximately $3 billion from nationalizing and 
subsequently selling the failed Belgian-Dutch bank Fortis during the 2008 financial 
crisis, Ping An, China’s second largest insurer, brought the claim under the China-
Belgium & Luxembourg BIT (1984). The key issue in this case was whether a dispute 
that arose under the substantive provisions of this 1984 BIT before the China-Belgium 
& Luxembourg BIT (2005) entered into force would be covered by the dispute 
settlement provisions of the latter treaty. In the award issued on 30 April 2015, the 
tribunal held that this was not the case and dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction. 
5. Beijing Urban Construction Group Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Yemen 
Another ICSID case brought by a Chinese entity, Beijing Urban Construction Group 
Co. Ltd. v. Yemen, was filed on 3 December 2014.674 Relying on the China-Yemen BIT 
(1998), the claim concerned a $114 million international airport project in Sana’a. The 
tribunal first issued its jurisdictional decision in May 2017, upholding its jurisdiction 
to rule on an alleged expropriation despite the presence of a narrow dispute resolution 
clause in the disputed BIT, which granted jurisdiction only in claims “relating to the 
amount of compensation for expropriation”.675 After initial filings on the merits had 
been exchanged, in January 2018, the disputing parties suspended the proceedings and 
in May 2018 discontinuance of the proceedings was formally requested. This was 
finally confirmed by the tribunal in June 2018. In a brief statement, the parties said that 
“BUCG and the Republic of Yemen are pleased to announce that they have settled their 
differences in relation to the Sana’a airport project and they look forward to future 
cooperation”. Further details on the terms of the parties’ settlement are not publicly 
available yet.676  
(iii) Potential Investor-State Dispute Settlement Cases 
In addition to the cases mentioned above, based on reports in the media, there are some 
potential disputes in which China or Chinese investors are involved, which may lead to 
ISDS cases in the near future. 
 
Financial Times, Ping An in Arbitration Claim over Fortis, 24.09.2012, available at: 
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/87437290-0620-11e2-bd29-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3bPhlPP5e, last visited on 
06.08.2020. For some academic discussions on this case, see: Alison Ross, Belgium Prevails Against Chinese 
Investor, Global Arbitration Review (GAR), 05.05.2015, available at: 
https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1034431/belgium-prevails-against-chinese-investor, last visited on 
05.08.2020. 
673 Leon E. Trakman, Geopolitics, China, and Investor-State Arbitration, at: China in the International Economic 
Order: New Directions and Changing Paradigms, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 285. 
674 Beijing Urban Construction Group Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/30. For some 
academic discussions on this case, see: Global Arbitration Review (GAR), Chinese Investor Takes on Yemen at 
ICSID, 09.12.2014, available at: https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1033938/chinese-investor-takes-on-
yemen-at-icsid, last visited on 31.07.2020. 
675 The China-Yemen BIT (1998), Art. 10. 
676 Jarrod Hepburn, Chinese State-Owned Investor Settles Treaty Claim After 2017 Jurisdictional Ruling That Took 
Generous View of Treaty’s Scope for Arbitration of Claims, IAReporter, 12.06.2018, available at: 
https://www.iareporter.com/articles/chinese-state-owned-investor-settles-treaty-claim-after-2017-jurisdictional-
ruling-that-took-generous-view-of-treatys-scope-for-arbitration-of-claims-recent-ruling-in-libya-case-adopted-
differing-a/, last visited on 01.08.2020. 
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First, at the end of 2017, the investment dispute between a duo of state-owned Chinese 
investors, China Railway Construction Corporation and China Railway Construction 
Corporation International, and the Mexican government appeared in the media.677 The 
dispute concerns the Mexican government’s refusal to approve the tender won by the 
Chinese investors to build a new train-line. The investors reportedly asked for $600 
million for the alleged expropriation of their investment, claiming that the Mexican 
authorities’ measures lacked good faith, transparency and due process and thus violated 
the China-Mexico BIT (2008). This BIT provides investors with the right to choose 
among ICSID, ICSID (AF) and UNCITRAL arbitration, as long as they have gone 
through the process in the host state’s administrative courts for at least four months 
before submitting a claim. Other information is currently not available to the public. 
Second, in March 2018, a Singapore-registered phosphate mining company, Asiaphos 
Ltd., threatened to file for arbitration against China, because the application to renew 
its mining rights in the central province of Sichuan was rejected. Asiaphos noted that 
local authorities had desired an amicable settlement of the situation, and that parties 
were in talks in relation to settlement. Asiaphos also made clear that it had a potential 
case under the China-Singapore BIT (1985) or ASEAN Comprehensive Investment 
Agreement (2009).678 
Third, in September 2018, it was reported that a Chinese mining company, Minerals 
and Metals Group, initiated negotiations with the Democratic Republic of Congo 
pursuant to the China-Congo BIT (2011). The negotiations related to Congo’s mining 
code, which was overhauled in January 2018 to impose a variety of new conditions on 
miners and to increase the state’s take from mining activity.679 
In addition, Jinlong Dongli Minera Internacional S.A., the Mexican subsidiary of a 
Chinese investor, sent a Notice of Intent on 7 September 2018, invoking the 
expropriation provision in the China-Mexico BIT (2008) against Mexico. According to 
the investor’s report, certain materials it had imported to invest in Mexico’s mineral 
sector had been unfairly embargoed and the investor’s bank accounts had been frozen 
under orders from Mexican courts and tax authorities. The investor claimed that 
Mexico’s actions stifled its development in Mexico and thus amounted to an 
expropriation of its investment. It is unclear how much is at stake.680 
Last but not least, on 10 June 2019, a new report revealed that Greece had been served 
a notice of arbitration by two Chinese investors, Wuxi T. Hertz Technologies Co. Ltd. 
 
677  Damien Charlotin & Luke Eric Peterson, BIT Dispute Involving Chinese State-owned Investors Leads 
Government to Hire Lawyers, IAReporter, 04.12.2017, available at: https://www.iareporter.com/articles/bit-dispute-
involving-chinese-state-owned-investors-leads-government-to-hire-lawyers/, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
678  IAReporter, China Warned of Possible Investment Treaty Arbitration 06.03.2018, available at: 
https://www.iareporter.com/articles/china-warned-of-possible-investment-treaty-arbitration/, last visited on 
26.05.2020. 
679 Zoe Williams, Chinese Mining Giant Puts State on Notice of BIT Claim, IAReporter, 10.09.2018, available at: 
https://www.iareporter.com/articles/chinese-mining-giant-puts-state-on-notice-of-bit-claim/, last visited on 
06.08.2020. 
680 Damien Charlotin, Chinese Miner Files BIT Notice Complaining of Judicially-Embargoed Material and Frozen 
Accounts, 05.10.2018, available at: https://www.iareporter.com/articles/chinese-miner-files-bit-notice-complaining-
of-judicially-embargoed-material-and-frozen-accounts/, last visited on 03.08.2020. 
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and Jetion Solar Co. Ltd., regarding their difficulties in developing a photovoltaic 
project in Northern Greece. This notice invoked the China-Greece BIT (1992), which 
provides for UNCITRAL arbitration in cases concerning the amount of compensation 
for expropriation.681 Other information has not been released to the public. 
(iv) An Analysis of China’s Investment Cases 
As presented above, until now, only three ISDS cases have been initiated against China 
and four cases initiated by investors from mainland China. Such low numbers contrast 
with the thousands of ISDS cases raised annually around the world, the more than 140 
BITs concluded by China until now, as well as the much larger number of cases that 
involved China in one way or another in the WTO Dispute Settlement System. 
Regarding the underlying reasons for such a small number of investment arbitration 
cases commenced by Chinese investors or filed against the Chinese government, 
despite the limited factual record, a few observations may be ventured.682 In this regard, 
some scholars identified three general factors of influence: China’s evolution from a 
state focused primarily on attracting foreign investment to one with increasing amounts 
of outward direct investment, the relatively recent practice of China entering into 
BITs683 and the absence of an international arbitration option in China’s early BITs.684 
Regarding the last factor, it also deserves attention that, even when international 
arbitration is provided for, under the first generation of China’s BITs, foreign investors 
could claim compensation, but they could not ordinarily challenge China on the 
grounds that an expropriation had occurred.685  
In terms of the scarcity of claims filed against China in particular, there has been some 
speculation about the contributions from the Chinese government and foreign investors. 
On the side of the Chinese government, its willingness to reach a compromise in dispute 
settlement is arguably an important contribution. 686  This is in line with China’s 
traditional preference for alternative dispute resolution that avoids recourse to 
international or domestic courts.687 At the same time, through limiting its involvement 
in arbitration cases, China may want to protect its political image that it is both “friendly” 
and “fair” to foreign investors.688 In relation to foreign investors, first, China has a 
 
681 Damien Charlotin, Chinese Investors Launch Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration against Greece, IAReporter, 
10.06.2019, available at: https://www.iareporter.com/articles/chinese-investors-launch-bilateral-investment-treaty-
arbitration-against-greece/, last visited on 31.07.2020. 
682 A concrete analysis of this issue requires more empirical research, which is unfortunately difficult to identify in 
the existing literature. 
683 Here Norah Gallagher pointed out that China had no history of entering into Friendship Commerce & Navigation 
Treaties like other states in the 19th and early 20th centuries given its experience with unequal treaties after the Opium 
Wars. See: Norah Gallagher & Wenhua Shan, China, at: Chester Brown (ed.), Commentaries on Selected Model 
Investment Treaties, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 141. 
684 Norah Gallagher, China's BIT's and Arbitration Practice: Progress and Problems, at: China and International 
Investment Law: Twenty Years of ICSID Membership, Brill | Nijhoff, 2014, p. 182. 
685 Although diverse interpretations of this requirement can be found in various decisions made by different tribunals, 
such an expression in treaty provisions should at least have exerted a certain discouraging effect on investors when 
they considered whether to initiate international arbitration. 
686 Norah Gallagher, China's BIT's and Arbitration Practice: Progress and Problems, at: China and International 
Investment Law: Twenty Years of ICSID Membership, Brill | Nijhoff, 2014, p. 183. 
687 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Trade and Investment Adjudication Involving ‘Silk Road Projects’: Legal Methodology 
Challenges, European University Institute Working Papers, Vol. 2, 2018, p. 1. 
688 Leon E. Trakman, Geopolitics, China, and Investor-State Arbitration, at: China in the International Economic 
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large and lucrative market with great allure, where foreign investors probably do not 
want to jeopardize their future dealings. Second, a report by the European Commission 
states that initiating arbitration against China is likely to be a “last resort, due to fear of 
retaliation”.689 Furthermore, foreign investors conceivably benefit more from reaching 
a negotiated settlement with the Chinese government than they would with 
adjudication.690  In this sense, it was pointed out that investors preferred to avoid 
investor-state arbitration on the grounds that China often accorded foreign investors 
better than “national treatment”.691 Third, investors may also perceive that China is 
well-resourced to engage in costly, dilatory and fractious arbitration proceedings.692 
Last but not least, concerns can relate to the law governing the enforcement of an 
investment award.693 
For the few cases that were initiated by Chinese investors, some scholars indicate a 
desire on the part of Chinese investors to preserve reputation and future business 
opportunities in host states as an important contribution.694 It was also argued that such 
limited litigation activity is in accoordance with the general scarceness of investor-state 
arbitration brought by Asian investors.695 Both of these may relate to China’s legal 
cultural characteristics of preserving and respecting “miànzi” and preferring amicable 
settlements.696 Another point that is worth pointing out here is one disputed issue that 
repeatedly appeared in existing cases, the understanding of the jurisdictional limit of 
international arbitration to disputes about the amount of compensation regarding 
expropriation, which is a typical feature of China’s BITs concluded at an early stage. 
 
Order: New Directions and Changing Paradigms, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 281. In turn, foreign 
investors “(usually) receive handsome returns on their investments”. Leon E. Trakman, China and Foreign Direct 
Investment: Does Distance Lend Enchantment to the View?, The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 2, 2014, 
p. 5.  
It is noted here that preserving the image should be differentiated from preserving China’s own “miànzi”. Namely, 
given China’s extensive treaty regime, it does not seem “realistic” for China to preserve its reputation on the 
international stage as never having a case filed against it in ISDS. See: Norah Gallagher & Wenhua Shan, China, at: 
Commentaries on Selected Model Investment Treaties, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 131-181. 
689 European Commission-Director-General for Trade, Summary of Contributions to the European Commission’s 
Public Consultation on “The Future Investment Relationship Between the EU and China", 2011, available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/december/tradoc_148394.pdf, last visited on 29.05.2020. 
690 Leopoldo Rubinacci, EU-China Investment Relationship-Update on State of Play, DG TRADE Civil Society 
Dialogue, 07.03.2012. 
691 Luke Nottage & Romesh Weeramantry, Investment Arbitration in Asia: Five Perspectives on Law and Practice, 
at: Vivienne Bath & Luke Nottage (eds.), Foreign Investment and Dispute Resolution Law and Practice in Asia, 
Routledge, 2011, p. 25. Wenhua Shan & Norah Gallagher & Sheng Zhang, National Treatment for Foreign 
Investment in China: A Changing Landscape, ICSID Review, Vol. 27, 2012, p. 120. 
692 Leon E. Trakman, Geopolitics, China, and Investor-State Arbitration, at: China in the International Economic 
Order: New Directions and Changing Paradigms, Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 280-281. 
693 There is uncertainty as to whether it is an international treaty or Chinese domestic law that would govern the 
enforcement of investment awards. See: Norah Gallagher & Wenhua Shan, China, at: Commentaries on Selected 
Model Investment Treaties, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 131-181. Leon E. Trakman, Enter the Dragon IV: 
China’s Proliferating Investment Treaty Program, UNSW Centre for Law, Markets and Regulation, 2011, available 
at: https://clmr.unsw.edu.au/article//enter-the-dragon-iv%3A--china%27s-proliferating-investment-treaty-program, 
last visited on 06.08.2020. 
694 Valentina Vadi, Converging Divergences: The Rise of Chinese Outward Foreign Investment and its Implications 
for International (Investment) Law, at: Karl P. Sauvant (ed.), Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 
2011-2012, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 715, 717. 
695 Id, p. 714. 
696 For more discussion on “miànzi”, see Section 3.1.1.3, supra. 
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China and Chinese investors have different and even opposite decisions on the 
interpretation of such clauses from various tribunals. 
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6.2.3.4 China’s Attitude towards Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform 
In the past decades, “fragmentation” was frequently used to describe the area of 
international investment law. This is being exacerbated by various efforts worldwide 
on the reform of ISDS.698 As a main player in international investment, China also 
participates and contributes to this ongoing reform process.  
In general, China’s attitude towards ISDS reform seems to lie in the middle of a 
spectrum of various approaches, on the one side of which is loyalty to arbitration, while 
on the other side is substituting it with a court system. Considering the differences 
among China’s IIAs and its interests as a capital importer and exporter, it was observed 
that “China may be happy to develop its approach on an incremental, case-by-case basis 
instead of seeking to forge a multilateral or regional one-size-fits-all solution”.699 At 
the same time, it was argued that most likely, China would take a gradual approach 
towards ISDS reform following Deng Xiaoping’s phrase “crossing the river by feeling 
for stones” (mōzhe shítóu guòhé, 摸着石头过河).700 
Based on publicly available information, the discussion in this section focuses on the 
opinions expressed by China in various international fora, together with its relevant 
treaty practice if there is any, which include China’s “One Belt One Road” Initiative, 
transparency in ISDS in UNCITRAL Working Group II and overall ISDS reform in 
UNCITRAL Working Group III. 
(i) Investor-State Dispute Settlement under the “One Belt One Road” Initiative
As introduced in Section 3.2.7, supra, China is constructing its “One Belt One Road” 
Initiative to further its economic ties with other states. Under this Initiative, China 
suggests to establish a comprehensive system for investment dispute settlement where 
the use of amicable DSMs is particularly stressed. A concrete reflection of this general 
guidance is visible in the 2017 CIETAC Investment Arbitration Rules, which adopt the 
unique practice of combining mediation with arbitration. More recently, in February 
2019, the Beijing Arbitration Commission/Beijing International Arbitration Center 
launched its draft International Investment Arbitration Rules, where “Arb-Med” is also 
provided for. More concrete efforts in this direction have been made by the Chinese 
government in the field of commercial arbitration,701 which may have a spill over 
698 This is represented by rejecting investment arbitration and proposing a court system to substitute, adjusting 
current investment arbitration practice, as well as keeping a vague attitude towards arbitration but emphasizing 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms instead. 
699 Anthea Roberts, The Shifting Landscape of Investor-State Arbitration: Loyalists, Reformists, Revolutionaries 
and Undecideds, EJIL: Talk!, 15.06.2017, available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-shifting-landscape-of-investor-
state-arbitration-loyalists-reformists-revolutionaries-and-undecideds/, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
700 Peter Malanczuk, China and the Emerging Standard of Transparency in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), 
New Zealand Association for Comparative Law, Vol. 19, 2015, p. 109. 
701  For example, at the beginning of 2018, Qianhai “One Belt One Road” docking center for international 
commercial litigation and mediation was established. See: Ling Zhang 张玲, Qianhai “One Belt One Road” 
Docking Center for International Commercial Litigation and Mediation Inaugurated on January 7 前海”一带一
路”国际商事诉调对接中心 1 月 7 日揭牌 , Qianhai News 前海新闻 , 08.01.2018, available at: 
http://iqianhai.sznews.com/content/2018-01/08/content_18209556.htm, last visited on 07.08.2020. Furthermore, the 
newly established China International Commercial Court (CICC) particularly promotes the connectivity of litigation, 
mediation, and arbitration, in order to “form a convenient, expeditious, low-cost ‘one stop’ dispute resolution 
platform”. See: China International Commercial Court, A Brief Introduction of China International Commercial 
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effect and thus influence China’s measures in investment dispute resolution in the near 
future. 
(ii) Transparency in Investor-State Dispute Settlement in UNCITRAL Working 
Group II 
The discussion in UNCITRAL Working Group II witnessed a change of China’s 
attitude to the issue of transparency in ISDS. At the beginning of the debate in 
UNCITRAL Working Group II in 2010, states expressed quite different views on the 
need for transparency in ISDS. Supporters of more transparency included states like 
Canada and the US, while opposition to transparency came from Russia, Germany, 
etc. 702  China belonged to the latter, clearly expressing its perception of ISDS 
transparency as superfluous. 703  At that time, China had not entered into any IIA 
including provisions on transparency or third-party intervention and there had been no 
such case where China or a Chinese investor was involved. China stressed that, given 
the confidentiality of arbitration, it was not appropriate to impose provisions on 
publicity and transparency in ISDS.704  
China’s rejection of transparency changed in 2013. This was evidenced for the first 
time during the UN General Assembly discussion on the work of UNCITRAL and its 
Rules on Transparency in October 2013, when the Chinese Delegation expressed its 
appreciation of and support for the adoption of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency 
to enhance the transparency of international investment arbitration procedures.705 It 
was argued that such a change was “induced particularly by the changing role of China 
from a major recipient of global foreign direct investment to a rising outward 
investor”.706  
The change in China’s attitude towards transparency in ISDS is also reflected in its 
IIAs. In this regard, China took quite a cautious approach at the initial stage. For 
example, in 2008, it concluded a BIT with Mexico, which only provides that the award 
“will be publicly accessible, unless the disputing parties agree otherwise”.707 In the 
same year, China concluded the China-New Zealand FTA (2008), in which discretion 
is granted to the host state regarding the publication of tribunal documents, subject to 
 
Court, 28.06.2018, available at: http://cicc.court.gov.cn/html/1/219/193/195/index.html, last visited on 31.07.2020. 
702 Mark Kantor, The Transparency Agenda for UNCITRAL Investment Arbitrations: Looking in all the Wrong 
Places, New York University Investment Law Forum, New York, 07.02.2011.  
703 Peter Malanczuk, China and the Emerging Standard of Transparency in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), 
New Zealand Association for Comparative Law, Vol. 19, 2015, p. 91. 
704 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation), 
Settlement of Commercial Disputes-Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration-Compilation of 
Comments by Governments-Note by the Secretariat-Addendum, A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.159/Add.1, 04.08.2010, p. 12. 
705 The Chinese Delegation further expressed that it believed that this set of rules would help dispel the apprehension 
that investment arbitration would sacrifice public interest for the protection of investors, reinforce social monitoring 
of the host state’s measures and thus contribute to the establishment of the trust in investment arbitration mechanisms. 
See: Statement by Mr Shang Zhen, Chinese Delegate at the 68th Session of the UN General Assembly on Agenda 
Item 79 Report of UNCITRAL on the Work of Its 46th Session, 14.10.2013, available at: http://www.china-
un.org/eng/chinaandun/legalaffairs/sixthcommittee1/t1091525.htm, last visited on 13.02.2017. 
706 Peter Malanczuk, China and the Emerging Standard of Transparency in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), 
New Zealand Association for Comparative Law, Vol. 19, 2015, p. 105. 
707 The China-Mexico BIT (2008), Art. 20.4. 
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the disputing parties identifying confidential information.708 In 2012, the conclusion of 
the China-Canada BIT (2012) constituted “a landmark in the history of the development 
of China’s BIT practice on ISDS transparency”. 709  This treaty contains extensive 
regulations on various transparency-related issues. First, the non-disputing treaty party 
is explicitly given the right to participate in ISDS proceedings by receiving arbitration 
documents, attending hearings and making submissions on questions of treaty 
interpretation.710 At the same time, public access to hearings and arbitration documents 
is also realized to a certain extent: subject to the redaction of confidential information, 
at least the awards shall be publicly available.711 Third, submissions by non-disputing 
parties may be accepted and relevant procedural guidance is also provided.712 In fact, 
the provisions in the China-Canada BIT (2012) on transparency-related issues 
correspond to the wording of pertinent provisions in the Canadian Model FIPA (2004), 
which indicates that incorporating these provisions may be introduced by Canada.713 
At the same time, the discrepancies between the China-Canada BIT (2012) and the 
Canadian Model FIPA (2004) point to China’s resistant attitude to some issues, such as 
automatic public hearings.714 It is noteworthy that many other IIAs concluded by China 
after 2009 do not contain ISDS transparency provisions.715 Until 2015, the China-
Australia FTA (2015) reintroduced transparency requirements into China’s IIA practice, 
which was further continued by the China-Turkey BIT (2015).716 
In brief, although China has explicitly addressed its support of transparency in ISDS in 
the context of UNICTRAL Transparency Rules, none of its existing IIAs directly refer 
to this set of rules. Instead, China’s IIAs reveal its cautious attitude towards this issue, 
which has been affected by the preferences of its treaty partners.717 
 
708 The China-New Zealand FTA (2008), Art. 157. 
709 Peter Malanczuk, China and the Emerging Standard of Transparency in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), 
New Zealand Association for Comparative Law, Vol. 19, 2015, p. 95. Frank J. Garcia, Evaluating International 
Economic Law Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, South Texas Law Review, Vol. 42, 2001, p. 310. 
710 The China-Canada BIT (2012), Art. 27.2. 
711 The China-Canada BIT (2012), Art. 28. 
712 The China-Canada BIT (2012), Art. 29. 
713 Luke Eric Peterson, Canada Announces Conclusion of Investment Treaty with China, but There’s an Asterisk, 
IAReporter, 16.02.2012, available at: https://www.iareporter.com/articles/canada-announces-conclusion-of-
investment-treaty-with-china-but-theres-an-asterisk/, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
714 Under the Canadian Model FIPA (2004), public hearings in ISDS cases is the default rule. See: the Canadian 
Model FIPA (2004), Art. 38. It was argued that, in light of the China-Canada BIT (2012), publishing an arbitral 
award seemed to be the maximum negotiation position China could give in to, and it probably took some time before 
China agreed to the publication of arbitral proceedings and documents. See: Frank J. Garcia, Evaluating 
International Economic Law Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, South Texas Law Review, Vol. 42, 2001, p. 311. 
715 Completely silence and equally uninformative on ISDS transparency is evidenced in the China-Malta BIT (2009), 
the China-Uzbekistan BIT (2011), the China-Japan-South Korea IIA (2012), the China-Tanzania BIT (2013), and 
the China-South Korea BIT (2015). 
716 The China-Turkey BIT (2015) incorporates provisions modelled on the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency. See: 
the China-Turkey BIT (2015), Art. 9.2(c). 
717 In this regard, Chinese scholars warned the Chinese government that, without a sound domestic system of 
information disclosure and secrecy, accepting a high level of transparency would not contribute to protecting public 
interests; what was worse, was the risk of entangling in mire. See: Jun Zhao & Yun Liu 赵骏、刘芸, The Reform 
of Transparency in International Investment Arbitration and China's Response 国际投资仲裁透明度改革及我国
的应对, Journal of Zhejiang University (Humanities and Social Science) 浙江大学学报（人文社会科学版）, Vol. 
44, 2014, p. 159. 
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(iii) Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform in UNCITRAL Working Group III 
The UNCITRAL Working Group III, which comprises states, intergovernmental and 
non-governmental organizations, began its work on ISDS reform in November 2017. It 
is entrusted with a broad mandate and carries out its work according to the following 
three steps: first, by identifying concerns regarding ISDS; second, considering whether 
reform is desirable in the light of any identified concerns; and third, if the Working 
Group were to conclude that reform is desirable, developing any relevant solutions to 
be recommended.718 For this, the Working Group III meets twice every year, and its 
latest session, the 39th session in New York, was devoted to addressing the possible 
reform of ISDS on various issues, including shareholder claims and reflective loss, 
dispute prevention and mitigation, interpretation of investment treaties by treaty parties, 
security for costs and frivolous claims, multiple proceedings and counterclaims, and 
multilateral instrument on ISDS reform.719 
As a member state of the UN, China participated in this ISDS reform discussion and 
expressed its opinions on various issues. First, China pointed out that, in the current 
ISDS system, inconsistency and incorrectness of investment arbitration decisions were 
problems and the existing annulment and judicial review were inadequate, but there 
was not necessarily a problem with the mechanism of disputing parties appointing 
arbitrators itself.720 Second, regarding the appointment of arbitrators, China expressed 
that, compared to commercial arbitration, investment arbitration was special in nature 
because of the involvement of governments, and thus arbitrators should be persons 
having a background in public international law or legal knowledge of investment 
treaties.721 At the same time, China mentioned other requirements for arbitrators in 
ISDS, including independence and impartiality, and protecting the legitimate rights and 
interests of investors in strict compliance with the underlying IIAs, the assurance of 
which required an integrated approach.722 Third, China argued that many developing 
countries, including China, faced difficulties in translating its documents in ISDS, since 
the meaning of certain terms related to the legal culture, and this process could also 
cause extra delays and costs in the proceedings.723  
 
 
718 United Nations, Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Fiftieth session (3-
21.07.2017), A/72/17, para. 264. 
719 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Working Group III: Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement Reform, available at: https://uncitral.un.org/en/working_groups/3/investor-state, last visited on 
06.08.2020. 
720  Anthea Roberts, UNCITRAL and ISDS Reforms: Moving to Reform Options…the Politics, EJIL: Talk!, 
08.11.2018, available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-reforms-moving-to-reform-options-the-process/, 
last visited on 05.08.2020. 
721 Anthea Roberts & Zeineb Bouraoui, UNCITRAL and ISDS Reforms: Concerns about Arbitral Appointments, 
Incentives and Legitimacy, EJIL: Talk!, 06.06.2018, available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-reforms-
concerns-about-arbitral-appointments-incentives-and-legitimacy/, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
722 Id. 
723 Anthea Roberts & Zeineb Bouraoui, UNCITRAL and ISDS Reforms: Concerns about Costs, Transparency, Third 
Party Funding and Counterclaims, 06.06.2018, available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-reforms-
concerns-about-costs-transparency-third-party-funding-and-counterclaims/, last visited on 06.08.2020. 
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6.3 Conclusion 
The historical experience and traditional philosophies have led to China’s doubts about 
international law and its cautious attitude to international adjudication, which still 
affects its performance on the international plane.  
Two types of mechanisms need to be analysed in relation to China’s engagement in 
investment dispute settlement in particular: state-state mechanisms for resolving 
disputes about treaty interpretation and application and investor-state DSMs for 
investors to bring cases against host states regarding complaints related to specific 
investments. With regard to the former, a hybrid approach combining diplomatic 
consultations and ad hoc arbitration was adopted consistently in China’s Model BITs, 
as well as most of its concluded IIAs and FTAs. In other words, the state-state DSMs 
in China’s IIAs are quite similar to each other, and they resonate with those in the China 
Model BITs. At the same time, by examining the DSMs in China’s IIAs chronologically, 
the treaties that were concluded at a later stage often contain more detailed procedural 
rules. In addition, certain diplomatic elements in early treaties disappeared in the 
treaties concluded at a later stage, which can be taken as evidence of China’s increasing 
confidence in international adjudication. China’s most recent practice has adjusted such 
DSMs to a model replicating quasi-WTO dispute settlement panel proceedings. This 
has been the practice of state-state DSMs under its FTAs. In general, China’s FTAs 
emphasized amicable DSMs and mutually satisfactory solutions, and this practice is 
expected to be continued.724 At the same time, the adoption of a system similar to the 
WTO panel proceedings can indicates a new level of confidence and the intention of 
learning from relevant experience in international trade dispute settlement. In relation 
to the WTO, generally speaking, China has transformed from being reluctant or even 
afraid to use the Dispute Settlement System to being confident and now making use of 
the system frequently. China’s performance in this system raised a combination of 
practical concerns related to the influence from its legal culture on dispute settlement. 
More importantly, joining the WTO and the great involvement in its Dispute Settlement 
System arguably have had a great impact on China’s understanding of “the utility, 
effectiveness and legitimacy of a system ruled by law”.725 The lessons China learned 
from its experience in the WTO Dispute Settlement System play a role in its position 
on SSDS in the field of international economic law. 
Regarding ISDS, both China Model BITs and its concluded IIAs reflect the changes of 
China’s approach in the three stages. These changes are particularly evidenced by the 
attitude towards investor-state arbitration, which has transformed from limiting 
international arbitration to disputes about the amount of compensation for expropriation 
to an overall acceptance of investment arbitration. In addition, since signing the ICSID 
 
724 This can be evidenced by China’s President Xi Jinping’s speeches at the G20 Summit and APEC Leader’s 
Meeting in 2015. See: www.cpcnews.cn 中国共产党新闻网 , Jinping Xi: Deepen Partnership and Promote 
Prosperity in Asia-Pacific 习 近 平 ： 深 化 伙 伴 关 系  共 促 亚 太 繁 荣 , 20.11.2015, available at: 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2015/1120/c64094-27835631.html, last visited on 04.08.2020. 
725 Jan Wouters & Matthieu Burnay, China and the European Union in the World Trade Organization: Living Apart 
Together?, at: Jan Wouters & Tanguy de Wilde & Pierre Defraigne & Jean-Christophe Defraigne, China, the 
European Union and the Restructuring of Global Governance, Edward Elgar, 2012, p. 87. 
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Convention in 1993, it has become China’s normal practice to incorporate ICSID 
arbitration for ISDS into its IIAs. This reflects “the increasing role of outward 
investment in China’s economic development and the corresponding interest in 
effective investor protection rules and procedures for Chinese investments abroad”.726 
This is also evidence of China’s changing attitude to international adjudication. 727 
Detailed procedural designs of the DSMs in China’s IIAs vary among each other, which 
represents China’s flexibility and open attitude. Until now, there have been eight cases 
under the IIAs concluded by China. Compared to the large amount of IIAs and 
increasing investment flows, this number of cases is relatively small. Possible 
underlying reasons for this include the Chinese government’s preference for the 
amicable settlement of investment disputes to preserve harmony and its political image 
as a friendly host state, foreign investors’ worries of the Chinese government’s 
retaliation, and how lucrativeness the Chinese market is. In addition, China has joined 
the worldwide ongoing reform of ISDS, presenting its approach at different 
international fora and adopting new practices in its IIAs. 
China’s practices in both SSDS and ISDS reflect some of its legal cultural 
characteristics on dispute settlement, such as the preference for amicable settlement and 
confidentiality in the dispute settlement process, as already presented in relation to its 
domestic level dispute settlement process. However, at the same time, from accepting 
the jurisdiction of an international adjudication body to actively participating in 
relevant reform discussions in various international fora, it is also clear that China has 
increasingly recognized the function of international adjudication in state-state and 
investor-state dispute settlement. 
  
 
726 Peter Malanczuk, China and the Emerging Standard of Transparency in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), 
New Zealand Association for Comparative Law, Vol. 19, 2015, p. 85. 
727 It was argued that joining the ICSID had profound implications because of the obligation to enforce any relevant 
arbitration award, and this could be read as a confirmation of “China’s preparedness and determination to engage as 
an equal partner in international economic exchanges”. See: Guiguo Wang, Chinese Mechanisms for Resolving 
Investor-State Disputes, Jindal Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 1, 2011, p. 228. 
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Chapter 7 The EU’s Approach to International Investment and Trade Dispute 
Settlement  
The EU’s approach to investment dispute settlement at the international level can be 
divided into state-state dispute settlement and investor-state dispute settlement.  
As explained in the Introduction to Part 3, in addition to appearing in IIAs, state-state 
DSMs can also be found in another relevant treaties, such as FTAs. In particular, recent 
years have witnessed the combination of trade and investment in one comprehensive 
economic agreement, where the same set of mechanisms is provided for dispute 
resolution between treaty parties. Therefore, the state-state DSMs in IIAs can be 
affected by those in FTAs, as well as by the WTO DSU. This is actually evident from 
the EU’s practice in recent years. Therefore, by following the same method of 
examination adopted in Chapter 6, supra, the analysis in the present chapter covers the 
state-state DSMs in the EU’s IIAs and FTAs, as well as its performance in the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System. 
With regard to ISDS, relevant practice is visible from the IIAs and the cases arising 
from them. However, because of the shift of the competence to conclude IIAs from the 
EU Member States to the Union in 2009, there are investor-state DSMs at both the 
Union and the Member State level in practice. Due to the fact that the Union conducts 
treaty negotiations with China and will be the contracting party to the prospective 
China-EU BIT, the practice at the Union level will provide more direct and useful 
evidence. Furthermore, as explained below, the Union’s practice of ISDS largely 
deviates from the practice of its Member States and there has been no concrete evidence 
showing any EU Member State objection to the Union’s proposal. Thus, the analysis in 
this thesis will focus on the Union’s practice, unless it appears to be necessary to 
address the situation at the EU Member State level. 
For both state-state and investor-state DSMs, relevant treaty provisions and specific 
cases are examined, aiming at identifying the features of the EU’s approach to 
international investment dispute settlement from a procedural perspective. At the same 
time, by bearing in mind the analysis of the EU’s legal cultural characteristics of dispute 
settlement in Chapter 3, supra, the discussion in this chapter will consider in particular 
whether and, if so how, these legal cultural characteristics have been reflected in the 
EU’s approach to state-state and investor-state investment dispute settlement at the 
international level. 
 
7.1 Historical Development of the EU’s International Investment Agreements 
Due to the shift in the competence to conclude IIAs from the EU Member States to the 
Union, the analysis of the EU’s IIA network is not straightforward. Before the Lisbon 
Treaty entered into force, the competence for international investment issues was 
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shared by the Union and its Member States. Specifically, the establishment of new 
foreign investments formed part of the Union’s exclusive competence in relation to 
market access,728 and therefore the IIAs signed by the Union only covered the pre-
establishment phase of foreign investment but did not cover post-establishment 
investment protection.729 EU Member States enjoyed exclusive competence in relation 
to the post-establishment treatment of investments,730 and thus, by and large, the EU 
Member States’ IIAs covered investments that had already been established in host 
states.731 As a result, the majority of the IIAs that are currently in place were concluded 
by EU Member States, while others involve the Union only or both the Union and its 
Member States. In particualr, rules on investment dispute settlement was in the hands 
of the EU Member States and are mainly found in their IIAs. While the European 
Commission was busy elaborating “a liberalization agenda focused on market access 
for direct investment”, EU Member States focused on the protection and promotion of 
investment.732  
In 2009, the Union’s power in invesmtent policymaking was increased by the Lisbon 
Treaty, which transferred the exclusive power in relation to investment protection from 
the EU Member States to the Union.733 In such a new situation, only the Union “may 
legislate and adopt legally binding acts” in the field of foreign direct investment, while 
its Member States may only do so if they are empowered by the Union or for the 
implementation of acts of the Union.734 This shift of competence provides a legal basis 
for the Union’s external action in bilateral and multilateral investment negotiations.735 
 
728 Marc Bungenberg & Stephan Hobe, The Relationship of International Investment Law and European Union Law, 
at: Marc Bungenberg & Jörn Griebel & Stephan Hobe & August Reinisch (eds.), International Investment Law: A 
Handbook, C.H.Beck-Hart-Nomos, 2015, p. 1608. 
729  Lorenza Mola, Which Role for the EU in the Development of International Investment Law?, Society of 
International Economic Law (SIEL) Inaugural Conference 2008, Geneva, 15-17.07.2008. 
730 It should be noted that, even when agreements fall outside the Union’s exclusive competence, EU Member States’ 
treaty-making power is constrained by their duty of loyalty and sincere cooperation with the Union, as well as their 
duty to support the Union’s external policy. See: the Treaty on European Union (entered into force on 1 December 
2009), Arts. 4.3, 24.3; Commission of European Communities v. Denmark, Case C-487/98, 2002 E.C.R. 1-9619, pp. 
122-139. 
731 Anna Joubin-Bret, Admission and Establishment in the Context of Investment Protection, at: August Reinisch 
(ed.), Standards of Investment Protection, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 10-11. There are exceptions. For 
instance, Finnish BITs cover, in principle, the pre-establishment stage. However, the relevant question of competence 
with respect to such exceptions does not appear to have been evoked in any setting or to have resulted in any 
controversy. See: Marc Bungenberg & Catharine Titi, The Evolution of EU Investment Law and the Future of EU-
China Investment Relations, at: China and International Investment Law: Twenty Years of ICSID Membership, Brill 
| Nijhoff, 2015, p. 301. 
732 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards a Comprehensive European 
International Investment Policy, COM(2010)343 final, 07.07.2010, p. 11. 
733 By amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, the Treaty 
of Lisbon subjected the European international investment law landscape to “a drastic change”, which inserted the 
Union’s exclusive competence for foreign direct investment by establishing a link between the Common Commercial 
Policy and foreign direct investment. See: Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Art. 207. Marc 
Bungenberg & Catharine Titi, The Evolution of EU Investment Law and the Future of EU-China Investment 
Relations, at: China and International Investment Law: Twenty Years of ICSID Membership, Brill | Nijhoff, 2015, 
p. 300. Armand de Mestral C.M., The Lisbon Treaty and the Expansion of EU Competence Over Foreign Direct 
Investment and the Implications for Investor-State Arbitration, at: Yearbook on International Investment Law & 
Policy 2010–2011, Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 367-368. 
734 TFEU, Art. 2(1). 
735 Marc Bungenberg, The Division of Competences Between the EU and Its Member States in the Area of Investment 
Politics, at: Marc Bungenberg et al. (eds.), International Investment Law and EU Law, Springer, 2011, p. 36. See 
145
 
· 
It has also reshaped the EU-China investment relations, as well as the negotiations and 
conclusion of a China-EU BIT. 
Except for the general reference to foreign direct investment, the Lisbon Treaty does 
not give a precise delineation of the shift of competence. Based on a request from the 
European Commission, this ambiguity was subsequently clarified by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in its Opinion 2/15. According to this Opinion, 
the Union does not have the necessary exclusive competence in relation to non-direct 
foreign investment and ISDS, and the conclusion of relevant treaty provisions falls 
under the shared competence between the Union and its Member States.736 The CJEU 
also clarified that a regime for settling disputes between states instead falls under the 
exclusive competence of the Union.737 As such, the fate of state-state DSMs is different 
from that of investor-state DSMs in the agreements on investment concluded by the 
Union, where the former falls within the scope of the Union’s exclusive competence 
but the latter belongs to the area of shared competence between the Union and its 
Member States. 
 
7.2 The EU’s Practice of State-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
State-state DSMs are provided for in the Union’s concluded treaties for disputes about 
issues regarding the interpretation and application of treaty provisions. Different from 
the practice in China, the Union has not adopted any Model BIT, and therefore the 
analysis in this section directly addresses the Union’s IIAs and FTAs. Based on publicly 
available information, no case has been brought under these treaties, and therefore no 
examination can be conducted in this sense. Furthermore, considering the trend of 
following the WTO panel proceedings as the model for the provisions on state-state 
DSMs in the Union’s treaties for international trade and investment, the practice in the 
WTO Dispute Settlement System is also analysed. 
7.2.1 The State-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in the EU’s Internatioanl 
Investment Agreements 
Before the Lisbon Treaty, the Union did not have the competence to sign IIAs with 
third states on investment protection. Despite this, it was authorized to negotiate a 
number of trade agreements with investment provisions, including the WTO 
 
also: Marc Bungenberg & Catharine Titi, The Evolution of EU Investment Law and the Future of EU-China 
Investment Relations, at: China and International Investment Law: Twenty Years of ICSID Membership, Brill | 
Nijhoff, 2015, p. 305. 
736 CJEU Opinion 2/15 of the Court (Full Court), 16.05.2017, paras. 285-293. Before Opinion 2/15, there had 
already been various arguments raised by scholars and practitioners supporting signing any new IIA as mixed, 
especially considering the stipulated way of determining the respondent in a specific case. See e.g. Tomáš Fecák, 
International Investment Agreements and EU Law, Kluwer Law International, 2016, p. 309. In addition, after the 
issuance of Opinion 2/15, the underlying reasons and the corresponding effect of the CJEU’s decision have been 
discussed in a heated way. For example, it was commented that the CJEU had never been a big fan of other 
international courts meddling in the interpretation of EU Law or a supporter of arbitration. See: Despite Our 
Differences-A Blog about EU Law and Other Creatures by Daniel Sarmiento, The Singapore Silver Bullet, 
17.05.2017, available at: https://despiteourdifferencesblog.wordpress.com/2017/05/17/the-singapore-silver-bullet/, 
last visited on 30.07.2020. 
737 CJEU Opinion 2/15 of the Court (Full Court), 16.05.2017, paras. 294-304. 
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Agreement, the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and various association and economic 
cooperation agreements.738 In terms of dispute settlement under such a treaty, the same 
state-state dispute settlement system was provided for disputes regarding the 
interpretation and application of provisions on trade and investment, which are analysed 
in the following Section 7.2.2, infra.739 After the Lisbon Treaty, the Union’s current 
practice of the state-state DSMs is visible in the three recently concluded treaties, EU-
Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (2016) 740  (hereinafter 
“CETA”), the EU-Singapore Investment Protection Agreement (2018)741 (hereinafter 
“EU-Singapore IPA (2018)”), and the EU-Vietnam Investment Protection Agreement 
(2018) 742  (hereinafter “EU-Vietnam IPA (2018)”). CETA is a comprehensive 
economic agreement covering both trade and investment, where the same set of state-
state DSMs is used in disputes about provisions on trade and investment. As stand-
alone investment treaties, the EU-Singapore IPA and the EU-Vietnam IPA each have 
their own state-state dispute settlement systems.  
In general, these three state-state dispute settlement systems are quite similar to each 
other. The two treaties concluded at a later stage, the EU-Singapore IPA and the EU-
Vietnam IPA, provide rules covering more procedural issues, such as the replacement 
of arbitrators, information and technical advice, decision making by tribunals, the 
review of measures taken to comply with the final report, time limits, etc. Furthermore, 
from amicable settlement through to consultations and mediation, the initiation of an 
arbitration procedure, the establishment of the arbitration panel, the interim panel report, 
the issuance of and compliance with arbitration panel ruling, to temporary remedies in 
the case of non-compliance, together many more procedural details, the relevant 
provisions rely heavily on the WTO panel proceedings, copying the procedures and 
even the language contained in the corresponding part of the WTO DSU. At the same 
time, some adjustments that deviate from the WTO Dispute Settlement System can be 
found. A typical example is the selection of adjudicators in a specific case. In the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System, disputing parties do not have control over the composition 
of the panel unless they reach an agreement, while in the EU’s practice party autonomy 
is more respected by granting disputing parties the possibility to select their own 
arbitrators from the pre-established lists of arbitrators.743 
The state-state DSMs contained in the EU Member States’ IIAs concluded with 
different third states in different periods of time vary to a large extent. For the purpose 
 
738 These agreements include limited, but sometimes extensive, investment provisions together with provisions on 
goods, services, etc. It was even argued that, before the Lisbon Treaty, the Union had already started to “aspire to 
establish its own investment policy”. See: Marc Bungenberg & Catharine Titi, The Evolution of EU Investment Law 
and the Future of EU-China Investment Relations, at: China and International Investment Law: Twenty Years of 
ICSID Membership, Brill | Nijhoff, 2015, p. 301. 
739 There is no separate state-state DSM for investment in these treaties or provisions on ISDS. See: Armand de 
Mestral C.M., The Lisbon Treaty and the Expansion of EU Competence Over Foreign Direct Investment and the 
Implications for Investor-State Arbitration, at: Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 2010–2011, 
Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 372-373. 
740 EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (finalized on 02.2016, provisionally entered into 
force on 09.2017). 
741 The EU-Singapore Investment Protection Agreement (authentic texts as of 04.2018). 
742 The EU-Vietnam Investment Protection Agreement (authentic texts as of 08.2018). 
743 See e.g. the EU-Singapore IPA, Art. 3.29. 
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of the present thesis, the 26 IIAs concluded between China and the EU Member States 
before Lisbon Treaty are of more relevance and provide more direct inspiration. Section 
9.3.1, infra, gives a detailed analysis of the state-state DSMs in these IIAs. After 2009, 
because of the ongoing negotiations for a China-EU BIT, no EU Member States are in 
contact with China in relation to updating the existing agreements or negotiating new 
investment agreements. Nevertheless, they are still active in the area of investment 
treaty making, including negotiating with other third states based on the Union’s 
authorization and updating their own Model BITs.744 
7.2.2 The State-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in the EU’s Free Trade 
Agreements 
The EU can be described as a “veteran” in concluding FTAs,745 being one of the most 
active players in the world in this area. As of 30 April 2020, among the 294 FTAs 
notified to the WTO,746 about 40 were concluded by the EU (or formerly the EC).747 
The dispute settlement systems in these FTAs have undergone a transformation over 
time from a diplomatic approach to following a quasi-WTO dispute settlement panel 
proceedings model.748 These two stages are discussed in turn below. Since there has 
not been a single dispute under these FTAs, the analysis is based purely on treaty texts. 
7.2.2.1 Diplomatic State-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms (with One 
Exception) 
Most of the FTAs concluded between the EC and third states aiming at preparing them 
as accession candidates to the EC included diplomatic state-state DSMs. 749  This 
approach relies solely on a political channel for potential disputes.750  The dispute 
 
744 For example, in 2018, the Netherlands updated its Model BIT, where some innovations on the design of state-
state arbitration can be identified. An example is that, in state-state arbitration, the Netherlands Model BIT (2018) 
explicitly allows tribunals to propose to disputing states at any stage of the proceedings to settle the dispute amicably, 
which can be realized through the settlement of the dispute ex aequo et bono if disputing states thus agree. See: The 
Netherlands Model BIT (2018), Art. 25.5. 
745  Szilárd Gáspár-Szilágyi, A Follow-up to the EU Commission’s Decision to ‘Split’ Trade and Investment 
Protection, International Economic Law and Policy Blog, 14.09.2017, available at: 
http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2017/09/guest-post-a-follow-up-to-the-eu-commissions-decision-to-
split-trade-and-investment-protection.html, last visited on 01.08.2020. 
746  World Trade Organization, Regional Trade Agreements, available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
747  World Trade Organization, Regional Trade Agreements Database, available at: 
http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx, last visited on 26.05.2020. European Commission, 
Negotiations and Agreements, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/negotiations-and-
agreements/#_in-place, last visited on 31.07.2020.  
748 Ignacio Garcia Bercero, Dispute Settlement in European Union Free Trade Agreements: Lessons Learned?, at: 
Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino (eds.), Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO System, Oxford University Press, 
2006, p. 383. In addition to the political and adjudicative model, some scholars identified another model, the hybrid 
model of DSMs, in the EU’s FTAs, where arbitration includes both political and adjudicative elements. See: Edna 
Ramírez Robles, Political & Quasi-Adjudicative Dispute Settlement Models in European Union Free Trade 
Agreements-Is the Quasi-adjudicative Model A Trend Or Is It Just Another Model?, World Trade Organization 
Economic Research and Statistics Division-Staff Working Paper ERSD-2006-09, 11.2006, available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd200609_e.pdf, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
749 Ignacio Garcia Bercero, Dispute Settlement in European Union Free Trade Agreements: Lessons Learned?, at: 
Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO System, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 389. An exception is the Euro-
Mediterranean Agreements (EUROMED), which also adopts a diplomatic DSM, but the political sensitivity coming 
from a membership seems to be absent. 
750 For example, in the EC-Croatia FTA, in order to settle disputes about the application or interpretation of treaty 
provisions, recourse to the Association Council, which may settle the dispute by means of a binding decision, is the 
only way. See: Council and Commission Decision concerning the conclusion of the Stabilisation and Association 
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settlement process is barely regulated, and very often only one article addresses this in 
the FTA. These diplomatic DSMs in the EU’s FTAs are similar to the political DSMs 
in international public law, particularly the one provided for under the GATT 1947.751 
The unavoidable weaknesses of such DSMs have been pointed out: first, resolutions 
are made on a political basis; second, there is no pre-established legal state or only a 
barely detailed legal stage; third, the respondent can easily block the dispute settlement 
proceedings; fourth, parties are allowed to take unilateral decisions, such as 
retaliation.752 Regarding the underlying reasons for such a choice for the EU’s FTAs, 
contributing factors include, in addition to political sensitivity in terms of membership, 
partnership and geopolitics,  the EU’s institutional conservativism and tendency to 
follow models used previously. 753  In addition, the GATT 1947 model of dispute 
settlement, which included negotiation, conciliation and a consensus-based decision-
making process, operated as an example for state-state DSMs in the area of international 
economic law and tended to be followed. 
At a later point of this development stage, timid steps towards a judicial model were 
taken by adding the possibility of referring disputes to arbitration, such as the Euro-
Mediterranean Agreement.754  However, under these DSMs, a respondent still has 
opportunities to block the process at various points, such as the selection of its own 
arbitrator and the appointment of the chair. Moreover, there is no compliance procedure 
provided, and therefore the implementation of arbitral awards essentially relies on the 
“best efforts” of disputing parties.755 
One exceptional treaty concluded by the EC in the 1990s is the Energy Charter Treaty 
(ECT). Like in the WTO, the EC became a member to the ECT along with its Member 
States.756 In fact, the EC played a major role as a coordinator and driving force behind 
the negotiations leading to the ECT. 757  To resolve disputes concerning the 
 
Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Croatia, 
of the other part (entered into force on 01.03.2002), OJ L 026, 2005, Art. 113. With Croatia’s accession to the EU on 
1 July 2003, this FTA was denounced. 
751 Edna Ramírez Robles, Political & Quasi-Adjudicative Dispute Settlement Models in European Union Free Trade 
Agreements-Is the Quasi-adjudicative Model A Trend Or Is It Just Another Model?, World Trade Organization 
Economic Research and Statistics Division-Staff Working Paper ERSD-2006-09, 11.2006, available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd200609_e.pdf, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
752 Id, pp. 19-22. 
753 Ignacio Garcia Bercero, Dispute Settlement in European Union Free Trade Agreements: Lessons Learned?, at: 
Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO System, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 390. Edna Ramírez Robles, 
Political & Quasi-Adjudicative Dispute Settlement Models in European Union Free Trade Agreements-Is the Quasi-
adjudicative Model A Trend Or Is It Just Another Model?, World Trade Organization Economic Research and 
Statistics Division-Staff Working Paper ERSD-2006-09, 11.2006, available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd200609_e.pdf, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
754 The Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their 
Member States, of the one part, and the State of Israel, of the other part (signed on 20.11.1995, entered into force on 
01.06.2000), Art. 75. 
755 Edna Ramírez Robles, Political & Quasi-Adjudicative Dispute Settlement Models in European Union Free Trade 
Agreements-Is the Quasi-adjudicative Model A Trend Or Is It Just Another Model?, World Trade Organization 
Economic Research and Statistics Division-Staff Working Paper ERSD-2006-09, 11.2006, available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd200609_e.pdf, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
756  Council of the European Union & Commission of the European Communities, Council and Commission 
Decision of 23 September 1997 on the Conclusion, by the European Communities, of the Energy Charter Treaty and 
the Energy Charter Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects, 98/181/EC, ECSC, Euratom, 
23.09.1997. 
757 European Commission, Press Release Database, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-94-
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interpretation and application of this treaty, a two-tiered system was designed and 
incorporated. Initially, disputing parties shall endeavour to settle disputes through 
diplomatic channels.758 According to the ECT’s official website, such “diplomatic 
channels” include good offices, which can be made available to disputing parties at any 
time, with the facilitation from the Energy Charter Secretariat as a trusted third party.759 
If no settlement can be reached, ad hoc arbitration would become available for matters 
on most aspects of the ECT.760 Procedural issues, such as the composition of tribunals, 
applicable arbitration rules and applicable laws are prescribed.761 The arbitral awards 
reached at the end of the process shall be final and binding.762 Thus, compared to other 
treaties concluded during the same phase, the EC’s unconditional commitment to ad 
hoc arbitration in the ECT was quite unusual. Considering its leading role in the 
negotiations of the ECT, the EC’s support for this DSM was more likely to be the case 
instead of passive acceptance. This confirms, to a certain extent, that the practice of 
adopting diplomatic DSMs in its FTAs was largely due to the fact that the treaty parties 
were potentially acceding members or had a partnership with the EC. 
7.2.2.2 A Shift to a quasi-WTO dispute settlement Panel Proceedings Model 
Marked by the conclusion of the EU-Mexico Global Agreement, the state-state dispute 
settlement systems in the EU’s FTAs shifted to a model that is similar to the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System.763 Under this Agreement, for dispute settlement, treaty 
parties are required to initially “make every attempt through cooperation and 
consultations to arrive to a mutually satisfactory resolution”, possibly with the 
assistance from the Joint Committee.764 If the dispute is not resolved through the Joint 
Committee within the given time, either disputing party may request the establishment 
 
75_en.htm?locale=EN, last visited on 26.05.2020. The ECT was even described as a child of the EU. See: Jan 
Kleinheisterkamp, The Next 10 Year ECT Investment Arbitration: A Vision for the Future–From a European Law 
Perspective, London School of Economics Legal Studies Working Paper, Vol. 7, 2011. 
758 The Energy Charter Treaty, Art. 27(1). 
759 International Energy Charter, Dispute Settlement, available at: https://energycharter.org/what-we-do/dispute-
settlement/overview/, last visited on 31.07.2020. 
760 Exceptions to the application of ad hoc arbitration include: (i) competition disputes, for which a bilateral non-
binding consultation mechanism is offered in Art. 6 of the ECT; (ii) environmental disputes, for which the ECT Art. 
19 provides for disputes to be reviewed by the Charter Conference if no other international fora are appropriate for 
the consideration of such disputes; (iii) transit disputes, where a specialised conciliation mechanism was presented 
by Art. 7.7, allowing for a faster and less formal procedure. Additionally, Art. 29 and Annex D established a 
mechanism which is largely similar to the WTO Dispute Settlement System for Energy Charter member countries 
to resolve trade disputes, provided that at least one of them is not a WTO member. 
761 The Energy Charter Treaty, Art. 27 (2)&(3). 
762 The Energy Charter Treaty, Art. 27 (3)(h). 
763 Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community 
and its Member States, of the one part, and the United Mexican States, of the other part (signed on 08.12.1997, 
entered into force on 01.20.2000). The initial agreement postponed the establishment of dispute settlement 
provisions to a later decision by the Joint Council, which was taken in March 2000. See: The EC/Mexico Joint 
Council, Decision 2/2000 of the EC-Mexico Joint Council of 23 March 2000 (Covering Trade in Goods, Government 
Procurement, Cooperation for Competition, Consultation on Intellectual Property Rights, Dispute Settlement), CE-
MX 3854/00, 23.03.2000. 
Currently, the EU and Mexico have reached an “agreement in principle” on the main trade parts of a new EU-Mexico 
association agreement. This new agreement replaces the previous deal in effect from 2000. See: European 
Commission, New EU-Mexico Agreement: The Agreement in Principle and its Texts, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/eu-mexico-trade-agreement/, last visited on 30.07.2020. 
764 The EC/Mexico Joint Council, Decision 2/2000 of the EC-Mexico Joint Council of 23 March 2000 (Covering 
Trade in Goods, Government Procurement, Cooperation for Competition, Consultation on Intellectual Property 
Rights, Dispute Settlement), CE-MX 3854/00, 23.03.2000, Art. 42 (1)&(2). 
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of an arbitration panel, where each party may choose its own arbitrator and the chair is 
in principle to be decided by consensus.765 Failure to appoint arbitrators will lead to a 
selection by lot from the candidates proposed.766 After hearing the case, the panel 
should issue an initial report followed by comments submitted by the parties and a final 
report in the end.767 The time frames for the various stages are clearly stated for both 
normal and urgent situations.768 It is also noted that the EU-Mexico Global Agreement 
(1997) goes beyond panels’ final rulings and regulates the implementation of panel 
reports.769 In brief, the procedural design of the whole dispute settlement system is 
very similar to the WTO panel proceedings.770 
One year later, the EU concluded the EU-Chile Association Agreement (2002),771 in 
which the state-state dispute settlement system constitutes another typical example of 
the quasi-WTO dispute settlement panel proceedings model. Compared to the EU-
Mexico Global Agreement (1997), in addition to the more detailed procedural 
arrangements added to the treaty text, two issues deserve particular attention.772 First, 
the EU-Chile Association Agreement (2002) adds provisions on the submission of 
amicus curiae briefs and cooperation by parties on increasing transparency.773 Second, 
under the EU-Chile Association Agreement (2002), the composition of the panel for a 
specific case is determined by lot from a pre-established roster of 15 panellists.774 
These two can be read as a sign of the EU’s intention and treaty parties’ agreement to 
add judicial features and to increase the institutionalization of such dispute settlement 
systems. 
After the Lisbon Treaty, as of 31 April 2020, the EU has concluded two trade deals that 
include state-state DSMs. In addition to CETA (2016), a more recent example is the 
EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement. 775  The state-state dispute settlement 
system in this newly negotiated agreement follows the practice of quasi-WTO dispute 
 
765 Id, Art. 44 (1)&(2). 
766 Id, Art. 44 (4). Thus, on this point, the respondent does not have the chance to block the dispute settlement 
process. 
767 Id, Art. 45 (1)&(2). 
768 Id, Arts. 43-46. 
769 The EC/Mexico Joint Council, Decision 2/2000 of the EC-Mexico Joint Council of 23 March 2000 (Covering 
Trade in Goods, Government Procurement, Cooperation for Competition, Consultation on Intellectual Property 
Rights, Dispute Settlement), CE-MX 3854/00, 23.03.2000, Art. 46. 
770 In addition, also similar to the practice under the WTO Dispute Settlement System, a separate Code of Conduct 
for arbitrators is attached to the EU-Mexico Global Agreement (1997) to add to the panels’ credibility. See: id, 
Appendix I of Annex XVI. 
771 Agreement establishing an association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, 
and the Republic of Chile, of the other part (signed on 18.11.2002, entered into force on 01.03.2005). 
772 For a comprehensive analysis of the differences between the EU-Mexico Global Agreement (1997) and the EU-
Chile Association Agreement (2002), see: Edna Ramírez Robles, Political & Quasi-Adjudicative Dispute Settlement 
Models in European Union Free Trade Agreements-Is the Quasi-adjudicative Model A Trend Or Is It Just Another 
Model?, World Trade Organization Economic Research and Statistics Division-Staff Working Paper ERSD-2006-
09, 11.2006, available at: https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd200609_e.pdf, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
773 The EU-Chile Association Agreement (2002), Annex XV paras. 35-37.  
774 Id, Art. 185(2)(3). 
775 The negotiations between the EU and Japan on the Economic Partnership Agreement have been finalized and 
the legal revision of the texts has been completed. The texts will be binding upon the EU and Japan under 
international law after the completion by each treaty party of its internal legal procedures necessary for the entry 
into force of the Agreement. For more information on this, see: European Commission, EU-Japan Economic 
Partnership Agreement: Texts of the Agreement, 18.04.2018, available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1684, last visited on 31.07.2020. 
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settlement panel proceedings model. Specifically, first of all, amicable and confidential 
consultations are compulsory. 776  Mediation is provided as an additional optional 
amicable option, which is available at any time based on the consent of the disputing 
parties.777 If disputes fail to be resolved through consultation, the panel procedure can 
be initiated by one party.778 The composition of the panel in a specific case should be 
based on an agreement between the disputing parties as the first choice; if no agreement 
can be reached, the panel is selected from a pre-established list.779 This follows the 
practice under the EU-Chile FTA (2002), but is differs from arbitration practice where 
each disputing party normally enjoys the right to choose its own adjudicator.780 The 
constituted panel is expected to issue an interim panel report first, to be followed by the 
process of seeking comments from disputing parties and then a final report.781 Rules 
on compliance proceedings are also listed, regulating issues such as the reasonable 
period of time for compliance, temporary remedies in the case of non-compliance, the 
review of measures taken to comply after the suspension of obligations.782  
In brief, despite the differences in the details,783 the common features in the EU’s FTAs 
concluded within this phase show the transformation from a diplomatic to a quasi-WTO 
dispute settlement panel proceedings model.784 Compared to the diplomatic DSMs 
adopted by the EU at the earlier stage, the quasi-WTO dispute settlement panel 
proceedings model is apparently more demanding in terms of human resources and 
institutional requirements,785 but the EU has insisted on using it in all of its FTAs 
concluded with third states after the transformation. At the same time, the EU seems to 
have tried hard to realize its proposals raised in the DSU reform negotiations at the 
WTO in its FTAs, such as greater transparency. The possible underlying reasons for 
such a shift in practice may include the EU’s dissatisfaction with the diplomatic 
approach where one party can easily block the dispute settlement process, its inclination 
towards having procedures that ensure a rapid resolution and the satisfaction with its 
experience in the WTO Dispute Settlement System.786 
 
776 The EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement, Art. 21.5. 
777 Id, Art. 21.6. 
778 Id, Art. 21.7. 
779 Id, Art. 21.8. 
780 This can be found in many other FTAs in the world. See e.g. Free Trade Agreement between the Government of 
the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Singapore (signed on 23.10.2008, entered 
into force on 01.01.2009), Art. 9. 
781 The EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement, Arts. 21.18, 21.19. 
782 Id, Arts. 21.20-21.23. 
783 A comparison of the detailed differences between the FTAs concluded by the EU before 2004 can be found in: 
Stefan Szepesi, Comparing EU Free Trade Agreements: Dispute Settlement, European Centre for Development 
Policy Management (ECDPM), 01.2004, available at: https://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/IB-6G-
Comparing-EU-Free-Trade-Agreements-Dispute-Settlement-2004.pdf, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
784 As confirmed by the clear expression of the European Commission, the EU “has included dispute settlement 
mechanism based on the WTO dispute settlement mechanism in all of its Free Trade Agreements since 2000”. See: 
European Commission, Dispute Settlement, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/dispute-
settlement/, last visited on 31.07.2020. 
785 Stefan Szepesi, Comparing EU Free Trade Agreements: Dispute Settlement, European Centre for Development 
Policy Management (ECDPM), 01.2004, available at: https://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/IB-6G-
Comparing-EU-Free-Trade-Agreements-Dispute-Settlement-2004.pdf, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
786 Ignacio Garcia Bercero, Dispute Settlement in European Union Free Trade Agreements: Lessons Learned?, at: 
Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO System, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 391. 
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Since CETA, the EU-Singapore IPA, the EU-Vietnam IPA, and the EU-Japan 
Economic Partnership Agreement were concluded after the Lisbon Treaty and thus 
represent the EU’s most up-to-date practice, TABLE 7.2.1-2 lists the details regarding 
the design of and the comparison of their state-state dispute settlement systems.  
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su
re
 a
t i
ss
ue
 a
nd
 th
e 
le
ga
l b
as
is
 f
or
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
nt
, 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
an
 e
xp
la
na
ti
on
 o
f 
ho
w
 s
uc
h 
m
ea
su
re
 c
on
st
it
ut
es
 a
 b
re
ac
h 
of
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 2
9.
2.
 
C
om
p
os
it
io
n
 o
f 
th
e 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 
P
an
el
 
A
rt
. 2
9.
7 
C
om
po
si
ti
on
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l 
1.
 T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
co
m
po
se
d 
of
 th
re
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s.
 
2.
 T
he
 P
ar
ti
es
 s
ha
ll
 c
on
su
lt
 w
it
h 
a 
vi
ew
 to
 r
ea
ch
in
g 
an
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t o
n 
th
e 
co
m
po
si
ti
on
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l w
it
hi
n 
10
 w
or
ki
ng
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
re
ce
ip
t b
y 
th
e 
re
sp
on
di
ng
 P
ar
ty
 o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t f
or
 th
e 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f 
an
 a
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
pa
ne
l. 
3.
 I
n 
th
e 
ev
en
t t
ha
t t
he
 P
ar
ti
es
 a
re
 u
na
bl
e 
to
 a
gr
ee
 o
n 
th
e 
co
m
po
si
ti
on
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l w
ith
in
 th
e 
ti
m
e 
fr
am
e 
se
t o
ut
 in
 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
2,
 e
ith
er
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 r
eq
ue
st
 th
e 
C
ha
ir
 o
f 
th
e 
C
E
T
A
 J
oi
nt
 C
om
m
it
te
e,
 o
r 
th
e 
C
ha
ir
's
 d
el
eg
at
e,
 to
 d
ra
w
 b
y 
lo
t t
he
 a
rb
it
ra
to
rs
 
fr
om
 th
e 
lis
t e
st
ab
lis
he
d 
un
de
r 
A
rt
ic
le
 2
9.
8.
 O
ne
 a
rb
it
ra
to
r 
sh
al
l b
e 
dr
aw
n 
fr
om
 th
e 
su
b-
lis
t o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
, o
ne
 f
ro
m
 th
e 
su
b-
lis
t o
f 
th
e 
re
sp
on
di
ng
 P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 o
ne
 f
ro
m
 th
e 
su
b-
li
st
 o
f 
ch
ai
rp
er
so
ns
. I
f 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
ha
ve
 a
gr
ee
d 
on
 o
ne
 o
r 
m
or
e 
of
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s,
 a
ny
 
re
m
ai
ni
ng
 a
rb
it
ra
to
r 
sh
al
l b
e 
se
le
ct
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e 
in
 th
e 
ap
pl
ic
ab
le
 s
ub
-l
is
t o
f 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s.
 I
f 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
ha
ve
 a
gr
ee
d 
on
 a
n 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
, o
th
er
 th
an
 th
e 
ch
ai
rp
er
so
n,
 w
ho
 is
 n
ot
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 P
ar
ty
, t
he
 c
ha
ir
pe
rs
on
 a
nd
 o
th
er
 a
rb
it
ra
to
r 
sh
al
l b
e 
se
le
ct
ed
 f
ro
m
 
th
e 
su
b-
li
st
 o
f 
ch
ai
rp
er
so
ns
. 
4.
 T
he
 C
ha
ir
 o
f 
th
e 
C
E
T
A
 J
oi
nt
 C
om
m
it
te
e,
 o
r 
th
e 
C
ha
ir
's
 d
el
eg
at
e,
 s
ha
ll
 s
el
ec
t t
he
 a
rb
it
ra
to
rs
 a
s 
so
on
 a
s 
po
ss
ib
le
 a
nd
 n
or
m
al
ly
 w
ith
in
 
fi
ve
 w
or
ki
ng
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 3
 b
y 
ei
th
er
 P
ar
ty
. T
he
 C
ha
ir
, o
r 
th
e 
C
ha
ir
's
 d
el
eg
at
e,
 s
ha
ll
 g
iv
e 
a 
re
as
on
ab
le
 
op
po
rt
un
it
y 
to
 r
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
es
 o
f 
ea
ch
 P
ar
ty
 to
 b
e 
pr
es
en
t w
he
n 
lo
ts
 a
re
 d
ra
w
n.
 O
ne
 o
f 
th
e 
C
ha
ir
pe
rs
on
s 
ca
n 
pe
rf
or
m
 th
e 
se
le
ct
io
n 
by
 
lo
t a
lo
ne
 if
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
ha
ir
pe
rs
on
 w
as
 in
fo
rm
ed
 a
bo
ut
 th
e 
da
te
, t
im
e 
an
d 
pl
ac
e 
of
 th
e 
se
le
ct
io
n 
by
 lo
t a
nd
 d
id
 n
ot
 a
cc
ep
t t
o 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
e 
w
it
hi
n 
fi
ve
 w
or
ki
ng
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 3
. 
 
5.
 T
he
 d
at
e 
of
 e
st
ab
li
sh
m
en
t o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll
 b
e 
th
e 
da
te
 o
n 
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
la
st
 o
f 
th
e 
th
re
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
is
 s
el
ec
te
d.
 
6.
 I
f 
th
e 
li
st
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
fo
r 
in
 A
rt
ic
le
 2
9.
8 
is
 n
ot
 e
st
ab
li
sh
ed
 o
r 
if
 it
 d
oe
s 
no
t c
on
ta
in
 s
uf
fi
ci
en
t n
am
es
 a
t t
he
 ti
m
e 
a 
re
qu
es
t i
s 
m
ad
e 
pu
rs
ua
nt
 to
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 3
, t
he
 th
re
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l b
e 
dr
aw
n 
by
 lo
t f
ro
m
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
w
ho
 h
av
e 
be
en
 p
ro
po
se
d 
by
 o
ne
 o
r 
bo
th
 o
f 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
it
h 
A
rt
ic
le
 2
9.
8.
1.
 
7.
 R
ep
la
ce
m
en
t o
f 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l t
ak
e 
pl
ac
e 
on
ly
 f
or
 th
e 
re
as
on
s 
an
d 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 th
e 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e 
se
t o
ut
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
s 
21
 th
ro
ug
h 
25
 
of
 A
nn
ex
 2
9-
A
. 
L
is
t 
of
 
A
rb
it
ra
to
rs
 
A
rt
. 2
9.
8 
 L
is
t o
f 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
1.
 T
he
 C
E
T
A
 J
oi
nt
 C
om
m
it
te
e 
sh
al
l, 
at
 it
s 
fi
rs
t m
ee
ti
ng
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
en
tr
y 
in
to
 f
or
ce
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
es
ta
bl
is
h 
a 
li
st
 o
f 
at
 le
as
t 1
5 
in
di
vi
du
al
s,
 c
ho
se
n 
on
 th
e 
ba
si
s 
of
 o
bj
ec
tiv
it
y,
 r
el
ia
bi
li
ty
 a
nd
 s
ou
nd
 ju
dg
m
en
t, 
w
ho
 a
re
 w
il
li
ng
 a
nd
 a
bl
e 
to
 s
er
ve
 a
s 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s.
 T
he
 li
st
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sh
al
l b
e 
co
m
po
se
d 
of
 th
re
e 
su
b-
lis
ts
: o
ne
 s
ub
-l
is
t f
or
 e
ac
h 
Pa
rt
y 
an
d 
on
e 
su
b-
lis
t o
f 
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
w
ho
 a
re
 n
ot
 n
at
io
na
ls
 o
f 
ei
th
er
 P
ar
ty
 to
 
ac
t a
s 
ch
ai
rp
er
so
ns
. E
ac
h 
su
b-
lis
t s
ha
ll 
in
cl
ud
e 
at
 le
as
t f
iv
e 
in
di
vi
du
al
s.
 T
he
 C
E
T
A
 J
oi
nt
 C
om
m
it
te
e 
m
ay
 r
ev
ie
w
 th
e 
li
st
 a
t a
ny
 ti
m
e 
an
d 
sh
al
l e
ns
ur
e 
th
at
 th
e 
li
st
 c
on
fo
rm
s 
w
it
h 
th
is
 A
rt
ic
le
. 
2.
 T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
to
rs
 m
us
t h
av
e 
sp
ec
ia
lis
ed
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
of
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l t
ra
de
 la
w
. T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
to
rs
 a
ct
in
g 
as
 c
ha
ir
pe
rs
on
s 
m
us
t a
ls
o 
ha
ve
 
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
 a
s 
co
un
se
l o
r 
pa
ne
ll
is
t i
n 
di
sp
ut
e 
se
ttl
em
en
t p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
 o
n 
su
bj
ec
t m
at
te
rs
 w
it
hi
n 
th
e 
sc
op
e 
of
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t. 
T
he
 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l b
e 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t, 
se
rv
e 
in
 th
ei
r 
in
di
vi
du
al
 c
ap
ac
it
ie
s 
an
d 
no
t t
ak
e 
in
st
ru
ct
io
ns
 f
ro
m
 a
ny
 o
rg
an
is
at
io
n 
or
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t, 
or
 
be
 a
ff
il
ia
te
d 
w
it
h 
th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t o
f 
an
y 
of
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
, a
nd
 s
ha
ll 
co
m
pl
y 
w
it
h 
th
e 
C
od
e 
of
 C
on
du
ct
 in
 A
nn
ex
 2
9-
B
. 
T
er
m
s 
of
 
R
ef
er
en
ce
 o
f 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 P
an
el
 
 
U
rg
en
cy
 
P
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
 
A
rt
. 2
9.
11
 U
rg
en
t p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
 
In
 c
as
es
 o
f 
ur
ge
nc
y,
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
th
os
e 
in
vo
lv
in
g 
pe
ri
sh
ab
le
 o
r 
se
as
on
al
 g
oo
ds
, o
r 
se
rv
ic
es
 th
at
 r
ap
id
ly
 lo
se
 th
ei
r 
tr
ad
e 
va
lu
e,
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l a
nd
 th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
sh
al
l m
ak
e 
ev
er
y 
ef
fo
rt
 to
 a
cc
el
er
at
e 
th
e 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s 
to
 th
e 
gr
ea
te
st
 e
xt
en
t p
os
si
bl
e.
 T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll
 a
im
 a
t i
ss
ui
ng
 a
n 
in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t t
o 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
w
ith
in
 7
5 
da
ys
 o
f 
th
e 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l, 
an
d 
a 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t 
w
it
hi
n 
15
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t. 
U
po
n 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
a 
P
ar
ty
, t
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll 
m
ak
e 
a 
pr
el
im
in
ar
y 
ru
li
ng
 w
it
hi
n 
10
 d
ay
s 
of
 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
n 
w
he
th
er
 it
 d
ee
m
s 
th
e 
ca
se
 to
 b
e 
ur
ge
nt
. 
R
u
le
s 
of
 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 P
an
el
 
P
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
 
A
rt
. 2
9.
16
 R
ul
es
 o
f 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e 
D
is
pu
te
 s
et
tl
em
en
t p
ro
ce
du
re
 u
nd
er
 th
is
 C
ha
pt
er
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
go
ve
rn
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
ru
le
s 
of
 p
ro
ce
du
re
 f
or
 a
rb
itr
at
io
n 
in
 A
nn
ex
 2
9-
A
, u
nl
es
s 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
ag
re
e 
ot
he
rw
is
e.
 
F
u
n
ct
io
n
s 
of
 
P
an
el
s 
 
In
te
ri
m
 P
an
el
 
R
ep
or
t 
A
rt
. 2
9.
9 
In
te
ri
m
 p
an
el
 r
ep
or
t 
1.
 T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
 p
re
se
nt
 to
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 a
n 
in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t w
it
hi
n 
15
0 
da
ys
 o
f 
th
e 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l. 
T
he
 
re
po
rt
 s
ha
ll
 c
on
ta
in
: 
 
(a
) 
fi
nd
in
gs
 o
f 
fa
ct
; a
nd
 
(b
) 
de
te
rm
in
at
io
ns
 a
s 
to
 w
he
th
er
 th
e 
re
sp
on
di
ng
 P
ar
ty
 h
as
 c
on
fo
rm
ed
 w
it
h 
it
s 
ob
li
ga
ti
on
s 
un
de
r 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t. 
2.
 E
ac
h 
P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 s
ub
m
it
 w
ri
tt
en
 c
om
m
en
ts
 to
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l o
n 
th
e 
in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t, 
su
bj
ec
t t
o 
an
y 
ti
m
e 
li
m
it
s 
se
t b
y 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l. 
A
ft
er
 c
on
si
de
ri
ng
 a
ny
 s
uc
h 
co
m
m
en
ts
, t
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 m
ay
: 
(a
) 
re
co
ns
id
er
 it
s 
re
po
rt
; o
r 
157
 
· 
(b
) 
m
ak
e 
an
y 
fu
rt
he
r 
ex
am
in
at
io
n 
th
at
 it
 c
on
si
de
rs
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
. 
3.
 T
he
 in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll
 b
e 
co
nf
id
en
ti
al
. 
F
in
al
 P
an
el
 
R
ep
or
t 
A
rt
. 2
9.
10
 F
in
al
 p
an
el
 r
ep
or
t 
1.
 U
nl
es
s 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 a
gr
ee
 o
th
er
w
is
e,
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll 
is
su
e 
a 
re
po
rt
 in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
it
h 
th
is
 C
ha
pt
er
. T
he
 f
in
al
 p
an
el
 r
ep
or
t 
sh
al
l s
et
 o
ut
 th
e 
fi
nd
in
gs
 o
f 
fa
ct
, t
he
 a
pp
lic
ab
il
ity
 o
f 
th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
of
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
ba
si
c 
ra
tio
na
le
 b
eh
in
d 
an
y 
fi
nd
in
gs
 a
nd
 c
on
cl
us
io
ns
 th
at
 it
 m
ak
es
. T
he
 r
ul
in
g 
of
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l i
n 
th
e 
fi
na
l p
an
el
 r
ep
or
t s
ha
ll
 b
e 
bi
nd
in
g 
on
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
. 
2.
 T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
 is
su
e 
to
 th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
an
d 
to
 th
e 
C
E
T
A
 J
oi
nt
 C
om
m
it
te
e 
a 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t w
it
hi
n 
30
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t. 
3.
 E
ac
h 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 m
ak
e 
pu
bl
ic
ly
 a
va
il
ab
le
 th
e 
fi
na
l p
an
el
 r
ep
or
t, 
su
bj
ec
t t
o 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
39
 o
f 
A
nn
ex
 2
9-
A
. 
C
om
p
li
an
ce
 w
it
h
 
th
e 
F
in
al
 R
ep
or
t 
A
rt
. 2
9.
12
 C
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
it
h 
th
e 
fi
na
l p
an
el
 r
ep
or
t 
T
he
 r
es
po
nd
in
g 
Pa
rt
y 
sh
al
l t
ak
e 
an
y 
m
ea
su
re
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 to
 c
om
pl
y 
w
ith
 th
e 
fi
na
l p
an
el
 r
ep
or
t. 
N
o 
la
te
r 
th
an
 2
0 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
fi
na
l p
an
el
 r
ep
or
t b
y 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s,
 th
e 
re
sp
on
di
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 in
fo
rm
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 th
e 
C
E
T
A
 J
oi
nt
 C
om
m
it
te
e 
of
 it
s 
in
te
nt
io
ns
 
in
 r
es
pe
ct
 o
f 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e.
 
R
ea
so
n
ab
le
 
P
er
io
d
 f
or
 
C
om
p
li
an
ce
 
A
rt
. 2
9.
13
 R
ea
so
na
bl
e 
pe
ri
od
 o
f 
ti
m
e 
fo
r 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e 
1.
 I
f 
im
m
ed
ia
te
 c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
is
 n
ot
 p
os
si
bl
e,
 n
o 
la
te
r 
th
an
 2
0 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
fi
na
l p
an
el
 r
ep
or
t b
y 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s,
 th
e 
re
sp
on
di
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 n
ot
if
y 
th
e 
re
qu
es
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 th
e 
C
E
T
A
 J
oi
nt
 C
om
m
itt
ee
 o
f 
th
e 
pe
ri
od
 o
f 
ti
m
e 
it
 w
il
l r
eq
ui
re
 f
or
 c
om
pl
ia
nc
e.
 
2.
 I
n 
th
e 
ev
en
t o
f 
di
sa
gr
ee
m
en
t b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
P
ar
tie
s 
on
 th
e 
re
as
on
ab
le
 p
er
io
d 
of
 ti
m
e 
in
 w
hi
ch
 to
 c
om
pl
y 
w
it
h 
th
e 
fi
na
l p
an
el
 r
ep
or
t, 
th
e 
re
qu
es
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
, w
it
hi
n 
20
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
no
tif
ic
at
io
n 
m
ad
e 
un
de
r 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
1 
by
 th
e 
re
sp
on
di
ng
 P
ar
ty
, r
eq
ue
st
 in
 
w
ri
ti
ng
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l t
o 
de
te
rm
in
e 
th
e 
le
ng
th
 o
f 
th
e 
re
as
on
ab
le
 p
er
io
d 
of
 ti
m
e.
 S
uc
h 
re
qu
es
t s
ha
ll
 b
e 
no
ti
fi
ed
 s
im
ul
ta
ne
ou
sl
y 
to
 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 to
 th
e 
C
E
T
A
 J
oi
nt
 C
om
m
itt
ee
. T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
 is
su
e 
its
 r
ul
in
g 
to
 th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
an
d 
to
 th
e 
C
E
T
A
 J
oi
nt
 
C
om
m
it
te
e 
w
it
hi
n 
30
 d
ay
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t. 
3.
 T
he
 r
ea
so
na
bl
e 
pe
ri
od
 o
f 
ti
m
e 
m
ay
 b
e 
ex
te
nd
ed
 b
y 
m
ut
ua
l a
gr
ee
m
en
t o
f 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s.
 
4.
 A
t a
ny
 ti
m
e 
af
te
r 
th
e 
m
id
po
in
t i
n 
th
e 
re
as
on
ab
le
 p
er
io
d 
of
 ti
m
e 
an
d 
at
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
, t
he
 r
es
po
nd
in
g 
Pa
rt
y 
sh
al
l 
m
ak
e 
it
se
lf
 a
va
il
ab
le
 to
 d
is
cu
ss
 th
e 
st
ep
s 
it
 is
 ta
ki
ng
 to
 c
om
pl
y 
w
it
h 
th
e 
fi
na
l p
an
el
 r
ep
or
t. 
5.
 T
he
 r
es
po
nd
in
g 
Pa
rt
y 
sh
al
l n
ot
if
y 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 th
e 
C
E
T
A
 J
oi
nt
 C
om
m
it
te
e 
be
fo
re
 th
e 
en
d 
of
 th
e 
re
as
on
ab
le
 p
er
io
d 
of
 ti
m
e 
of
 
m
ea
su
re
s 
th
at
 it
 h
as
 ta
ke
n 
to
 c
om
pl
y 
w
ith
 th
e 
fi
na
l p
an
el
 r
ep
or
t. 
T
em
p
or
ar
y 
R
em
ed
ie
s 
A
rt
. 2
9.
14
 T
em
po
ra
ry
 r
em
ed
ie
s 
in
 c
as
e 
of
 n
on
-c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
1.
 I
f:
 
(a
) 
th
e 
re
sp
on
di
ng
 P
ar
ty
 f
ai
ls
 to
 n
ot
if
y 
it
s 
in
te
nt
io
n 
to
 c
om
pl
y 
w
ith
 th
e 
fi
na
l p
an
el
 r
ep
or
t u
nd
er
 A
rt
ic
le
 2
9.
12
 o
r 
th
e 
ti
m
e 
it
 w
il
l r
eq
ui
re
 
fo
r 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e 
un
de
r 
A
rt
ic
le
 2
9.
13
.1
; 
158
 
· 
(b
) 
at
 th
e 
ex
pi
ry
 o
f 
th
e 
re
as
on
ab
le
 p
er
io
d 
of
 ti
m
e,
 th
e 
re
sp
on
di
ng
 P
ar
ty
 f
ai
ls
 to
 n
ot
if
y 
an
y 
m
ea
su
re
 ta
ke
n 
to
 c
om
pl
y 
w
it
h 
th
e 
fi
na
l p
an
el
 
re
po
rt
; o
r 
(c
) 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l o
n 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e 
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 6
 e
st
ab
li
sh
es
 th
at
 a
 m
ea
su
re
 ta
ke
n 
to
 c
om
pl
y 
is
 in
co
ns
is
te
nt
 w
ith
 th
at
 
Pa
rt
y'
s 
ob
li
ga
ti
on
s 
un
de
r 
th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 2
9.
2,
 th
e 
re
qu
es
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
sh
al
l b
e 
en
ti
tle
d 
to
 s
us
pe
nd
 o
bl
ig
at
io
ns
 o
r 
re
ce
iv
e 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n.
 T
he
 le
ve
l o
f 
th
e 
nu
ll
if
ic
at
io
n 
an
d 
im
pa
ir
m
en
t s
ha
ll
 b
e 
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
 s
ta
rt
in
g 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
no
ti
fi
ca
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
fi
na
l p
an
el
 r
ep
or
t t
o 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
. 
2.
 B
ef
or
e 
su
sp
en
di
ng
 o
bl
ig
at
io
ns
, t
he
 r
eq
ue
st
in
g 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 n
ot
if
y 
th
e 
re
sp
on
di
ng
 P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 th
e 
C
E
T
A
 J
oi
nt
 C
om
m
itt
ee
 o
f 
it
s 
in
te
nt
io
n 
to
 d
o 
so
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
 th
e 
le
ve
l o
f 
ob
li
ga
ti
on
s 
it
 in
te
nd
s 
to
 s
us
pe
nd
. 
3.
 E
xc
ep
t a
s 
ot
he
rw
is
e 
pr
ov
id
ed
 in
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
th
e 
su
sp
en
si
on
 o
f 
ob
li
ga
ti
on
s 
m
ay
 c
on
ce
rn
 a
ny
 p
ro
vi
si
on
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 
29
.2
 a
nd
 s
ha
ll 
be
 li
m
ite
d 
at
 a
 le
ve
l e
qu
iv
al
en
t t
o 
th
e 
nu
ll
if
ic
at
io
n 
or
 im
pa
ir
m
en
t c
au
se
d 
by
 th
e 
vi
ol
at
io
n.
 
4.
 T
he
 r
eq
ue
st
in
g 
P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 im
pl
em
en
t t
he
 s
us
pe
ns
io
n 
10
 w
or
ki
ng
 d
ay
s 
af
te
r 
th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
no
tif
ic
at
io
n 
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 in
 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
2 
by
 th
e 
re
sp
on
di
ng
 P
ar
ty
, u
nl
es
s 
a 
P
ar
ty
 h
as
 r
eq
ue
st
ed
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 u
nd
er
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
s 
6 
an
d 
7.
 
5.
 A
 d
is
ag
re
em
en
t b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 c
on
ce
rn
in
g 
th
e 
ex
is
te
nc
e 
of
 a
ny
 m
ea
su
re
 ta
ke
n 
to
 c
om
pl
y 
or
 it
s 
co
ns
is
te
nc
y 
w
it
h 
th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 2
9.
2 
("
di
sa
gr
ee
m
en
t o
n 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e"
),
 o
r 
on
 th
e 
eq
ui
va
le
nc
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
le
ve
l o
f 
su
sp
en
si
on
 a
nd
 th
e 
nu
ll
if
ic
at
io
n 
or
 im
pa
ir
m
en
t c
au
se
d 
by
 th
e 
vi
ol
at
io
n 
("
di
sa
gr
ee
m
en
t o
n 
eq
ui
va
le
nc
e"
),
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l. 
6.
 A
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 r
ec
on
ve
ne
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l b
y 
pr
ov
id
in
g 
a 
w
ri
tt
en
 r
eq
ue
st
 to
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l, 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 th
e 
C
E
T
A
 
Jo
in
t C
om
m
it
te
e.
 I
n 
ca
se
 o
f 
a 
di
sa
gr
ee
m
en
t o
n 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e,
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll 
be
 r
ec
on
ve
ne
d 
by
 th
e 
re
qu
es
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
. I
n 
ca
se
 
of
 a
 d
is
ag
re
em
en
t o
n 
eq
ui
va
le
nc
e,
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll 
be
 r
ec
on
ve
ne
d 
by
 th
e 
re
sp
on
di
ng
 P
ar
ty
. I
n 
ca
se
 o
f 
di
sa
gr
ee
m
en
ts
 o
n 
bo
th
 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e 
an
d 
on
 e
qu
iv
al
en
ce
, t
he
 a
rb
itr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll
 r
ul
e 
on
 th
e 
di
sa
gr
ee
m
en
t o
n 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e 
be
fo
re
 r
ul
in
g 
on
 th
e 
di
sa
gr
ee
m
en
t 
on
 e
qu
iv
al
en
ce
. 
7.
 T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
 n
ot
if
y 
it
s 
ru
li
ng
 to
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 a
nd
 to
 th
e 
C
E
T
A
 J
oi
nt
 C
om
m
it
te
e 
ac
co
rd
in
gl
y:
 
(a
) 
w
it
hi
n 
90
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t t
o 
re
co
nv
en
e 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l, 
in
 c
as
e 
of
 a
 d
is
ag
re
em
en
t o
n 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e;
 
(b
) 
w
it
hi
n 
30
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t t
o 
re
co
nv
en
e 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l, 
in
 c
as
e 
of
 a
 d
is
ag
re
em
en
t o
n 
eq
ui
va
le
nc
e;
 
(c
) 
w
it
hi
n 
12
0 
da
ys
 o
f 
th
e 
fi
rs
t r
eq
ue
st
 to
 r
ec
on
ve
ne
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l, 
in
 c
as
e 
of
 a
 d
is
ag
re
em
en
t o
n 
bo
th
 c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
an
d 
eq
ui
va
le
nc
e.
 
8.
 T
he
 r
eq
ue
st
in
g 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 n
ot
 s
us
pe
nd
 o
bl
ig
at
io
ns
 u
nt
il 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l r
ec
on
ve
ne
d 
un
de
r 
pa
ra
gr
ap
hs
 6
 a
nd
 7
 h
as
 d
el
iv
er
ed
 it
s 
ru
lin
g.
 A
ny
 s
us
pe
ns
io
n 
sh
al
l b
e 
co
ns
is
te
nt
 w
it
h 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l's
 r
ul
in
g.
 
9.
 T
he
 s
us
pe
ns
io
n 
of
 o
bl
ig
at
io
ns
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
te
m
po
ra
ry
 a
nd
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
ap
pl
ie
d 
on
ly
 u
nt
il
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
 f
ou
nd
 to
 b
e 
in
co
ns
is
te
nt
 w
ith
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 2
9.
2 
ha
s 
be
en
 w
it
hd
ra
w
n 
or
 a
m
en
de
d 
so
 a
s 
to
 b
ri
ng
 it
 in
to
 c
on
fo
rm
ity
 w
it
h 
th
os
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
, a
s 
159
 
· 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
un
de
r 
A
rt
ic
le
 2
9.
15
, o
r 
un
ti
l t
he
 P
ar
ti
es
 h
av
e 
se
tt
le
d 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e.
 
10
. A
t a
ny
 ti
m
e,
 th
e 
re
qu
es
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 r
eq
ue
st
 th
e 
re
sp
on
di
ng
 P
ar
ty
 to
 p
ro
vi
de
 a
n 
of
fe
r 
fo
r 
te
m
po
ra
ry
 c
om
pe
ns
at
io
n 
an
d 
th
e 
re
sp
on
di
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 p
re
se
nt
 s
uc
h 
of
fe
r.
 
R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
M
ea
su
re
 T
ak
en
 
to
 C
om
p
ly
 A
ft
er
 
th
e 
A
d
op
ti
on
 o
f 
T
em
p
or
ar
y 
R
em
ed
ie
s 
fo
r 
N
on
-C
om
pl
ia
n
ce
 
A
rt
. 2
9.
15
 R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
m
ea
su
re
s 
ta
ke
n 
to
 c
om
pl
y 
af
te
r 
th
e 
su
sp
en
si
on
 o
f 
ob
li
ga
ti
on
s 
1.
 W
he
n,
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
su
sp
en
si
on
 o
f 
ob
li
ga
tio
ns
 b
y 
th
e 
re
qu
es
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
, t
he
 r
es
po
nd
in
g 
P
ar
ty
 ta
ke
s 
m
ea
su
re
s 
to
 c
om
pl
y 
w
it
h 
th
e 
fi
na
l 
pa
ne
l r
ep
or
t, 
th
e 
re
sp
on
di
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
no
ti
fy
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 th
e 
C
E
T
A
 J
oi
nt
 C
om
m
itt
ee
 a
nd
 r
eq
ue
st
 a
n 
en
d 
to
 th
e 
su
sp
en
si
on
 o
f 
ob
lig
at
io
ns
 a
pp
li
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
re
qu
es
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
. 
2.
 I
f 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 d
o 
no
t r
ea
ch
 a
n 
ag
re
em
en
t o
n 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ti
bi
li
ty
 o
f 
th
e 
no
tif
ie
d 
m
ea
su
re
 w
it
h 
th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 2
9.
2 
w
it
hi
n 
60
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
no
ti
fi
ca
ti
on
, t
he
 r
eq
ue
st
in
g 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 r
eq
ue
st
 in
 w
ri
ti
ng
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l t
o 
ru
le
 o
n 
th
e 
m
at
te
r.
 S
uc
h 
re
qu
es
t s
ha
ll
 b
e 
no
ti
fi
ed
 s
im
ul
ta
ne
ou
sl
y 
to
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 to
 th
e 
C
E
T
A
 J
oi
nt
 C
om
m
it
te
e.
 T
he
 f
in
al
 p
an
el
 r
ep
or
t s
ha
ll
 
be
 n
ot
if
ie
d 
to
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 a
nd
 to
 th
e 
C
E
T
A
 J
oi
nt
 C
om
m
it
te
e 
w
it
hi
n 
90
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
su
bm
is
si
on
 o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t. 
If
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l r
ul
es
 th
at
 a
ny
 m
ea
su
re
 ta
ke
n 
to
 c
om
pl
y 
is
 in
 c
on
fo
rm
it
y 
w
ith
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 2
9.
2,
 th
e 
su
sp
en
si
on
 o
f 
ob
lig
at
io
ns
 s
ha
ll 
be
 te
rm
in
at
ed
. 
R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
M
ea
su
re
s 
T
ak
en
 
to
 C
om
p
ly
 w
it
h
 
th
e 
F
in
al
 R
ep
or
t 
 
R
u
le
 o
f 
In
te
rp
re
ta
ti
on
 
A
rt
. 2
9.
17
 G
en
er
al
 r
ul
e 
of
 in
te
rp
re
ta
ti
on
 
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
 in
te
rp
re
t t
he
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
of
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t i
n 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
it
h 
cu
st
om
ar
y 
ru
le
s 
of
 in
te
rp
re
ta
ti
on
 o
f 
pu
bl
ic
 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l l
aw
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
 th
os
e 
se
t o
ut
 in
 th
e 
V
ie
nn
a 
C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
on
 th
e 
L
aw
 o
f 
T
re
at
ie
s.
 T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
 a
ls
o 
ta
ke
 in
to
 
ac
co
un
t r
el
ev
an
t i
nt
er
pr
et
at
io
ns
 in
 r
ep
or
ts
 o
f 
P
an
el
s 
an
d 
th
e 
A
pp
el
la
te
 B
od
y 
ad
op
te
d 
by
 th
e 
W
T
O
 D
is
pu
te
 S
et
tl
em
en
t B
od
y.
 
R
u
li
n
gs
 o
f 
th
e 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 P
an
el
 
A
rt
. 2
9.
18
 R
ul
in
gs
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l 
T
he
 r
ul
in
gs
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l c
an
no
t a
dd
 to
 o
r 
di
m
in
is
h 
th
e 
ri
gh
ts
 a
nd
 o
bl
ig
at
io
ns
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
fo
r 
in
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t. 
R
ep
la
ce
m
en
t 
of
 
A
rb
it
ra
to
rs
 
 
Su
sp
en
si
on
 a
nd
 
T
er
m
in
at
io
n
 o
f 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 
P
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
 
 
160
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M
u
tu
al
ly
 A
gr
ee
d
 
So
lu
ti
on
s 
A
rt
. 2
9.
19
 M
ut
ua
ll
y 
ag
re
ed
 s
ol
ut
io
ns
 
T
he
 P
ar
ti
es
 m
ay
 r
ea
ch
 a
 m
ut
ua
lly
 a
gr
ee
d 
so
lu
ti
on
 to
 a
 d
is
pu
te
 u
nd
er
 th
is
 C
ha
pt
er
 a
t a
ny
 ti
m
e.
 T
he
y 
sh
al
l n
ot
if
y 
th
e 
C
E
T
A
 J
oi
nt
 
C
om
m
it
te
e 
an
d 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l o
f 
an
y 
su
ch
 s
ol
ut
io
n.
 U
po
n 
no
ti
fi
ca
ti
on
 o
f 
th
e 
m
ut
ua
ll
y 
ag
re
ed
 s
ol
ut
io
n,
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll
 
te
rm
in
at
e 
it
s 
w
or
k 
an
d 
th
e 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s 
sh
al
l b
e 
te
rm
in
at
ed
. 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
an
d 
T
ec
h
n
ic
al
 A
d
vi
ce
 
T
im
e 
L
im
it
s 
161
E
U
-S
in
ga
p
or
e 
IP
A
 (
20
18
) 
O
b
je
ct
iv
e 
Sc
op
e 
A
rt
. 3
.2
5 
Sc
op
e 
T
hi
s 
Se
ct
io
n 
sh
al
l a
pp
ly
 w
it
h 
re
sp
ec
t t
o 
an
y 
di
ff
er
en
ce
 c
on
ce
rn
in
g 
th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
an
d 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
is
 
A
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
ex
ce
pt
 a
s 
ot
he
rw
is
e 
ex
pr
es
sl
y 
pr
ov
id
ed
. 
C
h
oi
ce
 o
f 
F
or
u
m
 
A
rt
. 3
. 4
5 
R
el
at
io
n 
w
it
h 
W
T
O
 O
bl
ig
at
io
ns
 
1.
R
ec
ou
rs
e 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
se
tt
le
m
en
t p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
of
 th
is
 S
ec
ti
on
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
w
it
ho
ut
 p
re
ju
di
ce
 to
 a
ny
ac
ti
on
 in
 th
e 
W
T
O
 f
ra
m
ew
or
k,
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
di
sp
ut
e 
se
tt
le
m
en
t p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
.
2.
N
ot
w
it
hs
ta
nd
in
g 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
1,
 w
he
re
 a
 P
ar
ty
 h
as
, w
it
h 
re
ga
rd
 to
 a
 p
ar
ti
cu
la
r 
m
ea
su
re
, i
ni
ti
at
ed
 d
is
pu
te
 s
et
tl
em
en
t p
ro
ce
ed
i n
gs
, e
ith
er
un
de
r 
th
is
 S
ec
tio
n 
or
 u
nd
er
 th
e 
W
T
O
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
it 
m
ay
 n
ot
 in
st
it
ut
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
se
tt
le
m
en
t p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
 r
eg
ar
di
ng
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
m
ea
su
re
 in
th
e 
ot
he
r 
fo
ru
m
 u
nt
il
 th
e 
fi
rs
t p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
 h
av
e 
en
de
d.
 M
or
eo
ve
r,
 a
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
no
t i
ni
ti
at
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
se
ttl
em
en
t p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
 u
nd
er
 th
is
Se
ct
io
n 
an
d 
un
de
r 
th
e 
W
T
O
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
un
le
ss
 s
ub
st
an
tia
lly
 d
if
fe
re
nt
 o
bl
ig
at
io
ns
 u
nd
er
 b
ot
h 
ag
re
em
en
ts
 a
re
 in
 d
is
pu
te
, o
r 
un
le
ss
 th
e
fo
ru
m
 s
el
ec
te
d 
fa
il
s 
fo
r 
pr
oc
ed
ur
al
 o
r 
ju
ri
sd
ic
tio
na
l r
ea
so
ns
 to
 m
ak
e 
fi
nd
in
gs
 o
n 
th
e 
cl
ai
m
 s
ee
ki
ng
 r
ed
re
ss
 o
f 
th
at
 o
bl
ig
at
io
n,
 p
ro
vi
de
d
th
at
 th
e 
fa
il
ur
e 
of
 th
e 
fo
ru
m
 is
 n
ot
 th
e 
re
su
lt
 o
f 
a 
fa
il
ur
e 
of
 a
 d
is
pu
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 to
 a
ct
 d
il
ig
en
tly
.
3.
Fo
r 
th
e 
pu
rp
os
es
 o
f 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
2:
(a
)
di
sp
ut
e 
se
ttl
em
en
t p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
 u
nd
er
 th
e 
W
T
O
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t a
re
 d
ee
m
ed
 to
 b
e 
in
it
ia
te
d 
by
 a
 P
ar
ty
's
 r
eq
ue
st
 f
or
 th
e 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f
a 
pa
ne
l u
nd
er
 A
rt
ic
le
 6
 o
f 
th
e 
U
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
 o
n 
R
ul
es
 a
nd
 P
ro
ce
du
re
s 
G
ov
er
ni
ng
 th
e 
S
et
tle
m
en
t o
f 
D
is
pu
te
s 
co
nt
ai
ne
d 
in
 A
nn
ex
 2
 o
f
th
e 
W
T
O
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t (
he
re
in
af
te
r 
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 a
s 
"D
S
U
")
 a
nd
 a
re
 d
ee
m
ed
 to
 b
e 
en
de
d 
w
he
n 
th
e 
D
S
B
ad
op
ts
 th
e 
Pa
ne
l's
 r
ep
or
t, 
an
d 
th
e 
A
pp
el
la
te
 B
od
y'
s 
re
po
rt
 a
s 
th
e 
ca
se
 m
ay
 b
e,
 u
nd
er
 A
rt
ic
le
s 
16
 a
nd
 1
7(
14
) 
of
 th
e 
D
SU
; a
nd
(b
)
di
sp
ut
e 
se
tt
le
m
en
t p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
 u
nd
er
 th
is
 S
ec
ti
on
 a
re
 d
ee
m
ed
 to
 b
e 
in
it
ia
te
d 
by
 a
 P
ar
ty
's
 r
eq
ue
st
 f
or
 th
e 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f 
an
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l u
nd
er
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 1
 o
f 
A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
8 
(I
ni
ti
at
io
n 
of
 A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 P
ro
ce
du
re
) 
an
d 
ar
e 
de
em
ed
 to
 b
e 
en
de
d 
w
he
n 
th
e
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l i
ss
ue
s 
it
s 
ru
li
ng
 to
 th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
an
d 
to
 th
e 
C
om
m
itt
ee
 u
nd
er
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
 o
f 
A
rt
ic
le
 3
.3
2 
(A
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
Pa
ne
l R
ul
in
g)
 o
r
w
he
n 
th
e 
pa
rt
ie
s 
ha
ve
 r
ea
ch
ed
 a
 m
ut
ua
lly
 a
gr
ee
d 
so
lu
ti
on
 u
nd
er
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.3
9 
(M
ut
ua
lly
 A
gr
ee
d 
So
lu
ti
on
).
4.
N
ot
hi
ng
 in
 th
is
 S
ec
tio
n 
sh
al
l p
re
cl
ud
e 
a 
Pa
rt
y 
fr
om
 im
pl
em
en
ti
ng
 th
e 
su
sp
en
si
on
 o
f 
ob
li
ga
ti
on
s 
au
th
or
is
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
D
S
B
. N
ei
th
er
 th
e
W
T
O
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t n
or
 th
e 
E
U
S
FT
A
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
in
vo
ke
d 
to
 p
re
cl
ud
e 
a 
Pa
rt
y 
fr
om
 ta
ki
ng
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
 m
ea
su
re
s 
un
de
r 
A
rt
ic
le
 3
.3
6
(T
em
po
ra
ry
 R
em
ed
ie
s 
in
 C
as
e 
of
 N
on
-c
om
pl
ia
nc
e)
 o
f 
th
is
 S
ec
tio
n.
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R
eq
u
es
t 
an
d
 
R
ec
ei
p
t 
of
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
C
on
su
lt
at
io
n
s 
A
rt
. 3
.2
6 
C
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
 
1.
T
he
 P
ar
ti
es
 s
ha
ll
 e
nd
ea
vo
ur
 to
 r
es
ol
ve
 a
ny
 d
if
fe
re
nc
e 
re
ga
rd
in
g 
th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
an
d 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
5 
(S
co
pe
) 
by
 e
nt
er
in
g 
in
to
 c
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
 in
 g
oo
d 
fa
it
h 
w
it
h 
th
e 
ai
m
 o
f 
re
ac
hi
ng
 a
 m
ut
ua
ll
y 
ag
re
ed
 s
ol
ut
io
n.
2.
A
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
se
ek
 c
on
su
lta
tio
ns
, b
y 
m
ea
ns
 o
f 
a 
w
ri
tt
en
 r
eq
ue
st
 to
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
P
ar
ty
 c
op
ie
d 
to
 th
e 
C
om
m
it
te
e,
 a
nd
 s
ha
ll
 g
iv
e 
th
e
re
as
on
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t, 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
id
en
ti
fi
ca
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
at
 is
su
e,
 th
e 
ap
pl
ic
ab
le
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
5 
(S
co
pe
),
an
d 
th
e 
re
as
on
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
ap
pl
ic
ab
ili
ty
 o
f 
su
ch
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s.
3.
C
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
he
ld
 w
it
hi
n 
th
ir
ty
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t a
nd
 ta
ke
 p
la
ce
, u
nl
es
s 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
ag
re
e 
ot
he
rw
is
e,
on
 th
e 
te
rr
it
or
y 
of
 th
e 
P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t. 
T
he
 c
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
de
em
ed
 c
on
cl
ud
ed
 w
ith
in
 s
ix
ty
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
re
ce
ip
t
of
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t, 
un
le
ss
 th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
ag
re
e 
ot
he
rw
is
e.
 C
on
su
lta
tio
ns
 s
ha
ll 
be
 c
on
fi
de
nt
ia
l, 
an
d 
w
it
ho
ut
 p
re
ju
di
ce
 to
 th
e 
ri
gh
ts
 o
f 
ei
th
er
Pa
rt
y 
in
 a
ny
 f
ur
th
er
 p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
.
4.
C
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
 o
n 
m
at
te
rs
 o
f 
ur
ge
nc
y 
sh
al
l b
e 
he
ld
 w
it
hi
n 
fi
ft
ee
n 
da
ys
 o
f 
th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t, 
an
d 
sh
al
l b
e 
de
em
ed
co
nc
lu
de
d 
w
it
hi
n 
th
ir
ty
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t, 
un
le
ss
 th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
ag
re
e 
ot
he
rw
is
e.
5.
If
 th
e 
P
ar
ty
 to
 w
hi
ch
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t i
s 
m
ad
e 
do
es
 n
ot
 r
es
po
nd
 to
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t f
or
 c
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
 w
it
hi
n 
te
n 
da
ys
 o
f 
th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
it
s 
re
ce
ip
t,
or
 if
 c
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
 a
re
 n
ot
 h
el
d 
w
ith
in
 th
e 
ti
m
ef
ra
m
es
 la
id
 d
ow
n 
in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 3
 o
r 
in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 4
 r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y,
 o
r 
if
 c
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
 h
av
e
be
en
 c
on
cl
ud
ed
 a
nd
 n
o 
m
ut
ua
ll
y 
ag
re
ed
 s
ol
ut
io
n 
ha
s 
be
en
 r
ea
ch
ed
, t
he
 c
om
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 r
eq
ue
st
 th
e 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f 
an
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l i
n 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
it
h 
A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
8 
(I
ni
ti
at
io
n 
of
 A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 P
ro
ce
du
re
).
M
ed
ia
ti
on
 
A
rt
. 3
.2
7 
M
ed
ia
ti
on
 
A
ny
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 r
eq
ue
st
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
P
ar
ty
 to
 e
nt
er
 in
to
 a
 m
ed
ia
ti
on
 p
ro
ce
du
re
 w
it
h 
re
sp
ec
t t
o 
an
y 
m
ea
su
re
 a
dv
er
se
ly
 a
ff
ec
tin
g 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 p
ur
su
an
t t
o 
A
nn
ex
 1
0 
(M
ed
ia
ti
on
 P
ro
ce
du
re
 f
or
 D
is
pu
te
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
P
ar
tie
s)
. 
In
it
ia
ti
on
 
A
rt
. 3
.2
8 
In
it
ia
ti
on
 o
f 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 P
ro
ce
du
re
 
1.
W
he
re
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 h
av
e 
fa
il
ed
 to
 r
es
ol
ve
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
by
 r
ec
ou
rs
e 
to
 c
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
 a
s 
pr
ov
id
ed
 f
or
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
6 
(C
on
su
lta
tio
ns
),
 th
e
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 r
eq
ue
st
 th
e 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f 
an
 a
rb
itr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l i
n 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
it
h 
th
is
 A
rt
ic
le
.
2.
T
he
 r
eq
ue
st
 f
or
 th
e 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f 
an
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll 
be
 m
ad
e 
in
 w
ri
ti
ng
 to
 th
e 
P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t a
nd
 th
e
C
om
m
it
te
e.
 T
he
 c
om
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 id
en
ti
fy
 in
 it
s 
re
qu
es
t t
he
 s
pe
ci
fi
c 
m
ea
su
re
 a
t i
ss
ue
, a
nd
 it
 s
ha
ll
 e
xp
la
in
 h
ow
 s
uc
h 
m
ea
su
re
co
ns
ti
tu
te
s 
a 
br
ea
ch
 o
f 
th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
5 
(S
co
pe
) 
in
 a
 m
an
ne
r 
su
ff
ic
ie
nt
 to
 p
re
se
nt
 th
e 
le
ga
l b
as
is
 f
or
 th
e
co
m
pl
ai
nt
 c
le
ar
ly
.
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· 
C
om
p
os
it
io
n
 o
f 
th
e 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 
P
an
el
 
A
rt
. 3
.2
9 
E
st
ab
li
sh
m
en
t o
f 
th
e 
A
rb
itr
at
io
n 
Pa
ne
l 
1.
A
n 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll
 b
e 
co
m
po
se
d 
of
 th
re
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s.
2.
W
it
hi
n 
fi
ve
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
re
ce
ip
t b
y 
th
e 
Pa
rt
y 
co
m
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 1
 o
f 
A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
8
(I
ni
ti
at
io
n 
of
 A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 P
ro
ce
du
re
),
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 s
ha
ll 
en
te
r 
in
to
 c
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
 in
 o
rd
er
 to
 a
gr
ee
 o
n 
th
e 
co
m
po
si
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n
pa
ne
l.
3.
In
 th
e 
ev
en
t t
ha
t t
he
 P
ar
ti
es
 a
re
 u
na
bl
e 
to
 a
gr
ee
, w
it
hi
n 
te
n 
da
ys
 o
f 
en
te
ri
ng
 in
to
 th
e 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
, o
n 
th
e
ch
ai
rp
er
so
n 
of
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l, 
th
e 
ch
ai
r 
of
 th
e 
C
om
m
it
te
e,
 o
r 
th
e 
ch
ai
r's
 d
el
eg
at
e,
 s
ha
ll
, w
it
hi
n 
tw
en
ty
 d
ay
s 
of
 e
nt
er
in
g 
in
to
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
, s
el
ec
t o
ne
 a
rb
it
ra
to
r 
w
ho
 w
il
l s
er
ve
 a
s 
a 
ch
ai
rp
er
so
n 
by
 lo
t f
ro
m
 th
e 
li
st
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 u
nd
er
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
1 
of
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.4
4 
(L
is
ts
 o
f 
A
rb
it
ra
to
rs
).
4.
In
 th
e 
ev
en
t t
ha
t t
he
 P
ar
ti
es
 a
re
 u
na
bl
e 
to
 a
gr
ee
, w
it
hi
n 
te
n 
da
ys
 o
f 
en
te
ri
ng
 in
to
 th
e 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
, o
n 
th
e
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s:
(a
)
ea
ch
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 s
el
ec
t o
ne
 a
rb
it
ra
to
r,
 w
ho
 w
il
l n
ot
 a
ct
 a
s 
a 
ch
ai
rp
er
so
n,
 f
ro
m
 th
e 
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
on
 th
e 
li
st
 e
st
ab
li
sh
ed
 u
nd
er
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
2 
of
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.4
4 
(L
is
ts
 o
f 
A
rb
it
ra
to
rs
),
 w
it
hi
n 
fi
ft
ee
n 
da
ys
 o
f 
en
te
ri
ng
 in
to
 th
e 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
; a
nd
(b
)
if
 e
it
he
r 
P
ar
ty
 f
ai
ls
 to
 s
el
ec
t a
n 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 u
nd
er
 s
ub
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
4(
a)
, t
he
 c
ha
ir
 o
f 
th
e 
C
om
m
it
te
e,
 o
r 
th
e 
ch
ai
r's
 d
el
eg
at
e,
 s
ha
ll
 s
el
ec
t
an
y 
re
m
ai
ni
ng
 a
rb
it
ra
to
r 
by
 lo
t f
ro
m
 a
m
on
g 
th
e 
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
pr
op
os
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
Pa
rt
y 
pu
rs
ua
nt
 to
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
 o
f 
A
rt
ic
le
 3
.4
4 
(L
is
ts
 o
f
A
rb
it
ra
to
rs
),
 w
it
hi
n 
tw
en
ty
 d
ay
s 
of
 e
nt
er
in
g 
in
to
 c
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
.
5.
Sh
ou
ld
 th
e 
li
st
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
fo
r 
in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
 o
f 
A
rt
ic
le
 3
.4
4 
(L
is
ts
 o
f 
A
rb
it
ra
to
rs
) 
no
t b
e 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
at
 th
e 
ti
m
e 
re
qu
ir
ed
 p
ur
su
an
t t
o
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
4:
(a
)
w
he
re
 b
ot
h 
P
ar
ti
es
 h
av
e 
pr
op
os
ed
 in
di
vi
du
al
s 
pu
rs
ua
nt
 to
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
 o
f 
A
rt
ic
le
 3
.4
4 
(L
is
ts
 o
f 
A
rb
it
ra
to
rs
),
 e
ac
h 
Pa
rt
y 
m
ay
 s
el
ec
t
on
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
, w
ho
 w
il
l n
ot
 a
ct
 a
s 
a 
ch
ai
rp
er
so
n,
 f
ro
m
 a
m
on
g 
th
e 
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
pr
op
os
ed
, w
it
hi
n 
fi
ft
ee
n 
da
ys
 o
f 
en
te
ri
ng
 in
to
 th
e
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
. I
f 
a 
Pa
rt
y 
fa
ils
 to
 s
el
ec
t a
n 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
, t
he
 c
ha
ir
 o
f 
th
e 
C
om
m
itt
ee
, o
r 
th
e 
ch
ai
r's
 d
el
eg
at
e,
 s
ha
ll
se
le
ct
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 b
y 
lo
t f
ro
m
 a
m
on
g 
th
e 
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
pr
op
os
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
Pa
rt
y 
w
hi
ch
 f
ai
le
d 
to
 s
el
ec
t i
ts
 a
rb
it
ra
to
r;
 o
r
(b
)
w
he
re
 o
nl
y 
on
e 
Pa
rt
y 
ha
s 
pr
op
os
ed
 in
di
vi
du
al
s 
pu
rs
ua
nt
 to
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
 o
f 
A
rt
ic
le
 3
.4
4 
(L
is
ts
 o
f 
A
rb
it
ra
to
rs
),
 e
ac
h 
P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 s
el
ec
t
on
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
, w
ho
 w
il
l n
ot
 a
ct
 a
s 
a 
ch
ai
rp
er
so
n,
 f
ro
m
 a
m
on
g 
th
e 
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
pr
op
os
ed
, w
it
hi
n 
fi
ft
ee
n 
da
ys
 o
f 
en
te
ri
ng
 in
to
 th
e
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
. I
f 
a 
Pa
rt
y 
fa
ils
 to
 s
el
ec
t a
n 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
, t
he
 c
ha
ir
 o
f 
th
e 
C
om
m
itt
ee
, o
r 
th
e 
ch
ai
r's
 d
el
eg
at
e,
 s
ha
ll
se
le
ct
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 b
y 
lo
t f
ro
m
 a
m
on
g 
th
e 
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
pr
op
os
ed
.
6.
Sh
ou
ld
 th
e 
li
st
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
fo
r 
in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 1
 o
f 
A
rt
ic
le
 3
.4
4 
(L
is
ts
 o
f 
A
rb
it
ra
to
rs
) 
no
t b
e 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
at
 th
e 
ti
m
e 
re
qu
ir
ed
 p
ur
su
an
t t
o
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
3,
 th
e 
ch
ai
rp
er
so
n 
sh
al
l b
e 
se
le
ct
ed
 b
y 
lo
t f
ro
m
 a
m
on
g 
fo
rm
er
 M
em
be
rs
 o
f 
th
e 
W
T
O
 A
pp
el
la
te
 B
od
y,
 w
ho
 s
ha
ll 
no
t b
e 
a
pe
rs
on
 o
f 
ei
th
er
 P
ar
ty
.
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7.
T
he
 d
at
e 
of
 e
st
ab
li
sh
m
en
t o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll
 b
e 
th
e 
da
te
 o
n 
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
la
st
 o
f 
th
e 
th
re
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
is
 s
el
ec
te
d.
8.
R
ep
la
ce
m
en
t o
f 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l t
ak
e 
pl
ac
e 
on
ly
 f
or
 th
e 
re
as
on
s 
an
d 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 th
e 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 d
et
ai
le
d 
in
 R
ul
es
 1
9 
to
 2
5 
of
 A
nn
ex
9 
(R
ul
es
 o
f 
P
ro
ce
du
re
 f
or
 A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
).
L
is
t 
of
 
A
rb
it
ra
to
rs
 
A
rt
. 3
.4
4 
L
is
ts
 o
f 
A
rb
it
ra
to
rs
 
1.
T
he
 P
ar
ti
es
 s
ha
ll
 e
st
ab
li
sh
, u
po
n 
th
e 
en
tr
y 
in
to
 f
or
ce
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
a 
li
st
 o
f 
fi
ve
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
w
ho
 a
re
 w
ill
in
g 
an
d 
ab
le
 to
 s
er
ve
 a
s 
th
e 
ch
ai
rp
er
so
n 
of
 a
n 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
9 
(E
st
ab
lis
hm
en
t o
f 
th
e
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 P
an
el
).
2.
T
he
 C
om
m
itt
ee
 s
ha
ll,
 n
o 
la
te
r 
th
an
 s
ix
 m
on
th
s 
af
te
r 
th
e 
en
tr
y 
in
to
 f
or
ce
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
es
ta
bl
is
h 
a 
li
st
 o
f 
at
 le
as
t t
en
 in
di
vi
du
al
s
w
ho
 a
re
 w
ill
in
g 
an
d 
ab
le
 to
 s
er
ve
 a
s 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s.
 E
ac
h 
of
 th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
sh
al
l p
ro
po
se
 u
po
n 
th
e 
en
tr
y 
in
to
 f
or
ce
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t a
t l
ea
st
fi
ve
 in
di
vi
du
al
s 
to
 s
er
ve
 a
s 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s.
3.
T
he
 C
om
m
itt
ee
 w
il
l e
ns
ur
e 
th
at
 th
e 
li
st
 o
f 
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
to
 s
er
ve
 a
s 
ch
ai
rp
er
so
ns
 o
r 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s,
 e
st
ab
li
sh
ed
 p
ur
su
an
t t
o 
pa
ra
gr
ap
hs
 1
an
d 
2 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y,
 a
re
 m
ai
nt
ai
ne
d.
4.
A
rb
it
ra
to
rs
 s
ha
ll
 h
av
e 
sp
ec
ia
li
se
d 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
of
 o
r 
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
 in
 la
w
 a
nd
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l t
ra
de
 o
r 
in
ve
st
m
en
t, 
or
 in
 th
e 
se
tt
le
m
en
t o
f
di
sp
ut
es
 a
ri
si
ng
 u
nd
er
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l t
ra
de
 a
gr
ee
m
en
ts
. T
he
y 
sh
al
l b
e 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t, 
se
rv
e 
in
 th
ei
r 
in
di
vi
du
al
 c
ap
ac
iti
es
 a
nd
 n
ot
 b
e
af
fi
li
at
ed
 w
it
h 
th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 o
f 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
, a
nd
 s
ha
ll
 c
om
pl
y 
w
it
h 
A
nn
ex
 1
1 
(C
od
e 
of
 C
on
du
ct
 f
or
 A
rb
it
ra
to
rs
 a
nd
M
ed
ia
to
rs
).
T
er
m
s 
of
 
R
ef
er
en
ce
 o
f 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 P
an
el
 
U
rg
en
cy
 
P
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
 
A
rt
. 3
.3
0 
Pr
el
im
in
ar
y 
R
ul
in
g 
on
 U
rg
en
cy
 
If
 a
 P
ar
ty
 s
o 
re
qu
es
ts
, t
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
 g
iv
e 
a 
pr
el
im
in
ar
y 
ru
li
ng
 w
it
hi
n 
te
n 
da
ys
 o
f 
it
s 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
n 
w
he
th
er
 it
 d
ee
m
s 
th
e 
ca
se
 to
 b
e 
ur
ge
nt
. 
R
u
le
s 
of
 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 P
an
el
 
P
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
 
A
rt
. 3
.4
0 
R
ul
es
 o
f 
P
ro
ce
du
re
 
1.
D
is
pu
te
 s
et
tl
em
en
t p
ro
ce
du
re
s 
un
de
r 
th
is
 S
ec
ti
on
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
go
ve
rn
ed
 b
y 
A
nn
ex
 9
 (
R
ul
es
 o
f 
P
ro
ce
du
re
 f
or
 A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
).
2.
A
ny
 m
ee
ti
ng
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll 
be
 o
pe
n 
to
 th
e 
pu
bl
ic
 in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
it
h 
A
nn
ex
 9
 (
R
ul
es
 o
f 
Pr
oc
ed
ur
e 
fo
r 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
).
F
u
n
ct
io
n
s 
of
 
P
an
el
s 
In
te
ri
m
 P
an
el
 
R
ep
or
t 
A
rt
. 3
.3
1 
In
te
ri
m
 P
an
el
 R
ep
or
t 
1.
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
 is
su
e 
an
 in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t t
o 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
se
tt
in
g 
ou
t t
he
 f
in
di
ng
s 
of
 f
ac
t, 
th
e 
ap
pl
ic
ab
il
it
y 
of
 r
el
ev
an
t
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pr
ov
is
io
ns
 a
nd
 th
e 
ba
si
c 
ra
tio
na
le
 b
eh
in
d 
an
y 
fi
nd
in
gs
 a
nd
 r
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
ns
, n
ot
 la
te
r 
th
an
 n
in
et
y 
da
ys
 f
ro
m
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t 
of
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l. 
W
he
re
 it
 c
on
si
de
rs
 th
at
 th
is
 d
ea
dl
in
e 
ca
nn
ot
 b
e 
m
et
, t
he
 c
ha
ir
pe
rs
on
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l m
us
t n
ot
if
y 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
an
d 
th
e 
C
om
m
itt
ee
 in
 w
ri
ti
ng
, s
ta
tin
g 
th
e 
re
as
on
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
de
la
y 
an
d 
th
e 
da
te
 o
n 
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l p
la
ns
 to
 is
su
e 
its
 
in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t. 
U
nd
er
 n
o 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s 
sh
ou
ld
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l i
ss
ue
 it
s 
in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t l
at
er
 th
an
 1
20
 d
ay
s 
af
te
r 
th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
it
s 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t. 
2.
A
ny
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 s
ub
m
it
 a
 w
ri
tt
en
 r
eq
ue
st
 f
or
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l t
o 
re
vi
ew
 p
re
ci
se
 a
sp
ec
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t w
it
hi
n 
th
ir
ty
 d
ay
s 
of
its
 n
ot
if
ic
at
io
n.
3.
In
 c
as
es
 o
f 
ur
ge
nc
y 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll
 m
ak
e 
ev
er
y 
ef
fo
rt
 to
 is
su
e 
it
s 
in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t a
nd
 a
ny
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 s
ub
m
it
 a
 w
ri
tt
en
re
qu
es
t f
or
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l t
o 
re
vi
ew
 p
re
ci
se
 a
sp
ec
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t, 
w
it
hi
n 
ha
lf
 o
f 
th
e 
re
sp
ec
tiv
e 
ti
m
e 
fr
am
es
 u
nd
er
pa
ra
gr
ap
hs
 1
 a
nd
 2
.
4.
A
ft
er
 c
on
si
de
ri
ng
 a
ny
 w
ri
tt
en
 c
om
m
en
ts
 b
y 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 o
n 
th
e 
in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t, 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l m
ay
 m
od
if
y 
it
s 
re
po
rt
 a
nd
 m
ak
e
an
y 
fu
rt
he
r 
ex
am
in
at
io
n 
it
 c
on
si
de
rs
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
. T
he
 f
in
di
ng
s 
of
 th
e 
fi
na
l p
an
el
 r
ul
in
g 
sh
al
l i
nc
lu
de
 a
 s
uf
fi
ci
en
t d
is
cu
ss
io
n 
of
 th
e
ar
gu
m
en
ts
 m
ad
e 
at
 th
e 
in
te
ri
m
 r
ev
ie
w
 s
ta
ge
, a
nd
 s
ha
ll
 a
ns
w
er
 c
le
ar
ly
 to
 th
e 
w
ri
tt
en
 c
om
m
en
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
tw
o 
P
ar
ti
es
.
F
in
al
 P
an
el
 
R
ep
or
t 
A
rt
. 3
.3
2 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 P
an
el
 R
ul
in
g 
1.
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
 is
su
e 
its
 r
ul
in
g 
to
 th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
an
d 
to
 th
e 
C
om
m
it
te
e 
w
it
hi
n 
15
0 
da
ys
 f
ro
m
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
th
e 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l. 
W
he
re
 it
 c
on
si
de
rs
 th
at
 th
is
 d
ea
dl
in
e 
ca
nn
ot
 b
e 
m
et
, t
he
 c
ha
ir
pe
rs
on
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll
 n
ot
if
y 
th
e
Pa
rt
ie
s 
an
d 
th
e 
C
om
m
itt
ee
 in
 w
ri
ti
ng
, s
ta
tin
g 
th
e 
re
as
on
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
de
la
y 
an
d 
th
e 
da
te
 o
n 
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l p
la
ns
 to
 is
su
e 
it
s
ru
lin
g.
 U
nd
er
 n
o 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s 
sh
ou
ld
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l i
ss
ue
 it
s 
ru
li
ng
 la
te
r 
th
an
 1
80
 d
ay
s 
af
te
r 
th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
it
s 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t.
2.
In
 c
as
es
 o
f 
ur
ge
nc
y 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll
 m
ak
e 
ev
er
y 
ef
fo
rt
 to
 is
su
e 
it
s 
ru
li
ng
 w
it
hi
n 
se
ve
nt
y-
fi
ve
 d
ay
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
it
s
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t. 
U
nd
er
 n
o 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s 
sh
ou
ld
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l i
ss
ue
 it
s 
ru
li
ng
 la
te
r 
th
an
 n
in
et
y 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
it
s
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t.
C
om
p
li
an
ce
 w
it
h
 
th
e 
F
in
al
 R
ep
or
t 
A
rt
. 3
.3
3 
C
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
it
h 
th
e 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 P
an
el
 R
ul
in
g 
E
ac
h 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 ta
ke
 a
ny
 m
ea
su
re
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 to
 c
om
pl
y 
in
 g
oo
d 
fa
it
h 
w
it
h 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l r
ul
in
g,
 a
nd
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 s
ha
ll
 e
nd
ea
vo
ur
 
to
 a
gr
ee
 o
n 
th
e 
pe
ri
od
 o
f 
ti
m
e 
to
 c
om
pl
y 
w
it
h 
th
e 
ru
li
ng
. 
R
ea
so
n
ab
le
 
P
er
io
d
 f
or
 
C
om
p
li
an
ce
 
A
rt
. 3
.3
4 
R
ea
so
na
bl
e 
Pe
ri
od
 o
f 
T
im
e 
fo
r 
C
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
1.
N
o 
la
te
r 
th
an
 th
ir
ty
 d
ay
s 
af
te
r 
th
e 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
no
ti
fi
ca
ti
on
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l r
ul
in
g 
to
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
, t
he
 P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d
ag
ai
ns
t s
ha
ll
 n
ot
if
y 
th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 th
e 
C
om
m
itt
ee
 o
f 
th
e 
ti
m
e 
it 
w
il
l r
eq
ui
re
 f
or
 c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
(h
er
ei
na
ft
er
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 a
s
"r
ea
so
na
bl
e 
pe
ri
od
 o
f 
tim
e"
),
 if
 im
m
ed
ia
te
 c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
is
 n
ot
 p
os
si
bl
e.
2.
If
 th
er
e 
is
 d
is
ag
re
em
en
t b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 o
n 
th
e 
re
as
on
ab
le
 p
er
io
d 
of
 ti
m
e 
to
 c
om
pl
y 
w
ith
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l r
ul
in
g,
 th
e
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· 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
, w
it
hi
n 
tw
en
ty
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
no
ti
fi
ca
tio
n 
m
ad
e 
un
de
r 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
1 
by
 th
e 
P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t,  
re
qu
es
t i
n 
w
ri
ti
ng
 th
e 
or
ig
in
al
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 to
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
th
e 
le
ng
th
 o
f 
th
e 
re
as
on
ab
le
 p
er
io
d 
of
 ti
m
e.
 S
uc
h 
re
qu
es
t s
ha
ll
 b
e 
no
ti
fi
ed
 
si
m
ul
ta
ne
ou
sl
y 
to
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 to
 th
e 
C
om
m
it
te
e.
 T
he
 o
ri
gi
na
l a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
 is
su
e 
it
s 
ru
lin
g 
to
 th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
an
d 
no
tif
y 
th
e 
C
om
m
it
te
e 
w
it
hi
n 
tw
en
ty
 d
ay
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
th
e 
su
bm
is
si
on
 o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t. 
3.
In
 th
e 
ev
en
t t
ha
t a
ny
 m
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
or
ig
in
al
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 is
 n
o 
lo
ng
er
 a
va
ila
bl
e,
 th
e 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 s
et
 o
ut
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
9
(E
st
ab
li
sh
m
en
t o
f 
th
e 
A
rb
itr
at
io
n 
Pa
ne
l)
 s
ha
ll
 a
pp
ly
. T
he
 ti
m
e 
li
m
it
 f
or
 is
su
in
g 
th
e 
ru
li
ng
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
th
ir
ty
-f
iv
e 
da
ys
 f
ro
m
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
th
e
su
bm
is
si
on
 o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
.
4.
T
he
 P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t s
ha
ll 
in
fo
rm
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 in
 w
ri
ti
ng
 o
f 
it
s 
pr
og
re
ss
 to
 c
om
pl
y 
w
it
h 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l
ru
lin
g 
at
 le
as
t o
ne
 m
on
th
 b
ef
or
e 
th
e 
ex
pi
ry
 o
f 
th
e 
re
as
on
ab
le
 p
er
io
d 
of
 ti
m
e.
5.
T
he
 r
ea
so
na
bl
e 
pe
ri
od
 o
f 
ti
m
e 
m
ay
 b
e 
ex
te
nd
ed
 b
y 
m
ut
ua
l a
gr
ee
m
en
t o
f 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s.
T
em
p
or
ar
y 
R
em
ed
ie
s 
A
rt
. 3
.3
6 
T
em
po
ra
ry
 R
em
ed
ie
s 
in
 C
as
e 
of
 N
on
-c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
1.
If
 th
e 
P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t f
ai
ls
 to
 n
ot
if
y 
an
y 
m
ea
su
re
 ta
ke
n 
to
 c
om
pl
y 
w
it
h 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l r
ul
in
g 
be
fo
re
 th
e 
ex
pi
ry
 o
f 
th
e
re
as
on
ab
le
 p
er
io
d 
of
 ti
m
e,
 o
r 
if
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l r
ul
es
 th
at
 n
o 
m
ea
su
re
 ta
ke
n 
to
 c
om
pl
y 
ex
is
ts
 o
r 
th
at
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
 n
ot
if
ie
d 
un
de
r
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
1 
of
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.3
5 
(R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
A
ny
 M
ea
su
re
 T
ak
en
 to
 C
om
pl
y 
w
it
h 
th
e 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 P
an
el
 R
ul
in
g)
 is
 in
co
ns
is
te
nt
 w
ith
 th
at
Pa
rt
y'
s 
ob
li
ga
ti
on
s 
un
de
r 
th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
5 
(S
co
pe
),
 th
e 
P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t s
ha
ll
 e
nt
er
 in
to
 n
eg
ot
ia
ti
on
s
w
it
h 
th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 w
it
h 
a 
vi
ew
 to
 d
ev
el
op
in
g 
m
ut
ua
ll
y 
ac
ce
pt
ab
le
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t o
n 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n.
2.
If
 n
o 
ag
re
em
en
t o
n 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
is
 r
ea
ch
ed
 w
it
hi
n 
th
ir
ty
 d
ay
s 
af
te
r 
th
e 
en
d 
of
 th
e 
re
as
on
ab
le
 p
er
io
d 
of
 ti
m
e 
or
 o
f 
th
e 
is
su
an
ce
 o
f
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l r
ul
in
g 
un
de
r 
A
rt
ic
le
 3
.3
5 
(R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
A
ny
 M
ea
su
re
 T
ak
en
 to
 C
om
pl
y 
w
ith
 th
e 
A
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
P
an
el
 R
ul
in
g)
 th
at
 n
o
m
ea
su
re
 ta
ke
n 
to
 c
om
pl
y 
ex
is
ts
 o
r 
th
at
 a
 m
ea
su
re
 ta
ke
n 
to
 c
om
pl
y 
is
 in
co
ns
is
te
nt
 w
it
h 
th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
5
(S
co
pe
),
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
en
ti
tle
d,
 u
po
n 
no
ti
fi
ca
tio
n 
to
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 to
 th
e 
C
om
m
it
te
e,
 to
 ta
ke
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
m
ea
su
re
s 
at
 a
 le
ve
l e
qu
iv
al
en
t t
o 
th
e 
nu
ll
if
ic
at
io
n 
or
 im
pa
ir
m
en
t c
au
se
d 
by
 th
e 
vi
ol
at
io
n.
 T
he
 n
ot
if
ic
at
io
n 
sh
al
l s
pe
ci
fy
 s
uc
h 
m
ea
su
re
s.
T
he
 c
om
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 ta
ke
 s
uc
h 
m
ea
su
re
s 
at
 a
ny
 m
om
en
t a
ft
er
 th
e 
ex
pi
ry
 o
f 
te
n 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
no
ti
fi
ca
ti
on
by
 th
e 
P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t, 
un
le
ss
 th
e 
P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t h
as
 r
eq
ue
st
ed
 a
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
un
de
r 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
3.
3.
If
 th
e 
P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t c
on
si
de
rs
 th
at
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
ta
ke
n 
by
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 a
re
 n
ot
 e
qu
iv
al
en
t t
o 
th
e 
nu
ll
if
ic
at
io
n 
or
im
pa
ir
m
en
t c
au
se
d 
by
 th
e 
vi
ol
at
io
n,
 it
 m
ay
 r
eq
ue
st
 in
 w
ri
ti
ng
 th
e 
or
ig
in
al
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 to
 r
ul
e 
on
 th
e 
m
at
te
r.
 S
uc
h 
re
qu
es
t s
ha
ll 
be
no
tif
ie
d 
to
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 to
 th
e 
C
om
m
it
te
e 
be
fo
re
 th
e 
ex
pi
ry
 o
f 
th
e 
te
n-
da
y 
pe
ri
od
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
. T
he
 o
ri
gi
na
l
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l, 
ha
vi
ng
 s
ou
gh
t, 
if
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
, t
he
 o
pi
ni
on
 o
f 
ex
pe
rt
s,
 s
ha
ll
 n
ot
if
y 
its
 r
ul
in
g 
on
 th
e 
le
ve
l o
f 
th
e 
su
sp
en
si
on
 o
f
ob
lig
at
io
ns
 to
 th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
an
d 
to
 th
e 
C
om
m
it
te
e 
w
it
hi
n 
th
ir
ty
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
th
e 
su
bm
is
si
on
 o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t. 
M
ea
su
re
s 
sh
al
l n
ot
 b
e
ta
ke
n 
un
ti
l t
he
 o
ri
gi
na
l a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 h
as
 n
ot
if
ie
d 
it
s 
ru
li
ng
, a
nd
 a
ny
 m
ea
su
re
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
co
ns
is
te
nt
 w
it
h 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l r
ul
in
g.
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4.
In
 th
e 
ev
en
t t
ha
t a
ny
 m
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
or
ig
in
al
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 is
 n
o 
lo
ng
er
 a
va
il
ab
le
, t
he
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s 
la
id
 d
ow
n 
in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
9
(E
st
ab
li
sh
m
en
t o
f 
th
e 
A
rb
itr
at
io
n 
Pa
ne
l)
 s
ha
ll
 a
pp
ly
. T
he
 p
er
io
d 
fo
r 
is
su
in
g 
th
e 
ru
li
ng
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
fo
rt
y-
fi
ve
 d
ay
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
th
e
su
bm
is
si
on
 o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 3
.
5.
T
he
 m
ea
su
re
s 
fo
re
se
en
 in
 th
is
 A
rt
ic
le
 s
ha
ll 
be
 te
m
po
ra
ry
 a
nd
 s
ha
ll
 n
ot
 b
e 
ap
pl
ie
d 
af
te
r:
(a
)
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
ha
ve
 r
ea
ch
ed
 a
 m
ut
ua
lly
 a
gr
ee
d 
so
lu
ti
on
 p
ur
su
an
t t
o 
A
rt
ic
le
 3
.3
9 
(M
ut
ua
ll
y 
A
gr
ee
d 
S
ol
ut
io
n)
; o
r
(b
)
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 h
av
e 
re
ac
he
d 
an
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t o
n 
w
he
th
er
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
 n
ot
if
ie
d 
un
de
r 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
1 
of
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.3
7 
(R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
A
ny
 M
e a
su
re
T
ak
en
 to
 C
om
pl
y 
A
ft
er
 th
e 
A
do
pt
io
n 
of
 T
em
po
ra
ry
 R
em
ed
ie
s 
fo
r 
N
on
-C
om
pl
ia
nc
e)
 b
ri
ng
s 
th
e 
Pa
rt
y 
co
m
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t i
nt
o
co
nf
or
m
it
y 
w
it
h 
th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
5 
(S
co
pe
);
 o
r
(c
)
an
y 
m
ea
su
re
 f
ou
nd
 to
 b
e 
in
co
ns
is
te
nt
 w
ith
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
5 
(S
co
pe
) 
ha
s 
be
en
 w
ith
dr
aw
n 
or
 a
m
en
de
d 
so
 a
s
to
 b
ri
ng
 it
 in
to
 c
on
fo
rm
ity
 w
it
h 
th
os
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
, a
s 
ru
le
d 
un
de
r 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
2 
of
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.3
7 
(R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
A
ny
 M
ea
su
re
 T
ak
en
 to
C
om
pl
y 
A
ft
er
 th
e 
A
do
pt
io
n 
of
 T
em
po
ra
ry
 R
em
ed
ie
s 
fo
r 
N
on
-C
om
pl
ia
nc
e)
.
R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
M
ea
su
re
 T
ak
en
 
to
 C
om
p
ly
 A
ft
er
 
th
e 
A
d
op
ti
on
 o
f 
T
em
p
or
ar
y 
R
em
ed
ie
s 
fo
r 
N
on
-C
om
pl
ia
n
ce
 
A
rt
. 3
.3
7 
R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
A
ny
 M
ea
su
re
 T
ak
en
 to
 C
om
pl
y 
A
ft
er
 th
e 
A
do
pt
io
n 
of
 T
em
po
ra
ry
 R
em
ed
ie
s 
fo
r 
N
on
-C
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
1.
T
he
 P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t s
ha
ll 
no
ti
fy
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 th
e 
C
om
m
it
te
e 
of
 a
ny
 m
ea
su
re
 it
 h
as
 ta
ke
n 
to
 c
om
pl
y 
w
it
h 
th
e
ru
lin
g 
of
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l a
nd
 o
f 
it
s 
re
qu
es
t f
or
 th
e 
te
rm
in
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
ap
pl
ie
d 
by
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
.
2.
If
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 d
o 
no
t r
ea
ch
 a
n 
ag
re
em
en
t o
n 
w
he
th
er
 th
e 
no
tif
ie
d 
m
ea
su
re
 b
ri
ng
s 
th
e 
Pa
rt
y 
co
m
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t i
nt
o 
co
nf
or
m
it
y 
w
it
h
th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
5 
(S
co
pe
) 
w
it
hi
n 
th
ir
ty
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
no
ti
fi
ca
tio
n,
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
sh
al
l r
eq
ue
st
 in
 w
ri
ti
ng
 th
e 
or
ig
in
al
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 to
 r
ul
e 
on
 th
e 
m
at
te
r.
 S
uc
h 
re
qu
es
t s
ha
ll
 b
e 
no
ti
fi
ed
 s
im
ul
ta
ne
ou
sl
y 
to
 th
e 
ot
he
r
Pa
rt
y 
an
d 
to
 th
e 
C
om
m
it
te
e.
 T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 r
ul
in
g 
sh
al
l b
e 
no
ti
fi
ed
 to
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 a
nd
 to
 th
e 
C
om
m
it
te
e 
w
it
hi
n 
fo
rt
y-
fi
ve
 d
ay
s 
of
th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
th
e 
su
bm
is
si
on
 o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t. 
If
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l r
ul
es
 th
at
 a
ny
 m
ea
su
re
 ta
ke
n 
to
 c
om
pl
y 
is
 in
 c
on
fo
rm
it
y 
w
ith
 th
e
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
5 
(S
co
pe
),
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.3
6 
(T
em
po
ra
ry
 R
em
ed
ie
s 
in
 C
as
e 
of
 N
on
-
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e)
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
te
rm
in
at
ed
.
R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
M
ea
su
re
s 
T
ak
en
 
to
 C
om
p
ly
 w
it
h
 
th
e 
F
in
al
 R
ep
or
t 
A
rt
. 3
.3
5 
R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
A
ny
 M
ea
su
re
 T
ak
en
 to
 C
om
pl
y 
w
ith
 th
e 
A
rb
itr
at
io
n 
Pa
ne
l R
ul
in
g 
1.
T
he
 P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t s
ha
ll 
no
ti
fy
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 th
e 
C
om
m
it
te
e 
be
fo
re
 th
e 
en
d 
of
 th
e 
re
as
on
ab
le
 p
er
io
d 
of
 ti
m
e
of
 a
ny
 m
ea
su
re
 th
at
 it
 h
as
 ta
ke
n 
to
 c
om
pl
y 
w
it
h 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l r
ul
in
g.
2.
In
 th
e 
ev
en
t t
ha
t t
he
re
 is
 d
is
ag
re
em
en
t b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 th
e 
ex
is
te
nc
e 
or
 th
e 
co
ns
is
te
nc
y 
of
 a
ny
 m
ea
su
re
 n
ot
if
ie
d
un
de
r 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
1 
w
it
h 
th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
5 
(S
co
pe
),
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 r
eq
ue
st
 in
 w
ri
ti
ng
 th
e 
or
ig
in
al
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l t
o 
ru
le
 o
n 
th
e 
m
at
te
r.
 S
uc
h 
re
qu
es
t s
ha
ll
 id
en
tif
y 
th
e 
sp
ec
if
ic
 m
ea
su
re
 a
t i
ss
ue
 a
nd
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
3.
25
 (
Sc
op
e)
 w
it
h 
w
hi
ch
 it
 c
on
si
de
rs
 th
at
 m
ea
su
re
 to
 b
e 
in
co
ns
is
te
nt
, i
n 
a 
m
an
ne
r 
su
ff
ic
ie
nt
 to
 p
re
se
nt
 th
e 
le
ga
l b
as
is
 f
or
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
nt
cl
ea
rl
y,
 a
nd
 it
 s
ha
ll
 e
xp
la
in
 h
ow
 s
uc
h 
m
ea
su
re
 is
 in
co
ns
is
te
nt
 w
ith
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
5 
(S
co
pe
).
 T
he
 o
ri
gi
na
l
168
  
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll
 n
ot
if
y 
it
s 
ru
li
ng
 w
it
hi
n 
fo
rt
y-
fi
ve
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
th
e 
su
bm
is
si
on
 o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t. 
3.
In
 th
e 
ev
en
t t
ha
t a
ny
 m
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
or
ig
in
al
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 is
 n
o 
lo
ng
er
 a
va
il
ab
le
, t
he
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s 
se
t o
ut
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
9
(E
st
ab
li
sh
m
en
t o
f 
th
e 
A
rb
itr
at
io
n 
Pa
ne
l)
 s
ha
ll
 a
pp
ly
. T
he
 ti
m
e 
li
m
it
 f
or
 is
su
in
g 
th
e 
ru
li
ng
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
si
xt
y 
da
ys
 f
ro
m
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
th
e
su
bm
is
si
on
 o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
.
R
u
le
 o
f 
In
te
rp
re
ta
ti
on
 
A
rt
. 3
.4
2 
R
ul
es
 o
f 
In
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
 in
te
rp
re
t t
he
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
5 
(S
co
pe
) 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 c
us
to
m
ar
y 
ru
le
s 
of
 
in
te
rp
re
ta
ti
on
 o
f 
pu
bl
ic
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l l
aw
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
 th
os
e 
co
di
fi
ed
 in
 th
e 
V
ie
nn
a 
C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
on
 th
e 
L
aw
 o
f 
T
re
at
ie
s.
 W
he
re
 a
n 
ob
lig
at
io
n 
un
de
r 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t i
s 
id
en
tic
al
 to
 a
n 
ob
li
ga
ti
on
 u
nd
er
 th
e 
W
T
O
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll
 ta
ke
 in
to
 a
cc
ou
nt
 
an
y 
re
le
va
nt
 in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
in
 r
ul
in
gs
 o
f 
th
e 
W
T
O
 D
is
pu
te
 S
et
tl
em
en
t B
od
y 
(h
er
ei
na
ft
er
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 a
s 
"D
SB
")
. T
he
 r
ul
in
gs
 
of
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l c
an
no
t a
dd
 to
 o
r 
di
m
in
is
h 
th
e 
ri
gh
ts
 a
nd
 o
bl
ig
at
io
ns
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
in
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
5 
(S
co
pe
).
 
R
u
li
n
gs
 o
f 
th
e 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 P
an
el
 
A
rt
. 3
.4
3 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 P
an
el
 D
ec
is
io
ns
 a
nd
 R
ul
in
gs
 
1.
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
 m
ak
e 
ev
er
y 
ef
fo
rt
 to
 ta
ke
 a
ny
 d
ec
is
io
n 
by
 c
on
se
ns
us
. W
he
re
, n
ev
er
th
el
es
s,
 a
 d
ec
is
io
n 
ca
nn
ot
 b
e 
ar
ri
ve
d
at
 b
y 
co
ns
en
su
s,
 th
e 
m
at
te
r 
at
 is
su
e 
sh
al
l b
e 
de
ci
de
d 
by
 m
aj
or
it
y 
vo
te
.
2.
A
ny
 r
ul
in
g 
of
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll
 b
e 
bi
nd
in
g 
on
 th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
an
d 
sh
al
l n
ot
 c
re
at
e 
an
y 
ri
gh
ts
 o
r 
ob
li
ga
ti
on
s 
to
 p
hy
si
ca
l o
r 
le
ga
l
pe
rs
on
s.
 T
he
 r
ul
in
g 
sh
al
l s
et
 o
ut
 th
e 
fi
nd
in
gs
 o
f 
fa
ct
, t
he
 a
pp
lic
ab
il
it
y 
of
 th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
5 
(S
co
pe
) 
an
d
th
e 
ra
ti
on
al
e 
be
hi
nd
 a
ny
 f
in
di
ng
s 
an
d 
co
nc
lu
si
on
s 
th
at
 it
 m
ak
es
. T
he
 C
om
m
it
te
e 
sh
al
l m
ak
e 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l r
ul
in
g 
pu
bl
ic
ly
av
ai
la
bl
e 
in
 it
s 
en
tir
et
y,
 u
nl
es
s 
it
 d
ec
id
es
 n
ot
 to
 d
o 
so
 in
 o
rd
er
 to
 e
ns
ur
e 
th
e 
co
nf
id
en
ti
al
it
y 
of
 a
ny
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
de
si
gn
at
ed
 b
y 
ei
th
er
Pa
rt
y 
as
 c
on
fi
de
nt
ia
l.
R
ep
la
ce
m
en
t 
of
 
A
rb
it
ra
to
rs
 
Su
sp
en
si
on
 a
nd
 
T
er
m
in
at
io
n
 o
f 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 
P
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
 
A
rt
. 3
.3
8 
Su
sp
en
si
on
 a
nd
 T
er
m
in
at
io
n 
of
 A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 P
ro
ce
du
re
s 
1.
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
, a
t t
he
 w
ri
tt
en
 r
eq
ue
st
 o
f 
bo
th
 P
ar
ti
es
, s
us
pe
nd
 it
s 
w
or
k 
at
 a
ny
 ti
m
e 
fo
r 
a 
pe
ri
od
 a
gr
ee
d 
by
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 n
ot
ex
ce
ed
in
g 
tw
el
ve
 m
on
th
s 
an
d 
sh
al
l r
es
um
e 
it
s 
w
or
k 
at
 th
e 
en
d 
of
 th
is
 a
gr
ee
d 
pe
ri
od
 a
t t
he
 w
ri
tt
en
 r
eq
ue
st
 o
f 
th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
, o
r
be
fo
re
 th
e 
en
d 
of
 th
is
 a
gr
ee
d 
pe
ri
od
 a
t t
he
 w
ri
tt
en
 r
eq
ue
st
 o
f 
bo
th
 P
ar
ti
es
. I
f 
th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 d
oe
s 
no
t r
eq
ue
st
 th
e 
re
su
m
pt
io
n 
of
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l's
 w
or
k 
be
fo
re
 th
e 
ex
pi
ry
 o
f 
th
e 
ag
re
ed
 s
us
pe
ns
io
n 
pe
ri
od
, t
he
di
sp
ut
e 
se
tt
le
m
en
t p
ro
ce
du
re
s 
in
it
ia
te
d 
pu
rs
ua
nt
 to
 th
is
 S
ec
tio
n 
sh
al
l b
e 
de
em
ed
 te
rm
in
at
ed
. S
ub
je
ct
 to
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.4
5 
(R
el
at
io
n 
w
it
h
W
T
O
 O
bl
ig
at
io
ns
),
 th
e 
su
sp
en
si
on
 a
nd
 te
rm
in
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l's
 w
or
k 
ar
e 
w
it
ho
ut
 p
re
ju
di
ce
 to
 th
e 
ri
gh
ts
 o
f 
ei
th
er
 P
ar
ty
 in
169
  
ot
he
r 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s.
 
2.
T
he
 P
ar
ti
es
 m
ay
, a
t a
ny
 ti
m
e,
 a
gr
ee
 in
 w
ri
ti
ng
 to
 te
rm
in
at
e 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
se
tt
le
m
en
t p
ro
ce
du
re
s 
in
it
ia
te
d 
pu
rs
ua
nt
 to
 th
is
 S
ec
ti
on
.
M
u
tu
al
ly
 A
gr
ee
d
 
So
lu
ti
on
s 
A
rt
. 3
.3
9 
M
ut
ua
ll
y 
A
gr
ee
d 
S
ol
ut
io
n 
T
he
 P
ar
ti
es
 m
ay
 r
ea
ch
 a
 m
ut
ua
lly
 a
gr
ee
d 
so
lu
ti
on
 to
 a
 d
is
pu
te
 u
nd
er
 th
is
 S
ec
ti
on
 a
t a
ny
 ti
m
e.
 T
he
y 
sh
al
l n
ot
if
y 
th
e 
C
om
m
it
te
e 
an
d 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l, 
if
 a
ny
, o
f 
su
ch
 a
 s
ol
ut
io
n.
 I
f 
th
e 
so
lu
tio
n 
re
qu
ir
es
 a
pp
ro
va
l p
ur
su
an
t t
o 
th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 d
om
es
tic
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s 
of
 e
it
he
r 
Pa
rt
y,
 th
e 
no
ti
fi
ca
ti
on
 s
ha
ll
 r
ef
er
 to
 th
is
 r
eq
ui
re
m
en
t, 
an
d 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
se
tt
le
m
en
t p
ro
ce
du
re
s 
in
iti
at
ed
 p
ur
su
an
t t
o 
th
is
 S
ec
ti
on
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
su
sp
en
de
d.
 I
f 
su
ch
 a
pp
ro
va
l i
s 
no
t r
eq
ui
re
d,
 o
r 
up
on
 n
ot
if
ic
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
co
m
pl
et
io
n 
of
 a
ny
 s
uc
h 
do
m
es
ti
c 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
, t
he
 p
ro
ce
du
re
 
sh
al
l b
e 
te
rm
in
at
ed
. 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
an
d 
T
ec
h
n
ic
al
 A
d
vi
ce
 
A
rt
. 3
.4
1 
Su
bm
is
si
on
 o
f 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
1.
A
t t
he
 r
eq
ue
st
 o
f 
a 
P
ar
ty
, o
r 
up
on
 it
s 
ow
n 
in
it
ia
tiv
e,
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l m
ay
 o
bt
ai
n 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
fr
om
 a
ny
 s
ou
rc
e,
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
th
e
Pa
rt
ie
s 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e,
 it
 d
ee
m
s 
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
. T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
pa
ne
l a
ls
o 
ha
s 
th
e 
ri
gh
t t
o
se
ek
 th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 o
pi
ni
on
 o
f 
ex
pe
rt
s 
as
 it
 d
ee
m
s 
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e.
 T
he
 a
rb
itr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll
 c
on
su
lt 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 b
ef
or
e 
ch
oo
si
ng
 s
uc
h
ex
pe
rt
s.
 A
ny
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ob
ta
in
ed
 in
 th
is
 m
an
ne
r 
m
us
t b
e 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
to
 th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
an
d 
su
bm
itt
ed
 f
or
 th
ei
r 
co
m
m
en
ts
.
2.
In
te
re
st
ed
 n
at
ur
al
 o
r 
le
ga
l p
er
so
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
ar
e 
au
th
or
is
ed
 to
 s
ub
m
it
 a
m
ic
us
 c
ur
ia
e 
br
ie
fs
to
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l i
n 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
ith
 A
nn
ex
 9
 (
R
ul
es
 o
f 
P
ro
ce
du
re
 f
or
 A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
).
T
im
e 
L
im
it
s 
A
rt
. 3
.4
6 
T
im
e 
L
im
its
 
1.
A
ll
 ti
m
e 
li
m
it
s 
la
id
 d
ow
n 
in
 th
is
 S
ec
ti
on
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
 th
e 
lim
its
 f
or
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
ls
 to
 n
ot
if
y 
th
ei
r 
ru
li
ng
s,
 s
ha
ll 
be
 c
ou
nt
ed
 in
ca
le
nd
ar
 d
ay
s,
 th
e 
fi
rs
t d
ay
 b
ei
ng
 th
e 
da
y 
fo
ll
ow
in
g 
th
e 
ac
t o
r 
fa
ct
 to
 w
hi
ch
 th
ey
 r
ef
er
, u
nl
es
s 
ot
he
rw
is
e 
sp
ec
if
ie
d.
2.
A
ny
 ti
m
e 
li
m
it
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 th
is
 S
ec
ti
on
 m
ay
 b
e 
m
od
if
ie
d 
by
 m
ut
ua
l a
gr
ee
m
en
t o
f 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s.
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E
U
-V
ie
tn
am
 I
P
A
 (
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18
) 
O
b
je
ct
iv
e 
A
rt
. 3
.1
 O
bj
ec
ti
ve
 
T
he
 o
bj
ec
ti
ve
 o
f 
th
is
 C
ha
pt
er
 is
 to
 e
st
ab
li
sh
 a
n 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
an
d 
ef
fi
ci
en
t m
ec
ha
ni
sm
 f
or
 a
vo
id
in
g 
an
d 
se
ttl
in
g 
an
y 
di
sp
ut
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
re
ga
rd
in
g 
th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
ti
on
 a
nd
 a
pp
li
ca
ti
on
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t w
it
h 
a 
vi
ew
 to
 a
rr
iv
in
g 
at
 a
 m
ut
ua
ll
y 
ag
re
ed
 s
ol
ut
io
n.
 
Sc
op
e 
A
rt
. 3
.2
 S
co
pe
 
T
hi
s 
C
ha
pt
er
 a
pp
li
es
 w
it
h 
re
sp
ec
t t
o 
th
e 
av
oi
da
nc
e 
an
d 
se
tt
le
m
en
t o
f 
an
y 
di
sp
ut
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 r
eg
ar
di
ng
 th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
or
 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
ex
ce
pt
 a
s 
ot
he
rw
is
e 
pr
ov
id
ed
 f
or
 in
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t. 
C
h
oi
ce
 o
f 
F
or
u
m
 
A
rt
. 3
.2
4 
C
ho
ic
e 
of
 F
or
um
 
1.
R
ec
ou
rs
e 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
se
tt
le
m
en
t p
ro
ce
du
re
 u
nd
er
 th
is
 C
ha
pt
er
 s
ha
ll 
be
 w
it
ho
ut
 p
re
ju
di
ce
 to
 a
ny
 a
ct
io
n 
in
 th
e 
fr
am
ew
or
k 
of
 th
e
W
or
ld
 T
ra
de
 O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n,
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
di
sp
ut
e 
se
tt
le
m
en
t a
ct
io
n,
 o
r 
un
de
r 
an
y 
ot
he
r 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
gr
ee
m
en
t t
o 
w
hi
ch
 b
ot
h 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
ar
e
pa
rt
y.
2.
B
y 
w
ay
 o
f 
de
ro
ga
ti
on
 f
ro
m
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 1
, a
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 n
ot
, f
or
 a
 p
ar
ti
cu
la
r 
m
ea
su
re
, s
ee
k 
re
dr
es
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
br
ea
ch
 o
f 
a 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
ll
y
eq
ui
va
le
nt
 o
bl
ig
at
io
n 
un
de
r 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t a
nd
 u
nd
er
 th
e
W
T
O
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t o
r 
un
de
r 
an
y 
ot
he
r 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
gr
ee
m
en
t t
o 
w
hi
ch
 b
ot
h 
P
ar
ti
es
 a
re
 p
ar
ty
 in
 th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 f
or
a.
 O
nc
e 
di
sp
ut
e
se
ttl
em
en
t p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
 h
av
e 
be
en
 in
it
ia
te
d,
 th
e 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
no
t b
ri
ng
 a
 c
la
im
 s
ee
ki
ng
 r
ed
re
ss
 f
or
 th
e 
br
ea
ch
 o
f 
th
e 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
ll
y
eq
ui
va
le
nt
 o
bl
ig
at
io
n 
un
de
r 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
ag
re
em
en
t t
o 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
fo
ru
m
, u
nl
es
s 
th
e 
fo
ru
m
 s
el
ec
te
d 
fi
rs
t f
ai
ls
 f
or
 p
ro
ce
du
ra
l o
r 
ju
ri
sd
ic
ti
on
al
re
as
on
s 
to
 m
ak
e 
fi
nd
in
gs
 o
n 
th
e 
cl
ai
m
 s
ee
ki
ng
 r
ed
re
ss
 to
 th
at
 o
bl
ig
at
io
n.
3.
Fo
r 
th
e 
pu
rp
os
es
 o
f 
th
is
 A
rt
ic
le
:
(a
)
di
sp
ut
e 
se
ttl
em
en
t p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
 u
nd
er
 th
e 
W
T
O
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t a
re
 d
ee
m
ed
 to
 b
e 
in
it
ia
te
d 
by
 a
 P
ar
ty
's
 r
eq
ue
st
 f
or
 th
e 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f
a 
pa
ne
l u
nd
er
 A
rt
ic
le
 6
 o
f 
th
e 
U
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
 o
n 
R
ul
es
 a
nd
 P
ro
ce
du
re
s 
G
ov
er
ni
ng
 th
e 
S
et
tl
em
en
t o
f 
D
is
pu
te
s;
(b
)
di
sp
ut
e 
se
tt
le
m
en
t p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
 u
nd
er
 th
is
 C
ha
pt
er
 a
re
 d
ee
m
ed
 to
 b
e 
in
it
ia
te
d 
by
 a
 P
ar
ty
's
 r
eq
ue
st
 f
or
 th
e 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f 
an
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l u
nd
er
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 1
 o
f 
A
rt
ic
le
 3
.5
 (
In
it
ia
ti
on
 o
f 
th
e 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 P
ro
ce
du
re
);
(c
)
di
sp
ut
e 
se
ttl
em
en
t p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
 u
nd
er
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
gr
ee
m
en
t a
re
 d
ee
m
ed
 to
 b
e 
in
it
ia
te
d 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
it
h 
th
at
ag
re
em
en
t.
4.
N
ot
hi
ng
 in
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t s
ha
ll
 p
re
cl
ud
e 
a 
P
ar
ty
 f
ro
m
 im
pl
em
en
tin
g 
th
e 
su
sp
en
si
on
 o
f 
ob
li
ga
tio
ns
 a
ut
ho
ri
se
d 
by
 th
e 
D
S
B
. N
ei
th
er
th
e 
W
T
O
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t n
or
 th
e 
F
re
e 
T
ra
de
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t s
ha
ll
 b
e 
in
vo
ke
d 
to
 p
re
cl
ud
e 
a 
P
ar
ty
 f
ro
m
 ta
ki
ng
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
 m
ea
su
re
s 
un
de
r
A
rt
ic
le
 3
.1
5 
(T
em
po
ra
ry
 R
em
ed
ie
s 
in
 C
as
e 
of
 N
on
-C
om
pl
ia
nc
e)
.
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R
eq
u
es
t 
an
d
 
R
ec
ei
p
t 
of
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
C
on
su
lt
at
io
n
s 
A
rt
. 3
.3
 C
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
 
1.
T
he
 P
ar
ti
es
 s
ha
ll
 e
nd
ea
vo
ur
 to
 r
es
ol
ve
 a
ny
 d
is
pu
te
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
 (
Sc
op
e)
 b
y 
en
te
ri
ng
 in
to
 c
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
 in
 g
oo
d 
fa
ith
w
it
h 
th
e 
ai
m
 o
f 
re
ac
hi
ng
 a
 m
ut
ua
ll
y 
ag
re
ed
 s
ol
ut
io
n.
2.
A
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
se
ek
 c
on
su
lta
tio
ns
 b
y 
m
ea
ns
 o
f 
a 
w
ri
tt
en
 r
eq
ue
st
 to
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
P
ar
ty
, c
op
ie
d 
to
 th
e 
C
om
m
it
te
e 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
pu
rs
ua
nt
 to
A
rt
ic
le
 4
.1
 (
C
om
m
it
te
e)
, i
de
nt
if
yi
ng
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
 a
t i
ss
ue
 a
nd
 th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
of
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t.
3.
C
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
he
ld
 w
it
hi
n 
30
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
 a
nd
 ta
ke
 p
la
ce
, u
nl
es
s 
th
e
Pa
rt
ie
s 
ag
re
e 
ot
he
rw
is
e,
 in
 th
e 
te
rr
it
or
y 
of
 th
e 
Pa
rt
y 
to
 w
hi
ch
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t i
s 
m
ad
e.
 T
he
 c
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
de
em
ed
 c
on
cl
ud
ed
 w
it
hi
n
45
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t, 
un
le
ss
 b
ot
h 
P
ar
ti
es
 a
gr
ee
 to
 c
on
ti
nu
e 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
. C
on
su
lta
ti
on
s,
 in
 p
ar
ti
cu
la
r 
al
l
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
an
d 
po
si
ti
on
s 
ta
ke
n 
by
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
, s
ha
ll 
be
 c
on
fi
de
nt
ia
l a
nd
 w
it
ho
ut
 p
re
ju
di
ce
 to
 th
e 
ri
gh
ts
 o
f 
ei
th
er
 P
ar
ty
 in
 a
ny
fu
rt
he
r 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s.
4.
C
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
 o
n 
m
at
te
rs
 o
f 
ur
ge
nc
y,
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
th
os
e 
re
ga
rd
in
g 
pe
ri
sh
ab
le
 g
oo
ds
, s
ea
so
na
l g
oo
ds
 o
r 
se
as
on
al
 s
er
vi
ce
s,
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
he
ld
w
it
hi
n 
15
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
. T
he
 c
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
de
em
ed
 c
on
cl
ud
ed
 w
ith
in
 2
0
da
ys
, u
nl
es
s 
bo
th
 P
ar
ti
es
 a
gr
ee
 to
 c
on
ti
nu
e 
co
ns
ul
ta
ti
on
s.
5.
T
he
 P
ar
ty
 th
at
 s
ou
gh
t c
on
su
lta
tio
ns
 m
ay
 h
av
e 
re
co
ur
se
 to
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.5
 (
In
iti
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
A
rb
itr
at
io
n 
P
ro
ce
du
re
) 
if
:
(a
)
th
e 
ot
he
r 
P
ar
ty
 d
oe
s 
no
t r
es
po
nd
 to
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t f
or
 c
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
 w
ith
in
 1
5 
da
ys
 o
f 
th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
it
s 
re
ce
ip
t;
(b
)
th
e 
co
ns
ul
ta
ti
on
s 
ar
e 
no
t h
el
d 
w
it
hi
n 
th
e 
ti
m
ef
ra
m
es
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
fo
r 
in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
s 
3 
or
 4
;
(c
)
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
ag
re
e 
no
t t
o 
ha
ve
 c
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
; o
r
(d
)
th
e 
co
ns
ul
ta
ti
on
s 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
co
nc
lu
de
d 
w
it
ho
ut
 a
 m
ut
ua
ll
y 
ag
re
ed
 s
ol
ut
io
n.
6.
D
ur
in
g 
co
ns
ul
ta
ti
on
s 
ea
ch
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
pr
ov
id
e 
su
ff
ic
ie
nt
 f
ac
tu
al
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
fo
r 
an
 e
xa
m
in
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
m
an
ne
r 
in
 w
hi
ch
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
at
 is
su
e 
co
ul
d 
af
fe
ct
 th
e 
op
er
at
io
n 
an
d 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t.
M
ed
ia
ti
on
 
A
rt
. 3
.4
 M
ed
ia
ti
on
 M
ec
ha
ni
sm
 
T
he
 P
ar
ti
es
 m
ay
 a
t a
ny
 ti
m
e 
ag
re
e 
to
 e
nt
er
 in
to
 a
 m
ed
ia
ti
on
 p
ro
ce
du
re
 p
ur
su
an
t t
o 
A
nn
ex
 9
 (
M
ed
ia
ti
on
 M
ec
ha
ni
sm
) 
w
it
h 
re
sp
ec
t t
o 
an
y 
m
ea
su
re
 a
dv
er
se
ly
 a
ff
ec
ti
ng
 in
ve
st
m
en
t 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
. 
In
it
ia
ti
on
 
A
rt
 3
.5
 I
ni
tia
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 P
ro
ce
du
re
 
1.
If
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 f
ai
l t
o 
re
so
lv
e 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
by
 r
ec
ou
rs
e 
to
 c
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
 a
s 
pr
ov
id
ed
 f
or
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.3
 (
C
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
),
 th
e 
Pa
rt
y 
th
at
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so
ug
ht
 c
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
 m
ay
 r
eq
ue
st
 th
e 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f 
an
 a
rb
itr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l. 
2.
T
he
 r
eq
ue
st
 f
or
 th
e 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f 
an
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll 
be
 m
ad
e 
in
 w
ri
ti
ng
 to
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 c
op
ie
d 
to
 th
e 
C
om
m
it
te
e.
T
he
 c
om
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 id
en
ti
fy
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
 a
t i
ss
ue
 in
 it
s 
re
qu
es
t, 
an
d 
ex
pl
ai
n 
ho
w
 th
at
 m
ea
su
re
 is
 in
co
ns
is
te
nt
 w
it
h 
th
e
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t i
n 
su
ch
 a
 m
an
ne
r 
as
 to
 c
le
ar
ly
 p
re
se
nt
 th
e 
le
ga
l b
as
is
 f
or
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
nt
.
C
om
p
os
it
io
n
 o
f 
th
e 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 
P
an
el
 
A
rt
. 3
.7
 E
st
ab
li
sh
m
en
t o
f 
th
e 
A
rb
itr
at
io
n 
Pa
ne
l 
1.
A
n 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll
 b
e 
co
m
po
se
d 
of
 th
re
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s.
2.
W
it
hi
n 
10
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
re
ce
ip
t b
y 
th
e 
P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
n s
t o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t f
or
 th
e 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f 
an
 a
rb
itr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l, 
th
e
Pa
rt
ie
s 
sh
al
l c
on
su
lt
 in
 o
rd
er
 to
 a
gr
ee
 o
n 
th
e 
co
m
po
si
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l.
3.
If
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 d
o 
no
t a
gr
ee
 o
n 
th
e 
co
m
po
si
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l w
it
hi
n 
th
e 
ti
m
e 
fr
am
e 
pr
ov
id
ed
 f
or
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
, e
ac
h 
P
ar
ty
m
ay
 a
pp
oi
nt
 a
n 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 f
ro
m
 th
e 
su
b-
li
st
 o
f 
th
at
 P
ar
ty
 e
st
ab
lis
he
d 
un
de
r 
A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
3 
(L
is
t o
f 
A
rb
it
ra
to
rs
) 
w
it
hi
n 
10
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e
ex
pi
ry
 o
f 
th
e 
tim
e 
fr
am
e 
pr
ov
id
ed
 f
or
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
. I
f 
a 
P
ar
ty
 f
ai
ls
 to
 a
pp
oi
nt
 a
n 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 f
ro
m
 it
s 
su
b-
li
st
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 s
ha
ll
 b
e
se
le
ct
ed
 b
y 
lo
t, 
up
on
 r
eq
ue
st
 o
f 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
Pa
rt
y,
 b
y 
th
e 
ch
ai
r 
of
 th
e 
C
om
m
it
te
e,
 o
r 
th
e 
ch
ai
r's
 d
el
eg
at
e,
 f
ro
m
 th
e 
su
b-
li
st
 o
f 
th
at
 P
ar
ty
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
un
de
r 
A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
3 
(L
is
t o
f 
A
rb
itr
at
or
s)
.
4.
If
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 d
o 
no
t a
gr
ee
 o
n 
th
e 
ch
ai
rp
er
so
n 
of
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l w
it
hi
n 
th
e 
tim
e 
fr
am
e 
pr
ov
id
ed
 f
or
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
 th
e 
ch
ai
r 
of
th
e 
C
om
m
itt
ee
, o
r 
th
e 
ch
ai
r's
 d
el
eg
at
e,
 s
ha
ll
 s
el
ec
t b
y 
lo
t, 
up
on
 r
eq
ue
st
 o
f 
a 
P
ar
ty
, t
he
 c
ha
ir
pe
rs
on
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l f
ro
m
 th
e
su
b-
li
st
 o
f 
ch
ai
rp
er
so
ns
 e
st
ab
li
sh
ed
 u
nd
er
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
3 
(L
is
t o
f 
A
rb
it
ra
to
rs
).
5.
T
he
 c
ha
ir
 o
f 
th
e 
C
om
m
itt
ee
, o
r 
th
e 
ch
ai
r's
 d
el
eg
at
e,
 s
ha
ll
 s
el
ec
t t
he
 a
rb
it
ra
to
rs
 w
it
hi
n 
fi
ve
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
pa
ra
gr
ap
hs
 3
 o
r 
4.
6.
T
he
 d
at
e 
of
 e
st
ab
li
sh
m
en
t o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll
 b
e 
th
e 
da
te
 o
n 
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
th
re
e 
se
le
ct
ed
 a
rb
it
ra
to
rs
 h
av
e 
no
ti
fi
ed
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
of
 th
e 
ac
ce
pt
an
ce
 o
f 
th
ei
r 
ap
po
in
tm
en
t i
n 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
it
h 
A
nn
ex
 7
 (
R
ul
es
 o
f 
P
ro
ce
du
re
).
7.
If
 a
ny
 o
f 
th
e 
lis
ts
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
fo
r 
in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
3 
(L
is
t o
f 
A
rb
it
ra
to
rs
) 
ha
ve
 n
ot
 b
ee
n 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
or
 d
o 
no
t c
on
ta
in
 s
uf
fi
ci
en
t n
am
es
 a
t
th
e 
ti
m
e 
a 
re
qu
es
t i
s 
m
ad
e 
pu
rs
ua
nt
 to
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
s 
3 
or
 4
, t
he
 a
rb
it
ra
to
rs
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
dr
aw
n 
by
 lo
t f
ro
m
 a
m
on
g 
th
e 
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
w
ho
 h
av
e
be
en
 f
or
m
al
ly
 p
ro
po
se
d 
by
 b
ot
h 
P
ar
tie
s 
or
 b
y 
a 
Pa
rt
y 
in
 th
e 
ev
en
t t
ha
t o
nl
y 
on
e 
P
ar
ty
 h
as
 m
ad
e 
a 
pr
op
os
al
.
L
is
t 
of
 
A
rb
it
ra
to
rs
 
A
rt
. 3
.2
3 
L
is
t o
f 
A
rb
it
ra
to
rs
 
1.
T
he
 C
om
m
itt
ee
 s
ha
ll,
 n
o 
la
te
r 
th
an
 s
ix
 m
on
th
s 
af
te
r 
th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
en
tr
y 
in
to
 f
or
ce
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
es
ta
bl
is
h 
a 
li
st
 o
f 
at
 le
as
t 1
5
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
w
ho
 a
re
 w
ill
in
g 
an
d 
ab
le
 to
 s
er
ve
 a
s 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s.
T
he
 li
st
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
co
m
po
se
d 
of
 th
re
e 
su
b-
li
st
s:
(a
)
on
e 
su
b-
li
st
 f
or
 V
ie
t N
am
;
(b
)
on
e 
su
b-
lis
t f
or
 th
e 
U
ni
on
 a
nd
 it
s 
M
em
be
r 
S
ta
te
s;
 a
nd
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(c
)
on
e 
su
b-
li
st
 o
f 
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
w
ho
 a
re
 n
ot
 n
at
io
na
ls
 o
f 
ei
th
er
 P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 d
o 
no
t h
av
e 
pe
rm
an
en
t r
es
id
en
ce
 in
 e
it
he
r 
P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 w
ho
 s
ha
ll
ac
t a
s 
ch
ai
rp
er
so
n 
of
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l.
2.
E
ac
h 
su
b-
li
st
 s
ha
ll
 in
cl
ud
e 
at
 le
as
t f
iv
e 
in
di
vi
du
al
s.
 T
he
 C
om
m
it
te
e 
sh
al
l e
ns
ur
e 
th
at
 th
e 
li
st
 is
 a
lw
ay
s 
m
ai
nt
ai
ne
d 
at
 th
at
 m
in
im
um
nu
m
be
r 
of
 in
di
vi
du
al
s.
3.
A
rb
it
ra
to
rs
 s
ha
ll
 h
av
e 
de
m
on
st
ra
te
d 
ex
pe
rt
is
e 
an
d 
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
 o
f 
la
w
 a
nd
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l t
ra
de
. T
he
y 
sh
al
l b
e 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t, 
se
rv
e 
in
th
ei
r 
in
di
vi
du
al
 c
ap
ac
iti
es
 a
nd
 n
ot
 ta
ke
 in
st
ru
ct
io
ns
 f
ro
m
 a
ny
 o
rg
an
is
at
io
n 
or
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t, 
or
 b
e 
af
fi
li
at
ed
 w
it
h 
th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t o
f 
an
y
of
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
, a
nd
 s
ha
ll
 c
om
pl
y 
w
it
h 
th
e 
C
od
e 
of
 C
on
du
ct
 in
 A
nn
ex
 8
 (
C
od
e 
of
 C
on
du
ct
 f
or
 A
rb
it
ra
to
rs
 a
nd
 M
ed
ia
to
rs
).
4.
T
he
 C
om
m
itt
ee
 m
ay
 e
st
ab
li
sh
 a
n 
ad
di
ti
on
al
 li
st
 o
f 
10
 in
di
vi
du
al
s 
w
it
h 
de
m
on
st
ra
te
d 
ex
pe
rt
is
e 
an
d 
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
 in
 s
pe
ci
fi
c 
se
ct
or
s
co
ve
re
d 
by
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t. 
S
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
ag
re
em
en
t o
f 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s,
 s
uc
h 
an
 a
dd
it
io
na
l l
is
t s
ha
ll
 b
e 
us
ed
 to
 c
om
po
se
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n
pa
ne
l i
n 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
it
h 
th
e 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e 
se
t o
ut
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.7
 (
E
st
ab
li
sh
m
en
t o
f 
th
e 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 P
an
el
).
T
er
m
s 
of
 
R
ef
er
en
ce
 o
f 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 P
an
el
 
A
rt
. 3
.6
 T
er
m
s 
of
 R
ef
er
en
ce
 o
f 
A
rb
itr
at
io
n 
P
an
el
 
U
nl
es
s 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 a
gr
ee
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
w
ith
in
 1
0 
da
ys
 o
f 
th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
th
e 
se
le
ct
io
n 
of
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s,
 th
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 r
ef
er
en
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll
 b
e:
 
"T
o 
ex
am
in
e,
 in
 th
e 
lig
ht
 o
f 
th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
of
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t c
it
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
, t
he
 m
at
te
r 
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 in
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t f
or
 th
e 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f 
an
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 p
ur
su
an
t t
o 
A
rt
ic
le
 3
.5
 (
In
it
ia
ti
on
 o
f 
th
e 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 P
ro
ce
du
re
),
 to
 r
ul
e 
on
 th
e 
co
nf
or
m
it
y 
of
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
 in
 q
ue
st
io
n 
w
it
h 
th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
 (
Sc
op
e)
, a
nd
 to
 s
et
 o
ut
 in
 it
s 
re
po
rt
 th
e 
fi
nd
in
gs
 o
f 
fa
ct
, t
he
 
ap
pl
ic
ab
il
it
y 
of
 r
el
ev
an
t p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
an
d 
th
e 
ba
si
c 
ra
ti
on
al
e 
fo
r 
an
y 
fi
nd
in
gs
 a
nd
 r
ec
om
m
en
da
ti
on
s,
 in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 A
rt
ic
le
s 
3.
10
 
(I
nt
er
im
 R
ep
or
t)
 a
nd
 3
.1
1 
(F
in
al
 R
ep
or
t)
."
. 
U
rg
en
cy
 
P
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
 
A
rt
. 3
.9
 P
re
lim
in
ar
y 
R
ul
in
g 
on
 U
rg
en
cy
 
If
 a
 P
ar
ty
 s
o 
re
qu
es
ts
, t
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
 g
iv
e 
a 
pr
el
im
in
ar
y 
ru
li
ng
 w
it
hi
n 
10
 d
ay
s 
of
 it
s 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
n 
w
he
th
er
 it
 d
ee
m
s 
th
e 
ca
se
 to
 b
e 
ur
ge
nt
. 
R
u
le
s 
of
 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 P
an
el
 
P
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
 
A
rt
. 3
.8
 D
is
pu
te
 S
et
tl
em
en
t P
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
 o
f 
th
e 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 P
an
el
 
1.
T
he
 r
ul
es
 a
nd
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s 
se
t o
ut
 in
 th
is
 A
rt
ic
le
, A
nn
ex
es
 7
 (
R
ul
es
 o
f 
P
ro
ce
du
re
) 
an
d 
8 
(C
od
e 
of
 C
on
du
ct
 f
or
 A
rb
it
ra
to
rs
 a
nd
M
ed
ia
to
rs
) 
sh
al
l g
ov
er
n 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
se
tt
le
m
en
t p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
 o
f 
an
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
.
2.
U
nl
es
s 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 a
gr
ee
 o
th
er
w
is
e,
 th
ey
 s
ha
ll
 m
ee
t t
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 w
it
hi
n 
10
 d
ay
s 
of
 it
s 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t i
n 
or
de
r 
to
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
al
l
m
at
te
rs
 th
at
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 o
r 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l d
ee
m
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
 th
e 
ti
m
et
ab
le
 o
f 
th
e 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s 
an
d 
th
e 
re
m
un
er
at
io
n 
an
d
ex
pe
ns
es
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
it
h 
A
nn
ex
 7
 (
R
ul
es
 o
f 
P
ro
ce
du
re
).
 A
rb
it
ra
to
rs
 a
nd
 r
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
es
 o
f 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
m
ay
 ta
ke
pa
rt
 in
 th
is
 m
ee
ti
ng
 v
ia
 te
le
ph
on
e 
or
 v
id
eo
 c
on
fe
re
nc
e.
3.
T
he
 v
en
ue
 o
f 
th
e 
he
ar
in
g 
sh
al
l b
e 
de
ci
de
d 
by
 m
ut
ua
l c
on
se
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
. I
f 
th
e 
P
ar
tie
s 
do
 n
ot
 a
gr
ee
 o
n 
th
e 
ve
nu
e 
of
 th
e 
he
ar
in
g,
 it
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sh
al
l b
e 
he
ld
 in
 B
ru
ss
el
s 
if
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 is
 V
ie
t N
am
 a
nd
 in
 H
a 
N
oi
 if
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 is
 th
e 
E
U
 P
ar
ty
. 
4.
A
ny
 h
ea
ri
ng
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
op
en
 to
 th
e 
pu
bl
ic
 u
nl
es
s 
ot
he
rw
is
e 
pr
ov
id
ed
 f
or
 in
 A
nn
ex
 7
 (
R
ul
es
 o
f 
P
ro
ce
du
re
).
5.
In
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
it
h 
A
nn
ex
 7
 (
R
ul
es
 o
f 
P
ro
ce
du
re
),
 th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
sh
al
l b
e 
gi
ve
n 
th
e 
op
po
rt
un
ity
 to
 a
tt
en
d 
an
y 
of
 th
e 
pr
es
en
ta
ti
on
s,
st
at
em
en
ts
, a
rg
um
en
ts
 o
r 
re
bu
tt
al
s 
in
 th
e 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s.
 A
ny
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
or
 w
ri
tt
en
 s
ub
m
is
si
on
 s
ub
m
itt
ed
 to
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l b
y 
a
Pa
rt
y,
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
an
y 
co
m
m
en
ts
 o
n 
th
e 
de
sc
ri
pt
iv
e 
pa
rt
 o
f 
th
e 
in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t, 
re
sp
on
se
s 
to
 q
ue
st
io
ns
 b
y 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l a
nd
co
m
m
en
ts
 b
y 
a 
P
ar
ty
 o
n 
th
os
e 
re
sp
on
se
s,
 s
ha
ll 
be
 m
ad
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
to
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
P
ar
ty
.
6.
U
nl
es
s 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 a
gr
ee
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
w
ith
in
 th
re
e 
da
ys
 o
f 
th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l, 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l m
ay
re
ce
iv
e,
 in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
it
h 
A
nn
ex
 7
 (
R
ul
es
 o
f 
P
ro
ce
du
re
),
 u
ns
ol
ic
it
ed
 w
ri
tt
en
 s
ub
m
is
si
on
s 
(a
m
ic
us
 c
ur
ia
e 
su
bm
is
si
on
s)
 f
ro
m
 n
at
ur
al
or
 le
ga
l p
er
so
n 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
in
 th
e 
te
rr
it
or
y 
of
 a
 P
ar
ty
.
7.
Fo
r 
it
s 
in
te
rn
al
 d
el
ib
er
at
io
ns
, t
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
 m
ee
t i
n 
cl
os
ed
 s
es
si
on
 w
he
re
 o
nl
y 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
ta
ke
 p
ar
t. 
T
he
 a
rb
itr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l
m
ay
 a
ls
o 
pe
rm
it
 it
s 
as
si
st
an
ts
 to
 b
e 
pr
es
en
t a
t i
ts
 d
el
ib
er
at
io
ns
. T
he
 d
el
ib
er
at
io
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l a
nd
 th
e 
do
cu
m
en
ts
 s
ub
m
it
te
d
to
 it
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
ke
pt
 c
on
fi
de
nt
ia
l.
F
u
n
ct
io
n
s 
of
 
P
an
el
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te
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m
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an
el
 
R
ep
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A
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0 
In
te
ri
m
 R
ep
or
t 
1.
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
 is
su
e 
an
 in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t t
o 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
se
tt
in
g 
ou
t t
he
 f
in
di
ng
s 
of
 f
ac
t, 
th
e 
ap
pl
ic
ab
il
it
y 
of
 r
el
ev
an
t
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 a
nd
 th
e 
ba
si
c 
ra
tio
na
le
 f
or
 a
ny
 f
in
di
ng
s 
an
d 
re
co
m
m
en
da
ti
on
s,
 n
o 
la
te
r 
th
an
 9
0 
da
ys
 f
ro
m
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f 
th
e
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l. 
W
he
n 
it
 c
on
si
de
rs
 th
at
 th
is
 d
ea
dl
in
e 
ca
nn
ot
 b
e 
m
et
, t
he
 c
ha
ir
pe
rs
on
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll 
no
tif
y 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
an
d 
th
e 
C
om
m
it
te
e 
in
 w
ri
ti
ng
, s
ta
ti
ng
 th
e 
re
as
on
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
de
la
y 
an
d 
th
e 
da
te
 o
n 
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l p
la
ns
 to
 is
su
e 
its
 in
te
ri
m
re
po
rt
. T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
, u
nd
er
 n
o 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s,
 is
su
e 
th
e 
in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t l
at
er
 th
an
 1
20
 d
ay
s 
af
te
r 
th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t
of
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l.
2.
A
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 s
ub
m
it
 a
 w
ri
tt
en
 r
eq
ue
st
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
 c
om
m
en
ts
, t
o 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l t
o 
re
vi
ew
 p
re
ci
se
 a
sp
ec
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t
w
it
hi
n 
14
 d
ay
s 
of
 it
s 
no
tif
ic
at
io
n.
3.
In
 c
as
es
 o
f 
ur
ge
nc
y,
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
th
os
e 
in
vo
lv
in
g 
pe
ri
sh
ab
le
 g
oo
ds
 o
r 
se
as
on
al
 g
oo
ds
 o
r 
se
rv
ic
es
, t
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
 m
ak
e
ev
er
y 
ef
fo
rt
 to
 is
su
e 
it
s 
in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t w
it
hi
n 
45
 d
ay
s 
an
d,
 in
 a
ny
 c
as
e,
 n
o 
la
te
r 
th
an
 6
0 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f 
th
e
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l. 
A
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 s
ub
m
it
 a
 w
ri
tt
en
 r
eq
ue
st
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
 c
om
m
en
ts
, t
o 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l t
o 
re
vi
ew
 p
re
ci
se
 a
sp
ec
ts
 o
f 
th
e
in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t, 
w
it
hi
n 
se
ve
n 
da
ys
 o
f 
th
e 
no
tif
ic
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t.
4.
A
ft
er
 c
on
si
de
ri
ng
 a
ny
 w
ri
tt
en
 r
eq
ue
st
s,
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
co
m
m
en
ts
, b
y 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
on
 th
e 
in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t, 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l m
ay
 m
od
if
y
its
 r
ep
or
t a
nd
 m
ak
e 
an
y 
fu
rt
he
r 
ex
am
in
at
io
n 
th
at
 it
 c
on
si
de
rs
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
.
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1 
Fi
na
l R
ep
or
t 
1.
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
 is
su
e 
its
 f
in
al
 r
ep
or
t t
o 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 a
nd
 to
 th
e 
C
om
m
it
te
e 
w
it
hi
n 
12
0 
da
ys
 o
f 
th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l. 
W
he
n 
it 
co
ns
id
er
s 
th
at
 th
is
 d
ea
dl
in
e 
ca
nn
ot
 b
e 
m
et
, t
he
 c
ha
ir
pe
rs
on
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll
 n
ot
if
y 
th
e
Pa
rt
ie
s 
an
d 
th
e 
C
om
m
itt
ee
 in
 w
ri
ti
ng
, s
ta
tin
g 
th
e 
re
as
on
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
de
la
y 
an
d 
th
e 
da
te
 o
n 
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l p
la
ns
 to
 is
su
e 
it
s
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t. 
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
 u
nd
er
 n
o 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s 
is
su
e 
th
e 
fi
na
l r
e p
or
t l
at
er
 th
an
 1
50
 d
ay
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t
of
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l.
2.
In
 c
as
es
 o
f 
ur
ge
nc
y,
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
th
os
e 
in
vo
lv
in
g 
pe
ri
sh
ab
le
 g
oo
ds
 o
r 
se
as
on
al
 g
oo
ds
 o
r 
se
rv
ic
es
, t
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
 m
ak
e
ev
er
y 
ef
fo
rt
 to
 n
ot
if
y 
it
s 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t w
it
hi
n 
60
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
it
s 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t. 
T
he
 a
rb
itr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll
 u
nd
er
 n
o 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s
is
su
e 
th
e 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t l
at
er
 th
an
 7
5 
da
ys
 f
ro
m
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l.
3.
T
he
 f
in
al
 r
ep
or
t s
ha
ll
 in
cl
ud
e 
a 
su
ff
ic
ie
nt
 d
is
cu
ss
io
n 
of
 th
e 
ar
gu
m
en
ts
 m
ad
e 
at
 th
e 
in
te
ri
m
 r
ev
ie
w
 s
ta
ge
, a
nd
 s
ha
ll 
cl
ea
rl
y 
ad
dr
es
s 
th
e
co
m
m
en
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
.
C
om
p
li
an
ce
 w
it
h
 
th
e 
F
in
al
 R
ep
or
t 
A
rt
. 3
.1
2 
C
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
it
h 
th
e 
Fi
na
l R
ep
or
t 
T
he
 P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t s
ha
ll
 ta
ke
 a
ny
 m
ea
su
re
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 to
 c
om
pl
y 
pr
om
pt
ly
 a
nd
 in
 g
oo
d 
fa
it
h 
w
it
h 
th
e 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t. 
R
ea
so
n
ab
le
 
P
er
io
d
 f
or
 
C
om
p
li
an
ce
 
A
rt
. 3
.1
3 
R
ea
so
na
bl
e 
Pe
ri
od
 o
f 
T
im
e 
fo
r 
C
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
1.
If
 im
m
ed
ia
te
 c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
is
 n
ot
 p
os
si
bl
e,
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 s
ha
ll
 e
nd
ea
vo
ur
 to
 m
ut
ua
lly
 a
gr
ee
 o
n 
th
e 
pe
ri
od
 o
f 
ti
m
e 
to
 c
om
pl
y 
w
ith
 th
e
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t. 
In
 s
uc
h 
a 
ca
se
, t
he
 P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t s
ha
ll
, n
o 
la
te
r 
th
an
 3
0 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t, 
no
ti
fy
 th
e
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 th
e 
C
om
m
itt
ee
 o
f 
th
e 
tim
e 
it
 w
il
l r
eq
ui
re
 f
or
 c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
(h
er
ei
na
ft
er
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 a
s 
th
e 
"r
ea
so
na
bl
e 
pe
ri
od
 o
f
tim
e"
).
2.
If
 th
er
e 
is
 d
is
ag
re
em
en
t b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 o
n 
th
e 
re
as
on
ab
le
 p
er
io
d 
of
 ti
m
e 
to
 c
om
pl
y 
w
ith
 th
e 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t, 
th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
sh
al
l, 
w
it
hi
n 
20
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
no
ti
fi
ca
ti
on
 m
ad
e 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
it
h 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
1 
by
 th
e 
P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t, 
re
qu
es
t,
in
 w
ri
ti
ng
, t
he
 a
rb
itr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l e
st
ab
li
sh
ed
 p
ur
su
an
t t
o 
A
rt
ic
le
 3
.7
 (
E
st
ab
li
sh
m
en
t o
f 
th
e 
A
rb
itr
at
io
n 
Pa
ne
l)
 (
he
re
in
af
te
r 
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 a
s
th
e 
"o
ri
gi
na
l a
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
pa
ne
l"
) 
to
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
th
e 
le
ng
th
 o
f 
th
e 
re
as
on
ab
le
 p
er
io
d 
of
 ti
m
e.
 T
ha
t r
eq
ue
st
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
no
ti
fi
ed
 to
 th
e 
P
ar
ty
co
m
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t a
nd
 c
op
ie
d 
to
 th
e 
C
om
m
itt
ee
.
3.
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
 n
ot
if
y 
it
s 
ru
li
ng
 o
n 
th
e 
re
as
on
ab
le
 p
er
io
d 
of
 ti
m
e 
to
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 a
nd
 to
 th
e 
C
om
m
it
te
e 
w
it
hi
n 
20
 d
ay
s 
of
th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
th
e 
su
bm
is
si
on
 o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
.
4.
T
he
 P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t s
ha
ll 
in
fo
rm
, i
n 
w
ri
ti
ng
, t
he
 c
om
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 o
f 
it
s 
pr
og
re
ss
 to
 c
om
pl
y 
w
it
h 
th
e 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t a
t l
ea
st
30
 d
ay
s 
be
fo
re
 th
e 
ex
pi
ry
 o
f 
th
e 
re
as
on
ab
le
 p
er
io
d 
of
 ti
m
e.
5.
T
he
 P
ar
ti
es
 m
ay
 a
gr
ee
 to
 e
xt
en
d 
th
e 
re
as
on
ab
le
 p
er
io
d 
of
 ti
m
e.
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5 
T
em
po
ra
ry
 R
em
ed
ie
s 
in
 C
as
e 
of
 N
on
-C
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
1.
If
 th
e 
P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t f
ai
ls
 to
 n
ot
if
y 
th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 th
e 
C
om
m
itt
ee
 o
f 
an
y 
m
ea
su
re
 ta
ke
n 
to
 c
om
pl
y 
w
it
h 
th
e
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t b
ef
or
e 
th
e 
ex
pi
ry
 o
f 
th
e 
re
as
on
ab
le
 p
er
io
d 
of
 ti
m
e,
 o
r 
if
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l r
ul
es
 th
at
 n
o 
m
ea
su
re
 to
 c
om
pl
y 
w
it
h 
ha
s 
be
en
ta
ke
n 
or
 th
at
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
 n
ot
if
ie
d 
un
de
r 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
1 
of
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.1
4 
(R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
M
ea
su
re
 T
ak
en
 to
 C
om
pl
y 
w
ith
 th
e 
Fi
na
l R
ep
or
t)
 is
in
co
ns
is
te
nt
 w
it
h 
th
at
 P
ar
ty
's
 o
bl
ig
at
io
ns
 u
nd
er
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
 (
Sc
op
e)
, t
he
 P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t s
ha
ll
, i
f
so
 r
eq
ue
st
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 a
ft
er
 c
on
su
lta
tio
ns
 w
it
h 
th
at
 P
ar
ty
, p
re
se
nt
 a
n 
of
fe
r 
fo
r 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n.
2.
If
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 d
ec
id
es
 n
ot
 to
 r
eq
ue
st
 a
n 
of
fe
r 
fo
r 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
or
, i
n 
ca
se
 s
uc
h 
re
qu
es
t i
s 
m
ad
e,
 if
 n
o 
ag
re
em
en
t o
n
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
is
 r
ea
ch
ed
 w
it
hi
n 
30
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
en
d 
of
 th
e 
re
as
on
ab
le
 p
er
io
d 
of
 ti
m
e 
or
 o
f 
th
e 
is
su
an
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l r
ul
in
g
un
de
r 
A
rt
ic
le
 3
.1
4 
(R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
M
ea
su
re
 T
ak
en
 to
 C
om
pl
y 
w
it
h 
th
e 
Fi
na
l R
ep
or
t)
 th
at
 n
o 
m
ea
su
re
 to
 c
om
pl
y 
w
it
h 
ha
s 
be
en
 ta
ke
n 
or
th
at
 a
 m
ea
su
re
 ta
ke
n 
is
 in
co
ns
is
te
nt
 w
it
h 
th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
 (
S
co
pe
),
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
be
 e
nt
it
le
d,
 u
po
n
no
tif
ic
at
io
n 
to
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
Pa
rt
y 
an
d 
to
 th
e 
C
om
m
it
te
e,
 to
 ta
ke
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
 m
ea
su
re
s 
w
it
hi
n 
th
e 
fr
am
ew
or
k 
of
 th
e 
pr
ef
er
en
ti
al
 tr
ad
e 
an
d
in
ve
st
m
en
t c
om
m
it
m
en
ts
 a
pp
li
ca
bl
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 w
hi
ch
 h
av
e 
an
 e
ff
ec
t e
qu
iv
al
en
t t
o 
th
e 
nu
ll
if
ic
at
io
n 
or
 im
pa
ir
m
en
t c
au
se
d 
by
th
e 
vi
ol
at
io
n.
 T
he
 n
ot
if
ic
at
io
n 
sh
al
l s
pe
ci
fy
 s
uc
h 
m
ea
su
re
s.
 T
he
 c
om
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 im
pl
em
en
t t
he
 m
ea
su
re
s 
at
 a
ny
 m
om
en
t a
ft
er
th
e 
ex
pi
ry
 o
f 
10
 d
ay
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
no
ti
fi
ca
ti
on
 b
y 
th
e 
P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t, 
un
le
ss
 th
e 
P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t
ha
s 
re
qu
es
te
d 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
un
de
r 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
3 
of
 th
is
 A
rt
ic
le
.
3.
If
 th
e 
P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t c
on
si
de
rs
 th
at
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f 
th
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
ta
ke
n 
by
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 is
 n
ot
 e
qu
iv
al
en
t t
o 
th
e
nu
lli
fi
ca
tio
n 
or
 im
pa
ir
m
en
t c
au
se
d 
by
 th
e 
vi
ol
at
io
n,
 it
 m
ay
 r
eq
ue
st
, i
n 
w
ri
ti
ng
, t
he
 o
ri
gi
na
l a
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
pa
ne
l t
o 
ru
le
 o
n 
th
e 
m
at
te
r.
 T
ha
t
re
qu
es
t s
ha
ll
 b
e 
no
ti
fi
ed
 to
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 c
op
ie
d 
to
 th
e 
C
om
m
it
te
e 
be
fo
re
 th
e 
ex
pi
ry
 o
f 
th
e 
pe
ri
od
 o
f 
10
 d
ay
s 
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 in
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
2.
 T
he
 o
ri
gi
na
l a
rb
itr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll
 n
ot
if
y 
it
s 
ru
li
ng
 o
n 
th
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
ta
ke
n 
by
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 to
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 a
nd
 to
th
e 
C
om
m
itt
ee
 w
it
hi
n 
30
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
th
e 
su
bm
is
si
on
 o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t. 
O
bl
ig
at
io
ns
 s
ha
ll
 n
ot
 b
e 
su
sp
en
de
d 
un
ti
l t
he
 o
ri
gi
na
l
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l h
as
 n
ot
if
ie
d 
it
s 
ru
li
ng
, a
nd
 a
ny
 s
us
pe
ns
io
n 
sh
al
l b
e 
co
ns
is
te
nt
 w
ith
 th
at
 r
ul
in
g.
4.
T
he
 m
ea
su
re
s 
se
t o
ut
 in
 th
is
 A
rt
ic
le
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
te
m
po
ra
ry
 a
nd
 s
ha
ll
 n
ot
 b
e 
ap
pl
ie
d 
af
te
r:
(a
)
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
ha
ve
 r
ea
ch
ed
 a
 m
ut
ua
lly
 a
gr
ee
d 
so
lu
ti
on
 p
ur
su
an
t t
o 
A
rt
ic
le
 3
.1
9 
(M
ut
ua
ll
y 
A
gr
ee
d 
S
ol
ut
io
n)
;
(b
)
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 h
av
e 
ag
re
ed
 th
at
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
 n
ot
if
ie
d 
un
de
r 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
1 
of
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.1
4 
(R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
M
ea
su
re
 T
ak
en
 to
 C
om
pl
y 
w
it
h 
th
e
Fi
na
l R
ep
or
t)
 b
ri
ng
s 
th
e 
Pa
rt
y 
co
m
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t i
nt
o 
co
nf
or
m
it
y 
w
it
h 
th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
 (
S
co
pe
);
 o
r
(c
)
an
y 
m
ea
su
re
 f
ou
nd
 to
 b
e 
in
co
ns
is
te
nt
 w
ith
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
 (
S
co
pe
) 
ha
s 
ee
n 
w
it
hd
ra
w
n 
or
 a
m
en
de
d 
so
 a
s 
to
br
in
g 
it 
in
to
 c
on
fo
rm
it
y 
w
it
h 
th
os
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
, a
s 
ru
le
d 
un
de
r 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
3 
of
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.1
4 
(R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
M
ea
su
re
 T
ak
en
 to
 C
om
pl
y 
w
it
h
th
e 
Fi
na
l R
ep
or
t)
177
  
R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
M
ea
su
re
 T
ak
en
 
to
 C
om
p
ly
 A
ft
er
 
th
e 
A
d
op
ti
on
 o
f 
T
em
p
or
ar
y 
R
em
ed
ie
s 
fo
r 
N
on
-C
om
pl
ia
n
ce
 
A
rt
. 3
.1
6 
R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
M
ea
su
re
 T
ak
en
 to
 C
om
pl
y 
A
ft
er
 th
e 
A
do
pt
io
n 
of
 T
em
po
ra
ry
 R
em
ed
ie
s 
fo
r 
N
on
-C
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
1.
T
he
 P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t s
ha
ll 
no
ti
fy
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 th
e 
C
om
m
it
te
e 
of
 a
ny
 m
ea
su
re
 it
 h
as
 ta
ke
n 
to
 c
om
pl
y 
w
it
h 
th
e
re
po
rt
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l f
ol
lo
w
in
g 
th
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
ap
pl
ie
d 
by
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 o
r 
fo
ll
ow
in
g 
th
e 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 c
om
pe
ns
at
io
n,
as
 th
e 
ca
se
 m
ay
 b
e.
 W
it
h 
th
e 
ex
ce
pt
io
n 
of
 c
as
es
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
, t
he
 c
om
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 te
rm
in
at
e 
th
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
ta
ke
n 
in
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
it
h 
A
rt
ic
le
 3
.1
5 
(T
em
po
ra
ry
 R
em
ed
ie
s 
in
 C
as
e 
of
 N
on
-c
om
pl
ia
nc
e)
 w
it
hi
n 
30
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
th
e 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e
no
tif
ic
at
io
n.
 I
n 
th
e 
ev
en
t t
ha
t c
om
pe
ns
at
io
n 
ha
s 
be
en
 a
pp
li
ed
, a
nd
 w
it
h 
th
e 
ex
ce
pt
io
n 
of
 c
as
es
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
, t
he
 P
ar
ty
co
m
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t m
ay
 te
rm
in
at
e 
th
e 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 s
uc
h 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
w
ith
in
 3
0 
da
ys
 o
f 
it
s 
no
ti
fi
ca
ti
on
 th
at
 it
 h
as
 c
om
pl
ie
d 
w
it
h 
th
e
re
po
rt
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l.
2.
If
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 d
o 
no
t a
gr
ee
 o
n 
w
he
th
er
 th
e 
no
ti
fi
ed
 m
ea
su
re
 b
ri
ng
s 
th
e 
P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t i
nt
o 
co
nf
or
m
it
y 
w
it
h 
th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
 (
Sc
op
e)
, w
it
hi
n 
30
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
no
tif
ic
at
io
n,
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
re
qu
es
t, 
in
w
ri
ti
ng
, t
he
 o
ri
gi
na
l a
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
pa
ne
l t
o 
ru
le
 o
n 
th
e 
m
at
te
r.
 T
ha
t r
eq
ue
st
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
no
ti
fi
ed
 to
 th
e 
P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t, 
co
pi
ed
 to
 th
e
C
om
m
it
te
e.
3.
T
he
 r
ul
in
g 
of
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll
 b
e 
no
ti
fi
ed
 to
 th
e 
P
ar
tie
s 
an
d 
to
 th
e 
C
om
m
it
te
e 
w
it
hi
n 
45
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
th
e 
su
bm
is
si
on
of
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t. 
If
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l r
ul
es
 th
at
 th
e 
no
ti
fi
ed
 m
ea
su
re
 is
 in
 c
on
fo
rm
it
y 
w
it
h 
th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
(S
co
pe
),
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.1
5 
(T
em
po
ra
ry
 R
em
ed
ie
s 
in
 C
as
e 
of
 N
on
-c
om
pl
ia
nc
e)
 o
r 
th
e 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n,
 a
s 
th
e 
ca
se
m
ay
 b
e,
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
te
rm
in
at
ed
. W
he
re
 r
el
ev
an
t, 
th
e 
le
ve
l o
f 
su
sp
en
si
on
 o
f 
ob
li
ga
ti
on
s 
or
 o
f 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
sh
al
l b
e 
ad
ap
te
d 
in
 li
gh
t o
f 
th
e
ru
lin
g 
of
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l.
R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
M
ea
su
re
s 
T
ak
en
 
to
 C
om
p
ly
 w
it
h
 
th
e 
F
in
al
 R
ep
or
t 
A
rt
. 3
.1
4 
R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
M
ea
su
re
 T
ak
en
 to
 C
om
pl
y 
w
it
h 
th
e 
Fi
na
l R
ep
or
t 
1.
T
he
 P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t s
ha
ll 
no
ti
fy
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 th
e 
C
om
m
it
te
e 
be
fo
re
 th
e 
en
d 
of
 th
e 
re
as
on
ab
le
 p
er
io
d 
of
 ti
m
e
of
 a
ny
 m
ea
su
re
 th
at
 it
 h
as
 ta
ke
n 
to
 c
om
pl
y 
w
it
h 
th
e 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t.
2.
If
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 d
is
ag
re
e 
on
 th
e 
ex
is
te
nc
e 
or
 th
e 
co
ns
is
te
nc
y 
of
 a
ny
 m
ea
su
re
 ta
ke
n 
to
 c
om
pl
y 
w
it
h 
th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
3.
2 
(S
co
pe
) 
an
d 
no
ti
fi
ed
 u
nd
er
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 1
, t
he
 c
om
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 r
eq
ue
st
, i
n 
w
ri
ti
ng
, t
he
 o
ri
gi
na
l a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 to
 r
ul
e 
on
 th
e
m
at
te
r.
 T
he
 r
eq
ue
st
 s
ha
ll 
be
 n
ot
if
ie
d 
to
 th
e 
Pa
rt
y 
co
m
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t a
nd
 c
op
ie
d 
to
 th
e 
C
om
m
it
te
e.
 T
he
 c
om
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
id
en
ti
fy
 in
 it
s 
re
qu
es
t t
he
 s
pe
ci
fi
c 
m
ea
su
re
 a
t i
ss
ue
, a
nd
 e
xp
la
in
 h
ow
 s
uc
h 
m
ea
su
re
 is
 in
co
ns
is
te
nt
 w
it
h 
th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
 (
Sc
op
e)
 in
 a
 m
an
ne
r 
su
ff
ic
ie
nt
 to
 c
le
ar
ly
 p
re
se
nt
 th
e 
le
ga
l b
as
is
 f
or
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
nt
.
3.
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
 n
ot
if
y 
it
s 
ru
li
ng
 to
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 a
nd
 to
 th
e 
C
om
m
it
te
e 
w
it
hi
n 
45
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
th
e 
su
bm
is
si
on
 o
f 
th
e
re
qu
es
t r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
.
R
u
le
 o
f 
In
te
rp
re
ta
ti
on
 
A
rt
. 3
.2
1 
R
ul
es
 o
f 
In
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
 in
te
rp
re
t t
he
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
 (
S
co
pe
) 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 c
us
to
m
ar
y 
ru
le
s 
of
 
178
in
te
rp
re
ta
ti
on
 o
f 
pu
bl
ic
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l l
aw
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
 th
os
e 
co
di
fi
ed
 in
 th
e 
V
ie
nn
a 
C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
on
 th
e 
L
aw
 o
f 
T
re
at
ie
s,
 d
on
e 
at
 V
ie
nn
a 
on
 2
3 
M
ay
 1
96
9 
(h
er
ei
na
ft
er
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 a
s 
th
e 
"V
ie
nn
a 
C
on
ve
nt
io
n"
).
 T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
 a
ls
o 
ta
ke
 in
to
 a
cc
ou
nt
 r
el
ev
an
t 
in
te
rp
re
ta
ti
on
s 
in
 r
ep
or
ts
 o
f 
pa
ne
ls
 a
nd
 o
f 
th
e 
A
pp
el
la
te
 B
od
y 
ad
op
te
d 
by
 th
e 
D
is
pu
te
 S
et
tl
em
en
t B
od
y 
un
de
r 
A
nn
ex
 2
 o
f 
th
e 
W
T
O
 
A
gr
ee
m
en
t (
he
re
in
af
te
r 
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 a
s 
"D
S
B
")
. T
he
 r
ep
or
ts
 a
nd
 r
ul
in
gs
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l c
an
no
t a
dd
 to
 o
r 
di
m
in
is
h 
th
e 
ri
gh
ts
 a
nd
 
ob
lig
at
io
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
fo
r 
in
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t. 
R
u
li
n
gs
 o
f 
th
e 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 P
an
el
 
A
rt
. 3
.2
2 
D
ec
is
io
ns
 a
nd
 R
ul
in
gs
 o
f 
th
e 
A
rb
itr
at
io
n 
P
an
el
 
1.
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
 m
ak
e 
ev
er
y 
ef
fo
rt
 to
 ta
ke
 a
ny
 d
ec
is
io
n 
by
 c
on
se
ns
us
. I
n 
th
e 
ev
en
t t
ha
t a
 d
ec
is
io
n 
ca
nn
ot
 b
e 
re
ac
he
d 
by
co
ns
en
su
s,
 th
e 
m
at
te
r 
at
 is
su
e 
sh
al
l b
e 
de
ci
de
d 
by
 m
aj
or
ity
 v
ot
e.
 D
is
se
nt
in
g 
op
in
io
ns
 o
f 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l i
n 
no
 c
as
e 
be
 d
is
cl
os
ed
.
2.
T
he
 r
ep
or
ts
 a
nd
 r
ul
in
gs
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll
 b
e 
ac
ce
pt
ed
 u
nc
on
di
ti
on
al
ly
 b
y 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
. T
he
y 
sh
al
l n
ot
 c
re
at
e 
an
y 
ri
gh
ts
 o
r
ob
lig
at
io
ns
 w
it
h 
re
sp
ec
t t
o 
na
tu
ra
l o
r 
le
ga
l p
er
so
ns
. T
he
 r
ep
or
ts
 a
nd
 r
ul
in
gs
 s
ha
ll
 s
et
 o
ut
 th
e 
fi
nd
in
gs
 o
f 
fa
ct
, t
he
 a
pp
li
ca
bi
li
ty
 o
f 
th
e
re
le
va
nt
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
 (
S
co
pe
) 
an
d 
th
e 
ba
si
c 
ra
tio
na
le
 b
eh
in
d 
an
y 
fi
nd
in
gs
 a
nd
 c
on
cl
us
io
ns
. T
he
 C
om
m
it
te
e
sh
al
l m
ak
e 
th
e 
re
po
rt
s 
an
d 
ru
li
ng
s 
of
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l p
ub
lic
ly
 a
va
il
ab
le
 in
 th
ei
r 
en
ti
re
ty
 w
ith
in
 1
0 
da
ys
 o
f 
th
ei
r 
is
su
an
ce
, u
nl
es
s 
it
de
ci
de
s 
no
t t
o 
do
 s
o 
in
 o
rd
er
 to
 p
ro
te
ct
 c
on
fi
de
nt
ia
l i
nf
or
m
at
io
n.
R
ep
la
ce
m
en
t 
of
 
A
rb
it
ra
to
rs
 
A
rt
. 3
.1
7 
R
ep
la
ce
m
en
t o
f 
A
rb
it
ra
to
rs
 
If
 d
ur
in
g 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s 
th
e 
or
ig
in
al
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
, o
r 
so
m
e 
of
 it
s 
m
em
be
rs
, a
re
 u
na
bl
e 
to
 p
ar
ti
ci
pa
te
, w
it
hd
ra
w
, o
r 
ne
ed
 to
 
be
 r
ep
la
ce
d 
be
ca
us
e 
th
e 
m
em
be
r 
do
es
 n
ot
 c
om
pl
y 
w
it
h 
th
e 
re
qu
ir
em
en
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
C
od
e 
of
 C
on
du
ct
 in
 A
nn
ex
 8
 (
C
od
e 
of
 C
on
du
ct
 f
or
 
A
rb
it
ra
to
rs
 a
nd
 M
ed
ia
to
rs
),
 th
e 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e 
se
t o
ut
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.7
 (
E
st
ab
li
sh
m
en
t o
f 
th
e 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 P
an
el
) 
ap
pl
ie
s.
 T
he
 ti
m
e 
lim
it 
fo
r 
th
e 
no
tif
ic
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
re
po
rt
s 
an
d 
ru
li
ng
s,
 a
s 
th
e 
ca
se
 m
ay
 b
e,
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
ex
te
nd
ed
 b
y 
20
 d
ay
s.
 
Su
sp
en
si
on
 a
nd
 
T
er
m
in
at
io
n
 o
f 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 
P
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
 
A
rt
. 3
.1
8 
Su
sp
en
si
on
 a
nd
 T
er
m
in
at
io
n 
of
 A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 P
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
 
1.
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
, a
t t
he
 r
eq
ue
st
 o
f 
bo
th
 P
ar
ti
es
, s
us
pe
nd
 it
s 
w
or
k 
at
 a
ny
 ti
m
e 
fo
r 
a 
pe
ri
od
 a
gr
ee
d 
by
 th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
no
t
ex
ce
ed
in
g 
12
 c
on
se
cu
ti
ve
 m
on
th
s.
 I
t s
ha
ll 
re
su
m
e 
it
s 
w
or
k 
be
fo
re
 th
e 
en
d 
of
 th
at
 s
us
pe
ns
io
n 
pe
ri
od
 a
t t
he
 w
ri
tt
en
 r
eq
ue
st
 o
f 
bo
th
Pa
rt
ie
s.
 T
he
 P
ar
tie
s 
sh
al
l i
nf
or
m
 th
e 
C
om
m
it
te
e,
 a
cc
or
di
ng
ly
. T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 m
ay
 a
ls
o 
re
su
m
e 
its
 w
or
k 
at
 th
e 
en
d 
of
 th
e
su
sp
en
si
on
 p
er
io
d 
at
 th
e 
w
ri
tt
en
 r
eq
ue
st
 o
f 
ei
th
er
 P
ar
ty
. T
he
 r
eq
ue
st
in
g 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 in
fo
rm
 th
e 
C
om
m
it
te
e 
an
d 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
Pa
rt
y,
ac
co
rd
in
gl
y.
 I
f 
a 
Pa
rt
y 
do
es
 n
ot
 r
eq
ue
st
 th
e 
re
su
m
pt
io
n 
of
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l's
 w
or
k 
at
 th
e 
ex
pi
ry
 o
f 
th
e 
su
sp
en
si
on
 p
er
io
d,
 th
e
au
th
or
it
y 
of
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll
 la
ps
e 
an
d 
th
e 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s 
sh
al
l b
e 
te
rm
in
at
ed
. I
n 
th
e 
ev
en
t o
f 
a 
su
sp
en
si
on
 o
f 
th
e 
w
or
k 
of
 th
e
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l, 
th
e 
ti
m
e 
fr
am
es
 s
et
 o
ut
 in
 th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
of
 th
is
 C
ha
pt
er
 s
ha
ll 
be
 e
xt
en
de
d 
by
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
pe
ri
od
 o
f 
ti
m
e 
fo
r
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
w
or
k 
w
as
 s
us
pe
nd
ed
. T
he
 s
us
pe
ns
io
n 
an
d 
te
rm
in
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l's
 w
or
k 
ar
e 
w
it
ho
ut
 p
re
ju
di
ce
 to
 th
e 
ri
gh
ts
 o
f
ei
th
er
 P
ar
ty
 in
 o
th
er
 p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
.2
4 
(C
ho
ic
e 
of
 F
or
um
).
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2.
T
he
 P
ar
ti
es
 m
ay
 a
gr
ee
 to
 te
rm
in
at
e 
th
e 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s 
of
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l b
y 
jo
in
tl
y 
no
ti
fy
in
g 
th
e 
ch
ai
rp
er
so
n 
of
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n
pa
ne
l a
nd
 th
e 
C
om
m
it
te
e 
at
 a
ny
 ti
m
e 
be
fo
re
 th
e 
is
su
an
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l.
M
u
tu
al
ly
 A
gr
ee
d
 
So
lu
ti
on
s 
A
rt
. 3
.1
9 
M
ut
ua
ll
y 
A
gr
ee
d 
S
ol
ut
io
n 
T
he
 P
ar
ti
es
 m
ay
 r
ea
ch
 a
 m
ut
ua
lly
 a
gr
ee
d 
so
lu
ti
on
 to
 a
 d
is
pu
te
 u
nd
er
 th
is
 C
ha
pt
er
 a
t a
ny
 ti
m
e.
 T
he
y 
sh
al
l j
oi
nt
ly
 n
ot
if
y 
th
e 
C
om
m
it
te
e 
an
d 
th
e 
ch
ai
rp
er
so
n 
of
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l, 
w
he
re
 a
pp
lic
ab
le
, o
f 
an
y 
su
ch
 s
ol
ut
io
n.
 I
f 
th
e 
so
lu
tio
n 
re
qu
ir
es
 a
pp
ro
va
l p
ur
su
an
t t
o 
th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 d
om
es
ti
c 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 o
f 
ei
th
er
 P
ar
ty
, t
he
 n
ot
if
ic
at
io
n 
sh
al
l r
ef
er
 to
 th
is
 r
eq
ui
re
m
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
se
tt
le
m
en
t p
ro
ce
du
re
 s
ha
ll 
be
 s
us
pe
nd
ed
. I
f 
su
ch
 a
pp
ro
va
l i
s 
no
t r
eq
ui
re
d,
 o
r 
if
 th
e 
co
m
pl
et
io
n 
of
 a
ny
 s
uc
h 
do
m
es
ti
c 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 is
 n
ot
if
ie
d,
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
se
tt
le
m
en
t 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e 
sh
al
l b
e 
te
rm
in
at
ed
. 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
an
d 
T
ec
h
n
ic
al
 A
d
vi
ce
 
A
rt
. 3
.2
0 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
an
d 
T
ec
hn
ic
al
 A
dv
ic
e 
A
t t
he
 r
eq
ue
st
 o
f 
a 
P
ar
ty
, o
r 
up
on
 it
s 
ow
n 
in
iti
at
iv
e,
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l m
ay
 r
eq
ue
st
 a
ny
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
it
 d
ee
m
s 
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s 
of
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l f
ro
m
 a
ny
 s
ou
rc
e,
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e.
 T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 a
ls
o 
ha
s 
th
e 
ri
gh
t t
o 
se
ek
 th
e 
op
in
io
n 
of
 e
xp
er
ts
, a
s 
it
 d
ee
m
s 
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e.
 T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
 c
on
su
lt
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 b
ef
or
e 
ch
oo
si
ng
 s
uc
h 
ex
pe
rt
s.
 A
ny
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ob
ta
in
ed
 u
nd
er
 th
is
 A
rt
ic
le
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
an
d 
su
bm
it
te
d 
to
 th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
fo
r 
th
ei
r 
co
m
m
en
ts
 w
it
hi
n 
th
e 
ti
m
e 
fr
am
e 
se
t b
y 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
l. 
T
im
e 
L
im
it
s 
A
rt
. 3
.2
5 
T
im
e 
L
im
its
 
1.
A
ll
 ti
m
e 
li
m
it
s 
la
id
 d
ow
n 
in
 th
is
 S
ec
ti
on
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
 th
e 
lim
its
 f
or
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pa
ne
ls
 to
 n
ot
if
y 
th
ei
r 
re
po
rt
s 
an
d 
ru
li
ng
s,
 s
ha
ll
 b
e
co
un
te
d 
in
 c
al
en
da
r 
da
ys
 f
ro
m
 th
e 
da
y 
fo
ll
ow
in
g 
th
e 
ac
t o
r 
fa
ct
 to
 w
hi
ch
 th
ey
 r
ef
er
, u
nl
es
s 
ot
he
rw
is
e 
sp
ec
if
ie
d.
2.
A
ny
 ti
m
e 
li
m
it
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 th
is
 S
ec
ti
on
 m
ay
 b
e 
m
od
if
ie
d 
by
 m
ut
ua
l a
gr
ee
m
en
t o
f 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e.
 T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
an
el
m
ay
 a
t a
ny
 ti
m
e 
pr
op
os
e 
to
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 to
 m
od
if
y 
an
y 
ti
m
e 
li
m
it
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 th
is
 S
ec
tio
n,
 s
ta
tin
g 
th
e 
re
as
on
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
pr
op
os
al
.
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E
U
-J
ap
an
 E
co
no
m
ic
 P
ar
tn
er
sh
ip
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t 
O
b
je
ct
iv
e 
A
rt
. 2
1.
1 
O
bj
ec
ti
ve
 
T
he
 o
bj
ec
ti
ve
 o
f 
th
is
 C
ha
pt
er
 is
 to
 e
st
ab
li
sh
 a
n 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
an
d 
ef
fi
ci
en
t m
ec
ha
ni
sm
 f
or
 s
et
tli
ng
 d
is
pu
te
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 
th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
ti
on
 a
nd
 a
pp
li
ca
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t w
ith
 a
 v
ie
w
 to
 r
ea
ch
in
g 
a 
m
ut
ua
ll
y 
ag
re
ed
 s
ol
ut
io
n.
 
Sc
op
e 
A
rt
. 2
1.
2 
Sc
op
e 
U
nl
es
s 
ot
he
rw
is
e 
pr
ov
id
ed
 f
or
 in
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
th
is
 C
ha
pt
er
 a
pp
li
es
 w
it
h 
re
sp
ec
t t
o 
th
e 
se
tt
le
m
en
t o
f 
an
y 
di
sp
ut
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
t h
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
ti
on
 a
nd
 a
pp
li
ca
ti
on
 o
f 
th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t. 
C
h
oi
ce
 o
f 
F
or
um
 
A
rt
. 2
1.
27
 C
ho
ic
e 
of
 f
or
um
 
1.
W
he
re
 a
 d
is
pu
te
 a
ri
se
s 
w
it
h 
re
ga
rd
 to
 th
e 
al
le
ge
d 
in
co
ns
is
te
nc
y 
of
 a
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 m
ea
su
re
 w
it
h 
an
 o
bl
ig
at
io
n 
un
de
r 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t a
nd
a 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
lly
 e
qu
iv
al
en
t o
bl
ig
at
io
n 
un
de
r 
an
y 
ot
he
r 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
gr
ee
m
en
t t
o 
w
hi
ch
 b
ot
h 
P
ar
ti
es
 a
re
 p
ar
ty
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
 th
e 
W
T
O
A
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 s
el
ec
t t
he
 f
or
um
 in
 w
hi
ch
 to
 s
et
tl
e 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e.
2.
O
nc
e 
a 
P
ar
ty
 h
as
 s
el
ec
te
d 
th
e 
fo
ru
m
 a
nd
 in
it
ia
te
d 
di
sp
ut
e 
se
ttl
em
en
t p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
 u
nd
er
 th
is
 C
ha
pt
er
 o
r 
un
de
r 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l
ag
re
em
en
t w
it
h 
re
sp
ec
t t
o 
th
e 
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
 m
ea
su
re
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 1
, t
ha
t P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
no
t i
ni
ti
at
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
se
tt
le
m
en
t p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
in
 a
no
th
er
 f
or
um
 w
ith
 r
es
pe
ct
 to
 th
at
 p
ar
ti
cu
la
r 
m
ea
su
re
 u
nl
es
s 
th
e 
fo
ru
m
 s
el
ec
te
d 
fi
rs
t f
ai
ls
 to
 m
ak
e 
fi
nd
in
gs
 o
n 
th
e 
is
su
es
 in
 d
is
pu
te
fo
r 
ju
ri
sd
ic
ti
on
al
 o
r 
pr
oc
ed
ur
al
 r
ea
so
ns
.
3.
Fo
r 
th
e 
pu
rp
os
e 
of
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
:
(a
)
di
sp
ut
e 
se
ttl
em
en
t p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
 u
nd
er
 th
is
 C
ha
pt
er
 a
re
 d
ee
m
ed
 to
 b
e 
in
it
ia
te
d 
w
he
n 
a 
P
ar
ty
 r
eq
ue
st
s 
th
e 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f 
a 
pa
ne
l i
n
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
it
h 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
1 
of
 A
rt
ic
le
 2
1.
7;
(b
)
di
sp
ut
e 
se
tt
le
m
en
t p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
 u
nd
er
 th
e 
W
T
O
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t a
re
 d
ee
m
ed
 to
 b
e 
in
it
ia
te
d 
w
he
n 
a 
P
ar
ty
 r
eq
ue
st
s 
th
e 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f 
a
pa
ne
l i
n 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
it
h 
A
rt
ic
le
 6
 o
f 
th
e 
D
S
U
; a
nd
(c
)
di
sp
ut
e 
se
ttl
em
en
t p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
 u
nd
er
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t a
re
 d
ee
m
ed
 to
 b
e 
in
iti
at
ed
 w
he
n 
a 
P
ar
ty
 r
eq
ue
st
s 
th
e 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f 
a
di
sp
ut
e 
se
tt
le
m
en
t p
an
el
 in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
it
h 
th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
of
 th
at
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t.
4.
N
ot
hi
ng
 in
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t s
ha
ll
 p
re
cl
ud
e 
a 
P
ar
ty
 f
ro
m
 im
pl
em
en
tin
g 
th
e 
su
sp
en
si
on
 o
f 
co
nc
es
si
on
s 
or
 o
th
er
 o
bl
ig
at
io
ns
 a
ut
ho
ri
se
d
by
 th
e 
D
S
B
. A
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
no
t i
nv
ok
e 
th
e 
W
T
O
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t t
o 
pr
ec
lu
de
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
Pa
rt
y 
fr
om
 s
us
pe
nd
in
g 
co
nc
es
si
on
s 
or
 o
th
er
ob
lig
at
io
ns
 u
nd
er
 th
e 
co
ve
re
d 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
.
R
eq
u
es
t 
an
d
 
R
ec
ei
p
t 
of
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
A
rt
. 2
1.
4 
R
eq
ue
st
 f
or
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
B
ef
or
e 
a 
re
qu
es
t f
or
 c
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
 o
r 
m
ed
ia
ti
on
 is
 m
ad
e 
pu
rs
ua
nt
 to
 A
rt
ic
le
 2
1.
5 
or
 2
1.
6 
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
, a
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 r
eq
ue
st
 in
 w
ri
ti
ng
 
an
y 
re
le
va
nt
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
w
ith
 r
es
pe
ct
 to
 a
 m
ea
su
re
 a
t i
ss
ue
. T
he
 P
ar
ty
 to
 w
hi
ch
 th
at
 r
eq
ue
st
 is
 m
ad
e 
sh
al
l m
ak
e 
al
l e
ff
or
ts
 to
 p
ro
vi
de
 
th
e 
re
qu
es
te
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
in
 a
 w
ri
tt
en
 r
es
po
ns
e 
to
 b
e 
su
bm
it
te
d 
no
 la
te
r 
th
an
 2
0 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t. 
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A
rt
. 2
1.
17
 R
ec
ei
pt
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
1.
O
n 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
a 
P
ar
ty
, o
r 
on
 it
s 
ow
n 
in
it
ia
ti
ve
, t
he
 p
an
el
 m
ay
 s
ee
k 
fr
om
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 r
el
ev
an
t i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
it 
co
ns
id
er
s 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
an
d
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e.
 T
he
 P
ar
tie
s 
sh
al
l r
es
po
nd
 p
ro
m
pt
ly
 a
nd
 f
ul
ly
 to
 a
ny
 r
eq
ue
st
 b
y 
th
e 
pa
ne
l f
or
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n.
2.
O
n 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
a 
P
ar
ty
, o
r 
on
 it
s 
ow
n 
in
it
ia
ti
ve
, t
he
 p
an
el
 m
ay
 s
ee
k 
fr
om
 a
ny
 s
ou
rc
e 
an
y 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
co
nf
id
en
ti
al
in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 it
 c
on
si
de
rs
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
. T
he
 p
an
el
 a
ls
o 
ha
s 
th
e 
ri
gh
t t
o 
se
ek
 th
e 
op
in
io
n 
of
 e
xp
er
ts
 a
s 
it
 c
on
si
de
rs
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
.
3.
N
at
ur
al
 p
er
so
ns
 o
f 
a 
P
ar
ty
 o
r 
le
ga
l p
er
so
ns
 e
st
ab
li
sh
ed
 in
 a
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 s
ub
m
it
 a
m
ic
us
 c
ur
ia
e 
br
ie
fs
 to
 th
e 
pa
ne
l i
n 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
ith
th
e 
R
ul
es
 o
f 
P
ro
ce
du
re
.
4.
A
ny
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ob
ta
in
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
pa
ne
l u
nd
er
 th
is
 A
rt
ic
le
 s
ha
ll 
be
 m
ad
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
to
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 a
nd
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 m
ay
 s
ub
m
it
co
m
m
en
ts
 o
n 
th
at
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
to
 th
e 
pa
ne
l.
C
on
su
lt
at
io
n
s 
A
rt
. 2
1.
5 
C
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
 
1.
T
he
 P
ar
ti
es
 s
ha
ll
 e
nd
ea
vo
ur
 to
 r
es
ol
ve
 a
ny
 d
is
pu
te
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 2
1.
2 
th
ro
ug
h 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
 in
 g
oo
d 
fa
it
h 
w
it
h 
a 
vi
ew
 to
re
ac
hi
ng
 a
 m
ut
ua
ll
y 
ag
re
ed
 s
ol
ut
io
n.
2.
A
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 s
ee
k 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
 b
y 
m
ea
ns
 o
f 
a 
w
ri
tte
n 
re
qu
es
t t
o 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
P
ar
ty
. I
n 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t f
or
 c
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
, t
he
 P
ar
ty
 w
hi
ch
re
qu
es
te
d 
co
ns
ul
ta
ti
on
s 
sh
al
l g
iv
e 
th
e 
re
as
on
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t, 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
id
en
ti
fi
ca
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
 a
t i
ss
ue
 a
nd
 a
n 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 it
s
fa
ct
ua
l b
as
is
 a
nd
 it
s 
le
ga
l b
as
is
 s
pe
ci
fy
in
g 
th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 c
ov
er
ed
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s.
3.
D
ur
in
g 
co
ns
ul
ta
ti
on
s 
ea
ch
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 p
ro
vi
de
 s
uf
fi
ci
en
t i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
to
 e
na
bl
e 
a 
fu
ll
 e
xa
m
in
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
 a
t i
ss
ue
 in
cl
ud
in
g
ho
w
 th
at
 m
ea
su
re
 c
ou
ld
 a
ff
ec
t t
he
 o
pe
ra
tio
n 
an
d 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t.
4.
T
he
 P
ar
ty
 to
 w
hi
ch
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t f
or
 c
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
 is
 m
ad
e 
sh
al
l r
ep
ly
 to
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t n
o 
la
te
r 
th
an
 1
0 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
re
ce
ip
t o
f
th
e 
re
qu
es
t. 
T
he
 P
ar
tie
s 
sh
al
l e
nt
er
 in
to
 c
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
 n
o 
la
te
r 
th
an
 3
0 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t. 
C
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
 s
ha
ll
be
 d
ee
m
ed
 to
 b
e 
co
nc
lu
de
d 
no
 la
te
r 
th
an
 4
5 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t u
nl
es
s 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 a
gr
ee
 o
th
er
w
is
e.
 W
he
re
 b
ot
h
Pa
rt
ie
s 
co
ns
id
er
 th
at
 th
e 
ca
se
 c
on
ce
rn
s 
m
at
te
rs
 o
f 
ur
ge
nc
y,
 c
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
de
em
ed
 to
 b
e 
co
nc
lu
de
d 
no
 la
te
r 
th
an
 2
5 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t u
nl
es
s 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
ag
re
e 
ot
he
rw
is
e.
5.
C
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
 m
ay
 b
e 
he
ld
 in
 p
er
so
n 
or
 b
y 
an
y 
ot
he
r 
m
ea
ns
 o
f 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
ag
re
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s.
 U
nl
es
s 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
ag
re
e
ot
he
rw
is
e,
 c
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
, i
f 
he
ld
 in
 p
er
so
n,
 s
ha
ll 
ta
ke
 p
la
ce
 in
 th
e 
P
ar
ty
 to
 w
hi
ch
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t i
s 
m
ad
e.
6.
C
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
 a
ll
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
an
d 
po
si
ti
on
s 
ta
ke
n 
by
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 d
ur
in
g 
th
os
e 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s,
 s
ha
ll 
be
 c
on
fi
de
nt
ia
l
an
d 
w
it
ho
ut
 p
re
ju
di
ce
 to
 th
e 
ri
gh
ts
 o
f 
ei
th
er
 P
ar
ty
 in
 a
ny
 f
ur
th
er
 p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
.
M
ed
ia
ti
on
 
A
rt
. 2
1.
6 
M
ed
ia
ti
on
 
1.
A
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 a
t a
ny
 ti
m
e 
re
qu
es
t t
he
 o
th
er
 P
ar
ty
 to
 e
nt
er
 in
to
 a
 m
ed
ia
ti
on
 p
ro
ce
du
re
 w
it
h 
re
sp
ec
t t
o 
an
y 
m
at
te
r 
w
it
hi
n 
th
e 
sc
op
e 
of
th
is
 C
ha
pt
er
 c
on
ce
rn
in
g 
a 
m
ea
su
re
 th
at
 a
dv
er
se
ly
 a
ff
ec
ts
 tr
ad
e 
or
 in
ve
st
m
en
t b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s.
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2.
T
he
 P
ar
ti
es
 m
ay
 a
t a
ny
 ti
m
e 
ag
re
e 
to
 e
nt
er
 in
to
 a
 m
ed
ia
ti
on
 p
ro
ce
du
re
 w
hi
ch
 s
ha
ll 
be
 in
it
ia
te
d,
 c
on
du
ct
ed
 a
nd
 te
rm
in
at
ed
 in
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
it
h 
th
e 
M
ed
ia
ti
on
 P
ro
ce
du
re
 to
 b
e 
ad
op
te
d 
by
 th
e 
Jo
in
t C
om
m
it
te
e 
at
 it
s 
fi
rs
t m
ee
tin
g 
pu
rs
ua
nt
 to
 s
ub
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
4(
f)
 o
f
A
rt
ic
le
 2
2.
1.
3.
If
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 a
gr
ee
, t
he
 m
ed
ia
ti
on
 p
ro
ce
du
re
 m
ay
 c
on
ti
nu
e 
w
hi
le
 th
e 
pa
ne
l p
ro
ce
du
re
s 
se
t o
ut
 in
 S
ec
tio
n 
C
 p
ro
ce
ed
.
In
it
ia
ti
on
 
C
om
p
os
it
io
n
 o
f 
th
e 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 
P
an
el
 
A
rt
. 2
1.
7 
E
st
ab
li
sh
m
en
t o
f 
a 
pa
ne
l 
1.
T
he
 P
ar
ty
 th
at
 s
ou
gh
t c
on
su
lta
tio
ns
 p
ur
su
an
t t
o 
A
rt
ic
le
 2
1.
5 
m
ay
 r
eq
ue
st
 th
e 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f 
a 
pa
ne
l i
f:
(a
)
th
e 
ot
he
r 
P
ar
ty
 d
oe
s 
no
t r
es
po
nd
 to
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t f
or
 c
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
 w
ith
in
 1
0 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
it
s 
re
ce
ip
t, 
or
 d
oe
s 
no
t e
nt
er
 in
to
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
 w
it
hi
n 
30
 d
ay
s 
af
te
r 
th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t;
(b
)
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 a
gr
ee
 n
ot
 to
 e
nt
er
 in
to
 c
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
; o
r
(c
)
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
fa
il
 to
 r
es
ol
ve
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
th
ro
ug
h 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
 w
it
hi
n 
45
 d
ay
s,
 o
r 
w
it
hi
n 
25
 d
ay
s 
in
 c
as
es
 o
f 
ur
ge
nc
y,
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t f
or
 c
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
, u
nl
es
s 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 a
gr
ee
 o
th
er
w
is
e.
2.
T
he
 r
eq
ue
st
 f
or
 th
e 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f 
a 
pa
ne
l p
ur
su
an
t t
o 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
1 
sh
al
l b
e 
m
ad
e 
in
 w
ri
ti
ng
 to
 th
e 
P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t. 
In
 it
s
co
m
pl
ai
nt
, t
he
 c
om
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 e
xp
li
ci
tl
y 
id
en
ti
fy
:
(a
)
th
e 
m
ea
su
re
 a
t i
ss
ue
;
(b
)
th
e 
le
ga
l b
as
is
 s
pe
ci
fy
in
g 
th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 c
ov
er
ed
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
in
 s
uc
h 
a 
m
an
ne
r 
as
 to
 c
le
ar
ly
 p
re
se
nt
 h
ow
 s
uc
h 
m
ea
su
re
 is
 in
co
ns
is
te
nt
w
it
h 
th
os
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
; a
nd
(c
)
th
e 
fa
ct
ua
l b
as
is
.
A
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1.
8 
C
om
po
si
ti
on
 o
f 
a 
pa
ne
l
1.
A
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
co
m
po
se
d 
of
 th
re
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s.
2.
N
o 
la
te
r 
th
an
 1
0 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t f
or
 th
e 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f 
a 
pa
ne
l b
y 
th
e 
P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t, 
th
e
Pa
rt
ie
s 
sh
al
l c
on
su
lt
 w
it
h 
a 
vi
ew
 to
 r
ea
ch
in
g 
an
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t o
n 
th
e 
co
m
po
si
ti
on
 o
f 
th
e 
pa
ne
l.
3.
If
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 d
o 
no
t r
ea
ch
 a
n 
ag
re
em
en
t o
n 
th
e 
co
m
po
si
ti
on
 o
f 
th
e 
pa
ne
l w
it
hi
n 
th
e 
ti
m
e 
pe
ri
od
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
fo
r 
in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
, e
ac
h
Pa
rt
y 
sh
al
l a
pp
oi
nt
 a
n 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 f
ro
m
 th
e 
su
b-
li
st
 f
or
 th
at
 P
ar
ty
 e
st
ab
li
sh
ed
 p
ur
su
an
t t
o 
A
rt
ic
le
 2
1.
9 
no
 la
te
r 
th
an
 f
iv
e 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e
ex
pi
ry
 o
f 
th
e 
tim
e 
pe
ri
od
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
fo
r 
in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
. I
f 
a 
P
ar
ty
 f
ai
ls
 to
 a
pp
oi
nt
 a
n 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 w
it
hi
n 
th
at
 ti
m
e 
pe
ri
od
, t
he
 C
o-
ch
ai
r 
of
th
e 
Jo
in
t C
om
m
itt
ee
 f
ro
m
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 s
el
ec
t b
y 
lo
t, 
no
 la
te
r 
th
an
 f
iv
e 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
ex
pi
ry
 o
f 
th
e 
tim
e 
pe
ri
od
, a
n
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 f
ro
m
 th
e 
su
b-
li
st
 f
or
 th
e 
P
ar
ty
 th
at
 h
as
 f
ai
le
d 
to
 a
pp
oi
nt
 a
n 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 e
st
ab
li
sh
ed
 p
ur
su
an
t t
o 
A
rt
ic
le
 2
1.
9.
 T
he
 C
o-
ch
ai
r 
of
th
e 
Jo
in
t C
om
m
itt
ee
 f
ro
m
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 d
el
eg
at
e 
th
e 
se
le
ct
io
n 
by
 lo
t o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 to
 h
is
 o
r 
he
r 
re
pr
es
en
ta
ti
ve
.
4.
If
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 d
o 
no
t r
ea
ch
 a
n 
ag
re
em
en
t o
n 
th
e 
ch
ai
rp
er
so
n 
of
 th
e 
pa
ne
l w
ith
in
 th
e 
ti
m
e 
pe
ri
od
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
fo
r 
in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
, o
n
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re
qu
es
t o
f 
a 
P
ar
ty
, t
he
 C
o-
ch
ai
r 
of
 th
e 
Jo
in
t C
om
m
it
te
e 
fr
om
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 s
el
ec
t b
y 
lo
t, 
no
 la
te
r 
th
an
 f
iv
e 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
de
li
ve
ry
 o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t, 
th
e 
ch
ai
rp
er
so
n 
of
 th
e 
pa
ne
l f
ro
m
 th
e 
su
b-
li
st
 o
f 
ch
ai
rp
er
so
ns
 e
st
ab
li
sh
ed
 p
ur
su
an
t t
o 
A
rt
ic
le
 2
1.
9.
 T
ha
t 
re
qu
es
t s
ha
ll
 b
e 
no
ti
fi
ed
 s
im
ul
ta
ne
ou
sl
y 
to
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
P
ar
ty
. T
he
 C
o-
ch
ai
r 
of
 th
e 
Jo
in
t C
om
m
it
te
e 
fr
om
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 
de
le
ga
te
 th
e 
se
le
ct
io
n 
by
 lo
t o
f 
th
e 
ch
ai
rp
er
so
n 
of
 th
e 
pa
ne
l t
o 
hi
s 
or
 h
er
 r
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
e.
 
5.
Sh
ou
ld
 th
e 
li
st
s 
pr
ov
id
ed
 f
or
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 2
1.
9 
no
t b
e 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
or
 n
ot
 c
on
ta
in
 a
t l
ea
st
 n
in
e 
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
as
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 th
at
 A
rt
ic
le
,
th
e 
fo
ll
ow
in
g 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 a
pp
ly
:
(a
)
fo
r 
th
e 
se
le
ct
io
n 
of
 th
e 
ch
ai
rp
er
so
n:
(i
)
if
 th
e 
su
b-
li
st
 o
f 
ch
ai
rp
er
so
ns
 c
on
ta
in
s 
at
 le
as
t t
w
o 
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
ag
re
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s,
 th
e 
C
o-
ch
ai
r 
of
 th
e 
Jo
in
t C
om
m
it
te
e 
fr
om
 th
e
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 s
el
ec
t b
y 
lo
t t
he
 c
ha
ir
pe
rs
on
 f
ro
m
 th
os
e 
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
no
 la
te
r 
 h
an
 f
iv
e 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
de
li
ve
ry
 o
f 
th
e
re
qu
es
t r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 4
;
(i
i)
if
 th
e 
su
b-
li
st
 o
f 
ch
ai
rp
er
so
ns
 c
on
ta
in
s 
on
e 
in
di
vi
du
al
 a
gr
ee
d 
by
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
, t
ha
t i
nd
iv
id
ua
l s
ha
ll
 a
ct
 a
s 
ch
ai
rp
er
so
n;
 o
r
(i
ii
)
if
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 f
ai
l t
o 
se
le
ct
 a
 c
ha
ir
pe
rs
on
 p
ur
su
an
t t
o 
su
bp
ar
ag
ra
ph
 (
i)
 o
r 
(i
i)
 o
r 
if
 th
e 
su
b-
lis
t o
f 
ch
ai
rp
er
so
ns
 c
on
ta
in
s 
no
 in
di
vi
du
al
ag
re
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
, t
he
 C
o-
ch
ai
r 
of
 th
e 
Jo
in
t C
om
m
it
te
e 
fr
om
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
, n
o 
la
te
r 
th
an
 f
iv
e 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f
de
li
ve
ry
 o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 4
, s
el
ec
t b
y 
lo
t t
he
 c
ha
ir
pe
rs
on
 f
ro
m
 th
e 
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
w
ho
 h
ad
 b
ee
n 
fo
rm
al
ly
 p
ro
po
se
d
by
 a
 P
ar
ty
 a
s 
ch
ai
rp
er
so
n 
at
 th
e 
ti
m
e 
of
 e
st
ab
li
sh
in
g 
or
 u
pd
at
in
g 
th
e 
lis
t o
f 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 in
 A
rt
ic
le
 2
1.
9.
 A
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 p
ro
po
se
a 
ne
w
 in
di
vi
du
al
, i
f 
an
 in
di
vi
du
al
 w
ho
 h
ad
 b
ee
n 
fo
rm
al
ly
 p
ro
po
se
d 
as
 c
ha
ir
pe
rs
on
 b
y 
th
at
 P
ar
ty
 is
 n
o 
lo
ng
er
 a
va
il
ab
le
; a
nd
(b
)
fo
r 
th
e 
se
le
ct
io
n 
of
 a
n 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 o
th
er
 th
an
 th
e 
ch
ai
rp
er
so
n:
(i
)
if
 th
e 
su
b-
li
st
 o
f 
a 
Pa
rt
y 
co
nt
ai
ns
 a
t l
ea
st
 tw
o 
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
ag
re
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
, t
ha
t P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 s
el
ec
t a
n 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 f
ro
m
 th
os
e
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
no
 la
te
r 
th
an
 f
iv
e 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
ex
pi
ry
 o
f 
th
e 
ti
m
e 
pe
ri
od
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
;
(i
i)
if
 th
e 
su
b-
li
st
 o
f 
a 
P
ar
ty
 c
on
ta
in
s 
on
e 
in
di
vi
du
al
 a
gr
ee
d 
by
 th
e 
P
ar
tie
s,
 th
at
 in
di
vi
du
al
 s
ha
ll
 a
ct
 a
s 
an
 a
rb
it
ra
to
r;
 o
r
(i
ii
)
if
 a
n 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 c
an
no
t b
e 
se
le
ct
ed
 p
ur
su
an
t t
o 
su
bp
ar
ag
ra
ph
 (
i)
 o
r 
(i
i)
 o
r 
if
 th
e 
su
b-
li
st
 o
f 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
of
 a
 P
ar
ty
 c
on
ta
in
s 
no
in
di
vi
du
al
 a
gr
ee
d 
by
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
, t
he
 C
o-
ch
ai
r 
of
 th
e 
Jo
in
t C
om
m
itt
ee
 f
ro
m
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 s
el
ec
t a
n 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 a
pp
ly
in
g
m
ut
at
is
 m
ut
an
di
s 
th
e 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e 
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 in
 s
ub
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
(a
).
6.
T
he
 d
at
e 
of
 e
st
ab
lis
hm
en
t o
f 
th
e 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll
 b
e 
th
e 
da
te
 o
n 
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
la
st
 o
f 
th
e 
th
re
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
ha
s 
no
tif
ie
d 
to
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 th
e
ac
ce
pt
an
ce
 o
f 
hi
s 
or
 h
er
 a
pp
oi
nt
m
en
t.
L
is
t 
of
 
A
rb
it
ra
to
rs
 
A
rt
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1.
9 
L
is
t o
f 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
1.
T
he
 J
oi
nt
 C
om
m
it
te
e 
sh
al
l, 
at
 it
s 
fi
rs
t m
ee
ti
ng
 p
ur
su
an
t t
o 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
2 
of
 A
rt
ic
le
 2
2.
1,
 e
st
ab
li
sh
 a
 li
st
 o
f 
at
 le
as
t n
in
e 
in
di
vi
du
al
s
w
ho
 a
re
 w
ill
in
g 
an
d 
ab
le
 to
 s
er
ve
 a
s 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s.
 T
he
 li
st
 s
ha
ll 
be
 c
om
po
se
d 
of
 th
re
e 
su
b-
li
st
s:
 a
 s
ub
-l
is
t f
or
 e
ac
h 
Pa
rt
y 
an
d 
a 
su
b-
lis
t o
f
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
w
ho
 a
re
 n
ot
 n
at
io
na
ls
 o
f 
ei
th
er
 P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 w
ho
 s
ha
ll
 a
ct
 a
s 
th
e 
ch
ai
rp
er
so
n 
of
 th
e 
pa
ne
l. 
E
ac
h 
su
b-
li
st
 s
ha
ll 
in
cl
ud
e 
at
 le
as
t
184
th
re
e 
in
di
vi
du
al
s.
 F
or
 th
e 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
r 
an
 u
pd
at
e 
of
 th
e 
su
b-
li
st
 o
f 
ha
ir
pe
rs
on
s,
 
ea
ch
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 p
ro
po
se
 u
p 
to
 th
re
e 
in
di
vi
du
al
s.
 T
he
 J
oi
nt
 C
om
m
it
te
e 
w
il
l e
ns
ur
e 
th
at
 th
e 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 in
di
vi
du
al
s 
on
 th
e 
li
st
 o
f 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
is
 a
lw
ay
s 
m
ai
nt
ai
ne
d 
at
 th
e 
le
ve
l r
eq
ui
re
d 
by
 th
is
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
. 
2.
T
he
 J
oi
nt
 C
om
m
it
te
e 
m
ay
 e
st
ab
li
sh
 a
n 
ad
di
ti
on
al
 li
st
, c
on
si
st
in
g 
of
 in
di
vi
du
al
s 
w
it
h 
de
m
on
st
ra
te
d 
ex
pe
rt
is
e 
in
 s
pe
ci
fi
c 
se
ct
or
s
co
ve
re
d 
by
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
w
hi
ch
 m
ay
 b
e 
us
ed
 to
 c
om
po
se
 th
e 
pa
ne
l.
A
rt
. 2
1.
 1
0 
Q
ua
li
fi
ca
ti
on
s 
of
 a
rb
itr
at
or
s
A
ll
 a
rb
it
ra
to
rs
 s
ha
ll
:
(a
)
ha
ve
 d
em
on
st
ra
te
d 
ex
pe
rt
is
e 
in
 la
w
, i
nt
er
na
ti
on
al
 tr
ad
e 
an
d 
ot
he
r 
m
at
te
rs
 c
ov
er
ed
 b
y 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t a
nd
, i
n 
ca
se
 o
f 
a 
ch
ai
rp
er
so
n,
al
so
 h
av
e 
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
 in
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
;
(b
)
be
 in
de
pe
nd
en
t o
f,
 a
nd
 n
ot
 b
e 
af
fi
li
at
ed
 w
it
h 
or
 ta
ke
 in
st
ru
ct
io
ns
 f
ro
m
, e
ith
er
 P
ar
ty
;
(c
)
se
rv
e 
in
 th
ei
r 
in
di
vi
du
al
 c
ap
ac
it
ie
s 
an
d 
no
t t
ak
e 
in
st
ru
ct
io
ns
 f
ro
m
 a
ny
 o
rg
an
is
at
io
n 
or
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t w
it
h 
re
ga
rd
 to
 m
at
te
rs
 r
el
at
ed
 to
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e;
 a
nd
(d
)
co
m
pl
y 
w
it
h 
th
e 
C
od
e 
of
 C
on
du
ct
.
A
rt
. 2
1.
30
 R
ul
es
 o
f 
P
ro
ce
du
re
 a
nd
 C
od
e 
of
 C
on
du
ct
T
he
 p
an
el
 p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
fo
r 
in
 th
is
 C
ha
pt
er
 s
ha
ll 
be
 c
on
du
ct
ed
 in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
it
h 
th
e 
R
ul
es
 o
f 
P
ro
ce
du
re
 o
f 
a 
P
an
el
 a
nd
 th
e
C
od
e 
of
 C
on
du
ct
 f
or
 A
rb
it
ra
to
rs
, t
o 
be
 a
do
pt
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
Jo
in
t C
om
m
itt
ee
 a
t i
ts
 f
ir
st
 m
ee
tin
g 
pu
rs
ua
nt
 to
 s
ub
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
4(
f)
 o
f 
A
rt
ic
le
22
.1
.
T
er
m
s 
of
 
R
ef
er
en
ce
 o
f 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 P
an
el
 
A
rt
. 2
1.
13
 T
er
m
s 
of
 r
ef
er
en
ce
 
1.
U
nl
es
s 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 a
gr
ee
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
no
 la
te
r 
th
an
 1
0 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
th
e 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f 
th
e 
pa
ne
l, 
th
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 r
ef
er
en
ce
 o
f 
th
e
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll
 b
e:
"t
o 
ex
am
in
e,
 in
 th
e 
lig
ht
 o
f 
th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 c
ov
er
ed
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
of
 th
is
 g
re
em
en
t c
it
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
, t
he
 m
at
te
r 
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 in
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t
fo
r 
th
e 
st
ab
li
sh
m
en
t o
f 
th
e 
pa
ne
l, 
to
 d
ec
id
e 
on
 th
e 
co
nf
or
m
it
y 
of
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
 a
t i
ss
ue
 w
it
h 
th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 c
ov
er
ed
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
of
 th
is
A
gr
ee
m
en
t a
nd
 to
 is
su
e 
a 
re
po
rt
 in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
it
h 
A
rt
ic
le
s 
21
.1
8 
an
d 
21
.1
9"
.
2.
If
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 a
gr
ee
 o
n 
ot
he
r 
te
rm
s 
of
 r
ef
er
en
ce
 th
an
 th
os
e 
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 1
, t
he
y 
sh
al
l n
ot
if
y 
th
e 
ag
re
ed
 te
rm
s 
of
 r
ef
er
en
ce
to
 th
e 
pa
ne
l n
o 
la
te
r 
th
an
 th
re
e 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
ei
r 
ag
re
em
en
t.
U
rg
en
cy
 
P
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
 
A
rt
. 2
1.
14
 D
ec
is
io
n 
on
 u
rg
en
cy
 
If
 a
 P
ar
ty
 s
o 
re
qu
es
ts
, t
he
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
 d
ec
id
e,
 n
o 
la
te
r 
th
an
 1
5 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
its
 e
st
ab
li
sh
m
en
t, 
w
he
th
er
 a
 d
is
pu
te
 c
on
ce
rn
s 
m
at
te
rs
 o
f 
ur
ge
nc
y.
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R
u
le
s 
of
 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 P
an
el
 
P
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
 
A
rt
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1.
15
 P
an
el
 p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
 
1.
A
ny
 h
ea
ri
ng
 o
f 
th
e 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll
 b
e 
op
en
 to
 th
e 
pu
bl
ic
 u
nl
es
s 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
ag
re
e 
ot
he
rw
is
e 
or
 th
e 
su
bm
is
si
on
s 
an
d 
ar
gu
m
en
ts
 o
f 
a 
P
ar
ty
co
nt
ai
n 
co
nf
id
en
ti
al
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n.
 H
ea
ri
ng
s 
he
ld
 in
 c
lo
se
d 
se
ss
io
n 
sh
al
l b
e 
co
nf
id
en
ti
al
.
2.
U
nl
es
s 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 a
gr
ee
 o
th
er
w
is
e,
 th
e 
ve
nu
e 
sh
al
l a
lt
er
na
te
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 w
it
h 
th
e 
fi
rs
t h
ea
ri
ng
 to
 b
e 
he
ld
 in
 th
e 
Pa
rt
y
co
m
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t.
3.
T
he
 p
an
el
 a
nd
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 s
ha
ll
 tr
ea
t a
s 
co
nf
id
en
ti
al
 a
ny
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
su
bm
it
te
d 
by
 a
 P
ar
ty
 to
 th
e 
pa
ne
l w
hi
ch
 th
at
 P
ar
ty
 h
as
de
si
gn
at
ed
 a
s 
co
nf
id
en
ti
al
. W
he
re
 th
at
 P
ar
ty
 s
ub
m
it
s 
a 
co
nf
id
en
ti
al
 v
er
si
on
 o
f 
it
s 
w
ri
tt
en
 s
ub
m
is
si
on
s 
to
 th
e 
pa
ne
l, 
it
 s
ha
ll 
al
so
, o
n
re
qu
es
t o
f 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
Pa
rt
y,
 p
ro
vi
de
 a
 n
on
-c
on
fi
de
nt
ia
l s
um
m
ar
y 
of
 th
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
co
nt
ai
ne
d 
in
 it
s 
su
bm
is
si
on
s 
th
at
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
di
sc
lo
se
d
to
 th
e 
pu
bl
ic
 w
it
h 
an
 e
xp
la
na
ti
on
 a
s 
to
 w
hy
 th
e 
no
n-
di
sc
lo
se
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
is
 c
on
fi
de
nt
ia
l.
4.
T
he
 d
el
ib
er
at
io
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll 
be
 k
ep
t c
on
fi
de
nt
ia
l.
5.
T
he
 P
ar
ti
es
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
gi
ve
n 
th
e 
op
po
rt
un
it
y 
to
 a
tt
en
d 
an
y 
of
 th
e 
pr
es
en
ta
ti
on
s,
 s
ta
te
m
en
ts
, a
rg
um
en
ts
 o
r 
re
bu
tt
al
s 
in
 th
e 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s.
T
he
 P
ar
ti
es
 s
ha
ll
 m
ak
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
to
 e
ac
h 
ot
he
r 
an
y 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
or
 w
ri
tte
n 
su
bm
is
si
on
s 
su
bm
it
te
d 
to
 th
e 
pa
ne
l, 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
an
y 
co
m
m
en
ts
on
 th
e 
de
sc
ri
pt
iv
e 
pa
rt
 o
f 
th
e 
in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t, 
re
sp
on
se
s 
to
 q
ue
st
io
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
pa
ne
l a
nd
 w
ri
tt
en
 c
om
m
en
ts
 o
n 
th
os
e 
re
sp
on
se
s.
6.
T
he
 in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t a
nd
 th
e 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t s
ha
ll
 b
e 
dr
af
te
d 
w
it
ho
ut
 th
e 
pr
es
en
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
, a
nd
 in
 li
gh
t o
f 
th
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
pr
ov
id
ed
an
d 
th
e 
st
at
em
en
ts
 m
ad
e.
 T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
to
rs
 s
ha
ll
 a
ss
um
e 
fu
ll
 r
es
po
ns
ib
il
ity
 f
or
 th
e 
dr
af
ti
ng
 o
f 
th
e 
re
po
rt
s 
an
d 
sh
al
l n
ot
 d
el
eg
at
e 
th
is
re
sp
on
si
bi
li
ty
 to
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 p
er
so
n.
7.
T
he
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
 a
tt
em
pt
 to
 m
ak
e 
it
s 
de
ci
si
on
s,
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
its
 f
in
al
 r
ep
or
t, 
by
 c
on
se
ns
us
. I
t m
ay
 a
ls
o 
m
ak
e 
it
s 
de
ci
si
on
s,
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
its
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t, 
by
 m
aj
or
it
y 
vo
te
 w
he
re
 a
 d
ec
is
io
n 
ca
nn
ot
 b
e 
ar
ri
ve
d 
at
 b
y 
co
ns
en
su
s.
 D
is
se
nt
in
g 
op
in
io
ns
 o
f 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l n
ot
 b
e
pu
bl
is
he
d.
8.
T
he
 d
ec
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll
 b
e 
fi
na
l a
nd
 b
in
di
ng
 o
n 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
. T
he
y 
sh
al
l b
e 
un
co
nd
it
io
na
ll
y 
ac
ce
pt
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
. T
he
y
sh
al
l n
ot
 a
dd
 to
 o
r 
di
m
in
is
h 
th
e 
ri
gh
ts
 a
nd
 o
bl
ig
at
io
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
un
de
r 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t. 
T
he
y 
sh
al
l n
ot
 b
e 
co
ns
tr
ue
d 
as
 c
re
at
in
g
ri
gh
ts
 f
or
 a
nd
 o
bl
ig
at
io
ns
 o
n 
pe
rs
on
s.
F
u
n
ct
io
n
s 
of
 
P
an
el
s 
A
rt
. 2
1.
12
 F
un
ct
io
ns
 o
f 
pa
ne
ls
 
T
he
 p
an
el
 e
st
ab
li
sh
ed
 p
ur
su
an
t t
o 
A
rt
ic
le
 2
1.
7:
 
(a
)
sh
al
l m
ak
e 
an
 o
bj
ec
ti
ve
 a
ss
es
sm
en
t o
f 
th
e 
m
at
te
r 
be
fo
re
 it
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
 a
n 
ob
je
ct
iv
e 
as
se
ss
m
en
t o
f 
th
e 
fa
ct
s 
of
 th
e 
ca
se
 a
nd
 th
e
ap
pl
ic
ab
il
it
y 
of
, a
nd
 c
on
fo
rm
it
y 
of
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
at
 is
su
e 
w
it
h,
 th
e 
co
ve
re
d 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
;
(b
)
sh
al
l s
et
 o
ut
, i
n 
it
s 
de
ci
si
on
s,
 th
e 
fi
nd
in
gs
 o
f 
fa
ct
 a
nd
 la
w
 a
nd
 th
e 
ra
ti
on
al
e 
be
hi
nd
 a
ny
 f
in
di
ng
s 
an
d 
co
nc
lu
si
on
s 
th
at
 it
 m
ak
es
; a
nd
(c
)
sh
ou
ld
 c
on
su
lt
 r
eg
ul
ar
ly
 w
it
h 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 a
nd
 p
ro
vi
de
 a
de
qu
at
e 
op
po
rt
un
it
ie
s 
fo
r 
ac
hi
ev
in
g 
a 
m
ut
ua
ll
y 
ag
re
ed
 s
ol
ut
io
n.
186
In
te
ri
m
 P
an
el
 
R
ep
or
t 
A
rt
. 2
1.
18
 I
nt
er
im
 r
ep
or
t 
1.
T
he
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
 is
su
e 
an
 in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t t
o 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 s
et
tin
g 
ou
t a
 d
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
 p
ar
t a
nd
 it
s 
fi
nd
in
gs
 a
nd
 c
on
cl
us
io
ns
 n
o 
la
te
r 
th
an
 1
20
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
it
s 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t i
n 
a 
m
an
ne
r 
en
ab
li
ng
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 to
 r
ev
ie
w
 it
. W
he
n 
th
e 
pa
ne
l c
on
si
de
rs
 th
at
 th
is
 d
ea
dl
in
e
ca
nn
ot
 b
e 
m
et
, t
he
 c
ha
ir
pe
rs
on
 o
f 
th
e 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll
 n
ot
if
y 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 in
 w
ri
ti
ng
, s
ta
ti
ng
 th
e 
re
as
on
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
de
la
y 
an
d 
th
e 
da
te
 o
n 
w
hi
ch
th
e 
pa
ne
l p
la
ns
 to
 is
su
e 
its
 in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t. 
U
nd
er
 n
o 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s 
sh
al
l t
he
 d
el
ay
 e
xc
ee
d 
30
 d
ay
s 
af
te
r 
th
e 
de
ad
li
ne
.
2.
E
ac
h 
P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 s
ub
m
it
 to
 th
e 
pa
ne
l w
ri
tt
en
 c
om
m
en
ts
 a
nd
 a
 w
ri
tt
en
 r
eq
ue
st
 to
 r
ev
ie
w
 p
re
ci
se
 a
sp
ec
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t n
o 
la
te
r
th
an
 1
5 
da
y s
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
is
su
an
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t. 
A
ft
er
 c
on
si
de
ri
ng
 a
ny
 w
ri
tt
en
 c
om
m
en
ts
 a
nd
 r
eq
ue
st
s 
by
 e
ac
h 
Pa
rt
y 
on
 th
e
in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t, 
th
e 
pa
ne
l m
ay
 m
od
if
y 
th
e 
in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t a
nd
 m
ak
e 
an
y 
fu
rt
he
r 
ex
am
in
at
io
n 
it
 c
on
si
de
rs
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
.
3.
In
 c
as
es
 o
f 
ur
ge
nc
y,
(a
)
th
e 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll
 m
ak
e 
ev
er
y 
ef
fo
rt
 to
 is
su
e 
it
s 
in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t n
o 
la
te
r 
th
an
 6
0 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
it
s 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t a
nd
 s
ha
ll
 in
 n
o
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s 
is
su
e 
th
e 
in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t l
at
er
 th
an
 7
5 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
it
s 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t;
 a
nd
(b
)
ea
ch
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 s
ub
m
it
 to
 th
e 
pa
ne
l w
ri
tt
en
 c
om
m
en
ts
 a
nd
 a
 w
ri
tt
en
 r
eq
ue
st
 to
 r
ev
ie
w
 p
re
ci
se
 a
sp
ec
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t n
o 
la
te
r
th
an
 s
ev
en
 d
ay
s 
af
te
r 
th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
is
su
an
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t.
F
in
al
 P
an
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19
 F
in
al
 r
ep
or
t 
1.
T
he
 p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
 is
su
e 
it
s 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t t
o 
th
e 
P
ar
tie
s 
no
 la
te
r 
th
an
 3
0 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
is
su
an
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t. 
W
he
n 
th
e
pa
ne
l c
on
si
de
rs
 th
at
 th
is
 d
ea
dl
in
e 
ca
nn
ot
 b
e 
m
et
, t
he
 c
ha
ir
pe
rs
on
 o
f 
th
e 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll
 n
ot
if
y 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 in
 w
ri
ti
ng
, s
ta
ti
ng
 th
e 
re
as
on
s 
fo
r
th
e 
de
la
y 
an
d 
th
e 
da
te
 o
n 
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
pa
ne
l p
la
ns
 to
 is
su
e 
it
s 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t. 
U
nd
er
 n
o 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s 
sh
al
l t
he
 d
el
ay
 e
xc
ee
d 
30
 d
ay
s 
af
te
r
th
e 
de
ad
li
ne
.
2.
In
 c
as
es
 o
f 
ur
ge
nc
y,
 th
e 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll
 m
ak
e 
ev
er
y 
ef
fo
rt
 to
 is
su
e 
it
s 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t n
o 
la
te
r 
th
an
 1
5 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
is
su
an
ce
 o
f 
th
e
in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t a
nd
 s
ha
ll
 in
 n
o 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s 
is
su
e 
th
e 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t l
at
er
 th
an
 3
0 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
is
su
an
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
or
t.
3.
T
he
 f
in
al
 r
ep
or
t s
ha
ll
 in
cl
ud
e 
an
 a
de
qu
at
e 
di
sc
us
si
on
 o
f 
an
y 
w
ri
tt
en
 c
om
m
en
ts
 a
nd
 r
eq
ue
st
s 
m
ad
e 
by
 th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
on
 th
e 
in
te
ri
m
re
po
rt
. T
he
 p
an
el
 m
ay
, i
n 
it
s 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t, 
su
gg
es
t w
ay
s 
in
 w
hi
ch
 th
e 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t c
ou
ld
 b
e 
im
pl
em
en
te
d.
4.
T
he
 P
ar
ti
es
 s
ha
ll
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t p
ub
lic
ly
 a
va
il
ab
le
 in
 it
s 
en
ti
re
ty
 n
o 
la
te
r 
th
an
 1
0 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
it
s 
is
su
an
ce
 u
nl
es
s 
th
ey
de
ci
de
, i
n 
or
de
r 
to
 p
ro
te
ct
 c
on
fi
de
nt
ia
l i
nf
or
m
at
io
n,
 to
 p
ub
lis
h 
th
e 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t o
nl
y 
in
 p
ar
ts
, o
r 
no
t t
o 
pu
bl
is
h 
th
e 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t.
C
om
p
li
an
ce
 w
it
h
 
th
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F
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20
 C
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
it
h 
th
e 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t 
1.
T
he
 P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t s
ha
ll 
ta
ke
 a
ny
 m
ea
su
re
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 to
 c
om
pl
y 
pr
om
pt
ly
 a
nd
 in
 g
oo
d 
fa
it
h 
w
it
h 
th
e 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t i
ss
ue
d
pu
rs
ua
nt
 to
 A
rt
ic
le
 2
1.
19
.
2.
T
he
 P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t s
ha
ll,
 n
o 
la
te
r 
th
an
 3
0 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
is
su
an
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t, 
no
tif
y 
th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
of
 th
e 
le
ng
th
 o
f 
th
e 
re
as
on
ab
le
 p
er
io
d 
of
 ti
m
e 
fo
r 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
it
h 
th
e 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t a
nd
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 s
ha
ll
 e
nd
ea
vo
ur
 to
 a
gr
ee
 o
n 
th
e
187
  
re
as
on
ab
le
 p
er
io
d 
of
 ti
m
e 
re
qu
ir
ed
 f
or
 c
om
pl
ia
nc
e.
 I
f 
th
er
e 
is
 d
is
ag
re
em
en
t b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 o
n 
th
e 
le
ng
th
 o
f 
th
e 
re
as
on
ab
le
 p
er
io
d 
of
 ti
m
e,
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
, n
o 
la
te
r 
th
an
 2
0 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
no
tif
ic
at
io
n 
m
ad
e 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
it
h 
th
is
 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
by
 th
e 
P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t, 
re
qu
es
t i
n 
w
ri
ti
ng
 th
e 
or
ig
in
al
 p
an
el
 to
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
th
e 
le
ng
th
 o
f 
th
e 
re
as
on
ab
le
 p
er
io
d 
of
 
tim
e.
 S
uc
h 
re
qu
es
t s
ha
ll
 b
e 
no
ti
fi
ed
 s
im
ul
ta
ne
ou
sl
y 
to
 th
e 
Pa
rt
y 
co
m
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t. 
T
he
 o
ri
gi
na
l p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
 n
ot
if
y 
it
s 
de
te
rm
in
at
io
n 
to
 th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
no
 la
te
r 
th
an
 3
0 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
su
bm
is
si
on
 o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t. 
3.
T
he
 le
ng
th
 o
f 
th
e 
re
as
on
ab
le
 p
er
io
d 
of
 ti
m
e 
fo
r 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
it
h 
th
e 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t m
ay
 b
e 
ex
te
nd
ed
 b
y 
m
ut
ua
l a
gr
ee
m
en
t o
f 
th
e
Pa
rt
ie
s.
4.
T
he
 P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t s
ha
ll 
in
fo
rm
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 in
 w
ri
ti
ng
 o
f 
it
s 
pr
og
re
ss
 to
 c
om
pl
y 
w
it
h 
th
e 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t a
t l
ea
st
on
e 
m
on
th
 b
ef
or
e 
th
e 
ex
pi
ry
 o
f 
th
e 
re
as
on
ab
le
 p
er
io
d 
of
 ti
m
e 
fo
r 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
it
h 
th
e 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t u
nl
es
s 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 a
gr
ee
 o
th
er
w
is
e.
R
ea
so
n
ab
le
 
P
er
io
d
 f
or
 
C
om
p
li
an
ce
 
T
em
p
or
ar
y 
R
em
ed
ie
s 
A
rt
. 2
1.
22
 T
em
po
ra
ry
 r
em
ed
ie
s 
in
 c
as
e 
of
 n
on
-c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
1.
T
he
 P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t s
ha
ll,
 o
n 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
, e
nt
er
 in
to
 c
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
 w
it
h 
a 
vi
ew
 to
 a
gr
ee
in
g 
on
 a
m
ut
ua
ll
y 
sa
ti
sf
ac
to
ry
 c
om
pe
ns
at
io
n 
or
 a
ny
 a
lte
rn
at
iv
e 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
t i
f:
(a
)
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 A
rt
ic
le
 2
1.
21
 th
e 
or
ig
in
al
 p
an
el
 f
in
ds
 th
at
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
ta
ke
n 
to
 c
om
pl
y 
w
it
h 
th
e 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t a
s 
no
ti
fi
ed
 b
y 
th
e
Pa
rt
y 
co
m
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t a
re
 in
co
ns
is
te
nt
 w
it
h 
th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 c
ov
er
ed
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s;
(b
)
th
e 
P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t f
ai
ls
 to
 n
ot
if
y 
an
y 
m
ea
su
re
 ta
ke
n 
to
 c
om
pl
y 
w
it
h 
th
e 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t b
ef
or
e 
th
e 
ex
pi
ry
 o
f 
th
e 
re
as
on
ab
le
pe
ri
od
 o
f 
ti
m
e 
de
te
rm
in
ed
 in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
 o
f 
A
rt
ic
le
 2
1.
20
; o
r
(c
)
th
e 
Pa
rt
y 
co
m
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t n
ot
if
ie
s 
th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 th
at
 it
 is
 im
pr
ac
ti
ca
bl
e 
to
 c
om
pl
y 
w
ith
 th
e 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t w
it
hi
n 
th
e
re
as
on
ab
le
 p
er
io
d 
of
 ti
m
e 
de
te
rm
in
ed
 in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
 o
f 
A
rt
ic
le
 2
1.
20
.
2.
If
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 d
ec
id
es
 n
ot
 to
 m
ak
e 
a 
re
qu
es
t i
n 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
it
h 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
1 
or
 if
 a
 r
eq
ue
st
 is
 m
ad
e 
an
d 
no
 m
ut
ua
ll
y
sa
tis
fa
ct
or
y 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
no
r 
an
y 
al
te
rn
at
iv
e 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
t h
as
 b
ee
n 
ag
re
ed
 w
it
hi
n 
20
 d
ay
s 
af
te
r 
th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t m
ad
e
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 1
, t
he
 c
om
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 n
ot
if
y 
th
e 
P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t i
n 
w
ri
ti
ng
 th
at
 it
 in
te
nd
s 
to
 s
us
pe
nd
th
e 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
to
 th
e 
Pa
rt
y 
co
m
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t o
f 
co
nc
es
si
on
s 
or
 o
th
er
 o
bl
ig
at
io
ns
 u
nd
er
 th
e 
co
ve
re
d 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
. T
he
 n
ot
if
ic
at
io
n 
sh
al
l
sp
ec
if
y 
th
e 
le
ve
l o
f 
in
te
nd
ed
 s
us
pe
ns
io
n 
of
 c
on
ce
ss
io
ns
 o
r 
ot
he
r 
ob
li
ga
ti
on
s.
3.
T
he
 c
om
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 h
av
e 
th
e 
ri
gh
t t
o 
im
pl
em
en
t t
he
 s
us
pe
ns
io
n 
of
 c
on
ce
ss
io
ns
 o
r 
ot
he
r 
ob
li
ga
ti
on
s 
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 in
 th
e
pr
ec
ed
in
g 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
15
 d
ay
s 
af
te
r 
th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
no
ti
fi
ca
ti
on
 b
y 
th
e 
P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t, 
un
le
ss
 th
e 
P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d
ag
ai
ns
t h
as
 r
eq
ue
st
ed
 a
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 6
.
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4.
T
he
 s
us
pe
ns
io
n 
of
 c
on
ce
ss
io
ns
 o
r 
ot
he
r 
ob
li
ga
ti
on
s:
(a
)
sh
al
l b
e 
at
 a
 le
ve
l e
qu
iv
al
en
t t
o 
th
e 
nu
ll
if
ic
at
io
n 
or
 im
pa
ir
m
en
t t
ha
t i
s 
ca
us
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
fa
il
ur
e 
of
 th
e 
Pa
rt
y 
co
m
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t t
o
co
m
pl
y 
w
it
h 
th
e 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t;
 a
nd
(b
)
m
ay
 b
e 
ap
pl
ie
d 
to
 s
ec
to
rs
 th
at
 a
re
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 d
is
pu
te
 s
et
tl
em
en
t i
n 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
it
h 
A
rt
ic
le
 2
1.
2 
ot
he
r 
th
an
 th
e 
se
ct
or
 o
r 
se
ct
or
s 
in
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
pa
ne
l h
as
 f
ou
nd
 n
ul
li
fi
ca
ti
on
 o
r 
im
pa
ir
m
en
t, 
in
 p
ar
ti
cu
la
r 
if
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 is
 o
f 
th
e 
vi
ew
 th
at
 s
uc
h 
su
sp
en
si
on
 is
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
in
 in
du
ci
ng
 c
om
pl
ia
nc
e.
5.
T
he
 s
us
pe
ns
io
n 
of
 c
on
ce
ss
io
ns
 o
r 
ot
he
r 
ob
li
ga
ti
on
s 
or
 th
e 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
or
 a
ny
 a
lt
er
na
tiv
e 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
t r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 th
is
 A
rt
ic
le
sh
al
l b
e 
te
m
po
ra
ry
 a
nd
 s
ha
ll
 o
nl
y 
ap
pl
y 
un
ti
l t
he
 in
co
ns
is
te
nc
y 
of
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
 w
it
h 
th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 c
ov
er
ed
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
w
hi
ch
 h
as
 b
ee
n
fo
un
d 
in
 th
e 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t h
as
 b
ee
n 
re
m
ov
ed
, o
r 
un
ti
l t
he
 P
ar
tie
s 
ha
ve
 a
gr
ee
d 
on
 a
 m
ut
ua
ll
y 
sa
ti
sf
ac
to
ry
 c
om
pe
ns
at
io
n 
or
 a
ny
 a
lte
rn
at
iv
e
ar
ra
ng
em
en
t.
6.
If
 th
e 
P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t c
on
si
de
rs
 th
at
 th
e 
su
sp
en
si
on
 o
f 
co
nc
es
si
on
s 
or
 o
th
er
 o
bl
ig
at
io
ns
 d
oe
s 
no
t c
om
pl
y 
w
it
h 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
4,
th
at
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 r
eq
ue
st
 in
 w
ri
ti
ng
 th
e 
or
ig
in
al
 p
an
el
 to
 e
xa
m
in
e 
th
e 
m
at
te
r 
no
 la
te
r 
th
an
 1
5 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e
no
tif
ic
at
io
n 
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
. T
ha
t r
eq
ue
st
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
no
ti
fi
ed
 s
im
ul
ta
ne
ou
sl
y 
to
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
. T
he
 o
ri
gi
na
l p
an
el
 s
ha
ll
no
tif
y 
to
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 it
s 
de
ci
si
on
 o
n 
th
e 
m
at
te
r 
no
 la
te
r 
th
an
 3
0 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
su
bm
is
si
on
 o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t. 
C
on
ce
ss
io
ns
 o
r 
ot
he
r
ob
lig
at
io
ns
 s
ha
ll 
no
t b
e 
su
sp
en
de
d 
un
ti
l t
he
 o
ri
gi
na
l p
an
el
 h
as
 n
ot
if
ie
d 
it
s 
de
ci
si
on
. T
he
 s
us
pe
ns
io
n 
of
 c
on
ce
ss
io
ns
 o
r 
ot
he
r 
ob
li
ga
ti
on
s
sh
al
l b
e 
co
ns
is
te
nt
 w
it
h 
th
e 
de
ci
si
on
.
R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
M
ea
su
re
 T
ak
en
 
to
 C
om
p
ly
 A
ft
er
 
th
e 
A
d
op
ti
on
 o
f 
T
em
p
or
ar
y 
R
em
ed
ie
s 
fo
r 
N
on
-C
om
pl
ia
n
ce
 
A
rt
. 2
1.
23
 C
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
re
vi
ew
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
ad
op
ti
on
 o
f 
te
m
po
ra
ry
 r
em
ed
ie
s 
1.
U
po
n 
th
e 
no
ti
fi
ca
tio
n 
by
 th
e 
Pa
rt
y 
co
m
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t t
o 
th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 o
f 
th
e 
m
ea
su
re
 ta
ke
n 
to
 c
om
pl
y 
w
it
h 
th
e 
fi
na
l
re
po
rt
:
(a
)
in
 a
 s
it
ua
ti
on
 w
he
re
 th
e 
ri
gh
t t
o 
su
sp
en
d 
co
nc
es
si
on
s 
or
 o
th
er
 o
bl
ig
at
io
ns
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
ex
er
ci
se
d 
by
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 in
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
it
h 
A
rt
ic
le
 2
1.
22
, t
he
 c
om
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 te
rm
in
at
e 
th
e 
su
sp
en
si
on
 o
f 
co
nc
es
si
on
s 
or
 o
th
er
 o
bl
ig
at
io
ns
 n
o 
la
te
r 
th
an
30
 d
ay
s 
af
te
r 
th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
no
ti
fi
ca
tio
n,
 w
it
h 
th
e 
ex
ce
pt
io
n 
of
 th
e 
ca
se
s 
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
; o
r
(b
)
in
 a
 s
it
ua
tio
n 
w
he
re
 m
ut
ua
lly
 s
at
is
fa
ct
or
y 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
or
 a
n 
al
te
rn
at
iv
e 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
t h
as
 b
ee
n 
ag
re
ed
, t
he
 P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d
ag
ai
ns
t m
ay
 te
rm
in
at
e 
th
e 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 s
uc
h 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
or
 a
rr
an
ge
m
en
t n
o 
la
te
r 
th
an
 3
0 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e
no
tif
ic
at
io
n,
 w
ith
 th
e 
ex
ce
pt
io
n 
of
 th
e 
ca
se
s 
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
.
2.
If
 th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 d
o 
no
t r
ea
ch
 a
n 
ag
re
em
en
t o
n 
w
he
th
er
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
 n
ot
if
ie
d 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
it
h 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
1 
is
 c
on
si
st
en
t w
it
h 
th
e
re
le
va
nt
 c
ov
er
ed
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
w
ith
in
 3
0 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
no
ti
fi
ca
ti
on
, t
he
 c
om
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 r
eq
ue
st
 in
 w
ri
ti
ng
th
e 
or
ig
in
al
 p
an
el
 to
 e
xa
m
in
e 
th
e 
m
at
te
r.
 T
ha
t r
eq
ue
st
 s
ha
ll 
be
 n
ot
if
ie
d 
si
m
ul
ta
ne
ou
sl
y 
to
 th
e 
Pa
rt
y 
co
m
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t. 
T
he
 d
ec
is
io
n
of
 th
e 
pa
ne
l s
ha
ll
 b
e 
no
ti
fi
ed
 to
 th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
no
 la
te
r 
th
an
 4
5 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
su
bm
is
si
on
 o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t. 
If
 th
e 
pa
ne
l d
ec
id
es
 th
at
189
th
e 
m
ea
su
re
 n
ot
if
ie
d 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
it
h 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
1 
is
 c
on
si
st
en
t w
it
h 
th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 c
ov
er
ed
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s,
 th
e 
su
sp
en
si
on
 o
f 
co
nc
es
si
on
s 
or
 o
th
er
 o
bl
ig
at
io
ns
, o
r 
th
e 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
or
 a
lt
er
na
ti
ve
 a
rr
an
ge
m
en
t, 
sh
al
l b
e 
te
rm
in
at
ed
 n
o 
la
te
r 
th
an
 1
5 
da
ys
 a
ft
er
 
th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
th
e 
de
ci
si
on
. W
he
re
 r
el
ev
an
t, 
th
e 
le
ve
l o
f 
su
sp
en
si
on
 o
f 
co
nc
es
si
on
s 
or
 o
th
er
 o
bl
ig
at
io
ns
, o
r 
of
 th
e 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
or
 
al
te
rn
at
iv
e 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
t, 
sh
al
l b
e 
ad
ap
te
d 
in
 li
gh
t o
f 
th
e 
de
ci
si
on
 o
f 
th
e 
pa
ne
l. 
R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
M
ea
su
re
s 
T
ak
en
 
to
 C
om
p
ly
 w
it
h
 
th
e 
F
in
al
 R
ep
or
t 
A
rt
. 2
1.
21
 C
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
re
vi
ew
 
1.
T
he
 P
ar
ty
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d 
ag
ai
ns
t s
ha
ll,
 n
o 
la
te
r 
th
an
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
ex
pi
ry
 o
f 
th
e 
re
as
on
ab
le
 p
er
io
d 
of
 ti
m
e 
fo
r 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
it
h 
th
e 
fi
na
l
re
po
rt
, n
ot
if
y 
th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 P
ar
ty
 o
f 
an
y 
m
ea
su
re
s 
ta
ke
n 
to
 c
om
pl
y 
w
it
h 
th
e 
fi
na
l r
ep
or
t.
2.
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7.2.3 The EU’s Practice in the WTO Dispute Settlement System 
In 1995, the WTO agreements entered into force for the European Communities (EC)787 
and its Member States, giving them access to equal rights and obligations as the WTO 
Members.788 However, in practice, since the very beginning, the EU has exercised the 
bundled rights of its Member States for WTO-related affairs. 789  As a result, the 
European Commission alone represents the Union and its Members States in almost all 
WTO affairs,790 including dispute settlement in the WTO.791  
From an overview of the EU’s practice in the WTO Dispute Settlement System in the 
past 15 years, from a procedural perspective, four features can be identified that are 
relevant to the discussion in the present thesis and thus are examined in turn. 
7.2.3.1 Consistently Frequent Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement System with a 
High Success Rate 
Different from China’s experience in the WTO Dispute Settlement System, where the 
participation at different stages varied, the EU’s performance has been relatively stable. 
The EU has consistently made use of the WTO Dispute Settlement System to resolve 
state-state trade-related disputes, claiming its legal rights and addressing other WTO 
Members’ behaviour.792 As of 26 May 2020, the EU had initiated 104 cases, being the 
787 “European Communities (the EC)” was the official name in WTO before 1 December 2009, which then changed 
into “European Union (the EU)”. However, “European Communities” continues to appear in old materials. This 
thesis will use the term “European Union (the EU)” in general, unless it is clear that the subject was titled “European 
Communities (the EC)” when the relevant events took place. 
788 According to Art. XI (1) of the Marrakesh Agreement, the contracting parties to the GATT 1947 and the European 
Communities shall become original Members of the WTO. See: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization (signed on 15.04.1994, entered into force on 01.01.1995), Art. XI (1). See also: Frank Hoffmeister, The 
European Union in the World Trade Organization-A Model for the EU's Status in International Organisations?, at: 
Christine Kaddous (ed.), The European Union in International Organisations and Global Governance, Hart 
Publishing, 2015, p. 125. János Volkai, The European Union and its Member States' Participation in the World Trade 
Organization: A WTO Perspective, at: Christine Kaddous (ed.), The European Union in International Organisations 
and Global Governance, Hart Publishing, 2015, p. 116.  
789 Detlev Brauns & Tomas Baert, The European Union in the World Trade Organization Post-Lisbon: No Single 
Change to the Single Voice?, at: Christine Kaddous (ed.), The European Union in International Organisations and 
Global Governance, Hart Publishing, 2017, pp. 110-112. For this reason, WTO materials only refer to the “EU” (or 
the “EC”) in most situations. Sometimes references are made to specific EU Member States. This is the case in some 
disputes where an EU Member State’s law or measure is cited. It also happens when individual EU Member States 
speak in committee meetings, particularly in the Budget, Finance and Administration Committee. See: World Trade 
Organization, The European Union and the WTO, available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/european_communities_e.htm, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
790 In most meetings, representatives of EU Member States and the Union participate alongside each other, but only 
the Union’s representatives speak. When meetings are small and informal, even sometimes for consultations in trade 
negotiations, it may involve the Union’s representatives only. See: World Trade Organization, The European Union 
and the WTO, available at: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/european_communities_e.htm, last 
visited on 05.08.2020. 
791 There have been cases: (i) against the EU Member State concerned, such as Belgium-Administration of Measures 
Establishing Customs Duties for Rice (DS210); (ii) against the Union and EU Member States concerned, such as EC 
and certain member States-Large Civil Aircraft (DS 316); (iii) against the Union alone, such as European 
Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos (DS 135). 
792 Although there are 27 EU Member States and their interests may not always be consistent with each other, the 
high degree of delegation has enabled the EU to initiate complaints effectively. See: Alasdair Young, The European 
Union’s Use of the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Resolution Process, 2004, available at: 
https://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_36176_en.pdf, last visited on 07.08.2020.  
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second most prolific initiator of WTO complaints,793 among which nine cases were 
against China.794 
Frequently initiating disputes does not mean that the EU is litigious. Among the 102 
complaints initiated by the EU, only 49 cases entered into the adjudication process and 
eight cases were settled in the end through mutually agreed solutions during or after the 
adjudication process.795 Furthermore, the EU did not take action hastily when initiating 
disputes. In the cases where the EU resorted to adjudication for its claims, the success 
rate is significantly higher than the average of the top ten most frequent 
complainants.796 This points to the EU’s prudent attitude towards the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System. 
7.2.3.2 Supporting Attitude towards Amicable Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
In addition to adjudicative proceedings, Article 5 of the DSU provides for other 
amicable DSMs, including good offices, conciliation and mediation. However, these 
mechanisms have only been resorted to once and it was in a case involving the EC.797 
This case concerned Thailand and the Philippines as the complainants, on the one hand, 
and the EC as the respondent, on the other, and concerned tuna exports. The 
complainants had wanted to pursue adjudication, but, because of the EC’s insistence on 
avoiding adversarial procedures, mediation was chosen under Article 5 of the DSU. 
This was another attempt at an amicable settlement after the consultation failed. The 
WTO Deputy Director-General Rufus Yerxa was appointed as the mediator upon the 
request of the disputing parties. 798  During mediation, both parties sent written 
793 The EU comes only after the US which has brought complaints in 124 cases. In addition, the EU has acted as 
the respondent in 87 cases and requested third party status in 205 other cases. See: World Trade Organization, 
Disputes by Member, available at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm, last 
visited on 05.08.2020. See also: János Volkai, The European Union and its Member State's Participation in the 
World Trade Organization: A WTO Perspective, at: Christine Kaddous (ed.), The European Union in International 
Organisations and Global Governance: Recent Developments, 2015, p. 118. 
794  World Trade Organization, Disputes by Member, available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm, last visited on 05.08.2020. These eight 
cases are China—Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, DS339; China—Measures Affecting Financial 
Information Services and Foreign Financial Information Suppliers, DS372; China—Measures Related to the 
Exportation of Various Raw Materials, DS395; China—Provisional Anti-Dumping Duties on Certain Iron and Steel 
Fasteners from the European Union, DS407; China—Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on X-Ray Security Inspection 
Equipment from the European Union, DS425; China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten 
and Molybdenum, DS432; China—Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on High-Performance Stainless Steel 
Seamless Tubes (“HP-SSST”) from the European Union, DS460; China—Duties and other Measures concerning 
the Exportation of Certain Raw Materials, DS509; China—Certain Measures on the Transfer of Technology, DS549. 
795 Id. These eight cases are Korea—Laws, Regulations and Practices in the Telecommunications Procurement 
Sector, DS40; Japan—Measures concerning Sound Recordings, DS42; Japan—Procurement of a Navigation 
Satellite, DS73; United States—Measures Affecting Textiles and Apparel Products, DS85; India—Quantitative 
Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, DS96; United States—Measures Affecting 
Textiles and Apparel Products (II), DS151; Australia—Quarantine Regime for Imports, DS 287; Canada—Tax 
Exemptions and Reductions for Wine and Beer, DS354. 
796 Alasdair Young, The European Union’s Use of the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Resolution Process, 2004, 
available at: https://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_36176_en.pdf, last visited on 07.08.2020. 
797 World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement Without Recourse to Panels and the Appellate Body, available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c8s1p1_e.htm, last visited on 05.08.2020. The 
majority of amicable settlements in the WTO are realized through consultations. See: Alasdair Young, The European 
Union’s Use of the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Resolution Process, 2004, available at: 
https://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_36176_en.pdf, p. 4, last visited on 07.08.2020. 
798  Communication from the Director-General, Request for Mediation by the Philippines, Thailand and the 
European Communities, WT/GC/66, 16.10.2002. As the mediator, Rufus was requested to examine the extent to 
which a preferential tariff treatment granted by the EU to other WTO Members unduly impaired the two requesting 
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submissions to the mediator to explain the dispute, their positions and arguments, as 
well as attended meetings to deliver oral statements and to answer mediator’s 
questions.799 At a later stage, the mediator delivered an advisory opinion as to how the 
matter should be resolved. The dispute was settled in the end and did not proceed to 
panel proceedings.800 
This case provides a valuable example that demonstrates the possibility of successful 
mediation of state-state disputes in the WTO Dispute Settlement System. It also shows, 
to a certain extent, the EU’s supporting attitude towards state-state mediation.801 In 
order to promote the real use of amicable mechanisms in the WTO Dispute Settlement 
System, the EC also made contributions during the DSU reform negotiations. For 
example, it suggested that the compliance with mutually agreed solutions reached 
through these mechanisms should be examined via the procedures of DSU Article 21.5 
(or proposed 21bis) and 22, to the extent that they had been notified to the Dispute 
Settlement Body in full.802 The EU’s supporting attitude towards amicable DSMs 
resonates with its expression in the context of the WTO—“the purpose of a dispute 
settlement procedure is the amicable-and-quick-resolution of a dispute…any 
improvements of the DSU should contribute towards this overall goal of facilitating the 
earliest possible resolution of disputes”.803 
7.2.3.3 Mitigated Compliance and Vigorous Enforcement of Sanctions 
In the WTO Dispute Settlement System, compliance normally takes place within 
deadlines, without any party requesting authorization to retaliate. 804  The EU also 
generally has a good record of complying with the rulings from panels and the 
Appellate Body. In addition to the potential negative effect of retaliation full 
compliance is argued as a matter of “abiding by the international rule of law” and 
“helping a worldwide system to command respect throughout the entire 
membership”.805 A good record of compliance also improves the EU’s reputation in 
the WTO and helps when the EU is enforcing rulings against other WTO Members.  
Members’ legitimate export interests. 
799 Anna Spain Bradley, Integration Matters: Rethinking the Architecture of International Dispute Resolution, 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 32, 2010, pp. 31-32. 
800 The mediator called for the EC to establish a quota and tariff rates. On 5 June 2003, the EC adopted the mediator’s 
recommendation in Council Regulation (EC) No. 975/2003. See: Nilaratna Xuto, Thailand: Conciliating a Dispute 
on Tuna Exports to the EC, at: Peter Gallagher & Patrick Low & Andrew L. Stoler (eds.), Managing the Challenges 
of WTO Participation: 45 Case Studies, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 562. Communication from the 
Director-General, Request for Mediation by the Philippines, Thailand and the European Communities, Addendum, 
WT/GC/66/Add.1, 23.12.2002. 
801 In fact, prior to the Uruguay Round, the EC was regarded as being opposed to legalistic dispute settlement, but 
favoured amicable negotiated solutions. See: John Howard Jackson, The European Community and World Trade: 
The Commercial Policy Dimension, at: William James Adams (ed.), Singular Europe: Economy and Polity of the 
European Community After 1992, University of Michigan Press, 1993, p. 333. 
802  World Trade Organization-Dispute Settlement Body-Special Session, Contribution of the European 
Communities and its Member States to the Improvement of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/1, 
13.03.2002, p. 8. 
803 Id, p. 1. 
804 Ignacio Garcia Bercero & Paolo Garzotti, DSU Reform: Why Have Negotiations to Improve WTO Dispute 
Settlement Failed so far and What Are the Underlying Issues?, The Journal of World Investment & Trade, Vol. 6, 
2005, p. 860. 
805 Pieter Jan Kuijper & Frank Hoffmeister, WTO Influence on EU Law: Too Close for Comfort?, at: Ramses A. 
194
  
However, at the same time, the EU is unfortunately on the record as having delayed 
and incomplete compliance in several sensitive cases, such as Bananas, Hormones and 
GMO.806 Various reasons were pointed to as contributing to its imperfect compliance, 
such as the static state of WTO law and the vague notions contained therein,807 the lack 
of effective legislation ensuring implementation in defensive cases,808 and the priority 
of the EU’s fundamental societal choices involved in the disputes.809 Nonetheless, 
considering how few problematic cases there, non-compliance by the EU is rare.810 
The EU has been vigorous in seeking enforcement when the ruling was in favour of its 
position. Despite the difficulties in enforcing WTO decisions through the imposition of 
sanctions, the EU has been successful in overcoming these obstacles and realizing its 
legal rights through enforcement, especially when the stakes were sufficiently high.811 
Wessel & Steven Blockmans (eds.), Between Autonomy and Dependence: The EU Legal Order under the Influence 
of International Organisations, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2013, pp. 156-157. 
806  European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, DS27; European 
Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, DS291; United States—
Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC—Hormones Dispute, DS320. Although the EU adopted certain 
policy changes in every instance, they were not sufficient to placate the complainants. 
807 This leaves room for the judicial branch to exercise discretion and results in the hesitation of compliance when 
the exercise is not “right” in the eyes of the EU. See: Pieter Jan Kuijper & Frank Hoffmeister, WTO Influence on EU 
Law: Too Close for Comfort?, at: Between Autonomy and Dependence: The EU Legal Order under the Influence of 
International Organisations, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2013, pp. 156-157. 
808 There is only a partial legal basis in the EU’s Regulation 1515/2001, where the European Commission can 
quickly amend or repeal the disputed Union measure in accordance with the examination procedure after losing a 
case before the WTO. See: Council Regulation no 1515/2001 of 23 July 2001 on the measures that may be taken by 
the Community following a report adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body concerning anti-dumping and anti-
subsidy matters, OJ L201, 26.07.2001, codified by Regulation (EU) 2015/476 of the European Parliament and the 
Council, OJ L 83, 27.03.2015. If an EU Member State does not comply with the WTO decision, the only leverage 
that the European Commission has is the infringement procedure, which is in itself “cumbersome and not prone to 
prevent retaliation against the EU quickly”. See: Frank Hoffmeister, The European Union in the World Trade 
Organization-A Model for the EU's Status in International Organisations?, at: The European Union in International 
Organisations and Global Governance, Hart Publishing, 2015, p. 132. Thus, the European Commission in fact faced 
great pressure emanating from other Members in the WTO on the one hand and from its Member States on the other. 
See: Bart Kerremans, The European Commission in the WTO's DDA Negotiations-A Tale of an Agent, a Single 
Undertaking and Twenty-seven Nervous Principals, at: Spyros Blavoukos & Dimitris Bourantonis (eds.), The EU 
Presence in International Organizations, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2011, pp. 135-136, 138.  
Delays in the adoption of a negotiated settlement in the Banana case, or the compliance in Hormones case and GMO 
case, can be understood from the perspective of the high political costs in each of them. For analyses on the Banana 
case, see: Karen J. Alter & Sophie Meunier, Nested and Overlapping Regimes in the Transatlantic Banana Dispute, 
Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 13, 2007. Tim Josling & Tim Taylor, Conclusion, at: Timothy Josling & 
Timothy Taylor (eds.), Banana Wars: The Anatomy of a Trade Dispute, CABI Publishing, 2003, pp. 195-196. For 
analyses on Hormones Case, see: Chad Damro & Alberta M. Sbragia, The New Framework of Transatlantic 
Economic Governance: Strategic Trade Management and Regulatory Conflict in Multilateral Global Economy, at: 
Miriam L. Campanella & Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger (eds.), EU Economic Governance and Globalization, Edward 
Elgar, 2003, pp. 105-141. Sebastiaan Princen, EC Compliance with WTO Law: The Interplay of Law and Politics, 
European Journal of International Law, Vol. 15, 2004, p. 570. For analyses on GMOs Case, see: Thomas Bernauer, 
Genes, Trade and Regulation: The Seeds of Conflict in Food Biotechnology, Princeton University Press, 2003. Mark 
A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer, When Cooperation Fails: The International Law and Politics of Genetically
Modified Foods, Oxford University Press, 2009.
809 Pieter Jan Kuijper & Frank Hoffmeister, WTO Influence on EU Law: Too Close for Comfort?, at: Between
Autonomy and Dependence: The EU Legal Order under the Influence of International Organisations, T.M.C. Asser
Press, 2013, pp. 131-158, 148-153, 156-157. Alasdair R. Young, Effective Multilateralism on Trial: EU Compliance
with WTO Law, at: Spyros Blavoukos & Dimitris Bourantonis (eds.), The EU Presence in International Organizations,
Routledge, 2011, pp. 123-124.
810 Alasdair R. Young, Effective Multilateralism on Trial: EU Compliance with WTO Law, at: The EU Presence in
International Organizations, Routledge, 2011, pp. 119, 124.
811 Alasdair Young, The European Union’s Use of the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Resolution Process, 2004,
available at: https://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_36176_en.pdf, last visited on 07.08.2020. The one occasion where
it imposed sanctions, the Foreign Sales Corporations complaint, the potential value contained therein has been the
highest sanctions authorized thus far. See: United States—Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations”, DS108. 
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To date the EU has sought, threatened or imposed sanctions on five occasions, which 
is more than any other WTO Member.812 
7.2.3.4 Seeking More Transparency and a Stronger Judiciary 
Although the text of the DSU has not been changed since it entered into force in 1995, 
some developments can be identified in practice. One example is that more 
transparency has been gradually realized in the dispute settlement proceedings, 
represented by opening hearings and accepting amicus curiae. This is largely due to the 
efforts made by several WTO Members, including the EU. 
The WTO had always held hearings behind closed doors, which was criticized as 
departing from generally accepted judicial standards and, in particular, its reputation of 
“international standards of fairness, impartiality and due-process”.813 Encouraged by 
the willingness of the EU and several other WTO Members, there was an increase of 
transparency in hearings on an ad hoc basis since 2005. The first time that the WTO 
made hearings open for public observation was in the case brought by the EU against 
the US and Canada regarding the continued suspension of obligations in connection 
with the Hormones dispute.814 
Another issue related to transparency is amicus curiae. The acceptance of amicus briefs 
rests on the premise that providing a maximum amount of information to decision-
makers would contribute to more objective adjudication. 815  Similar to opening 
hearings, accepting amicus curiae in the WTO Dispute Settlement System also received 
support from the EU. In fact, the EU expressly presented its intention during the Doha 
round negotiations for the improvement of the WTO DSU. The EU pointed out that the 
DSU should provide sufficient flexibility for disputing parties to decide on the openness 
of their hearings, in order to show that trade dispute settlement was conducted in a fair, 
unbiased and professional manner. 816  In particular, it was necessary to define the 
812 The five cases are: United States—Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations”, DS108; United States—
Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, DS 248; United States—Anti-Dumping Act of 
1916, DS136; United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, DS217; United States—Measures 
Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft—Second Complaint, DS 353. For more information on the EU’s enforcement 
of sanctions, see: Alasdair R. Young & John Peterson, Parochial Global Europe: 21st Century Trade Politics, Oxford 
University Press, 2014, pp. 111-113. 
813 Ignacio Garcia Bercero & Paolo Garzotti, DSU Reform: Why Have Negotiations to Improve WTO Dispute 
Settlement Failed so far and What Are the Underlying Issues?, The Journal of World Investment & Trade, Vol. 6, 
2005, p. 854. The DSMs established under public international law normally provide for public access during the 
proceedings, which is the case of, for example, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 
814 In this case, following the joint request by the EU, the US and Canada, the panel decided to open up hearings in 
2005 and 2006. The proceedings were broadcasted through closed-circuit. See: World Trade Organization, DS320: 
United States—Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC—Hormones Dispute, available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds320_e.htm, last visited on 05.08.2020. At a later stage of 
this case, the Appellate Body made a similar decision to open hearings in 2008. See: European Commission, EU 
welcomes first opening of WTO Appellate Body hearing to the public, Press Release, 11.07.2008, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/july/tradoc_139603.pdf, last visited on 27.09.2019. 
815 Ignacio Garcia Bercero & Paolo Garzotti, DSU Reform: Why Have Negotiations to Improve WTO Dispute 
Settlement Failed so far and What Are the Underlying Issues?, The Journal of World Investment & Trade, Vol. 6, 
2005, p. 854. 
816  World Trade Organization-Dispute Settlement Body-Special Session, Contribution of the European 
Communities and its Member States to the Improvement of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/1, 
13.03.2002, pp. 6-7. 
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framework for allowing amicus curiae briefs better, in order to facilitate such 
submissions and avoid delays in the proceedings or additional burdens for the 
developing WTO Members.817 Decisions on whether to accept and consider amicus 
curiae briefs are now taken on a case-by-case basis in the WTO Dispute Settlement 
System.818 
In addition, although the WTO Dispute Settlement System already has a quasi-judicial 
nature, the EU is active in further enhancing the judicial features of this system. Typical 
evidence includes its proposal for establishing a permanent Panel Body. The EU 
suggested that such a body would be composed of 15 to 24 panellists, appointed through 
a process similar to that used for Appellate Body members or a less “political” selection 
procedure including a review of candidates by an ad hoc group of experts on WTO 
dispute settlement.819  Such a permanent Panel Body was argued as being able to 
expediate dispute settlement proceedings, issue consistent rulings, strengthen the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System’s judicial nature, and increase the involvement of 
developing countries in the panel process.820  
Most recently, on 5 July 2018, the EU submitted its proposals on WTO modernization, 
including a part on dispute settlement, which aims at “strengthening of the 
independence of the Appellate Body and its members” by introducing an additional 
mechanism for the interaction between them.821 For example, regarding the 90-day 
rule in Artice 17.5 of the DSU, the EU suggested a consultation obligation for the 
Appellate Body.822 In addition, it is suggested that there should be regular exchanges 
between the Appellate Body and WTO Members. The EU’s proposals were submitted 
in response to concerns raised by the US in the context of the crisis of the continuing 
the Appellate Body’s function which was caused by the US blocking the selection of 
new Appellate Body members. It is fair to say that such suggestions increase the 
influence of the WTO Members on the dispute settlement process, while, at the same 
time, they do not negatively affect the judicial function of the Appellate Body.823 
817 Id, p. 7. 
818  Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted on 06.11.1998, paras. 105-108. 
819  World Trade Organization-Dispute Settlement Body-Special Session, Contribution of the European 
Communities and its Member States to the Improvement of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/1, 
13.03.2002, pp. 3-4. Before this, there had been discussion papers submitted by the EU on 21 October 1998 and 23 
July 1999, and the text co-sponsored by the EC and its Member State before the Third Ministerial Conference, 
circulated as document WT-MIN(99)/8 of 22 November 1999. 
820 Id, pp. 2-3. See also: Marc L. Busch & Krzysztof J. Pelc, Does the WTO Need a Permanent Body of Panelists?, 
Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 12, 2009, pp. 583-584. 
821  Council of the European Union-General Secretariat, WTO–EU’s proposals on WTO Modernisation, WK 
8329/2018 INIT, 05.07.2018. 
822 The Appellate Body would need to consult with the parties early in appellate proceedings (or even before the 
appeal is filed) if it estimates that the report will be circulated after 90 days. If there is no agreement of the parties 
on exceeding this timeframe, there could be a mechanism pursuant to which the procedure or working arrangements 
for the particular appeal could be adapted to ensure the meeting of the 90-day timeframe. For example, the Appellate 
Body could propose that the parties voluntarily focus the scope of the appeal, set an indicative page limit on 
the parties' submissions or could take appropriate measures to reduce the length of its report. 
823 Communication from the European Union, China, Canada, India, Norway, New Zealand, Switzerland, Australia, 
Republic of Korea, Iceland, Singapore and Mexico and Montenegro to the General Council, WT/GC/W/752/Rev. 2, 
11.12.2018, available at: 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Language=ENGLISH&SourcePage=FE_B_009&
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7.3 The EU’s Practice of Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
Following the main approach to investment dispute settlement practice, in addition to 
state-state DSMs, the IIAs concluded by the EU also provide investor-state DSMs, 
granting foreign investors the right to resolve investment disputes directly with host 
states at the international level.  
Due to the change brought by the Lisbon Treaty, the EU’s investor-state DSMs can be 
divided into two groups: those concluded in the pre-Lisbon period and those from the 
post-Lisbon period. In particular, considering the importance of the EU’s current 
approach in this thesis, which set out to analyse the possible design of the dispute 
settlement system in the prospective China-EU BIT,824 the investment court system 
(hereinafter “ICS”) undoubtedly deserves particular attention and thus is explored 
separately in the following Section 7.3.3, infra. 
7.3.1 The Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in the Pre-Lisbon Period 
As introduced in Section 7.1, supra, the Lisbon Treaty transferred the competence for 
foreign direct investment from EU Member States to the Union. As a result, in the pre-
Lisbon period, the treaties on investment protection, including investment dispute 
settlement, were concluded mainly by EU Member States, only with the exception of 
the ECT where the Union and its Member States joined together. 
7.3.1.1 The Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in the EU Member 
States’ International Investment Agreements 
During the pre-Lisbon period, EU Member States were very active in negotiating and 
concluding investment treaties with third states, evidenced by their more than 1,356 
extra-EU IIAs. 825  Despite the occasional reluctance of Ireland, 826  all other EU 
Member States were relatively prolific in this field. In particular, Germany concluded 
about 130 IIAs, being the most productive state worldwide in this respect. Most of these 
IIAs include ISDS mechanisms, and nearly 1,200 of them contain provisions on 
investor-state arbitration. 827  As the European Commission stated, ISDS is “an 
Context=Script&DataSource=Cat&Query=%40Symbol%3dWT%2fGC%2fW%2f*&DisplayContext=popup&lan
guageUIChanged=true, last visited on 25.05.2020; Communication from the European Union, China, India and 
Montenegro to the General Council, WT/GC/W/753, 26.11.2018 and WT/GC/W/753/Rev., 11.12.2018, available at: 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Language=ENGLISH&SourcePage=FE_B_009&
Context=Script&DataSource=Cat&Query=%40Symbol%3dWT%2fGC%2fW%2f*&DisplayContext=popup&lan
guageUIChanged=true, last visited on 25.05.2020. 
824 It is apparent, at least until now, that the European Commission will probably push through its ICS in IIAs to be 
concluded in the near future. 
825 For an official list of EU Member States’ IIAs documented by the Union, see: List of the Bilateral Investment 
Agreements Referred to in Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 December 2012 Establishing Transitional Arrangements for Bilateral Investment Agreements between 
Member States and Third Countries, 2016/C 149/01, 27.04.2016. Among these IIAs, 1,160 are currently in force. 
See: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Investor-State Dispute Settlement: An 
Informationa Note on the United States and the European Union, 06.2014, available at: 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2014d4_en.pdf, p. 3, last visited on 06.08.2020. 
826  Ireland currently has no BIT with a third state in force. See: United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) Investment Policy Hub, IIAs by Economy_Ireland, available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/100#iiaInnerMenu, last visited on 06.08.2020. 
827  European Parliament, Prospects for a Multilateral Investment Court, 06.2017, available at: 
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established feature of investment agreements” and forms “a key part of the inheritance 
that the Union receives from Member State BITs”.828 
Many ISDS cases have been initiated under EU Member States’ IIAs. Studies 
conducted by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD)829 and by the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID)830 identified some features of the ISDS cases, where EU Member States or 
their investors are involved. First, investors from EU Member States are the greatest 
users of investor-state arbitration. As of 12 March 2015, the number of cases brought 
by EU investors in total was 327, accounting for more than 50% of ISDS cases initiated 
at the global level.831 Investors from almost all EU Member States had brought ISDS 
cases, and particularly investors from the Netherlands, the UK, Germany, France, Spain, 
and Italy had launched a total of 236 cases.832 Second, EU Member States have rarely 
been challenged by investors from outside the EU. Out of the 117 known cases in which 
EU Member States were respondents,833 only 29 cases were between an investor from 
a third state and an EU Member State.834 Furthermore, among this limited number of 
cases, EU Member States were more successful than other states in having claims 
dismissed.835  
Considering the purpose of this thesis exploring explore the possible design of the 
dispute settlement system in the prospective China-EU BIT, the focus will be limited 
to the 26 IIAs concluded between China and the EU Member States and the cases that 
arose from these IIAs. These IIAs and the cases illustrate the current ISDS system 
between China and EU Member States, which also provides a better understanding of 
the EU’s current practice. The analysis is provided in Section 9.2, infra. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2017/607252/EPRS_ATA(2017)607252_EN.pdf, p. 1, last 
visited on 05.08.2020. 
828 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards a Comprehensive European 
International Investment Policy, COM(2010)343 final, 07.07.2010, pp. 9-10. 
829 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Recent Trends in IIAs and ISDS, 2015, 
available at: http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2015d1_en.pdf, last visited on 06.08.2020. 
830 As of April 30, 2017, ICSID had registered 608 cases under the ICSID Convention and Additional Facility Rules. 
105 of these cases (17%) involved a State Party from the EU. No conciliation case had been registered by ICSID 
involving a State Party from the EU. See: International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), The 
ICSID Caseload-Statistics-Special Focus-European Union, 04.2017, available at: 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%20EU(English)April%202017.pdf, 
pp. 6 & 8, last visited on 03.08.2020. 
831  European Commission, Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)-Some Facts and Figures, 12.03.2015, 
available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153046.pdf, p. 5, last visited on 27.07.2020. 
832 Id. 
833 Among these cases, almost a quarter were faced by one state, the Czech Republic. Several EU Member States, 
such as Austria, Denmark or Finland, have not faced any known ISDS claim to date. See: United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Investor-State Dispute Settlement: An Informationa Note on the United 
States and the European Union, 06.2014, available at: 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2014d4_en.pdf, p. 1, last visited on 06.08.2020. 
834  European Commission, Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)-Some Facts and Figures, 12.03.2015, 
available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153046.pdf, p. 5, last visited on 27.07.2020. 
835 The data from ICSID shows the following figures for disputes against EU Member States: in 44% of the cases, 
all claims were dismissed or jurisdiction was declined; in 36% of the cases, the disputes were settled or otherwise 
discontinued; in 20% of the cases, the disputes led to an award upholding claims in part or in full. See: id. 
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7.3.1.2 The Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in the Energy Charter 
Treaty 
Like in the WTO, the EC became a member to the ECT along with its Member States,836 
for the first time assuming specific commitments in the field of investment. 837 In 
addition to state-state DSMs, which were introduced in Section 7.2.2.1, supra, the ECT 
provides DSMs to resolve disputes between an investor and a treaty party over alleged 
breaches of the treaty. 
Similar to state-state dispute settlement, the starting point of ISDS under the ECT is the 
desirability of an amicable settlement between the disputing parties, which can be 
realized through the good offices of the Energy Charter Secretariat. In the event that a 
dispute cannot be settled amicably within three months, the investor is allowed to 
submit the dispute to the courts or administrative tribunals of the treaty party, in 
accordance with any applicable previously agreed dispute settlement procedure, or to 
international conciliation or arbitration. With regard to investor-state arbitration in 
particular, both ad hoc and institutional arbitration are available. The content of the 
relevant provision in the ECT is summarized in TABLE 7.3.1.2. Considering the ECT 
is taken as “a child of the European Union”,838 the design of the investor-state DSMs 
represent the EU’s attitude towards ISDS at that stage. 
TABLE 7.3.1.2 Investor-State Arbitration under the ECT 
ECT 
Art. 
26 
Ad Hoc 
Arbitration 
Institutional 
Arbitration 
Applica
ble Law 
Result 
ICSID 
Arbitrati
on 
Other 
Institutio
ns 
A sole 
arbitrator or 
ad hoc 
arbitration 
tribunal 
established 
under the 
UNCITRA
L 
ICSID 
arbitratio
n 
The 
Arbitrati
on 
Institute 
of the 
Stockhol
m 
Chamber 
of 
The ECT 
and 
applicabl
e rules 
and 
principle
s of 
internati
onal law 
Arbitration awards are 
final and binding upon 
the parties to the 
dispute. Each 
Contracting Party shall 
carry out without delay 
any such award and 
shall make provision 
for the effective 
836  Council of the European Union & Commission of the European Communities, Council and Commission 
Decision of 23 September 1997 on the Conclusion, by the European Communities, of the Energy Charter Treaty and 
the Energy Charter Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects, 98/181/EC, ECSC, Euratom, 
23.09.1997. 
837 Frank Hoffmeister & Güneş Ünüvar, From BITS and Pieces Towards European Investment Agreements, at: Marc 
Bungenberg & August Reinisch & Christian Tietje (eds.), EU and Investment Agreements: Open Questions and 
Remaining Challenges, Nomos/Hart Publishing, 2013, p. 59. 
838 Jan Kleinheisterkamp, The Next 10 Year ECT Investment Arbitration: A Vision for the Future–From a European 
Law Perspective, London School of Economics Legal Studies Working Paper, Vol. 7, 2011, p. 1. For the following 
historic account, see: EUR-Lex, Final Act of the Energy Charter Conference, 31.12.1994, available at: https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:21994A1231(51)&from=EN, last visited on 30.07.2020. 
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Arbitration 
Rules 
Commer
ce 
enforcement in its area 
of such awards. 
While the first few ECT cases involving EU Member States were brought 
predominantly against eastern European states, the number of cases against western 
European states has been increasing in recent years.839 The Union has not been in the 
position of respondent in any ISDS case under the ECT,840 but it acted as amicus curiae 
in at least one case involving an EU Member State under the ICSID arbitration rules.841 
In the cases brought by EU investors, only ICSID arbitration has been resorted to, while 
arbitration cases under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or before the Arbitration 
Institution of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce may arise in the future.842 
7.3.2 The Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in the Post-Lisbon 
Period 
Although the Lisbon Treaty resulted in Union’s exclusive competence in foreign direct 
investment, the progress in negotiating IIAs has been made both by the Union and by 
its Member States, which are introduced respectively in the following. 
7.3.2.1 Progress Made by the Union 
After the Lisbon Treaty, the Union joined the impetus of reforming investor-state 
arbitration. This is evidenced by its concluded IIAs, its proposals for potential IIAs, as 
well as other relevant internal and external measures. As of 30 April 2020, three IIAs 
have been concluded, CETA (2012), the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018) and the EU-
Singapore IPA (2018). The relevant provisions in these Agreements have many 
similarities and, thus, it is fair to say that they represent the EU’s most up-to-date 
practice, which is expected will be insisted upon for prospective IIAs. All of these three 
IIAs set up both amicable and adjudicative mechanisms for ISDS. Negotiation, 
mediation and consultations are explicitly stressed as amicable DSMs. A court system 
has been created for adjudication. For a detailed analysis of the ICS, see Section 7.3.3, 
infra. 
7.3.2.2 Progress Made by EU Member States 
As a necessary arrangement following the shift in competence, a transitional regime for 
the existing IIAs concluded by EU Member States with third states was established, 
which is composed of a replacement mechanism and an authorization mechanism.843 
839 Deborah Ruff & Julia Belcher & Charles Golsong, Energy Charter Treaty Coming up for 20 years, 2014, 
available at: http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/energy-charter-treaty-115911.pdf, p. 4, last visited on 
27.05.2020. 
840 Frank Hoffmeister & Güneş Ünüvar, From BITS and Pieces Towards European Investment Agreements, at: EU 
and Investment Agreements: Open Questions and Remaining Challenges, Nomos/Hart Publishing, 2013, p. 59.  
841 This case is: AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/07/22. For some academic discussions on this, see: Frank Hoffmeister & Güneş Ünüvar, From BITS 
and Pieces Towards European Investment Agreements, at: EU and Investment Agreements: Open Questions and 
Remaining Challenges, Nomos/Hart Publishing, 2013, p. 60. 
842 Danae Azaria, The European Union's Contribution to the Law on Standing and Jurisdiction in International 
Dispute Settlement, at: Marise Cremona & Anne Thies & Ramses A Wessel (eds.), The European Union and 
International Dispute Settlement, Hart Publishing, 2017, p. 79. 
843 Regulation 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 establishing 
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Under this regime, EU Member States’ existing IIAs are maintained in force until new 
agreements that are concluded between the Union and the same third states and come 
into effect.844 At the same time, EU Member States are allowed to amend existing IIAs 
and conclude new ones with third states, provided that they obtain authorization from 
the European Commission. Therefore, a successful implementation of the Union’s 
international investment policy will subsequently result in the gradual replacement of 
at least some of its Member States’ IIAs. 
Relying on EU Regulation 1219/2012, by mid-2016, the European Commission had 
granted 93 authorizations to its Member States to open new negotiations, 41 
authorizations to open re-negotiations, 16 authorizations to conclude new treaties, and 
21 authorizations to conclude protocols for existing BITs with third states.845 Thus, 
after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, EU Member States still remain active in 
negotiating IIAs. In addition to stressing the preference for amicable settlement, 
arbitration held by the ICSID or ad hoc arbitration established under the UNCITRAL 
arbitration rules are often provided as investor-state DSMs contained in those newly 
concluded IIAs by EU Member States.846 It deserves attention that that some of these 
IIAs reflect features of the current investment arbitration reform. For instance, the 
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (2014) 
are explicitly required to be applied to investor-state arbitration.847 In the recently 
adopted Netherlands Model BIT, 848  more reforms of traditional arbitration were 
introduced, especially including some practices adopted in the EU’s ICS, such as the 
importance of using amicable DSMs, temporal conditions for bringing claims, rules on 
third-party-funding, cost-shifting, etc. 
7.3.3 The EU’s Up-to-date Approach to Investor-State Dispute Settlement—the 
Investment Court System 
Since 2015, the European Commission has been working on the establishment of an 
investment court project, with a view to setting up a permanent body for ISDS.849 
transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and third countries (adopted 
on 12.12.2012, entered into force on 09.01.2013), (2012) OJ L351/40. See also: Philip Strik, Shaping the Single 
European Market in the Field of Foreign Direct Investment, Hart Publishing, 2016. 
844 On 8 May 2013, the Official Journal of the European Union for the first time published the List of the bilateral 
investment agreements between EU Member States and third states. See: List of the Bilateral Investment Agreements 
Referred to in Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Establishing Transitional Arrangements for Bilateral Investment Agreements between Member States and Third 
Countries, 2013/C 131/02, 08.05.2013. This list includes the IIAs that, after the issuance of Regulation No. 
1219/2012, EU Member States wish to maintain or to permit to enter into force with third states that were signed 
before 1 December 2009. This list was recently updated in 2016. See: List of the Bilateral Investment Agreements 
Referred to in Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2012 Establishing Transitional Arrangements for Bilateral Investment Agreements between Member 
States and Third Countries, 2016/C 149/01, 27.04.2016. 
845 Stefanie Schacherer, Can EU Member States Still Negotiate BITs with Third Countries?, International Institute 
for Sustainable Development (IISD), 10.08.2016, available at: https://www.iisd.org/itn/2016/08/10/can-eu-member-
states-still-negotiate-bits-with-third-countries-stefanie-schacherer/#_edn11, last visited on 03.08.2020. 
846 See e.g. Agreement between the Government of the Hellenic Republic and the Government of the United Arab 
Emirates on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (signed on 06.05.2014, entered into force on 
06.03.2016), Arts. 10.1-10.3. 
847 See e.g. id, Art. 10.4. 
848 The finalized text was adopted and released on 19 October 2018. 
849  European Commission, Dispute Settlement, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-
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Remarkably different from classic arbitration, the three investment agreements 
concluded by the EU after the Lisbon Treaty—CETA (2012), the EU-Vietnam IPA 
(2018) and the EU-Singapore IPA (2018)—establish a bilateral two-tiered ICS for 
ISDS separately.850 This ICS can be taken as a radical reaction, or a sea change, to the 
widely used investor-state arbitration: it proposed a complete renovation, which, by 
nature, is a permanent court system with a high level of transparency and independence. 
Such a practice constitutes the EU’s most up-to-date approach on the issue of ISDS. 
There is much literature on whether the EU’s proposal of replacing traditional 
investment arbitration with an ICS is a workable and viable way forward to improve 
the current situation of ISDS.851 While considering the subject of this thesis, in this 
section, the focus is put on analysing the procedural features of the proposed ICS and 
the values the EU tries to pursue and promote. In order to do this, it first summarizes 
the development history of the ICS. Then attention is paid to the procedural features of 
this court system, followed by an exploration of the reasons and values behind them. 
CETA (2012), the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018) and the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), together 
with relevant internal documents issued by the Union, act as the basis of the following 
analysis. 
7.3.3.1 The Development History of the Investment Court System 
As the starting point, on 7 July 2010, the European Commission issued a policy 
document, “Towards a comprehensive European international investment policy”, 
which identified certain characteristics of the ISDS system that presented challenges 
and should be addressed in the Union’s international investment policy, such as 
transparency, consistency, predictability, and the possibility to appeal.852 After the 
mandate to negotiate a comprehensive trade and investment agreement with the US for 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership was given to the European 
Commission in July 2013, the negotiations, particularly on the inclusion of ISDS in this 
prospective treaty, faced fierce opposition from various sides.853 In response, internal 
markets/dispute-settlement/, last visited on 31.07.2020. 
850 It is noted that there are other DSMs created for special types of disputes like disputes on financial issues, which 
are not included in the following discussion. 
851 For comments challenging the EU’s ICS on a number of grounds, see: Maria Beatrice Deli & Maria Laura 
Marceddu, Is the European Commission Issuing a Dismissal Letter to Arbitrators?, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 
19.10.2015, available at: http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2015/10/19/the-investment-court-system-for-
ttip-is-the-european-commission-issuing-a-death-certificate-for-arbitrators/, last visited on 04.08.2020. In addition, 
different arguments have been raised on various procedural features of this ICS. For example, regarding the 
feasibility and application of the independence and impartiality prerequisites listed in the Code of Conduct for 
adjudicators in the ICS, see e.g. Sophie Nappert, Escaping from Freedom? The Dilemma of an Improved ISDS 
Mechanism, at: Loukas Mistelis & Nikos Lavranos (eds.), European Investment Law and Arbitration Review 
(Volume 1), Brill | Nijhoff, 2016, pp. 178-179. Qinglin Zhang 张庆麟, An Analysis of the EU's Reform of the 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism 欧盟投资者-国家争端解决机制改革实践评析, Studies in Law and 
Business 法商研究, Vol. 3, 2016, pp. 148-150. Elisabeth Talbourdet, The EU’s Investment Court System-A Possible 
Solution to Conflicts of Interest in Investment Arbitration, EU Law Blog–King's Student Law Review (KSLR) Blog 
on European Law, 10.04.2017, available at: https://blogs.kcl.ac.uk/kslreuropeanlawblog/?p=1121#.Wr9dZJNuZE4, 
last visited on 05.08.2020.  
852 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards a Comprehensive European 
International Investment Policy, COM(2010)343 final, 07.07.2010. 
853 For example, in 2014, the German Minister for Economic Affairs told the German Federal Assembly that he 
would block the planned ISDS clauses, which would allow foreign companies to bypass the national courts and 
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public consultations were opened, and the final report of the consultations showed the 
necessity of substantial and far-reaching reforms of the ISDS system.854 As a further 
step, on 5 May 2015, the European Commission released a Concept Paper, in which it 
addressed four major controversial issues by suggesting: (i) rectifying the investment 
tribunals’ imbalanced interpretation of IIAs by reiterating governments’ rights to 
regulate to achieve legitimate public policy objectives; (ii) establishing a roster of 
arbitrators to deal with arbitrators’ potential conflicts of interests; (iii) differentiating 
between the role of domestic courts and international tribunals: the former being 
competent to rule on investment disputes by applying domestic laws, while the latter 
would interpret the international agreement and would examine EU law as a matter of 
fact; (iv) proposing a bilateral appellate mechanism modelled on the institutional set up 
for the WTO Appellate Body, to ensure correctness and consistency in interpretation, 
and thus legitimacy, independence, impartiality, and predictability could be 
enhanced. 855  In addition, it was pointed out that these innovative proposals were 
intended to be the stepping stones towards the establishment of a multilateral ICS.856  
In September 2015, the European Commission released the proposed negotiating text 
for investment provisions within the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.857 
In this proposal, the European Commission clearly sought to transform investment 
arbitration into a court-like system, moving towards the final goal of fully replacing the 
old ISDS mechanism with “a modern, efficient, transparent and impartial system”.858 
On 14 October 2015, the European Commission further proposed a new trade and 
investment strategy, which particularly stressed the objective of developing “a coherent, 
instead appeal directly to international arbitration. He explained that there should be no double standards, which 
meant only the international investors had the rights before international arbitration tribunals, but not the national 
enterprises. See: Financial Times, Germany Expresses Concerns about US and Canada Trade Deals, 25.09.2015, 
available at: https://www.ft.com/content/671841da-44c1-11e4-bce8-00144feabdc0, last visited on 06.08.2020. 
854 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Papter-Report: Online Public Consultation on Investment 
Protection and Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
Agreement (TTIP), SWD(2015) 3 final, 13.01.2015. In this Report, the European Commission particularly identified 
four major areas which, among others, required a further analysis: (i) the protection of the right to regulate; (ii) the 
establishment and functioning of arbitral tribunals; (iii) the relationship between domestic judicial systems and the 
ISDS; and (iv) the review of ISDS decisions for legal correctness through an appellate mechanism. Relevant 
academic discussions on this can be found in: Tomáš Fecák, International Investment Agreements and EU Law, 
Kluwer Law International, 2016, pp. 282-283. 
855 In particular, it was stressed that the bilateral appellate mechanism and the fixed list of arbitrators would be a 
standard feature in all EU IIAs. See: European Commission, Concept Paper-Investment in TTIP and Beyond–the 
Path for Reform: Enhancing the Right to Regulate and Moving from Current Ad Hoc Arbitration towards an 
Investment Court, 05.05.2015, available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF, p. 
11, last visited on 29.07.2020. 
856 The next step would be establishing an actual fully-fledged permanent investment court with tenured judges on 
the basis of an opt-in system. The final objective is to multi-lateralize the court, either as a self-standing international 
body or by embedding it into an existing multilateral organization. This idea was put forward by a number of 
stakeholders, including EU Member States, the European Parliament and civil society groups in the public 
consultation conducted in 2014. See: id, p. 4. 
857 This was released together with a Reading Guide. See: European Commission, Reading Guide–Draft Text on 
Investment Protection and Investment Court System in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, 
16.09.2015, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5652_en.htm, last visited on 29.07.2020. 
The proposal was formally presented to the US in November 2015 after informal consultations with EU Member 
States and the European Parliament.  
858 European Commission, EU Finalises Proposal for Investment Protection and Court System for TTIP, 12.11.2015, 
available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6059_en.htm, last visited on 29.07.2019. 
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unified and effective policy on investment dispute resolution”.859 In December 2015, 
the EU and Vietnam finalized negotiations on their treaty where an ICS was 
incorporated and, in September 2016, such a court system was also added to CETA for 
ISDS.860 In April 2018, the arbitration mechanism in the former version of the EU-
Singapore FTA (authentic text as of May 2015) was updated, in which both parties 
agreed to use the ICS to substitute investment arbitration. 
While adding the ICS to treaty negotiations, the European Commission also seeks to 
expand the effect of this system to a multilateral level. In 2016, it made a proposal for 
a Council Decision authorizing the Commission to negotiate a Convention to establish 
a multilateral court on investment.861 Recently, the May 2017 Commission Reflection 
Paper on Harnessing Globalisation reiterated that the proposed multilateral investment 
court would create a fair and transparent mechanism for international investment 
disputes.862 At this point, it can be said that the EU’s proposal of the ICS basically 
came into force and concrete steps are being taken to move towards establishing a 
multilateral court system for ISDS. 
In response to Belgium’s request,863 the CJEU issued Opinion 1/17 on 1 May 2019, 
confirming the compatibility of the ICS with EU law in the context of CETA.864 It is 
fair to say that the importance of this Opinion goes beyond CETA’s ICS. Given the 
similarities between the ICS in CETA (2012) and those in the EU-Singapore IPA (2018) 
and the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Opinion 1/17 should also clarify the concerns about 
the legitimacy of the relevant provisions in the latter two IPAs. Furthermore, as 
underscored by Advocate General Bot in his opinion, “what is at issue here is the 
definition of a model which is consistent with the structural principles of the EU legal 
859 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Trade for All–Towards a More 
Responsible Trade and Investment Policy, COM(2015) 497 final, 14.10.2015. 
860 The 2014 version of the CETA relied on traditional investment arbitration with arbitrators appointed by disputing 
parties. In late 2015, the European Commission reopened negotiations with Canada, and the treaty parties agreed on 
incorporating the mechanism analogous to the Investment Court System in CETA. See: European Commission, 
CETA: EU and Canada Agree on New Approach on Investment in Trade Agreement, Press Release, 29.02.2016, 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-399_en.htm, last visited on 31.07.2020. European 
Commission, European Commission Welcomes Parliament's Support of Trade Deal with Canada, 15.02.2017, 
available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-270_en.htm, last visited on 31.07.2020. It is noticeable that 
Canada concluded a BIT with more conventional investment arbitration for ISDS just before the update of CETA, 
the Canada-Hong Kong BIT (signed in 2016), which could indicate the EU’s affirmative attitude to the ICS. 
861 European Commission, Establishment of a Multilateral Investment Court for Investment Dispute Resolution, DG 
Trade – F2, 01.08.2016. After that, between 21 December 2016 and 15 March 2017, an online public consultation 
was carried out, which showed overall broad support for a multilateral reform of investment dispute settlement. See: 
European Commission, Recommendation for a Council Decision: Authorising the Opening of Negotiations for a 
Convention Establishing a Multilateral Court for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, COM(2017) 493 final, 
13.09.2017, p. 5. 
862 European Commission, Reflection Paper on Harnessing Globalisation, COM(2017) 240, 10.05.2017, p. 15. 
863 On 7 September 2017, in the context of CETA negotiations, Belgium requested the CJEU to render an opinion 
on the ICS’s compatibility with EU law, in particular with (i) the exclusive competence of the CJEU to provide the 
definitive interpretation of EU law, (ii) the general principle of equality, (iii) the requirement that EU law is effective, 
and (iv) the right to an independent and impartial judiciary. See: Request for an opinion submitted by the Kingdom 
of Belgium pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU (Opinion 1/17), 30.10.2017, C 369/2. 
864 Opinion 1/17 of the Court (Full Court), 30.04.2019. 
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order”,865 therefore it is reasonable to say that this Opinion also envisages the ultimate 
goal of replacing the bilateral ICS in each IIA with a single multilateral ICS.  
7.3.3.2 Procedural Features of the Investment Court System 
Based on relevant provisions in CETA (2012), the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018) and the EU-
Singapore IPA (2018), this section discusses some key procedural features of the ICS, 
covering both the amicable and adjudicative DSMs contained therein. 
(i) Amicable Settlement through Negotiation and Mediation
Reaching amicable settlement through negotiation and mediation for investor-state 
disputes is recommended in treaty texts. Both the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018) and the EU-
Singapore IPA (2018) set out separate provisions on “amicable resolution”, generally 
emphasizing the availability of negotiation and mediation at any time, even during 
adjudication, and the significance in resolving disputes amicably.866 
In particular, mediation is further regulated in a separate provision, where rules on some 
key procedural issues are provided, such as the appointment of mediators. At the same 
time, in the two more recently concluded IIAs, the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018) and the 
EU-Singapore IPA (2018), a Mediation Mechanism for Disputes between Investors and 
Parties is attached as an annex to each of them, which contains a comprehensive set of 
investor-state mediation rules.867 These two sets of rules are nearly identical, covering 
issues of the objective and scope of mediation, initiation of the procedure, selection of 
the mediator, rules for the mediation procedure, implementation of a mutually agreed 
solution, time limits, costs, etc.868 Among these rules, several procedural arrangements 
deserve particular attention. First, mediation is established as a voluntary and structured 
process, with much room left for party autonomy and mediators with regard to the 
detailed procedural arrangements. Recourse to mediation can happen at any time and is 
without prejudice to the disputing parties’ legal positions or rights. 869  Second, 
mediators are supposed to be selected upon the agreement of the disputing parties and, 
if no such an agreement can be reached, either disputing party may request the President 
of the Tribunal to draw by lot and appoint a mediator from the members of the 
Tribunal.870 Third, mediators are explicitly prevented from giving advice or comments 
on the consistency of the measure at issue with the applicable IIA.871 This means that 
865 Opinion of Advocate General Bot (delivered on 29.01.2019), paras. 86, 108. For more discussions on the CJEU’s 
Opinion 1/17, see: Guillaume Croisant, Opinion 1/17-The CJEU Confirms that CETA’s Investment Court System is 
Compatible with EU Law, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 30.04.2019, available at: 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/04/30/opinion-117-the-cjeu-confirms-that-cetas-investment-
court-system-is-compatible-with-eu-law/, last visited on 31.07.2020. 
866 The EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.2; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.29. 
867 The EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Annex 6; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Annex 10. CETA (2012) postpones the 
adoption of mediation rules to a later action of the Committee on Services and Investment. See: CETA (2012), Art. 
8.20.2. 
868 These two sets of investor-state mediation rules are also basically the same as state-state mediation rules in the 
EU’s IIAs, with slight differences. See: the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Annex 10; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Annex 
9. 
869 The EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Annex 6, Art. 6.2; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Annex 10, Art. 6.2.  
870 The EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Annex 6, Art. 3; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Annex 10, Art. 3. This is different 
from the rule under CETA (2012), where disputing parties may request the Secretary General of ICSID to appoint 
the mediator if no agreement can be reached. 
871 The EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Annex 6, Art. 4.3; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Annex 10, Art. 4.3.  
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only interest-based mediation, instead of rules-based mediation, is allowed.872 Fourth, 
the process of mediation should be confidential, but the final result must be available 
to the public.873  Last but not least, the issue of the implementation of settlement 
agreements reached through mediation is not regulated. It also noticeable that a Code 
of Conduct for Mediators is attached to ensure the quality and the behaviour of 
mediators.874 
Compared to a simple reference to mediation that is often found in other IIAs in the 
world,875 the EU’s IIAs provide more concrete guidance on practical issues, which 
enhances procedural certainties and predictability in mediation proceedings and thus is 
expected to promote the use of mediation.876 
(ii) Consultations as a Precondition for Adjudication
Although consultations are also an amicable and informal DSM, different from the 
autonomous nature of negotiation and mediation, consultations are set as mandatory in 
the ICS with a minimum period of time prior to the adjudication procedure. 
Furthermore, in order to initiate consultations, an investor shall submit a request to the 
other disputing party, setting out, in addition to other information, the provisions that 
are alleged to have been breached, the legal and the factual basis for the claim, and the 
relief sought and the estimated amount of damages claimed. 877 This points to the 
corresponding requirement of consultations in the DSU, where it is stated that any 
request for consultations shall be submitted in writing and shall give the reasons for the 
request, including identification of the measures at issue and an indication of the legal 
basis for the complaint.878  
872 Interest-based mediation and rule-based mediation are used to describe the mediators’ function in the substantive 
aspect of dispute resolution—suggesting a resolution according to parties’ interests or making an assessment of 
parties’ positions based on the applicable law. See: Manon Schonewille & Jeremy Lack, Mediation in the European 
Union and Abroad: 60 States Divided by a Common Word?, at: The Variegated Landscape of Mediation: A 
Comparative Study of Mediation Regulation and Practices in Europe and the World, Eleven International Publishing, 
2014, pp. 25-35. 
873 For example, in the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), it is provided that “[m]utually agreed solutions shall be made 
publicly available. However, the version disclosed to the public may not contain any information that a disputing 
party has designated as confidential […] All steps of the procedure, including any advice or proposed solution, shall 
be confidential. However, any disputing party may disclose to the public that mediation is taking place”. See: the 
EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Annex 6, Art. 4.6. Similar provisions also exist in the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018). See: the 
EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Annex 10, Art. 4.6. 
874 CETA (2012), Annex 29-B; the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Annex 11; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Annex 11. 
875 See e.g. Art. 9.18 of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) 
provides that “[i]n the event of an investment dispute, the claimant and the respondent should initially seek to resolve 
the dispute through consultation and negotiation, which may include the use of non-binding, third party procedures, 
such as good offices, conciliation or mediation”. Here, only the possibility of resorting to mediation is mentioned 
and no further guidance is provided. 
876 Since investor-state mediation does not involve the issue of depriving jurisdictions of EU Member States in 
relation to investment cases, it should be less problematic in terms of the CJEU’s Opinion 2/15. See: CJEU Opinion 
2/15 of the Court (Full Court), 16 May 2017. In this Opinion, upon the request of the European Commission 
regarding the EU’s competence in entering into comprehensive economic agreements in the context of the EU-
Singapore FTA, the CJEU found that the EU did not have exclusive competence over ISDS provisions, since a 
choice between bringing a dispute before a court of an EU Member State and submitting it to international arbitration 
had the effect of removing the case from the jurisdiction of an EU Member State. 
877 CETA (2012), Art. 8.19.4. Similar provisions can be found in the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.3.2; the EU-
Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.30.1. 
878 The DSU, Art. 4.4. 
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It is noticeable that the requirement of the request for consultations is clearly 
distinguishable from the required information for initiating mediation. For initiating 
investor-state mediation, CETA (2012) prescribes that the request should identify the 
specific measure at issue, provide a statement of the alleged adverse effects of the 
measure complained of, and explain how those effects are linked to the measure.879 In 
comparison, it seems that the purpose of consultations is to let the disputing parties 
examine their cases from a legal perspective, such as examining the advantages and 
disadvantages of the respective positions as a preparation for the case going to 
adjudication, while negotiation and mediation are designed for disputing parties to try 
to resolve the disputes by considering the interests of both. In other words, consultations 
appear to be more of a process for parties to have a clear understanding of their legal 
positions and reconsider the value of their cases, rather than settling the disputes based 
on their overall interests. This understanding is based on the fact that an investor cannot 
identify a measure in its claim during adjudication if it was not identified in its request 
for consultations.880 Therefore, it is fair to say that consultations are a preliminary step, 
or a stepping-stone, to adjudication in the ICS, which should be differentiated from 
negotiation and mediation, at least from the perspective of their differing objectives. 
(iii) A Two-tiered Court System
As mentioned above, the key innovation of the ICS is the creation of a two-tiered court 
system for ISDS, which is intended to be a permanent institution composed of a 
Tribunal and an Appeal Tribunal with standing adjudicators.881 Thus, instead of having 
ad hoc arbitral tribunals, the ICS increases the level of institutionalization by including 
rules on the constitution of the adjudication body. 
Members of Tribunals are to be appointed jointly by the EU and the other treaty party 
to the relevant IIA, completely changing the arrangement in traditional investment 
arbitration in which investors have a say in the selection of arbitrators. 882  CETA 
Tribunal is composed of 15 members: five of the members shall be nationals of the EU 
Member States, five shall be nationals of Canada and five shall be nationals of third 
states.883 These numbers are different from those of the EU-Vietnam IPA Tribunal, 
where nine members are provided for: three coming from the EU, three nationals of 
Vietnam and the remaining three being nationals of third states.884 Under the EU-
Singapore IPA (2018), the total number is reduced further to six, two nominated by the 
879 The EU-Vietnam IPA, Annex 10, Art. 2.4. The EU-Singapore IPA does not contain any provision on the 
requirement of the request for mediation. 
880 CETA (2012), Art. 8.22.1. The EU-Singapore IPA and the EU-Vietnam IPA do not contain provisions on such 
requirements. 
881 Although it is widely referred to as a “court” system, CETA (2012), the EU-Singapore IPA (2018) and the EU-
Vietnam IPA (2018) do not use the term “court” or “judge”, instead, only “Tribunal” and “Members of the Tribunal” 
are adopted. The title “judge” was only adopted to indicate the members of the First Instance under the EU’s TTIP 
proposal. It is possible that the EU readjusted the tone to reduce any risk of “re-politicization”. See: Jan Paulsson, 
Avoiding Unintended Consequences, at: Karl P. Sauvant & Michael Chiswick-Patterson (eds.), Appeals Mechanism 
in International Investment Disputes, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 258. 
882 Gus Van Harten, Comments on the European Commission’s Approach to Investor-State Arbitration in TTIP and 
CETA, Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper No. 59/2014, Vol. 10, 2014, p. 21. 
883 CETA (2012), Art. 8.27. 
884 EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.38.2. 
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EU, two by Singapore and two from third states.885 Joint committees are in charge of 
corresponding appointments.886 The appointment length of members of Tribunals also 
varies. 887  For a specific case, the division shall be composed of one or three 
members.888 
Failing to settle disputes through consultations, an investor may submit a claim to the 
Tribunal on its own behalf or on behalf of a locally established enterprise under one of 
the provided rules: the ICSID Convention and Rules of Procedure for Arbitration 
Proceedings, the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 
or any other rules upon agreement of the disputing parties.889 After adjudication, the 
Tribunal issues a provisional award, which can be appealed before an Appeal Tribunal. 
Under the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018) and the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Appeal 
Tribunals are established in a permanent manner.890  An Appeal Tribunal shall be 
composed of six pre-ordained members, two of whom shall be nationals of a Member 
State of the EU, two shall be nationals of the other treaty state and two shall be nationals 
of third states.891 These members are appointed for a four-year or eight-year term.892 
Such explicit and clear guidance is absent under CETA (2012), where the composition 
and other administrative and organizational matters regarding the Appeal Tribunal are 
left for future decisions of the CETA joint committee.893 Similar to the arrangement 
for the Tribunal, the Appeal Tribunal shall hear an appeal in a division consisting of 
three members.894 For a specific case, the appeal is supposed to be made on prescribed 
grounds, including the Tribunal’s errors in the interpretation or application of the 
applicable law, manifest errors in the appreciation of the facts, including the 
885 EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.9.2. 
886 CETA (2012), Art. 8.27.2; the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.9.2; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.38.2. 
887 In CETA (2012), members of the Tribunal are expected to serve for a five-year term, renewable once. The terms 
of seven of the fifteen persons appointed immediately after the entry into force of the Agreement shall be extended 
to six years. See: CETA (2012), Art. 8.27.5. In the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), members shall be appointed for an 
eight-year term, and the inaugural terms of three of the six persons appointed immediately after the entry into force, 
which are to be determined by lot, shall extend to twelve years. A member’s term of appointment may be renewed 
by the decision of the joint committee. See: the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.9.5. In the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), 
members of the Tribunal are in charge for four years, to be extended to six for those pulled out. See: the EU-Vietnam 
IPA (2018), Art. 3.38.5. 
888 CETA (2012), Arts. 8.23.5, 8.27.9; the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Arts. 3.9.7, 3.9.9; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), 
Arts. 3.38.6, 3.38.9. The composition of a division is “random and unpredictable, while giving equal opportunity to 
all Members of the Tribunals to serve”. See: CETA (2012), Art. 8.27; the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.9.8; the 
EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.38.7. This is similar to the corresponding requirement of a selection of the WTO 
Appellate Body division for a specific case. 
889 CETA (2012), Art. 8.23.1; the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.6; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.33. 
890 The EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.10.1; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.39.1. 
891 The EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.39.2. The EU-Singapore IPA is slightly different on this point, since the 
nationality requirement is eliminated. See: the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.10.2.  
892 The EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.10.5; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.39.5. 
893 CETA, Arts. 8.28.3, 8.28.7. On this issue, it is noted that the European Commission made a proposal as regards 
the adoption of a decision setting out the administrative and organizational matters regarding the functioning of the 
Appellate Tribunal. See: Proposal for a Council Decision on the position to be taken on behalf of the European Union 
in the CETA Joint Committee established under the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) 
between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part as regards the 
adoption of a decision setting out the administrative and organizational matters regarding the functioning of the 
Appellate Tribunal, COM(2019) 457 final, 11.10.2019, available at: https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:d4636933-ec0f-11e9-9c4e-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF, 
last visited on 25.05.2020. 
894 CETA (2012), Art. 8.28.5; the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.10.7; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.39.8. 
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interpretation of relevant domestic law, and the conditions provided in Article 52 of the 
ICSID Convention.895 As a result, the appeal mechanism in the ICS not only aims at 
resolving a the procedural irregularity in a Tribunal’s award but also correcting its 
substantive errors. This clearly expands the scope of current relevant practice, arguably 
granting the Appeal Tribunal the power to give a case a de novo review.896 In the end, 
the Appeal Tribunal can maintain, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions 
in the provisional award in whole or part.897 This also goes beyond existing practice, 
such as the ICSID annulment proceeding, where the result is limited to “annul”—
voiding a decision in whole or in part.898 A final award issued by the Tribunal or the 
Appeal Tribunal shall be binding for the disputing parties and shall not be subject to 
other remedies, such as review, set aside and annulment.899  
The appeal system aims at increasing the quality of adjudication and realizing justified 
consistency and coherence, because appeal decisions are expected to have a persuasive 
effect on future disputes, indirectly resulting in the development of precedent. It is 
expected to resolve the problem of diverging decisions from different ad hoc 
tribunals,900 making the ICS more predictable in delivering consistent case law in an 
efficient and cost-effective way and reaching “acceptable levels of quality in 
jurisprudential outcomes”.901 The idea of having an appeal mechanism in ISDS is not 
new,902 but the EU’s ICS is the first to develop procedural designs in treaties, which is 
a much more concrete step than simply envisaging the possibility. 
Despite the fact that some features of the ICS are still ad hoc, it undoubtedly signals an 
evolution towards an “institutionalized” process. In addition, although, until now, the 
ICS has been built on a case-by-case basis, separately in the EU’s IIAs, as was foreseen 
895 CETA (2012), Art. 8.28.9(a); the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.19; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.54.1. 
896 Kristina Anđeli, Why ICSID Doesn’t Need an Appellate Procedure, and What to Do Instead, at: Jean E. Kalicki 
& Anna Joubin-Bret (eds.), Reshaping the Investor-State Dispute Settlement System, Brill, 2015, p. 502. 
897 CETA (2012), Art. 6.10.2; the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.19; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.54.3. 
898  Thomas Johnson, ICSID Annulment: Factual Review, The Second Conference of the British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law’s Investment Treaty Forum-Appeals and Challenges to Investment Treaty 
Awards: Is it Time for an International Appellate System, London, 07.05.2004. 
899 CETA (2012), Art. 8.41; the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.22.1; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.57.1. 
900 Audley Sheppard & Hugo Warner, Appeals and Challenges to Investment Treaty Awards: Is It Time for an 
International Appellate System?-Editorial Note, Transnational Dispute Management (TDM), 04.2005, available at: 
https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=399, last visited on 06.08.2020. 
901  Jürgen Kurtz, Building Legitimacy Through Interpretation in Investor-State Arbitration: On Consistency, 
Coherence, and the Identification of Applicable Law, at: Zachary Douglas & Joost Pauwelyn & Jorge Vinuales (eds.), 
The Foundations of International Investment Law: Bridging Theory Into Practice, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 
281. 
902 For example, the 2012 US Model BIT already introduced a provision envisaging the establishment of an appeal 
mechanism. See: the US Model BIT (2012), Art. 28.10. In 2014, the ICSID secretariats also discussed a potential 
appeal system. See: ICSID Secretariat, Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration, 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), 26.10.2014, available at: 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/news-and-events/news-releases/possible-improvements-framework-icsid-arbitration, last 
visited on 05.08.2020. Similarly, UNCTAD’s World investment Report 2015 suggested an appeal mechanism for 
international investment. See: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment 
Report 2015: Reforming International Investment Governance, 2015, available at: 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf, p. 150, last visited on 06.08.2020. At the same time, 
paying lip-service to the future development of an appeal mechanism has been fashionable in the IIAs concluded in 
recent years, which can be found in various IIAs of different states. See e.g. the China-Australia FTA (2015), Art. 
9.23. 
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and referred to in each of these agreements, the final goal is to set up a multilateral two-
tiered ICS.903 
(iv) High Professional and Ethical Standards for Adjudicators
The ICS sets clear and stringent requirements for the professional qualifications of 
competent professionals to serve as members of Tribunals and Appeal Tribunals 
respectively. In order to be a member of the Tribunal, having the qualifications required 
in the national state for the appointment to a judicial office or to be a jurist of recognized 
competence, as well as demonstrating expertise in public international law, are 
compulsory conditions.904  For members serving on the Appeal Tribunal, a higher 
requirement is set as possessing “the qualifications required in their respective countries 
for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or be jurists of recognized 
competence”.905  
Furthermore, in order to avoid any unnecessary influence, members of the Tribunal and 
the Appeal Tribunal shall be independent, not affiliated with any government, and they 
are prohibited from taking on work as a legal counsel in any investment disputes.906 
Finally, members of a division can be removed when their behaviour appears to be 
inconsistent and incompatible with continued membership. 907  Such strict ethical 
standards are further strengthened by the fact that the ICS created its own codes of 
conduct for adjudicators.908 By comparing the other international standards that can be 
applied to investment dispute adjudicators, such as the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of 
Interest in International Arbitration909 and the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators Code 
of Professional and Ethical Conduct for Members,910 the substantive criteria contained 
in the ICS codes of conduct only reaffirm the normal requirements of fairness, diligence 
and impartiality which can also be found elsewhere. The real innovation, or the true 
safeguard, lies in the binding nature of the obligations under the ICS, transforming them 
from soft law to enforceable norms. 911  Furthermore, compared to the procedure 
available to challenge a suspected biased arbitrator in the domestic law of the seat of 
903 CETA (2012), Art. 8.29; the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.12; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.41. In order 
to achieve this goal, the Union has identified two steps: the first one is the inclusion of the ICS in the EU’s future 
trade and investment agreements; then, as the second step, the EU is to work towards the establishment of a 
multilateral investment court by replacing all the bilateral ICSs. See: European Commission, Recommendation for 
a Council Decision: Authorising the Opening of Negotiations for a Convention Establishing a Multilateral Court 
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, COM(2017) 493 final, 13.09.2017, pp. 2-3. 
904 CETA (2012), Art. 8.27(4); the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.9.4; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.39.7. 
905 The EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.10.4; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.39.7. 
906 CETA (2012), Art. 8.30.1; the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.11.1; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.40.1. 
907 CETA (2012), Art. 8.30 (4); the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.11.5; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.40.5. 
908 CETA (2012), Annex 29-B; the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Annex 11; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Annex 8. In 
addition, CETA also requires the application of IBA Guidelines on Conflict of Interest in International Arbitration. 
See: CETA (2012), Art. 8.30.1. 
909 International Bar Association, IBA Guidelines on Conflict of Interest in International Arbitration (adopted on 
23.10.2014). 
910 The Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators Code of Professional and Ethical 
Conduct for Members (2009). 
911 Before the EU’s proposal, the arbitral community had attempted to solve the issue of arbitrators’ independence 
through the adoption of a number of procedural measures, but they are not legally binding and do not provide any 
enforcement mechanism. In other words, they can only be applied as “soft law” and thus lack efficacy. See: Matthieu 
de Boisséson, La Soft Law dans l’arbitrage, Les Cahiers de l’Arbitrage, Vol. 3, 2014, p. 520. 
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arbitration, these standards help prevent a bias developing.912 It deserves attention that 
the ICS in CETA (2012) passes on the important task of deciding challenges to 
adjudicators to a more unrelated body, the President of the ICJ. However, in the EU-
Singapore IPA (2018) and the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), this was changed to be dealt 
with in-house. The President of the Tribunal is tasked with hearing challenges to 
members of the Appeal Tribunal, and the head of the Appeals Tribunal likewise hears 
challenges to members of the First Instance Tribunal.913 
The high professional and ethical standards of adjudicators provided for in the ICS is a 
response to increasing doubts about the independence and impartiality of arbitrators in 
investment arbitration, especially the severely criticized “double-hat issue”.914 In the 
CJEU’s Opinion 1/17, independence in Tribunals is particularly addressed by 
confirming that CETA (2012) offers sufficient procedural guarantees to ensure this 
independence. 915  The European Commission explained that these standards were 
considered to be comparable to those required for the members of permanent 
international courts, such as the International Court of Justice and the WTO Appellate 
Body.916  
(v) Significant Roles of Joint Committees and Investors’ Home States in Investor-
State Dispute Settlement
The ICS establishes a joint committee and sets out its organization and functions in 
treaty texts.917 Such a joint committee is composed of representatives from each treaty 
party and its function relies on negotiations and cooperation between the parties. A joint 
committee is entitled to establish operative committees to implement a wide range of 
matters,918 which can extend the subject matter of the respective IIA considerably.919  
During ISDS, a joint committee is competent to rule upon issues of treaty interpretation 
by making recommendations, which shall be binding on a Tribunal and even the starting 
date of such binding effect can be determined by the joint committee.920 Such an 
912 Gloria Maria Alvarez et al., A Response to the Criticism Against ISDS by EFILA, Journal of International 
Arbitration, Vol. 33, 2016, pp. 15-17. Maria Beatrice Deli & Maria Laura Marceddu, Is the European Commission 
Issuing a Dismissal Letter to Arbitrators?, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 19.10.2015, available at: 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2015/10/19/the-investment-court-system-for-ttip-is-the-european-
commission-issuing-a-death-certificate-for-arbitrators/, last visited on 04.08.2020. 
913 The EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.11.2; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.40.2. 
914 This expression is used to describe the conflicts arising when a person in one investment arbitration case serves 
as a counsel, while serves as an arbitrator in another case that involves the same legal issue. See: Stephan W. Schill, 
Ordering Paradigms in international Investment Law: Bilateralism-Multilateralism-Multilateralization, at: Zachary 
Douglas & Joost Pauwelyn & Jorge E. Viñuales (eds.), The Foundations of international Investment Law: Bringing 
Theory into Practice, Oxford Univresity Press, 2014, p. 134. 
915 Opinion 1/17 of the Court (Full Court), 30.04.2019, paras. 195-204. 
916 European Commission, Reading Guide–Draft Text on Investment Protection and Investment Court System in the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, 16.09.2015, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-15-5652_en.htm, last visited on 29.07.2020. 
917 CETA (2012), Chapter 26; the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 4.1; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 4.1. 
918 For example, under CETA, nine types of committees focusing on more specific and technical issues are set forth, 
whose authorities are to be granted by the CETA joint committee. See: CETA (2012), Art. 26.2. 
919 Andreas Fischer-Lescano (Translation into English by Elisabeth Schmalen), The Limits of EU and Constitutional 
Law for the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the EU and Canada (CETA)-Legal Opinion 
on Behalf of attac/Munich, 10.2014, available at: https://blog.campact.de/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/Gutachten_CETA_engl_final_27112014.pdf, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
920 CETA (2012), Art. 8.31.2; the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.13.3; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.42.5. 
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arrangement is considered to reduce the risk of an unforeseen interpretation from 
adjudicators.921 It may also contribute to resolving the fragmentation of the decisions 
in dispute resolution, especially before the establishment of a multilateral investment 
court, at least for the disputes under the EU’s own IIAs.922 As has been pointed out, 
such novelties put forward by the EU appears to be crucial to overcome the 
“conglomerate of global fragmented and diverging bilateral rules”. 923  In addition, 
under the EU-Singapore IPA (2018) and the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), joint committees 
will meet once a year to examine difficulties in ISDS and consider possible 
improvements.924 Based on its assigned function, a joint committee was described as 
“a parallel permanent interpretive body for the interpretation in a coherent, authoritative, 
evolutive fashion that would be mindful of the intentions to the State parties”, which 
“would thereby dissociate the settlement of the discrete factual dispute from the 
interpretive, jurisprudential function”.925  
In addition to exerting an influence on ISDS through joint committees, the independent 
power of investors’ home states has also been enhanced by directly being involved in 
treaty and domestic law interpretation in ISDS. Regarding the former, in a particular 
case, the home state can make submissions or be invited by the Tribunal to attend 
relevant hearings and to give submissions on the interpretation of the IIA at issue.926 
As has been pointed out, a non-disputing state party has “a legitimate interest in the 
interpretation of the treaty to which they are a party”.927 In terms of the latter, domestic 
law is required to be treated as “a matter of fact” and the Tribunal shall follow the 
prevailing interpretation given to the domestic law by the courts or authorities of that 
treaty party.928 Such an arrangement aims at safeguarding the autonomy of EU law, 
and preventing the emergence of competing jurisdictions between Tribunals in the ICS 
and the CJEU, as well as any risk of incompatibility stemming from contrasting 
interpretations by international tribunals and the EU court.929 
The increased power of joint committees and investors’ home states in the ICS 
decreases the level of delegation, showing the EU’s intention for treaty parties to have 
921 European Commission, Concept Paper-Investment in TTIP and Beyond–the Path for Reform: Enhancing the 
Right to Regulate and Moving from Current Ad Hoc Arbitration towards an Investment Court, 05.05.2015, available 
at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF, last visited on 29.07.2020. 
922 Different joint committees under various IIAs include representatives from the EU. When the EU negotiates with 
one of its treaty partners through a joint committee on treaty interpretation, it would bear in mind its other concluded 
treaties where similar provisions are contained therein. 
923  Stephan W. Schill, Ordering Paradigms in international Investment Law: Bilateralism-Multilateralism-
Multilateralization, at: The Foundations of international Investment Law: Bringing Theory into Practice, Oxford 
Univresity Press, 2014, p. 141. 
924 The EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 4.1.3; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 4.1.3. The relevant provision in the 
CETA (2012) only states that the joint committee shall provide a forum for the treaty parties to consult on issues 
related to difficulties which may arise in implementation and possible improvements. See: CETA (2012), Art. 8.44.1. 
925  Sophie Nappert, Escaping from Freedom? The Dilemma of an Improved ISDS Mechanism, at: European 
Investment Law and Arbitration Review (Volume 1), Brill | Nijhoff, 2016, p. 188. 
926 CETA (2012), Art. 8.38.2; the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.17.1; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.51.2. 
927 Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States, American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 104, 2010, p. 182. 
928 CETA (2012), Art. 8.31(2); the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.13.2; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.42.3. 
929 European Commission, Concept Paper-Investment in TTIP and Beyond–the Path for Reform: Enhancing the 
Right to Regulate and Moving from Current Ad Hoc Arbitration towards an Investment Court, 05.05.2015, available 
at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF, last visited on 29.07.2020. 
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more control over ISDS.930 As a result, it appears that the Tribunal and the Appellate 
Tribunal, together with the joint committee, result in a triadic architecture for ISDS. 
Although the judicial nature of the ICS has been repeatedly stressed, after a second 
reading, it is clear that the diplomatically functioning joint committees play a role in 
decision making. This could raise concerns about letting diplomatic elements take over 
the judicial function of the ICS, going against the original purpose of creating an ISDS 
mechanism, which is to depoliticize the process. 
(vi) Intensified Transparency
Another typical feature of the EU’s ICS is the high level of transparency. To make 
proceedings more open and transparent, the ICS adopted the UNCITRAL Rules on 
Transparency (2014) or similar provisions,931 and even takes further steps to increase 
transparency to a higher level. 
In the ICS, procedural transparency is mainly reflected in two ways: through the 
publication of documents and open hearings.932 Regarding the former, it is provided 
that “the request for consultations, the notice requesting a determination of the 
respondent, the notice of determination of the respondent, the agreement to mediate, 
the notice of intent to challenge a Member of the Tribunal, the decision on challenge to 
a Member of the Tribunal and the request for consolidation shall be included in the list 
of documents to be made available to the public”.933 As a result, almost all documents 
are public. In particular, exhibits, which are excluded from the UNCITRAL Rules on 
Transparency, are also made public in the ICS.934 A relevant issue here is third-party 
funding, which refers to “any funding provided by a natural or legal person who is not 
a party to the dispute but who enters into an agreement with a disputing party in order 
to finance part or all of the cost of the proceedings either through a donation or grant, 
930 Two issues, who selects adjudicators and whether there is any standing body composed of treaty parties, were 
argued to present the amount of delegation. See: Todd Allee & Manfred Elsig, Dispute Settlement Provisions in PTAs: 
New Data and New Concepts, at: Trade Cooperation: The Purpose, Design and Effects of Preferential Trade 
Agreements, Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 341-342. The roles of the joint committee and treaty parties in 
the ICS were argued as possibly being inspired by the practice of the joint committee under the NAFTA. See: 
Shaotang Wang 王少棠, Legetimacy Crisis Resolved? Reconsideration of the EU's Reform of Investment Court 
System 正当性危机的解除?——欧盟投资争端解决机制改革再议, Studies in Law and Business 法商研究, Vol. 
2, 2018, p. 165. 
931 The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, as modified by IIAs, shall apply in connection with proceedings under 
the EU’s ICS. See: CETA (2012), Art. 8.36.1; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.46.1. Differently, the EU-Singapore 
IPA did not mention the application of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, but drafted its own Rules on Public 
Access to Documents, Hearings and the Possibility of Third Persons to Make Submissions. This set of Rules provides 
for levels of transparency that match those of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, with provisions and language 
that are sometimes directly copied from the latter. Moreover, the UNCITRAL Secretariat is designated as a repository 
for the documents and information covered by the annex, playing the role it already plays under the UNCITRAL 
Rules on Transparency. See: the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Annex 8. This can be the EU’s concession to Singapore’s 
lesser enthusiasm for those UNCITRAL transparency rules. 
932 Christian Tietje & Freya Baetens, The Impact of Investor-State-Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (Study prepared for: Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands), 2014, available at: http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/the-impact-of-
investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds-in-the-ttip.pdf, pp. 105-109, last visited on 30.07.2020. 
933 CETA (2012), Art. 8.36.2. Similar provisions are also available at the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Annex 8, Art. 
1.1 and the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.46.2. 
934 CETA (2012), Art. 8.36.3. A similar provision is also available at the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.46.3. The 
EU-Singapore IPA (2018) does not contain such a provision. 
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or in return for remuneration dependent on the outcome of the dispute”. 935  The 
disputing party benefiting from third party funding shall give a notification of at least 
the name and address of the third party funder.936 Hearings are public, in principle, 
except for situations in which the Tribunal determines that there is a need to protect 
confidential or protected information.937 Along with enhancing transparency related to 
documents and hearings, the ICS also works on opening the ISDS process for the 
participation of third parties. Third parties are explicitly permitted to submit amicus 
curiae briefs, provided that the status of the entity making the submission and the nature 
of its interest in the proceeding are presented.938  
Intensified transparency is a response to criticism against traditional investment 
arbitration where investor-state arbitration took place behind closed doors excluding 
the public and thus can be considered undemocratic. 939  In fact, the European 
Commission had been strongly advocating for ISDS transparency since 2010.940 The 
approach to transparency adopted in the ICS represents the EU’s assertive stance of 
seeking more transparent dispute settlement proceedings. This practice has shifted 
significantly from the prevailing practice adopted in EU Member States’ BITs, and it 
even goes beyond what has been considered common in the procedural laws in 
European Member States, where similarly a state is the respondent and therefore public 
interest is naturally involved.941 This is also a radical step in light of the positions 
expressed by EU Member States during the discussions on the formulation of the 
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency.942 It was explained by the European Commission 
that “[i]n line with the EU’s approach in the WTO, the EU should ensure that investor-
state dispute settlement is conducted in a transparent manner (including requests for 
arbitration, submissions, open hearings, amicus curiae briefs and publication of 
awards)”.943 Therefore, it seems that, for dispute resolution in the area of international 
935 CETA (2012), Art. 8.1. Similar definitions are available at the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.1.1 and the EU-
Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.28. 
936 CETA (2012), Art. 8.26.1; the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.8.1. The EU-Vietnam IPA (2018) further 
requires the disclosure of the existence and nature of the funding arrangement, and any failure to disclose third-party 
funding may affect the tribunal’s eventual costs order. See: the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Arts. 3.37.1, 3.37.3. 
937 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency (2014), Art. 6; the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Annex 8, Art. 2. 
938 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency (2014), Art. 4; the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Annex 9, paras. 42-44. 
939 Pia Eberhardt & Cecilia Olivet with contributions from Tyler Amos & Nick Buxton, Profiting from Injustice: 
How Law Firms, Arbitrators and Financiers are Fueling an Investment Arbitration Boom, Corporate Europe 
Observatory and the Transnational Institute, 2012. Stephan W. Schill, International Investment Law and the Rule of 
Law, at: Jeffrey Lowell & J. Christopher Thomas & Jan van Zyl Smit (eds.), Rule of Law Symposium 2014: The 
Importance of the Rule of Law in Promoting Development, Singapore: Academy Publishing, 2015, pp. 81, 84. 
940 Jansen N. Calamita, Dispute Settlement Transparency in Europe’s Evolving Investment Treaty Policy, The 
Journal of World Investment & Trade, Vol. 15, 2014, pp. 672-675. 
941 In this sense, in contrast, the practice of some arbitration institutions that are involved in investment arbitration, 
such as ICSID and the Secretariat of the ECT which normally only publishes the registration and subject of cases, 
was argued to be “much in tradition of European procedural laws”. See: Mathias Wolkewitz, Transparency and 
Independence of Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration: Rule of Law Implications, European Investment Law and 
Arbitration Review, Vol. 1, 2016, pp. 295-296.  
942 It was pointed out that the formal positions submitted by EU Member States to UNCITRAL in 2010 showed that 
“not a single EU Member State came out in general favour of transparency” and considerable scepticism about the 
necessity of transparency in ISDS without consent from the disputing parties in specific cases was raised. See: Jansen 
N. Calamita, Dispute Settlement Transparency in Europe’s Evolving Investment Treaty Policy, The Journal of World
Investment & Trade, Vol. 15, 2014, p. 672.
943 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards a Comprehensive European
International Investment Policy, COM(2010)343 final, 07.07.2010, p. 10.
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trade and investment law, the EU intends to maintain a consistent approach towards 
procedural transparency; at the same time, compared to internal standards, a higher 
standard of transparency is preferred in international adjudication proceedings. 
(vii) Mechanisms for Scrutinizing Claims
The ICS includes filters to restrict investors’ access and to prevent possible abuse, 
including the time limits for filing a claim, a prohibition against parallel proceedings, a 
fast-track system for rejecting unfounded or frivolous claims, and a loser pays rule. 
First, investors can only bring a claim within a limited period of time, namely three 
years or 30 months after the knowledge of the treatment alleged to be inconsistent with 
the relevant IIA and knowledge of the loss or damage alleged to have been incurred is 
first attained or should have been first acquired.944 Second, parallel proceedings are 
prohibited, in order to avoid double compensation and diverging verdicts. With respect 
to a measure alleged to constitute a breach of the underlying IIA, withdrawing or 
discontinuing any existing proceeding before a tribunal or a court under domestic or 
international law is provided as a precondition to bringing a claim to the ICS.945 Third, 
an innovative fast track system for rejecting unfounded or frivolous claims is 
established, through which claims manifestly without legal merit or unfounded as a 
matter of law can be thrown out promptly.946 Fourth, under the ICS, the losing party is 
supposed to pay the costs.947 The clear expression of the loser pays rule changes the 
current situation that a government in an investor-state arbitration case probably needs 
to bear at least all of its own costs, even if it is successful.948 
These mechanisms for scrutinizing claims can prevent investors from abusing their 
rights and have a certain deterrent effect on investors causing them be more cautious 
about bringing a claim to the Tribunal. Furthermore, an article on security for costs can 
be found in the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018),949 which can also lead a potential claimant to 
reconsider its case and thus indirectly filter some claims. 
7.3.3.3 Analysis of the Investment Court System 
The innovations in the ICS have caused heated discussions on many technical and 
practical issues. 950  Instead of summarizing the existing discussion or giving the 
author’s own analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of various procedural 
arrangements, in line with the analysis in previous chapters, this section aims at 
944 CETA (2012), Art. 8.19.6; the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.3.3; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.30.2. 
945 CETA (2012), Art. 8.22 (1); the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.7.1; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.34.1. 
946 CETA (2012), Arts. 8.32, 8.33; the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Arts. 3.14, 3.15; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Arts. 
3.44, 3.45. 
947 CETA (2012), Art. 8.39.5; the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.21.1; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.53.4. 
948 European Commission, Investment Provisions in the EU-Canada Free Trade Agreement (CETA), 25.09.2014, 
available at: http://data.parliament.uk/DepositedPapers/Files/DEP2015-
0877/Lord_Livingston_to_Sir_William_Cash_MP_05.03.15_Annex_B.PDF, p. 6, last visited on 31.07.2020. 
949 The EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.48. Considering the fact that Vietnam’s experience of struggling to collect 
on a trio of costs orders against unsuccessful BIT claimants and the absence of similar provisions in CETA (2012) 
and the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), this article may be inserted based on Vietnam’s request. 
950 See, e.g. Maria Beatrice Deli & Maria Laura Marceddu, Is the European Commission Issuing a Dismissal Letter 
to Arbitrators?, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 19.10.2015, available at: 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2015/10/19/the-investment-court-system-for-ttip-is-the-european-
commission-issuing-a-death-certificate-for-arbitrators/, last visited on 04.08.2020.  
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exploring the underlying reasons for the features identified in Section 7.3.3.2, supra, 
with a view to revealing the values underpinning the EU’s choices. 
(i) Strengthening Amicable Dispute Settlement Mechanisms as an Alternative
Way to have Access to Justice
In the ICS, various treaty provisions provided for amicable DSMs, aiming at 
incorporating and strengthening the use of DSMs for ISDS in practice, especially 
mediation.  
This recalls the EU’s internal encouragement for using mediation in recent years. As 
discussed in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, supra, many internal measures have been taken by 
the Union, which evidenced the trend of promoting the use of amicable DSMs. The 
underpinnings for these measures are complex, but taking non-adjudication DSMs as 
an alternative way to have access to justice, which is an indispensable element of the 
rule of law, arguably also partly explains the EU’s support of amicable mechanisms for 
ISDS at the international level, especially considering the fact that pursuing the rule of 
law is also a guiding principle in the EU’s external action. 951  In particular, the 
advantages of amicable DSMs as more cost-effective ways than resorting to 
international adjudication ensures that disputing parties have access to justice, and this 
is especially important for small and medium-sized enterprises. In conclusion, amicable 
DSMs complement adjudication procedures in the ICS in realizing access to justice and 
the international rule of law. 
(ii) The Preference for a Permanent Two-tiered Court System to Enhance the
Soundness of Jurisprudence
Inspired by the dissatisfaction with traditional investment arbitration, the EU’s 
complete abandonment of arbitration and its proposal of the ICS is rather radical and 
innovative compared to the measures taken by other actors in this are around the 
world.952 Justifications for such an approach should thus go beyond simply responding 
to the drawbacks of arbitration. 
First of all, to the EU, the reform of investment arbitration is probably not due to doubts 
about investors’ rights to bring actions against states, since granting individuals such a 
right is not exceptional under EU law. On the contrary, EU law provides very similar 
standards under the fundamental freedoms. In particular, the CJEU did not object to the 
possibility of an individual bringing a complaint to the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) when it considered accession to the European Convention on Human 
Rights.953 It is important to note, however, that the procedural setting of international 
arbitration for resolving disputes between an investor and its host state is not typical. 
The CJEU is a typical judicial organ with a permanent two-tiered institution. This is 
951 Laurent Pech, Rule of Law as a Guiding Principle of the European Union’s External Action, Centre for the Law 
of EU External Relations (CLEER) Working Papers, Vol. 3, 2012. 
952 Shaotang Wang 王少棠, Legetimacy Crisis Resolved? Reconsideration of the EU's Reform of Investment Court 
System 正当性危机的解除?——欧盟投资争端解决机制改革再议, Studies in Law and Business 法商研究, Vol. 
2, 2018, p. 159. 
953 Juliane Kokott & Christoph Sobotta, Investment Arbitration and EU Law, Cambridge Yearbook of European 
Legal Studies, Vol. 18, 2016, pp. 4, 17-18. 
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also the case for the ECtHR. However, investment arbitration is often carried out ad 
hoc with no possibility of appeal. Second, in arbitration, arbitrators are often selected 
by the disputing parties, and thus their independence, impartiality and professionality 
may not be fully guaranteed. In particular, the arbitrators that are currently active in 
investment cases often come from the area of commercial arbitration and thus may not 
pay enough attention to the special nature of the cases in which a state is involved. At 
the same time, they may adjudicate issues from a private law perspective, which is not 
suitable for international investment law. More importantly, the justification of 
democracy is missing when an adjudicator is selected by a private entity in ISDS. Third, 
under EU law, investor protection primarily relies on the judiciary of the EU Member 
States and the CJEU, which are linked because of the preliminary ruling procedure and 
enables the CJEU to give a binding interpretation of EU law.954 However, the same 
does not apply to international arbitration. Therefore, it is fair to say that the problem 
that the EU probably wanted to resolve is the entire structure of arbitration, not just 
certain elements of the current practice of investor-state arbitration. 
As a result, it is not be completely unexpected that the EU proposed a court system for 
ISDS, which, as a temporary arrangement, is bilateral and intended to be multilateral 
as the final goal. In fact, the establishment of a permanent multilateral structure for 
international investment dispute settlement has been proposed by the EU for a relatively 
long time. As early as 1995, negotiations on a Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
started at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
where the EC requested the OECD “as a contribution to strengthening the multilateral 
system, to pursue its work aimed at elaborating a multilateral investment agreement”.955 
However, the negotiations were discontinued in 1998.956 Later, at the WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Cancun in 2003, the EC tried to put investment on the agenda, which 
failed again however.957 After realizing that the existing platforms were not capable of 
providing solutions, or at least the prospect of this was quite gloomy, the EU proposed 
the ICS when the time came to propose a new generation of ISDS mechanisms for its 
own IIAs. In addition, it should be noted that, from the perspective of its institutional 
954 Id, p. 4. 
955 Commission of the European Communities, A Level Playing Field for Direct Investment World-Wide, COM(95) 
42 final, 01.03.1995, p. 13. Negotiations on a proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment were launched by 
governments at the Annual Meeting of the OECD Council at Ministerial level in May 1995. The objective was to 
provide a broad multilateral framework for international investment with high standards for the liberalization of 
investment regimes and investment protection and with effective dispute settlement procedures. See: The 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 
available at: 
https://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/multilateralagreementoninvestment.htm, last 
visited on 05.08.2020. 
956 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 
available at: 
https://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/multilateralagreementoninvestment.htm, last 
visited on 05.08.2020. 
957 Martin Khor, The “Singapore Issues” in the WTO: Evolution and Implications for Developing Countries, TWN 
Trade & Development Series, Vol. 33, 2007, p. 15. 
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features, the ICS goes further than the WTO Dispute Settlement System and rather 
resembles the EU’s internal practice of the CJEU.958  
Such a permanent court system can arguably ensure the development of jurisprudence 
and the rule of law. First, the permanent nature of the ICS would help to ensure more 
consistency in judgments. A court can naturally develop its jurisprudence by letting 
former cases have precedential effects on latter cases. Second, the high standard of 
specific requirements imposed on members of Tribunals and Appeal Tribunals reduce 
uncertainty as to the expected professional conduct of the adjudicators. It was argued 
that the ICS ensures that adjudicators understand their role as faithfully interpreting and 
applying the agreement that was concluded by the treaty parties.959 Furthermore, the 
predefined roster ensures the independence and democratic basis of the appointment of 
adjudicators.960 In addition to that, the security of tenure protects adjudicators from 
unnecessary influence. Third, the system’s inherent high level of transparency 
guarantees the realization of a fair trial and due process.961 Last but not least, the 
inclusion of an appeal mechanism strengthens the jurisprudence of the ICS. Such an 
inclusion in fact is consistent with the suggestion to add investment to the WTO 
framework, where an Appellate Body would be available to supervise dispute 
resolution at the panel level. As shown by the Appellate Body in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System, such an appeal mechanism could increase consistency, 
predictability and legitimacy.962 Although the pursuit of consistency and coherence 
may continue to face difficulties as long as investment law is characterized by a 
multitude of bilateral treaties, such an appeal structure could help to institutionalize the 
dispute settlement procedure,963 as well as encourage the adjudicative body to continue 
958 The distinction between dispute settlement systems on institutional feature can be made between permanent 
tribunals such as the CJEU and the ad hoc arbitration tribunals, such as NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals, or the 
combination of both, such as the WTO Dispute Settlement System. See: Yan Luo, Dispute Settlement in the Proposed 
East Asia Free Trade Agreement: Lessons Learned from the ASEAN, the NAFTA, and the EU, at: Lorand Bartels & 
Federico Ortino (eds.), Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 
431. 
959 Comparing the situation where the disputing parties select the arbitrators ex post to one where the treaty parties 
select the adjudicators ex ante, the later was argued to help nudge states towards selecting balanced adjudicators. 
See: Anthea Roberts, Would a Multilateral Investment Court be Biased? Shifting to a Treaty Party Framework of 
Analysis, EJIL: Talk!, 28.04.2017, available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/would-a-multilateral-investment-court-be-
biased-shifting-to-a-treaty-party-framework-of-analysis/, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
960 As pointed out, adjudicators are important to guarantee to jurisprudence and can safeguard the legitimacy of a 
system, since the effectiveness of an international tribunal depends on the quality of the individuals who sit on the 
bench in specific cases. See: Luis González García, Making Impossible Investor-State Reform Possible, at: 
Reshaping the Investor-State Dispute Settlement System: Journeys for the 21st Century, Brill | Nijhoff, 2015, p. 433. 
Mathias Wolkewitz, Transparency and Independence of Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration: Rule of Law 
Implications, European Investment Law and Arbitration Review, Vol. 1, 2016, p. 298. 
961 Mathias Wolkewitz, Transparency and Independence of Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration: Rule of Law 
Implications, European Investment Law and Arbitration Review, Vol. 1, 2016, pp. 295-296. 
962  Thomas Wälde, Alternatives for Obtaining Greater Consistency in Investment Arbitration: An Appellate 
Institution after the WTO, Authoritative Treaty Arbitration or Mandatory Consolidation?, Transnational Dispute 
Management (TDM), 2005, available at: https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=421, 
last visited on 06.08.2020. Katia Yannaca-Small, Arbitration Under International Investment Agreements: A Guide 
to the Key Issues, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 629. Anders Nilsson & Oscar Englesson, Inconsistent Awards 
in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Is an Appeals Court Needed?, Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 30, 2013, 
p. 576. Thomas Schultz, Against Consistency in Investment Arbitration, at: Zachary Douglas & Joost Pauwelyn & 
Jorge E. Viñuales (eds.), The Foundations of International Investment Law: Bringing Theory into Practice, Oxford 
University Press, 2014, pp. 5-6.
963  Doak Bishop, The Case for an Appellate Panel and its Scope of Review, 04.2005, available at:
https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=403, p. 10, last visited on 30.07.2020.
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with the development of precedents and sound jurisprudence.964 At the same time, 
using a higher appellate body for the decision process could exert pressure on 
adjudicators at the lower level to bring their behaviour into alignment with the 
requirement of due process, which is an indispensable element of the rule of law.965 
From the perspective of being a “self-contained” or “autonomous” system, the 
combination of a tribunal and an appeal tribunal creates a “public justice system”, like 
those in the EU Member States’ national legal systems and the EU internal practice in 
the CJEU. 966  Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that various procedural 
arrangements in the ICS could simultaneously contribute to the soundness of 
jurisprudence and compliance with the rule of law. 
(iii) Granting Treaty Parties a Significant Role to Stress the Public Law Nature of
International Investment Law
In the ICS, treaty parties are granted a significant role in ISDS. First, adjudicators 
within this system are to be selected by treaty parties, rather than disputing parties, 
which completely deprives private investors a role in the selection of adjudicators. 
Second, treaty parties have the power to unilaterally make submissions on treaty 
interpretation, and such submissions must be accepted by the adjudicators. At the same 
time, the states’ interpretations of their domestic laws are required to be taken as fact 
in ISDS. In addition, the right of the joint committee to issue authoritative and binding 
interpretations of the IIA at issue further increases the influence of treaty parties. 
Different approaches to ISDS originate in the diverse interpretations of the nature of 
ISDS. In this vein, the complete change from the traditional commercial arbitration-
based investor-state adjudication process to a model that is normally used in 
international public law indicates the understanding by the EU of ISDS as belonging to 
international public law, instead of international private law. The use of pre-selected 
adjudicators is typical evidence of this view, since such a practice can only be found in 
existing state-state DSMs. 967  The public law understanding also explains the 
significant role given to the joint committee and treaty parties, as well as approaches to 
various detailed procedural issues, such as transparency. It arguably constitutes the 
theoretical foundation of the ICS. In fact, this international public law approach 
964 Jaemin Lee, Introduction of an Appellate Review Mechanism for International Investment Disputes: Expected 
Benefits and Remaining Tasks, at: Jean E. Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret (eds.), Reshaping the Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement System-Journeys for the 21st Century, Brill | Nijhoff, 2015, p. 481. 
965 Richard L. Abel, A Comparative Theory of Dispute Institutions in Society, Law & Society Review, Vol. 8, 1974, 
pp. 302-303. Howard Mann, Transparency and Consistency in International Investment Law: Can the Problems be 
Fixed by Tinkering?, at: Karl P. Sauvant & Michael Chiswick-Patterson (eds.), Appeals Mechanism in International 
Investment Disputes, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 214. 
966 Cecilia Malmström, Proposing an Investment Court System, European Commission, 16.09.2015, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/malmstrom/blog/proposing-investment-court-
system_en, last visited on 04.08.2020. Céline Lévesque, The European Union Commission Proposal for the Creation 
of an “Investment Court System”: The Q and A that the Commission Won’t be Issuing, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 
06.04.2016, available at: http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2016/04/06/the-european-union-commission-
proposal-for-the-creation-of-an-investment-court-system-the-q-and-a-that-the-commission-wont-be-issuing/, last 
visited on 03.08.2020. 
967 In addition to the ICJ and other international courts, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal established under the “Algiers 
Declaration” can be another example. The pre-selected members for adjudication refute disputing parties’ rights in 
the appointment of the arbitrators that will hear their dispute, dismissing one of the essential features of arbitration. 
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represents a new wave of ISDS practice in the world, moving away from a private-
oriented approach to a more “State-like” public system.968  
However, the corresponding radical changes to the procedural arrangements also raise 
reasonable concerns. For instance, adjudicators being selected by treaty parties instead 
of disputing parties creates the risk of appointing adjudicators for political reasons and 
may cause them to dismiss investors’ claims.969 The joint committee’s increased power 
to a certain extent brings state control into ISDS, or at least raises a fear of political 
interference. This could further result in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal being 
controlled by treaty parties.970 In addition, the Appeal Tribunal’s “limitless” power of 
reviewing and remanding a dispute from the Tribunal may increase costs and result in 
other delayed implications971 and thus may make the use of ICS by some investors 
particularly difficult. Together with the established mechanisms for filtering claims, the 
balance between investors and host states seems to be adjusted excessively, from 
allegedly favouring investors now to benefitting states, deviating from the goal of 
building the ISDS system in a more balanced manner.972 
7.3.3.4 Proposing the Investment Court System in Multilateral Fora 
In addition to insisting on the ICS in IIA negotiations with third states, the EU has also 
promoted the ICS in multilateral fora and evidence of this can be found in the discussion 
in the UNCITRAL Working Group III on investor-state arbitration reform.  
According to the documents submitted in preparation for the re-convention of the 
UNCITRAL Working Group III in April 2019, the EU stressed that the existing 
problems of ISDS require a systemic solution, which could be best found in a standing 
multilateral body, composed of a first instance and an appellate tribunal, staffed by full-
time adjudicators appointed in a carefully regulated process.973 This clearly derives 
from the practice in its ICS. The EU’s promotion of the ICS in the ongoing UNCITRAL 
discussion can be taken as another attempt at establishing an international court for 
968 Céline Lévesque, The European Union Commission Proposal for the Creation of an “Investment Court System”: 
The Q and A that the Commission Won’t be Issuing, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 06.04.2016, available at: 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2016/04/06/the-european-union-commission-proposal-for-the-
creation-of-an-investment-court-system-the-q-and-a-that-the-commission-wont-be-issuing/, last visited on 
03.08.2020. 
969 Eduardo Zuleta, The Challenge of Creating a Standing International Investment Court, at: Reshaping the 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement System: Journeys for the 21st Century, 2015, p. 411. Tomáš Fecák, International 
Investment Agreements and EU Law, Kluwer Law International, 2016, p. 290. 
970 Stephan W. Schill, The European Commission’s Proposal of an '"Investment Court System" for TTIP: Stepping 
Stone or Stumbling Block for Multilateralizing International Investment Law?, American Society of International 
Law, 2016, available at: https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/20/issue/9/european-commissions-proposal-
investment-court-system-ttip-stepping, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
971  Sophie Nappert, Escaping from Freedom? The Dilemma of an Improved ISDS Mechanism, at: European 
Investment Law and Arbitration Review (Volume 1), Brill | Nijhoff, 2016, p. 177. 
972 Alex Mills, The Balancing (and Unbalancing?) of Interests in International Investment Law and Arbitration, at: 
Zachary Douglas & Joost Pauwelyn & Jorge E. Viñuales (eds.), The Foundations of International Investment Law-
Bringing Theory into Practice, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 437. 
973 Although the EU viewed that only a two-tiered standing body could address the concerns expressed in relation 
to the current system, considering the difficulties in coordinating at a multilateral forum, it also envisaged an open 
architecture for states to opt-in for certain aspects of the standing body. See: Joel Dahlquist, As UNCITRAL Investor-
State Arbitration Reform Enters Crucial Phase, We Preview Agenda for Upcoming Meeting, IAReporter, 27.03.2019, 
available at: https://www.iareporter.com/articles/as-uncitral-investor-state-arbitration-reform-enters-crucial-phase-
we-preview-agenda-for-upcoming-meeting/, last visited on 31.07.2020.  
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ISDS after the failure to do so in the OECD and the WTO, and it could be a concrete 
step further on the way to a multilateral ISDS system. The final result will be seen by 
the progress made at the UNCITRAL Working Group III in the near future. 
7.4 Conclusion 
The EU’s approach to state-state trade and investment dispute settlement is mainly 
visible in three places: the DSMs in the IIAs and FTAs concluded by the EU, as well 
as the WTO Dispute Settlement System. After the Lisbon Treaty, the EU concluded 
three IIAs, CETA (2012), the EU-Singapore IPA (2018) and the EU-Vietnam IPA 
(2018). The state-state DSMs contained in these three agreements basically follow the 
design of the WTO Dispute Settlement System. In terms of the state-state DSMs laid 
out in the EU’s FTAs, a shift from a diplomatic approach to a quasi-WTO dispute 
settlement panel proceedings model can be identified. By reviewing these DSMs 
chronologically, it is noticeable that more judicial features have been added gradually 
over time. No state-state cases have been brought under the EU’s FTAs and IIAs, and 
therefore it is difficult to assess these DSMs in practice. The similarity between the 
DSMs in the EU’s FTAs and IIAs, on the one hand, and the WTO DSU on panel 
proceedings, on the other, make it possible for the EU to take advantage of its successful 
experience in the WTO Dispute Settlement System. The EU has consistently been a 
frequent user of the WTO Dispute Settlement System, regarding this system as a normal 
tool to ensure the realization of its legitimate procedural and substantive rights. As 
evidenced by the relatively high success rate in dispute settlement, it is fair to say that 
the EU has largely been a system protector. Along with its supporting attitude towards 
alternative DSMs, the EU has shown a preference for the judicial characteristics of the 
WTO Dispute Settlement System not only by its frequent use of the system, but also 
from its reform proposal concerning the establishment of a permanent Panel Body and 
enhancing transparency. In brief, regarding state-state DSMs, adjudicative and 
compulsory DSMs have become the preferred choice and normal practice in the EU.974 
Regarding ISDS, before 2009, it was EU Member States that enjoyed the competence 
to conclude IIAs with third states, and they had been quite active and productive in this 
area. Most of the IIAs provide for amicable DSMs, as well as arbitration for ISDS, and 
many cases have been brought under the latter, where EU investors were quite active 
in initiating investor-state arbitration but the EU/EU Member States were rarely 
challenged by non-EU investors. The Lisbon Treaty brought about a shift of 
competences in this area and, until now, three IIAs, CETA (2012), the EU-Singapore 
IPA (2018) and the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018) have been concluded. In these agreements, 
974 This was argued as being evidence of the general trend of the evolution of DSMs in international economic 
law—heading towards more adjudicative and compulsory DSMs. See: Ignacio Garcia Bercero, Dispute Settlement 
in European Union Free Trade Agreements: Lessons Learned?, at: Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO 
System, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 383. Edna Ramírez Robles, Political & Quasi-Adjudicative Dispute 
Settlement Models in European Union Free Trade Agreements-Is the Quasi-adjudicative Model A Trend Or Is It 
Just Another Model?, World Trade Organization Economic Research and Statistics Division-Staff Working Paper 
ERSD-2006-09, 11.2006, available at: https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd200609_e.pdf, last visited on 
05.08.2020.  
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the ground-breaking new approach to ISDS, the ICS, is consistently adopted, aiming at 
establishing an institution that “would address all the main issues which beset the 
current system”.975 In the ICS, amicable DSMs, including negotiation, mediation and 
consultations are provided for and strengthened, acting as alternative ways to access 
justice. For adjudication, a standing two-tiered court-like mechanism is established 
with typical judicial characteristics, such as adjudicators with high qualifications, 
independence and impartiality, that are pre-selected by treaty parties and require great 
procedural transparency. At the same time, joint committees and treaty parties are 
granted significant roles in ISDS and available mechanisms for examining claims. This 
reshapes the balance between investors and states, and stresses the public law nature of 
international investment law. It seems clear that the ICS will be an essential element in 
the EU’s position in its future negotiations for any prospective IIA and in multilateral 
fora. 
The procedural designs of the DSMs in the ICS should keep the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System and the state-state DSMs in its FTAs and recently concluded IIAs 
in mind. At the same time, it deserves attention that the EU’s most recent proposal on 
the WTO Dispute Settlement System reform, referring to strengthening the interaction 
between the Appellate Body and the WTO Members, resonates with its intention to 
strengthen the role of states in dispute settlement processes, as shown by the ICS.976 
All of these points confirm the EU’s persistent preference for a permanent two-tiered 
court-like system for dispute settlement in the area of international investment law and, 
more broadly, international economic law. In other words, from the proposal of a 
permanent Panel Body in the WTO, the gradually improved state-state DSMs in its 
FTAs and IIAs, to the proposal for an ICS, the EU’s direction is clear and calls for 
building a multilateral, judicialized and permanent system that respects the 
international rule of law to resolve international economic disputes. 
975 European Commission, A New System for Resolving Dispute between Foreign Investors and States in a Fair and 
Efficient Way, available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/september/tradoc_156042.pdf, last visited on 
31.07.2020. 
976 There are other points in the EU’s WTO Dispute Settlement System reform proposal that recall those featured in 
its ICS, including changing the membership of the Appellate Body into a full time job; providing that “issues of law 
covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel” do not include the meaning of the 
municipal measures. 
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Chapter 8 Comparison between China and the EU on International Investment 
Dispute Settlement 
Based on the analysis in Chapters 6 and 7, this chapter compares the performance of 
China and the EU in international investment dispute settlement. This comparison is 
carried out from two perspectives. Section 8.1 focuses on the existing performance of 
both parties in SSDS and ISDS, evidenced by their concluded treaties, relevant cases 
and other measures. Section 8.2 considers the reflection of legal cultural characteristics 
in the performance of both parties in the field of international investment dispute 
settlement, in order to compare the influence of legal culture on the approaches to 
investment dispute settlement of China and the EU at the international level. 
8.1 Comparison between the Approaches of China and the EU to International 
Investment Dispute Settlement 
The approaches to international investment dispute settlement of China and the EU are 
reflected in two systems: SSDS and ISDS. In terms of the former, despite the different 
development process, recent practice by both parties similarly resulted in the adoption 
of a quasi-WTO dispute settlement panel proceedings model. In contrast, there is a clear 
divergence in the latter, where China and the EU have particularly different perceptions 
on the objective of ISDS and have a different focus regarding DSMs for resolving 
disputes between investors and states. 
8.1.1 State-State Dispute Settlement: Similar Trust in a quasi-WTO dispute 
settlement Panel Proceedings Model 
Both China’s and the EU’s most recent IIAs adopt a quasi-WTO dispute settlement 
panel proceedings model for state-state investment dispute settlement, although the 
extensiveness of the rules and detailed procedural arrangements are different.977 Such 
a model includes amicable and informal DSMs aiming at finding mutually satisfying 
solutions, as well as adjudicative and formal processes in order to resolve disputes fairly 
and effectively. In particular, the rules on adjudication resemble the WTO panel 
proceedings to a large extent, providing pre-established stages and binding decisions 
taken by a third authority on a legal basis. Such similar preference shown by China’s 
and by the EU’s practice presents their trust in the function of WTO Dispute Settlement 
System in resolving disputes between states, for not only international trade but 
international investment. It is also noted that at the same time, diverse arrangements of 
detailed procedural issues can be identified in their concluded treaties, which indicate 
their different preferences thereon. Take the rules on procedural transparency as an 
example. China has been quite cautious in requiring transparency in SSDS, so under its 
977 For example, by comparing relevant articles in CETA (2012) and the China-Australia FTA (2015), it is clear that 
CETA (2012) covers several points that are not touched upon by the China-Australia FTA (2015) and often provides 
more detailed rules than the latter on the same issue. 
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FTAs and IIAs, compared to the DSU, it either keeps the same level of transparency or 
retrieve to a certain extent. 978  However, the EU has been a strong advocate for 
intensified transparency, so it moves further than the corresponding requirement 
contained in the DSU.979 
Based on publicly available information, both China and the EU have not put their state-
state DSMs in concluded IIAs or FTAs into practice, and therefore it is difficult to judge 
the real function of these measures. However, in this regard, the existing practice of 
both parties under the WTO should be illustrative, especially in terms of the treaties 
that have similar provisions to the DSU.  
8.1.2 Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Different Objectives and Focuses 
In contrast to the case of SSDS, where similarities can be easily identified in the 
recent treaties of both parties, differences have been clearly presented in the area of 
ISDS. Combining detailed rules on diverse procedural issues, overall, it is reasonable 
to conclude that China and the EU have presented different perceptions regarding the 
objective of ISDS, which is typically evidenced by their different concerning the 
various DSMs. 
In China, although the acceptance of international arbitration from an early stage can 
be found in IIAs, the limited number of cases and the multiple amicable mechanisms 
for resolving investment disputes created in its domestic legal system indicate that great 
efforts have been made to resolve disputes with foreign investors amicably. At the same 
time, in its IIAs, China often requires exhausting administrative review procedures, 
which can further prevent disputes from being brought to international adjudication. 
Furthermore, under its OBOR Initiative, constructing a comprehensive system, in 
which amicable DSMs are expected to play a vital role, has been promoted for 
investment dispute settlement. Thus, China’s focus in ISDS is arguably on efficient and 
effective dispute resolution, satisfying the needs of the disputing parties and restoring 
the problematic relationship to harmony. In contrast, although amicable mechanisms 
are also available, such as investor-state mediation, it is fair to say that the focus of the 
EU’s ICS is on the two-tiered adjudicative mechanism with typical judicial features. 
Through such an adjudication process, access to justice, the development of 
jurisprudence and the international rule of law can be realized, which should be 
understood as the essential part of the ISDS’s goal set by the EU. 
The different perceptions of China and the EU are not absolute. In other words, many 
elements are being considered by both parties at the same time, including resolving 
specific disputes effectively and efficiently, realizing procedural and substantive justice, 
restoring the relationship between the disputing parties, and preserving the international 
rule of law. This could explain the fact that arrangements that do not align with the goal 
presented above also exist in the IIAs of both parties. The key difference lies in where 
the emphasis is. Thus, instead of one goal set against another, it is about which objective 
is considered primary and plays the key role. 
978 For example, under the China-Australia FTA (2015), it is provided that hearings and the documents submitted to 
tribunals shall be confidential. See: the China-Australia FTA (2015), Annex 15-B, para. 17. 
979 For example, under the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), in SSDS, all hearings shall be open to the public unless 
otherwise provided. See: the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.8.4. 
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8.2 Comparison between China and the EU on the Reflection of Legal Culture in 
International Investment Dispute Settlement 
Based on the exploration of the practice of China and the EU in international investment 
dispute settlement, this section compares the reflection of legal cultural characteristics 
in that practice, including the similarities and the differences in each jurisdiction. 
8.2.1 Similarities: Consistency between Internal and International Practice and 
Legal Culture 
The various preferences in international investment dispute settlement presented by 
China and by the EU, to a certain extent, resonate with their internal practice 
respectively. For example, China’s focus on amicable settlement for ISDS points to the 
key role played by mediation in its domestic legal system; while for the EU, the court-
like adjudication process in the ICS can be taken as a reflection of its practice in the 
CJEU internally. In this sense, like internal DSMs, the practice at the international level 
also reflects the legal cultural characteristics of each jurisdiction. For instance, China’s 
preference for amicable DSMs and its cautious attitude towards transparency can be 
read as being in line with its consistent pursuit of harmony and traditionally “saving 
face”. Regarding the EU, it is reasonable to take the ICS as an example of its preference 
for resolving disputes through litigation in order to ensure the realization of due process 
and the rule of law. 
In this regard, it deserves attention that, even when similar approaches have been 
adopted by both sides for international investment dispute settlement, they may be 
supported by various underlying motivations. A typical example is the promotion of 
mediation. The existing practice in China and the EU shows their similar intention to 
promote the use of mediation for ISDS. However, the main underpinnings are arguably 
different. With regard to China, the preference for mediation is that it is a tool used to 
resolve disputes in an amicable and mutually satisfying way, contributing to the 
construction of harmony. While, in the EU, promoting mediation is founded on the 
notion of access to justice, which is an indispensable element in the ultimate goal of the 
rule of law. Such differences regarding the underlying motivations can help to 
understand the differences in the mediation process, such as the rules on transparency 
and qualifications of mediators. 
8.2.2 Differences: Compromise vs. Intensification 
Along with the reflection of the legal culture of each jurisdiction in international 
investment dispute settlement, it should be noted that the extent of its influence is 
different from the influence at the internal level. In this vein, international practice 
unavoidably exerts an influence on shaping the practice of China and the EU on the 
international plane. In this sense, the case of China and that of the EU are arguably 
different. International practice, especially international adjudication, is far from 
China’s traditional practice of dispute settlement. As a result, as evidenced by China’s 
hesitation to internalize western practice and its slow acceptance of international 
adjudication, it is fair to say that international practice compromises and balances the 
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influence from China’s legal culture in the development of China’s performance in 
international investment dispute settlement. 
Compared to China, the features presented by the EU’s case seem to be different. The 
preferences rooted in its legal culture seems to be further stressed and intensified in its 
international investment dispute settlement practice in many cases, a typical example 
of which the promotion of the ICS. This is because the current international practice of 
dispute settlement is primarily based on Western legal systems, where the EU is a main 
player. In addition, in contrast to implementing drastic measures internally, where 
unavoidably practical difficulties exist, the Union enjoys great freedom and often the 
Union’s rules are also incorporated into the EU’s international practice. As a result, for 
example, in the ICS, procedural designs that are in line with EU values and principles, 
but have not yet been realized internally, can be identified, such as opening all hearings 
in investor-state adjudication. 
8.3 Conclusion 
Comparing practice in international investment dispute settlement in China and the EU, 
both similarities and differences can be identified. For SSDS, both China’s and the 
EU’s most recent IIAs adopt a quasi-WTO dispute settlement panel proceedings model, 
although there are differences in their details. Regarding ISDS, both parties seem to 
have different perceptions regarding the objective of the whole system and the focus 
among various DSMs. China emphasises the amicable settlement of specific disputes 
and restoring harmonious relationships, while the EU cares more about realizing the 
international rule of law and developing jurisprudence through the system. Such 
differences should be in line with their internal practice and legal cultural characteristics, 
especially China’s traditional preference for harmony and the EU’s consistent pursuit 
of the rule of law. At the same time, each party’s approach has been affected by its 
experience with international practice. In this sense, compared to China’s situation, 
where there is more compromise and an acceptance of international practice, the 
preference in the EU’s legal culture seems to be further stressed and intensified in its 
practice of international investment dispute settlement. 
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Part 4 Exploration of the Dispute Settlement System in the Prospective China-
EU Bilateral Investment Treaty 
Introduction to Part 4 
Equipped with the knowledge of the legal cultural characteristics of dispute settlement 
in China and the EU and their relevant practice at the internal and international levels, 
the discussion in this Part explores the dispute settlement system in the prospective 
China-EU BIT.  
This Part starts with a brief overview of the investment legal relationship between 
China and the EU, including its historical development, current status and, particularly, 
the dispute settlement systems in the existing IIAs between China and EU Member 
States. This constitutes the necessary basis to anticipate future developments. After that, 
Chapters 10-12 provide a detailed discussion on the comprehensive dispute settlement 
system in the prospective China-EU BIT, which is expected to be composed of two 
sub-systems: one for state-state dispute settlement and one for investor-state dispute 
settlement. Chapter 10 focuses on the former category, while the latter will be addressed 
in Chapter 11. Each of these two chapters covers the objective, jurisdiction and the 
DSMs contained in the sub-system. Instead of providing a thorough analysis of the 
detailed procedural designs of each mechanism or presenting possible treaty texts, the 
focus is on identifying the probably thorny issues that may stand in the way of a 
successful conclusion of the negotiations between China and the EU, and thereafter 
suggesting possible approaches to resolving the conflicts that may arise from their 
various proposals. Such an analysis is mainly based on the existing practice in both 
parties discussed in Part 3, supra, with due consideration for their legal cultural 
characteristics of dispute settlement explored in Part 2, supra, while bearing in mind 
the investment relationship between China and the EU, which is addressed in Chapter 
8, supra. As a necessary further step, Chapter 12 assesses the relationship between the 
state-state and investor-state dispute settlement systems. This includes what separates 
them, connects them and a possible combination, with a view to ensuring these two 
systems function well and thus contributing to successful investment dispute resolution 
under the prospective China-EU BIT. 
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Chapter 9 The Legal Framework for China-EU Investment: Past and Present 
This Chapter provides an overview of the investment legal relationship between China 
and the EU, including its historical development, the current governing international 
legal framework and the state-state and the investor-state dispute settlement systems in 
the existing IIAs between China and EU Member States, with a view to providing the 
necessary background information to predict the future development of investment 
dispute settlement under a China-EU BIT. 
9.1 An Overview of the Development of the China-EU Investment Legal 
Relationship 
As introduced in Section 7.1, supra, before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009, 
the competence to conclude IIAs was shared by the Union and its Member States. As a 
result, both the Union and its Member States concluded treaties with China on 
investment. The power distribution was changed by the Lisbon Treaty to give the Union 
exclusive competence and thus, with respect to the prospective China-EU BIT, the 
negotiations have been undertaken between China and the Union. 
9.1.1 Before the Lisbon Treaty: General Agreements on Economic Cooperation 
and Bilateral Investment Treaties 
After the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and the EC in 1975, at an 
early stage, the EC-China Agreement on Trade and Economic Co-operation (1985) was 
concluded. Negotiations of this agreement began in 1983 and were concluded in 1985. 
It has four chapters, among which Chapter 2 defines various forms of economic co-
operation, including investment. Specifically, Article 12 states that the two treaty 
parties shall agree “to promote and encourage greater and mutually beneficial 
investment” and undertake “to improve the existing favourable investment climate”.980 
It only expresses the intention for future cooperation without imposing any substantive 
obligation on treaty parties, and thus it has more of a symbolic rather than practical 
value. Nevertheless, this Agreement drew up a framework and laid down a general basis 
for future developments in the field of foreign investment. In fact, at the time this 
agreement was signed, there had been considerable EC investments in China, and seven 
out of ten EC Member States had signed BITs with China.981  
Since then, the China-EC economic relationship has been developed by a series of 
actions. In 2003, China and the EC concluded a Framework Agreement for Establishing 
an Industrial Policy Dialogue in order to “strengthen and consolidate ties between the 
two Parties, promote and enhance mutual understanding and awareness of current and 
980 The Agreement on Trade and Economic Co-operation between the European Community and the People’s 
Republic of China (signed on 21.05.1985, entered into force on 22.09.1985), Art. 12. 
981 Wenhua Shan, The Legal Framework of EU-China Investment Relations: A Critical Appraisal, Hart Publishing, 
2005, p. 95. 
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forthcoming policy approaches, legislation and related issues in the industrial 
sector”.982 In the same year, both sides also launched the China-EC comprehensive 
strategic partnership, which deepened and broadened cooperation between the two 
parties in a wide range of areas, making China and the EU “highly interdependent as a 
result”. 983  This was followed by the Communication entitled “EU-China: Closer 
Partners, Growing Responsibilities” and a policy paper on Trade in 2006, which 
identified China’s recent emergence as a major economic and political power.984 In 
2007, negotiations were launched on a new China-EU Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement, with a view to upgrading the 1985 Trade and Economic Cooperation 
Agreement and reflecting the full breadth and depth of the China-EU Comprehensive 
Strategic Partnership. The negotiations of this Agreement were regularly mentioned in 
subsequent joint statements of EU-China Summits, but, since 2009, there has been no 
further reference.985 
It is noted that, alongside those general economic cooperation agreements with China, 
EU Member States were quite active in concluding BITs with China separately. Up to 
now, 26 BITs have been concluded and entered into force between China and 27 EU 
Member States. 986  These investment treaties contain more concrete provisions 
covering both substantive and procedural issues, including DSMs. They constitute an 
important part of the international legal framework governing the investment 
relationship between China and the EU,987 which are analysed in Section 9.3, infra. 
982  According to this Framework Agreement, both sides aim to “contribute to the improvement of the 
competitiveness of businesses from both sides, by ensuring a business-friendly level playing field for industry 
operators”. See: Framework Agreement Establishing Industrial Policy Dialogue between the Commission of the 
European Community and the Government of the People’s Republic of China (signed on 30.10.2003). 
983 Delegation of the European Union to China, EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, 23.11.2013, 
available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china_en/15398/EU-
China%202020%20Strategic%20Agenda%20for%20Cooperation, p. 2, last visited on 04.08.2020. A more critical 
perspective was provided by Maher who argued that a more comprehensive partnership, beyond trade and investment, 
failed to materialize due to diverging values and interests. See: Richard Maher, The Elusive EU-China Strategic 
Partnership, International Affairs, Vol. 92, 2016. 
984 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament-EU–China: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities, COM(2006) 632 final, 24.10.2006, p. 
2. Commission of the European Communities, Commission Working Document-Accompanying COM(2006) 631
Final: Closer Parterner, Growing Responsibilities–A Policy Paper on EU-China Trade and Investment: Competition 
and Partnership, COM(2006) 632 final, 24.10.2006.  
985 Since 2011, the negotiations of the new China-EU Partnership and Cooperation Agreement had been stalled due 
to divergences between the mandates and expectations of China and those of the EU. See: Chien-Huei Wu, 
Reclaiming the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Through the EU-China Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement: Taking Stock and Moving Forward, at: Julien Chaisse (ed.), Sixty Years of European Integration and 
Global Power Shifts: Perceptions, Interactions and Lessons, Hart Publishing, 2020. European Commission, 
Overview of FTA and Other Trade Negotiations (Updated March 2018), available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf, pp. 9-10, last visited on 27.05.2020. 
986 The only EU Member State that has not concluded an IIA with China is Ireland. In addition, since Belgium and 
Luxembourg jointly signed one BIT with China, there are 27 EU Member States but only 26 BITs. 
987 It is noted that there are other agreements between China and the EU in the pre-Lisbon period, such as the Textile 
Agreement. However, these agreements only focus on specific sectors or certain aspects of foreign investment, and 
are of quite limited relevance to the analysis of the DSMs in the prospective China-EU BIT. Therefore, they are not 
discussed in the present thesis. More discussion on these agreements can be found in: Wenhua Shan, The Legal 
Framework of EU-China Investment Relations: A Critical Appraisal, Hart Publishing, 2005, p. 93.  
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9.1.2 After the Lisbon Treaty: Heading towards a China-EU Bilateral Investment 
Treaty 
Concrete signs of a China-EU BIT date back to 2010. In the context of an Executive-
to-Executive meeting in April 2010, European Commission President Manuel Barroso 
and then-Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao instructed their respective teams to study the 
options for enhancing the bilateral investment relationship between China and the EU. 
To this end, the considerations of a standalone China-EU BIT were expressly put 
forward with the “Joint EU-China Investment Task Force” for a deeper cooperation on 
investment.988 
In this context, the European Commission launched a broad public consultation in 2011 
to gather views from stakeholders regarding the future EU-China investment 
relationship.989 The result revealed that China was regarded as one of the most strategic 
destinations for foreign direct investment by European companies—both at present and 
in the future, despite the fact that 80 per cent of the respondents pointed out a lack of 
transparency and consistency and the influence from political pressure in China’s legal 
system.990 Thus, an investment agreement between China and the EU was strongly 
supported by the responses, especially because of its potential to increase the “clarity 
and predictability of the investment environment in China and the implementation of 
laws and commitments”.991 In terms of investment DSMs, investor-state arbitration 
was seen by EU investors as a last resort, fearing a deterioration of their relationship 
with the Chinese government and illegal retaliatory actions by the government. 992 
When there is an investment-related dispute, the majority of the respondents mostly 
rely on amicable settlement. 
In 2012, the prospect of negotiating an investment treaty between China and the EU 
became clearer. At the 14th EU-China Summit in February 2012, leaders of both sides 
emphasized that a China-EU BIT “would promote and facilitate investment in both 
988 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards a Comprehensive European 
International Investment Policy, COM(2010)343 final, 07.07.2010, p. 7. See also: European Commission Director-
General for Trade, Consultation on the Future Investment Relationship between EU and China, 02.05.2011, available 
at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=900, last visited on 27.05.2020. 
989 This public consultation was open to all stakeholders both within the EU and in third states, running from 5 May 
to 5 July 2011 through an on-line questionnaire. The questionnaire mainly covered three topics: investment 
environment in China, investment environment in the EU, and the potential impacts of an EU-China investment 
agreement. In all, 57 answers were received from a wide range of respondents, including private companies, trade 
associations, trade union, governmental authorities, and NGOs. For more information, see: European Commission-
Director-General for Trade, Summary of Contributions to the European Commission’s Public Consultation on “The 
Future Investment Relationship Between the EU and China", 2011, available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/december/tradoc_148394.pdf, last visited on 29.05.2020. European 
Commission, Recommendation for a Council Decision: Authorising the Opening of Negotiations for a Convention 
Establishing a Multilateral Court for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, COM(2017) 493 final, 13.09.2017, p. 
3. The result of this public consultation resonates with those of some business surveys. See e.g. European Chamber
of Commerce in China (EUCCC), Business Confidence Survey 2011.
990 European Commission-Director-General for Trade, Summary of Contributions to the European Commission’s
Public Consultation on “The Future Investment Relationship Between the EU and China", 2011, available at:
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/december/tradoc_148394.pdf, last visited on 29.05.2020.
991 Id, p. 16.
992 Most of the respondents indicated that they would consider starting investment arbitration proceedings against
China only in the case of complete expropriation. See: id, pp. 3-4. 
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directions” and “[n]egotiations towards this agreement would include all issues of 
interest to either side”.993 Later during the 15th EU-China Summit in September 2012, 
the commitment to launch negotiations of a China-EU BIT was reconfirmed by both 
sides.994  
The process towards a China-EU BIT accelerated in 2013. On 18 October 2013, the 
European Council authorized the European Commission to initiate negotiations for a 
comprehensive investment agreement with China.995 Negotiations for a China-EU BIT 
were formally launched at the 16th EU-China Summit of 21 November 2013 in Beijing. 
Furthermore, both sides jointly adopted the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for 
Cooperation, where an investment agreement was made central to the EU’s long-term 
bilateral relationship with China.996 In fact, this was the first investment treaty that the 
Union started to negotiate after the Lisbon Treaty,997 which would replace the 26 
existing BITs between EU Member States and China with one single comprehensive 
investment agreement and constitute “an opportune moment to set in place a uniform 
legal framework regulating investment protection in their respective territories”.998 
After the official initiation of negotiations, China and the EU have made concerted 
efforts in moving forward. In 2016, China and the EU negotiators reached clear 
conclusions on an ambitious and comprehensive scope for the prospective China-EU 
BIT and established a joint negotiating text.999 In the same year, the Council of the 
European Union released the “EU Strategy on China”, which particularly expressed 
that the EU’s engagement with China would stay true to its values and interests, and 
that the EU expects China “to assume responsibilities in line with its global impact and 
support the rules-based international order from which it, too, benefits”.1000 On 16 July 
2018, the EU and China held the 20th summit in Beijing, where both sides agreed on a 
joint statement. In terms of investment, they committed to forging synergies between 
China’s OBOR Initiative and the EU’s Investment Plan and extended Trans-European 
993 Leopoldo Rubinacci, EU-China Investment Relationship-Update on State of Play, DG TRADE Civil Society 
Dialogue, 07.03.2012. 
994 European Commission, Commission Proposes to Open Negotiations for an Investment Agreement with China, 
Press Release, 23.05.2013, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-458_en.htm, last visited on 
05.08.2020. 
995 European Commission, Overview of FTA and Other Trade Negotiations (Updated March 2018), available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf, p. 9, last visited on 27.05.2020. This was 
based on the request of the European Commission on 23 May 2013 for a negotiating mandate to open official talks 
with China on a stand-alone BIT. See: European Commission, Commission Proposes to Open Negotiations for an 
Investment Agreement with China, Press Release, 23.05.2013, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
13-458_en.htm, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
996 Delegation of the European Union to China, EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, 23.11.2013, 
available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china_en/15398/EU-
China%202020%20Strategic%20Agenda%20for%20Cooperation, p. 5, last visited on 04.08.2020. 
997 Marc Bungenberg & Catharine Titi, The Evolution of EU Investment Law and the Future of EU-China Investment 
Relations, at: China and International Investment Law: Twenty Years of ICSID Membership, Brill | Nijhoff, 2015, 
pp. 297-298. 
998 Id, p. 297. 
999 This was described as “a major step forward in the EU-China talks launched at the end of 2013 and a direct 
response to the political commitment made by European and Chinese leaders at the June 2015 EU-China Summit”. 
See: European Commission, EU and China Agree on Scope of the Future Investment Deal, 15.01.2016, available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1435, last visited on 31.07.2020. 
1000  Council of the European Union, EU Strategy on China-Council Conclusions (18 July 2016), 11319/16, 
18.07.2016. 
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Transport Networks.1001 In particular, the ongoing investment agreement negotiations 
were viewed as a “top priority and a key project towards establishing and maintaining 
an open, predictable, fair and transparent business environment for their respective 
investors”.1002 According to the report of the 20th round of negotiations for a China-
EU BIT, which took place in February 2019, on ISDS, some progress was made “with 
some important policy discussions to follow”, and on SSDS, relevant works “will need 
to be accelerated”.1003 In the latest 28th round of negotiations, it was reported that 
“[d]ecisive progress was made in the chapter on State-to-State Dispute Settlement”.1004 
9.2 The Current International Legal Framework for the China-EU Investment 
Relationship 
The current legal framework regulating the investment relationship between China and 
the EU comprises both internal and international legal systems. The former involves 
China’s domestic legal system and the EU’s internal legal system, which is composed 
of EU law and EU Member States’ domestic legal systems. These systems cover both 
substantive and procedural foreign investment related issues, including investment 
DSMs, which were introduced and analysed in Sections 3.2, 4.2 and 4.3, supra. 
In addition to general international law,1005 more relevant rules of international law for 
the present analysis can be found in two groups of international agreements. First, as 
introduced in Section 9.1.1, supra, the 26 BITs between China and EU Member States 
constitute the main part of the legal framework regulating the investment relationship. 
Second, there are multilateral agreements to which China and the Union and/or EU 
Member States are contracting parties. These two groups are discussed in the following 
Section 9.2.1 and Section 9.2.2 respectively. 
9.2.1 Bilateral Investment Treaties between China and EU Member States 
Since the first BIT between China and an EU Member State was concluded in 1982, 26 
BITs have been negotiated and came into force. TABLE 9.2.1 provides information on 
the conclusion and amendment of these BITs. 
1001 Delegation of the European Union to China, Joint Statement of the 20th EU-China Summit, Press Release, 
17.07.2018, available at 
https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china_en/48424/Joint%20statement%20of%20the%2020th%20EU-
China%20Summit, last visited on 03.08.2020. 
1002 Id, p. 3, para. 13. 
1003 European Commission-Director-General for Trade, Report of the 20th Round of Negotiations for the EU-China 
Investment Agreement, 01.03.2019, available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/march/tradoc_157772.pdf, last visited on 31.07.2020. 
1004 European Commission-Director-General for Trade, Report of the 28th Round of Neogtiations on the EU-China 
Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, 27.04.2020, available at: 
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/april/tradoc_158727.pdf, last visited on 01.08.2020. 
1005 The Statute of the International Court of Justice identifies five sources of international law: (a) treaties between 
States; (b) customary international law derived from the practice of States; (c) general principles of law recognized 
by civilized nations; and, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of international law: (d) judicial 
decisions and the writings of the most highly qualified publicists. See: the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
Art. 38. 
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TABLE 9.2.1 The BITs between China and EU Member States1006 
No EU Member States Status 
1 Sweden Signed on 29.03.1982, entered into force on 29.03.1982, 
amendment protocol signed on 27.09.2004 
2 Germany (terminated) Signed on 07.10.1983, entered into force on 18.03.1985 
Germany Resigned on 01.12.2003, entered into force on 11.11.2005 
3 France (terminated) Signed on 30.05.1984, entered into force on 19.03.1985 
France Resigned in 26.11.2007, entered into force on 20.08.2010 
4 BLEU (Belgium-Luxembourg 
Economic Union) (terminated) 
Signed on 04.06.1984, entered into force on 05.10.1986 
BLEU (Belgium-Luxembourg 
Economic Union) 
Resigned on 06.06.2005, entered into force on 01.12.2009 
5 Finland (terminated) Signed on 04.09.1984, entered into force on 26.01.1986 
Finland Resigned on 15.11.2004, entered into force on 15.11.2006 
6 Italy Signed on 28.01.1985, entered into force on 28.08.1987 
7 Denmark Signed on 29.04.1985, entered into force on 29.04.1985 
8 The Netherlands (terminated) Signed on 17.06.1985, entered into force on 01.02.1987 
The Netherlands Resigned on 26.11.2001, entered into force on 01.08.2004 
9 Austria Signed on 12.09.1985, entered into force on 11.10.1986 
10 United Kingdom Signed in 15.05.1986, entered into force on 15.05.1986 
11 Poland Signed on 07.06.1988, entered into force on 08.01.1989 
12 Bulgaria Signed on 27.06.1989, entered into force on 21.08.1994, 
amendment protocol signed on 26.06.2007, entered into 
force on 10.11.2007 
13 Hungary Signed on 29.05.1991, entered into force on 01.04.1993 
14 Slovakia Signed on 04.12.1991, entered into force on 01.12.1992, 
amendment protocol signed on 07.12.2005, entered into 
force on 25.05.2007 
15 Portugal (terminated) Signed on 03.02.1992, entered into force on 01.12.1992 
Portugal Resigned on 09.12.2005, entered into force on 26.07.2008 
16 Spain (terminated) Signed on 06.02.1992, entered into force on 01.05.1993 
Spain Resigned on 14.11.2005, entered into force on 01.07.2008 
17 Greece Signed on 25.06.1992, entered into force on 21.12.1993 
18 Croatia Signed on 07.06.1993, entered into force on 01.07.1994 
19 Estonia Signed on 02.09.1993, entered into force on 01.06.1994 
20 Slovenia Signed on 13.09.1993, entered into force on 01.01.1995 
21 Lithuania Signed on 08.11.1993, entered into force on 01.06.1994 
22 Romania Signed on 12.07.1994, entered into force on 01.09.1995; 
amendment protocol signed on 16.04.2007, entered into 
force on 01.09.2008 
23 Cyprus Signed on 15.01.2001, entered into force on 29.04.2002 
24 Latvia Signed on 15.04.2004, entered into force on 01.02.2006 
25 Czech Republic (terminated) Signed on 04.12.1991, entered into force on 01.12.1992 
Czech Republic Signed on 08.12.2005, entered into force on 01.09.2006 
26 Malta Signed on 22.02.2009, entered into force on 01.04.2009 
As mentioned in Section 7.3.2.2, supra, EU Regulation 1219/2012 establishes a 
transitional regime for the existing BITs concluded by EU Member States with third 
1006 These BITs are listed according to the chronological sequence of their first signing dates. The information 
contained in this chart comes from: UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements Navigator_China, available at: 
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/countries/42/china, last visited on 
26.05.2020. The information here has been cross-checked with the information published on the official website of 
the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (MOFCOM), see: Ministry of Commerce of the 
People's Republic of China-Department of Treaty and Law 中华人民共和国商务部条约法律司, The List of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties Concluded by China 我国对外签订双边投资协定一览表, 12.12.2016, available at: 
http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/Nocategory/201111/20111107819474.shtml, last visited on 04.08.2020. 
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states, which also applies to those concluded with China. As a result, these 26 BITs will 
remain in force until a China-EU BIT comes into force, which means the latter “would 
streamline the existing bilateral investment protection agreements between China and 
most EU Member States into a single, coherent text”.1007 
9.2.2 Other Applicable Multilateral International Agreements 
Alongside the BITs between China and EU Member States, there are multilateral 
international agreements to which China and the Union and/or EU Member States are 
contracting parties and thus also regulate the China-EU investment relationship. These 
mainly include the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States (the ICSID Convention), the Convention 
Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), as well as the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and the Agreement on Trade-related 
Investment Measures (TRIMs) under the WTO.1008 Considering the subject of the 
present thesis, the ICSID Convention is of more relevance.  
As introduced in Section 2.2.2.2, supra, the ICSID Convention entered into force on 14 
October 1966 and is ratified by 163 contracting states. 1009  It does not set up a 
permanent body of judges or panel members to decide cases, as known in the context 
of the ICJ or the WTO Appellate Body, but it simply sets out the rules for resolving the 
disputes without providing substantive rights and obligations. Among other matters, 
this Convention establishes jurisdiction of the ICSID, authorizes conciliation and 
arbitration, as well as sets up an international institution, the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), being available to administer investor-state 
and state-state disputes under IIAs, FTAs, investment laws and contracts. Until now, 
ICSID has become the world’s leading institution devoted to international investment 
dispute settlement.1010 
Due to the great number of investor-state arbitration cases brought to ICSID, the ICSID 
arbitration rules have been resorted to many times. This set of rules was adopted on 25 
September 1967 and came into effect as of 1 January 1968, after which it was 
subsequently amended three times. In brief, under ICSID Arbitration Rules, the 
arbitration process starts with a request for arbitration by one disputing party. After 
going through screening and the registration of the request, arbitrators are appointed. 
Thereafter, there is both a written procedure and oral procedure and normally an award 
1007 European Commission, Commission Proposes to Open Negotiations for an Investment Agreement with China, 
Press Release, 23.05.2013, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-458_en.htm, last visited on 
05.08.2020. 
1008 Wenhua Shan, The Legal Framework of EU-China Investment Relations: A Critical Appraisal, Hart Publishing, 
2005, pp. 96-104. 
1009  International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), ICSID Convention, available at: 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/icsiddocs/ICSID-Convention.aspx, last visited on 03.08.2020. It has entered 
into force to China and all EU Member States. 
1010 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), Special Features of ICSID, available at: 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Special-20Features-20of-20ICSID.aspx, last visited on 03.08.2020. 
Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, State-State Dispute Settlement in Investment Treaties, 10.2014, available at: 
https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/best-practices-state-state-dispute-settlement-investment-
treaties.pdf, p. 17, last visited on 30.07.2020. 
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is granted after the tribunal’s deliberations.1011 Against the background of ISDS crisis, 
the past decades witnessed some development of ICSID arbitration practice, such as 
enhancing transparency and increasing efficiency. 
In the IIAs concluded by China, EU Member States and the EU, ICSID arbitration and 
conciliation regularly appear as options for ISDS. China and most EU Member States 
as well as their investors also have experience in ICSID cases. In the latest ongoing 
amendment to the ICSID rules, China, EU Member States and the Union have 
participated actively, which proves the significance of these rules to them.1012 
9.3 The Dispute Settlement Systems in the Bilateral Investment Treaties between 
China and EU Member States 
Two groups of DSMs can be identified in the investment dispute settlement systems 
contained in the existing BITs between China and EU Member States: one for state-
state disputes and one for investor-state disputes. In general, state-state DSMs exist in 
all the IIAs between China and EU Member States, while investor-state DSMs began 
to appear at a later stage.1013 These two categories are discussed respectively as follows. 
9.3.1 The State-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in the Bilateral Investment 
Treaties between China and EU Member States 
The procedural design of the state-state DSMs in the BITs between China and EU 
Member States have many similarities. For a comprehensive list of the provisions on 
state-state DSMs in these BITs, see TABLE 9.3.1. 
The process to resolve disputes concerning the interpretation and application of 
provisions in these BITs between treaty parties starts with compulsory consultations 
through diplomatic channels. A six-month block of time for consultations is very often 
provided with variations.1014 If parties fail to settle the dispute through consultations, 
upon the request of either party, the dispute can be submitted to an ad hoc arbitral 
tribunal. It is noticeable that, in the BITs between China and Belgian-Luxembourg 
Economic Union, another try is required for amicable settlement before the joint 
committee consisting of representatives of treaty parties, as a precondition to submitting 
any dispute to international arbitration.1015 
1011 For more information on ICSID arbitration, see: Meg Kinnear & Geraldine R. Fischer & Jara Minguez Almeida 
& Luisa Fernanda Torres & Mairée Uran Bidegain (eds.), Building International Investment Law: The First 50 Years 
of ICSID, Wolters Kluwer, 2015. 
1012 For the comments by China, the EU Member States and the EU on the proposed amendments to the ICSID rules, 
see: International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), State Input, available at: 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/amendments/state-input, last visited on 03.08.2020. 
1013 The first BIT between China and an EU Member State which incorporated an investor-state DSM is the China-
France BIT (1984-terminated). 
1014 For example, the China-Denmark BIT (1985) provides for five months and the China-Netherlands BIT (1987) 
stipulates a reasonable lapse of time. There are also BITs which did not provide any minimum time requirement, 
such as the China-Sweden BIT (1982) and the China-United Kingdom BIT (1986). 
1015 This extra precondition was incorporated into the China-BLEU BIT (1984-terminated) and the China-BLEU 
BIT (2005). See: the China-BLEU BIT (1984), Art. 12.1; the China-BLEU BIT (2005), Art. 9.2. 
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Regarding the composition of an ad hoc tribunal, each party chooses its own arbitrator 
and the chairman, who is a national of a third state which has diplomatic relations with 
the two treaty parties, is to be selected by the two appointed arbitrators. It is noted that 
three BITs, two have been terminated and one is still in force, require the treaty parties’ 
approval of the selection of the chairman.1016 If any position within the tribunal is not 
filled after the designated time limits, either party may invite the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations or the President of the International Court of Justice to make an 
appointment.1017  Tribunals enjoy general discretion over arbitration procedures. In 
each case, the tribunal is required to reach its award based on the provisions of the 
disputed IIA and principles of international law. Some IIAs further limit “principles of 
international law” to those “recognized by both contracting parties”.1018 In decision 
making, a majority vote is required within the tribunal and the final award shall be final 
and binding upon disputing parties. Each party bears the cost of its appointed arbitrator 
and representation in arbitral proceedings. The cost of the chairman and the remaining 
costs are to be borne in equal parts by the disputing parties. Under some IIAs, tribunals 
are given broader discretion to change the rule on the equal allocation of costs.1019 No 
provision is provided for the implementation of awards. 
In brief, for state-state disputes, the IIAs concluded between China and EU Member 
States provide for both amicable DSMs and ad hoc arbitration, with the former being a 
precondition to resorting to the latter. At the same time, rules are provided for certain 
procedural issues in ad hoc arbitration, such as the composition of tribunals, arbitration 
procedures, decision making, effect of arbitral awards, and allocation of costs. There 
are essential similarities among these IIAs, which are further in line with the general 
structure and some details in China Model BITs. In fact, such similarities can also be 
found in the BITs concluded by China or by EU Member States with third states. This 
is probably due to the preference for sticking to existing practices and the lack of real 
use of such DSMs in practice, and thus treaty parties did not take efforts to customize 
or reform what had already existed in their BITs. 
1016 These three BITs are the China-Germany BIT (1983-terminated), the China-France BIT (1984-terminated) and 
the China-France BIT (2007). 
1017 The BITs where the Secretary-General of the United Nations is used as the appointing authority are some old 
BITs that were terminated, with one exception, which include the China-Sweden BIT (1982-terminated), the China-
Germany BIT (1983-terminated), the China-France BIT (1984-terminated), and the China-France BIT (2007). 
1018 For instance, the China-Bulgaria BIT (1989), Art. 8.5; the China-BLEU BIT (2005), Art. 9.3.  
1019 The China-Lithuania BIT (1993), Art. 7.7; the China-Finland BIT (2004), Art. 8.7; the China-France BIT (2007), 
Art. 10.6. 
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t 
(U
N
C
TA
D
),
 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
at
: 
ht
tp
://
in
ve
st
m
en
tp
ol
ic
yh
ub
.u
nc
ta
d.
or
g/
II
A
/C
ou
nt
ry
B
its
/4
2#
iia
In
ne
rM
en
u,
 la
st
 v
is
it
ed
 o
n 
30
.1
1.
20
16
. T
hi
s 
ha
s 
be
en
 p
ar
tly
 c
ro
ss
-c
he
ck
ed
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
pu
bl
is
he
d 
on
 th
e 
of
fi
ci
al
 w
eb
si
te
 o
f 
th
e 
M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 
C
om
m
er
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
Pe
op
le
’s
 R
ep
ub
lic
 o
f 
C
hi
na
 (
M
O
FC
O
M
),
 s
ee
: D
ep
ar
tm
en
t o
f T
re
at
y 
an
d 
L
aw
 M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 C
om
m
er
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
P
eo
pl
e'
s 
R
ep
ub
li
c 
of
 C
hi
na
, L
is
t o
f B
il
at
er
al
 I
nv
es
tm
en
t T
re
at
ie
s 
co
nc
lu
de
d 
by
 C
hi
na
 我
国
对
外
签
订
双
边
投
资
协
定
一
览
表
 (
08
.1
1.
20
11
),
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
: h
ttp
://
tf
s.
m
of
co
m
.g
ov
.c
n/
ar
tic
le
/N
oc
at
eg
or
y/
20
11
11
/2
01
11
10
78
19
47
4.
sh
tm
l, 
la
st
 v
is
it
ed
 o
n 
05
.0
1.
20
19
. T
hi
s 
li
st
 is
 o
rd
er
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
si
gn
in
g 
da
te
s.
 
10
21
 T
he
 d
at
e 
of
 s
ig
na
tu
re
 a
nd
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
en
tr
y 
in
to
 f
or
ce
. 
10
22
 T
he
re
 is
 n
o 
E
ng
lis
h 
ve
rs
io
n 
of
 th
is
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t a
va
ila
bl
e.
 T
he
 tr
an
sl
at
io
n 
is
 c
ar
ri
ed
 o
ut
 b
y 
th
e 
au
th
or
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
C
hi
ne
se
 v
er
si
on
 a
va
il
ab
le
 a
t:
 h
ttp
:/
/tf
s.
m
of
co
m
.g
ov
.c
n/
ar
ti
cl
e/
h/
au
/2
01
00
7/
20
10
07
07
04
10
31
.s
ht
m
l, 
la
st
 v
is
it
ed
 o
n 
05
.0
1.
20
19
. 
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7.
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l s
ha
ll
 f
or
m
ul
at
e 
it
s 
ow
n 
ru
le
s.
3 
F
ra
n
ce
 
(T
er
m
in
at
ed
)  
30
.0
5.
19
84
 
19
.0
3.
19
85
 
A
rt
ic
le
 1
0 
1.
D
is
pu
te
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
or
 a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
of
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t s
ha
ll 
be
 s
et
tl
ed
 a
m
ic
ab
ly
 a
s 
fa
r 
as
 p
os
si
bl
e 
th
ro
ug
h
di
pl
om
at
ic
 c
ha
nn
el
s.
2.
If
 a
 d
is
pu
te
 c
an
no
t b
e 
se
tt
le
d 
w
ith
in
 s
ix
 m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
n 
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
m
at
te
r 
is
 r
ai
se
d 
by
 e
ith
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 it
 s
ha
ll,
 u
po
n 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
pa
rt
y,
 b
y 
su
bm
it
te
d 
to
 a
n 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
.
3.
A
n 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
be
 c
on
st
it
ut
ed
 f
or
 e
ac
h 
in
di
vi
du
al
 c
as
e 
in
 th
e 
fo
ll
ow
in
g 
w
ay
: 
E
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
sh
al
l a
pp
oi
nt
 o
ne
 a
rb
itr
at
or
 a
nd
 th
e 
tw
o 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l s
el
ec
t a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
a 
th
ir
d 
S
ta
te
, w
ho
, w
ith
 th
e 
ap
pr
ov
al
 o
f 
th
e 
tw
o 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s,
sh
al
l b
e 
ap
po
in
te
d 
as
 th
e 
ch
ie
f 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
, T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
to
rs
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
ap
po
in
te
d 
w
ith
in
 tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 w
he
n 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
no
ti
fi
es
 th
e 
ot
he
r
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 o
f 
it
s 
re
qu
es
t o
n 
su
bm
itt
in
g 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
fo
r 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n,
 w
hi
le
 th
e 
ch
ie
f 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
ap
po
in
te
d 
w
it
hi
n 
tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
tw
o
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
ar
e 
ap
po
in
te
d.
4.
If
 th
e 
ap
po
in
tm
en
t o
f 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
an
d 
ch
ie
f 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 h
av
e 
no
t b
ee
n 
m
ad
e 
w
it
hi
n 
th
e 
ti
m
e 
li
m
it
 a
s 
sp
ec
if
ie
d 
in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 (
3)
 a
bo
ve
, e
it
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
in
vi
te
th
e 
Se
cr
et
ar
y-
G
en
er
al
 o
f 
th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
N
at
io
ns
 to
 m
ak
e 
an
y 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
t. 
If
 th
e 
Se
cr
et
ar
y-
G
en
er
al
 o
f 
th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
N
at
io
ns
 is
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
or
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
pr
ev
en
te
d 
fr
om
 p
er
fo
rm
in
g 
th
e 
sa
id
 d
ut
y;
 a
 D
ep
ut
y 
Se
cr
et
ar
y-
G
en
er
al
 o
f 
se
ni
or
ity
 w
ho
 is
 n
ot
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
in
vi
te
d 
to
 m
ak
e
th
e 
ƒn
et
he
r.
re
 
5.
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l s
ha
ll
 f
or
m
ul
at
e 
it
s 
ow
n 
ru
le
s 
an
d 
ad
ju
di
ca
te
 b
y 
a 
m
aj
or
ity
 o
f 
vo
te
s.
 T
he
 f
in
al
 d
ec
is
io
n 
w
ill
 b
e 
bi
nd
in
g 
on
 b
ot
h 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s 
an
d 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 
tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
in
te
rp
re
t i
ts
 d
ec
is
io
n 
at
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
.
6.
E
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
be
ar
 th
e 
ex
pe
ns
es
 f
or
 it
s 
ow
n 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 a
nd
 r
ep
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
in
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
. T
he
 e
xp
en
se
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
ch
ie
f 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 a
nd
 o
th
er
re
le
va
nt
 e
xp
en
se
s 
sh
al
l b
e 
bo
rn
e 
eq
ua
lly
 b
y 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s.
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A
rt
ic
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1.
D
is
pu
te
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
or
 a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
of
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t s
ho
ul
d,
 a
s 
fa
r 
as
 p
os
si
bl
e,
 b
e 
se
ttl
ed
 th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
di
pl
om
at
ic
ch
an
ne
l.
If
 a
 d
is
pu
te
 c
an
no
t t
hu
s 
be
 s
et
tl
ed
 it
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
su
bm
itt
ed
 to
 th
e 
jo
in
t c
om
m
itt
ee
 c
on
si
st
in
g 
of
 r
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
es
 o
f 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s.
 S
uc
h 
co
m
m
it
te
e 
sh
al
l c
on
ve
ne
 a
m
ee
tin
g 
w
it
ho
ut
 u
nd
ue
 d
el
ay
 a
t t
he
 e
ar
li
er
 r
eq
ue
st
 o
f 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
.
2.
If
 a
 d
is
pu
te
 c
an
no
t t
hu
s 
be
 s
et
tl
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
jo
in
t c
om
m
itt
ee
 w
it
hi
n 
si
x 
m
on
th
s 
of
 a
 w
ri
tt
en
 n
ot
if
ic
at
io
n 
to
 o
ne
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 it
 s
ha
ll 
up
on
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 b
e 
su
bm
it
te
d 
to
 a
n 
ad
 h
oc
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l.
3.
Su
ch
 a
rb
itr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll
 c
on
si
st
 o
f 
th
re
e 
m
em
be
rs
. W
it
hi
n 
tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
of
 a
 w
ri
tte
n 
no
ti
fi
ca
tio
n 
of
 r
eq
ue
st
 f
or
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
, e
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 a
pp
oi
nt
 o
ne
m
em
be
r,
 a
nd
 th
es
e 
tw
o 
m
em
be
rs
 s
ha
ll 
w
it
hi
n 
tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
af
te
r 
th
ei
r 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
, s
el
ec
t a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
a 
th
ir
d 
S
ta
te
 w
hi
ch
 h
as
 d
ip
lo
m
at
ic
 r
el
at
io
ns
 w
ith
 tw
o 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g
P
ar
ti
es
 a
s 
th
ir
d 
m
em
be
r 
of
 tr
ib
un
al
. S
uc
h 
m
em
be
r 
sh
al
l b
e 
ap
po
in
te
d 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 o
f 
th
e 
tr
ib
un
al
 b
y 
th
e 
tw
o 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s.
4.
If
 w
it
hi
n 
fo
ur
 m
on
th
s 
of
 th
e 
w
ri
tte
n 
no
ti
fi
ca
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t f
or
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
, t
he
 a
d 
ho
c 
tr
ib
un
al
 h
as
 n
ot
 b
ee
n 
co
ns
ti
tu
te
d 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
, i
n 
th
e 
ab
se
nc
e 
of
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 a
rr
an
ge
m
en
t b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
tw
o 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s,
 in
vi
te
 th
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
to
 m
ak
e 
an
y 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
. I
f 
th
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 is
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 o
r 
if
 h
e 
is
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
pr
ev
en
te
d 
fr
om
 d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
 th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
n,
 th
e 
V
ic
e-
pr
es
id
en
t s
ha
ll
 b
e 
in
vi
te
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
. 
If
 th
e 
V
ic
e-
Pr
es
id
en
t i
s 
a 
na
ti
on
al
 o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 o
r 
if
 h
e 
to
o 
is
 p
re
ve
nt
ed
 f
ro
m
 d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
 th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
n,
 th
e 
M
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
ne
xt
 in
 s
en
io
ri
ty
 w
ho
 is
 n
ot
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
be
 in
vi
te
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
. 
5.
T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
de
te
rm
in
e 
its
 o
w
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e 
an
d 
re
ac
h 
its
 d
ec
is
io
n 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
gr
ee
m
en
ts
 in
 w
hi
ch
 b
ot
h
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s 
ha
ve
 p
ar
ti
ci
pa
te
d 
de
al
in
g 
w
ith
 s
uc
h 
m
at
te
rs
, a
nd
 g
en
er
al
ly
 r
ec
og
ni
ze
d 
pr
in
ci
pl
e 
of
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l l
aw
. 
T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll
 m
ak
e 
its
 d
ec
is
io
n 
by
 a
 m
aj
or
ity
 o
f 
vo
te
s.
 S
uc
h 
de
ci
si
on
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
fi
na
l a
nd
 b
in
di
ng
 o
n 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ti
es
. T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll
 in
te
rp
re
t i
ts
 d
ec
is
io
n
at
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y.
6.
E
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
be
ar
 th
e 
co
st
 o
f 
it
s 
ap
po
in
te
d 
m
em
be
rs
 o
f 
th
e 
tr
ib
un
al
. T
he
 a
dv
an
ce
d 
pa
ym
en
t o
f 
th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 a
nd
 th
e 
re
m
ai
ni
ng
 c
os
ts
 in
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s 
sh
al
l b
e 
bo
rn
e 
in
 e
qu
al
 p
ar
ts
 b
y 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s.
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(1
)
D
is
pu
te
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
or
 a
pp
li
ca
tio
n 
of
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t s
ho
ul
d,
 a
s 
fa
r 
as
 p
os
si
bl
e,
 b
e 
se
ttl
ed
 th
ro
ug
h 
di
pl
om
at
ic
ch
an
ne
ls
.
(2
)
If
 a
 d
is
pu
te
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ti
es
 c
an
no
t t
hu
s 
be
 s
et
tl
ed
 w
ith
in
 s
ix
 m
on
th
s,
 it
 s
ha
ll,
 u
po
n 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y,
 b
e 
su
bm
it
te
d 
to
 a
n 
ar
bi
tr
al
tr
ib
un
al
.
(3
)
Su
ch
 a
n 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
be
 c
on
st
itu
te
d 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 in
di
vi
du
al
 c
as
e 
in
 th
e 
fo
ll
ow
in
g 
w
ay
. W
ith
in
 tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
of
 th
e 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t f
or
 a
rb
it
ra
tio
n,
 e
ac
h
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
ap
po
in
t o
ne
 m
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
tr
ib
un
al
. T
he
se
 tw
o 
m
em
be
rs
 s
ha
ll
 th
en
 s
el
ec
t a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
a 
th
ir
d 
S
ta
te
, w
hi
ch
 h
as
 d
ip
lo
m
at
ic
 r
el
at
io
ns
 w
it
h 
bo
th
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s,
 w
ho
, o
n 
ap
pr
ov
al
 b
y 
th
e 
tw
o 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
tie
s,
 s
ha
ll 
be
 a
pp
oi
nt
ed
 c
ha
ir
m
an
 o
f 
th
e 
tr
ib
un
al
. T
he
 c
ha
ir
m
an
 s
ha
ll 
be
 a
pp
oi
nt
ed
 w
ith
in
 tw
o 
m
on
th
s
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
ap
po
in
tm
en
t o
f 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
tw
o 
m
em
be
rs
.
(4
)
If
 w
ith
in
 th
e 
pe
ri
od
s 
sp
ec
if
ie
d 
in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 (
3)
 o
f 
th
is
 A
rt
ic
le
 th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
 h
av
e 
no
t b
ee
n 
m
ad
e,
 e
ith
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
, i
n 
th
e 
ab
se
nc
e 
of
 a
ny
ot
he
r 
ag
re
em
en
t, 
in
vi
te
 th
e 
Pr
es
id
en
t o
f 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
to
 m
ak
e 
an
y 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
. I
f 
th
e 
Pr
es
id
en
t i
s 
a 
na
tio
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
or
 if
 h
e 
is
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
pr
ev
en
te
d 
fr
om
 d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
 th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
n,
 th
e 
V
ic
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
in
vi
te
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
. I
f 
th
e 
V
ic
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 is
 a
na
ti
on
al
 o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
, o
r 
if
 h
e 
to
o 
is
 p
re
ve
nt
ed
 f
ro
m
 d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
 th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
n,
 th
e 
M
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
ne
xt
 in
 s
en
io
ri
ty
 w
ho
is
 n
ot
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 w
ho
 is
 n
ot
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
pr
ev
en
te
d 
fr
om
 d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
 th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
n 
sh
al
l b
e 
in
vi
te
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
.  
(5
)
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l s
ha
ll 
de
te
rm
in
e 
it
s 
ow
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
 T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
re
ac
h 
its
 d
ec
is
io
n 
by
 a
 m
aj
or
ity
 o
f 
vo
te
s.
 T
he
 d
ec
is
io
n 
sh
al
l b
e 
fi
na
l a
nd
 b
in
di
ng
 o
n 
bo
th
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s.
 T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll
, u
po
n 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
, s
ta
te
 th
e 
re
as
on
s 
up
on
 w
hi
ch
 th
e 
aw
ar
d 
is
 b
as
ed
.
(6
)
E
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
be
ar
 th
e 
co
st
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 it
 h
as
 a
pp
oi
nt
ed
. T
he
 c
os
t o
f 
th
e 
ch
ai
rm
an
 a
nd
 th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 c
os
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
be
 b
or
ne
 in
 e
qu
al
pa
rt
s 
by
 th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
tie
s.
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A
rt
ic
le
 9
. 
(1
)
D
is
pu
te
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
an
d 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t s
ho
ul
d,
 a
s 
fa
r 
as
 p
os
si
bl
e,
 b
e 
se
ttl
ed
 th
ro
ug
h 
ne
go
ti
at
io
ns
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ti
es
. I
f 
su
ch
 a
 d
is
pu
te
 c
an
no
t b
e 
se
ttl
ed
 w
it
hi
n 
fi
ve
 m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
be
gi
nn
in
g 
of
 n
eg
ot
ia
tio
n,
 it
 s
ha
ll 
up
on
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g
P
ar
ty
, b
e 
su
bm
it
te
d 
to
 a
n 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
.
(2
)
Su
ch
 a
n 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
be
 c
on
st
itu
te
d 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 in
di
vi
du
al
 c
as
e 
in
 th
e 
fo
ll
ow
in
g 
w
ay
:
W
it
hi
n 
th
re
e 
m
on
th
s 
of
 th
e 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t f
or
 a
rb
itr
at
io
n,
 e
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
ap
po
in
t o
ne
 m
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
tr
ib
un
al
. T
ho
se
 tw
o 
m
em
be
rs
 s
ha
ll 
th
en
 s
el
ec
t a
na
ti
on
al
 o
f 
a 
th
ir
d 
S
ta
te
, w
ho
 o
n 
ap
pr
ov
al
 b
y 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ti
es
 s
ha
ll 
be
 a
pp
oi
nt
ed
 C
ha
ir
m
an
 o
f 
th
e 
tr
ib
un
al
. T
he
 C
ha
ir
m
an
 s
ha
ll 
be
 a
pp
oi
nt
ed
 w
ith
in
 th
re
e 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
ap
po
in
tm
en
t o
f 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
tw
o 
m
em
be
rs
.
If
 w
ith
in
 a
ny
 o
f 
th
e 
pe
ri
od
s 
sp
ec
if
ie
d 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
 h
av
e 
no
t b
ee
n 
m
ad
e,
 e
ith
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
, i
n 
th
e 
ab
se
nc
e 
of
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
in
vi
te
 th
e
P
re
si
de
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
to
 m
ak
e 
an
y 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
. I
f 
th
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 is
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 o
r 
if
 h
e 
is
 o
th
er
w
is
e
pr
ev
en
te
d 
fr
om
 d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
 th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
n,
 th
e 
V
ic
e-
Pr
es
id
en
t s
ha
ll 
be
 in
vi
te
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
. I
f 
th
e 
V
ic
e-
P
re
si
de
nt
 is
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 o
r 
if
 h
e,
 to
o,
 is
 p
re
ve
nt
ed
 f
ro
m
 d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
 th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
n,
 th
e 
M
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
ne
xt
 in
 s
en
io
ri
ty
 w
ho
 is
 n
ot
 a
 n
at
io
na
l 
of
 e
it
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
sh
al
l b
e 
in
vi
te
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
.
(3
)
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l s
ha
ll 
ap
pl
y 
th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
ot
he
r 
ag
re
em
en
ts
 c
on
cl
ud
ed
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s,
 a
nd
 th
e 
ge
ne
ra
l p
ri
nc
ip
le
s 
of
 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l l
aw
. I
t s
ha
ll 
re
ac
h 
its
 d
ec
is
io
n 
by
 a
 m
aj
or
ity
 o
f 
vo
te
s.
 S
uc
h 
de
ci
si
on
 s
ha
ll 
be
 f
in
al
 a
nd
 b
in
di
ng
 o
n 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ti
es
.
(4
)
E
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
be
ar
 th
e 
co
st
 o
f 
it
s 
ow
n 
m
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
tr
ib
un
al
 a
nd
 o
f 
it
s 
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
in
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
. T
he
 c
os
t o
f 
th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 in
di
sc
ha
rg
in
g 
hi
s 
ar
bi
tr
al
 f
un
ct
io
n 
an
d 
th
e 
re
m
ai
ni
ng
 c
os
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
be
 b
or
ne
 e
qu
al
ly
 b
y 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ti
es
.
(5
)
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l d
et
er
m
in
es
 it
s 
ow
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
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A
rt
ic
le
 1
1 
(1
)
D
is
pu
te
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
an
d 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t s
ha
ll
 b
e 
se
tt
le
d,
 a
s 
fa
r 
as
 p
os
si
bl
e,
 th
ro
ug
h 
fr
ie
nd
ly
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
 b
y 
bo
th
 P
ar
tie
s 
th
ro
ug
h 
di
pl
om
at
ic
 c
ha
nn
el
s.
(2
)
If
 s
uc
h 
di
sp
ut
es
 c
an
no
t b
e 
se
ttl
ed
 w
it
hi
n 
si
x 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
n 
w
hi
ch
 e
ith
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 in
fo
rm
s 
in
 w
ri
tin
g 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
, t
he
y 
sh
al
l, 
at
 th
e
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y,
 b
e 
su
bm
it
te
d 
fo
r 
se
tt
le
m
en
t t
o 
an
 a
d 
ho
c 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
rb
itr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
. 
(3
)
T
he
 a
d 
ho
c 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
rb
itr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 m
en
tio
ne
d 
ab
ov
e 
sh
al
l b
e 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
as
 f
ol
lo
w
s:
 T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l i
s 
co
m
po
se
d 
of
 th
re
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s.
 E
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
ap
po
in
t o
ne
 a
rb
it
ra
to
r;
 th
e 
tw
o 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
pr
op
os
e 
by
 m
ut
ua
l a
gr
ee
m
en
t t
he
 th
ir
d 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 w
ho
 is
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
a 
th
ir
d 
St
at
e 
w
hi
ch
 h
as
 d
ip
lo
m
at
ic
 r
el
at
io
ns
w
it
h 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s,
 a
nd
 th
e 
th
ir
d 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 w
il
l b
e 
ap
po
in
te
d 
as
 th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 o
f 
th
e 
tr
ib
un
al
 b
y 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ti
es
.
(4
)
If
 th
e 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
m
em
be
rs
 o
f 
th
e 
A
rb
it
ra
l T
ri
bu
na
l a
re
 n
ot
 m
ad
e 
w
ith
in
 a
 p
er
io
d 
of
 s
ix
 m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
re
qu
es
t f
or
 a
rb
itr
at
io
n,
 e
it
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g
P
ar
ty
 m
ay
, i
n 
th
e 
ab
se
nc
e 
of
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 a
rr
an
ge
m
en
t, 
in
vi
te
 th
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
.
240
 
S
ho
ul
d 
th
e 
Pr
es
id
en
t b
e 
a 
na
ti
on
al
 o
f 
on
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
, o
r 
sh
ou
ld
 h
e 
no
t b
e 
ab
le
 to
 p
er
fo
rm
 th
is
 d
es
ig
na
ti
on
 b
ec
au
se
 o
f 
ot
he
r 
re
as
on
s,
 th
is
 ta
sk
 s
ha
ll 
be
 e
nt
ru
st
ed
 to
 
th
e 
V
ic
e-
Pr
es
id
en
t o
f 
th
e 
C
ou
rt
, (
or
 to
 th
e 
ne
xt
 s
en
io
r 
Ju
dg
e 
of
 th
e 
C
ou
rt
) 
w
ho
 is
 n
ot
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
. 
 
(5
)
T
he
 A
rb
it
ra
l T
ri
bu
na
l s
ha
ll 
de
te
rm
in
e 
it
s 
ow
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
T
he
 A
rb
it
ra
l T
ri
bu
na
l s
ha
ll
 d
ec
id
e 
its
 a
w
ar
d 
by
 a
 m
aj
or
ity
 o
f 
vo
te
s.
 S
uc
h 
aw
ar
d 
is
 f
in
al
 a
nd
 b
in
gi
ng
 u
po
n 
th
e 
tw
o 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ti
es
.
(6
)
E
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
be
ar
 th
e 
co
st
 o
f 
it
s 
ow
n 
m
em
be
r 
an
d 
of
 it
s 
co
un
se
l i
n 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
. T
he
 c
os
t o
f 
th
e 
ch
ai
rm
an
 a
nd
 r
em
ai
ni
ng
 c
os
ts
 s
ha
ll 
be
bo
rn
e 
in
 e
qu
al
 p
ar
ts
 b
y 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ti
es
. 
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A
rt
ic
le
 1
3 
1.
D
is
pu
te
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
or
 a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
of
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t s
ha
ll,
 if
 p
os
si
bl
e,
 b
e 
se
tt
le
d 
by
 m
ea
ns
 o
f 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
 o
r
di
pl
om
at
ic
 n
eg
ot
ia
tio
ns
.
2.
If
 s
uc
h 
di
sp
ut
es
 c
an
no
t b
e 
se
tt
le
d 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
n 
of
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 1
 o
f 
th
is
 A
rt
ic
le
, w
ith
in
 a
 r
ea
so
na
bl
e 
la
ps
e 
of
 ti
m
e,
 th
ey
 s
ha
ll,
 u
po
n 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
P
ar
ty
, b
e 
su
bm
it
te
d 
to
 a
n 
ad
 h
oc
 a
rb
itr
at
io
n 
tr
ib
un
al
.
3.
Su
ch
 a
n 
ad
 h
oc
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
be
 c
om
po
se
d 
of
 th
re
e 
m
em
be
rs
. E
ac
h 
Pa
rt
y 
sh
al
l a
pp
oi
nt
 o
ne
 a
rb
itr
at
or
 a
nd
 th
e 
tw
o 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
th
us
 a
pp
oi
nt
ed
 s
ha
ll 
to
ge
th
er
 a
pp
oi
nt
 a
th
ir
d 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 a
s 
th
ei
r 
ch
ai
rm
an
 w
ho
 is
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
a 
th
ir
d 
St
at
e 
w
hi
ch
 h
as
 d
ip
lo
m
at
ic
 r
el
at
io
ns
 w
ith
 b
ot
h 
Pa
rt
ie
s.
4.
If
 o
ne
 o
f 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
fa
ils
 to
 a
pp
oi
nt
 it
s 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 a
nd
 h
as
 n
ot
 p
ro
ce
ed
ed
 to
 d
o 
so
 w
ith
in
 tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
af
te
r 
in
vi
ta
tio
n 
fr
om
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
Pa
rt
y 
to
 m
ak
e 
su
ch
 a
n 
ap
po
in
tm
en
t,
th
e 
la
tt
er
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 in
vi
te
 th
e 
Pr
es
id
en
t o
f 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
t.
5.
If
 th
e 
tw
o 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
ar
e 
un
ab
le
 to
 r
ea
ch
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
w
ith
in
 tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
th
ei
r 
ap
po
in
tm
en
t, 
on
 th
e 
ch
oi
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
th
ir
d 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
, a
nd
 in
 th
e 
ab
se
nc
e 
of
 a
ny
ot
he
r 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
t b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ti
es
, e
ith
er
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
 in
vi
te
 th
e 
Pr
es
id
en
t o
f 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
t.
6.
If
, i
n 
th
e 
ca
se
s 
pr
ov
id
ed
 f
or
 in
 th
e 
fo
ur
th
 a
nd
 f
if
th
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 o
f 
th
is
 A
rt
ic
le
, t
he
 P
re
si
de
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
is
 p
re
ve
nt
ed
 f
ro
m
 d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
 th
e 
sa
id
fu
nc
ti
on
 o
r 
is
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y,
 th
e 
V
ic
e-
P
re
si
de
nt
 s
ha
ll 
be
 in
vi
te
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
. I
f 
th
e 
V
ic
e-
P
re
si
de
nt
 is
 p
re
ve
nt
ed
 f
ro
m
 
di
sc
ha
rg
in
g 
th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
n 
or
 is
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 P
ar
ty
, t
he
 m
os
t s
en
io
r 
m
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
C
ou
rt
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
w
ho
 is
 n
ot
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
in
vi
te
d 
to
 m
ak
e
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
.
7.
U
nl
es
s 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
de
ci
de
 o
th
er
w
is
e,
 th
e 
tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
it
s 
ow
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
8.
B
ef
or
e 
th
e 
tr
ib
un
al
 d
ec
id
es
, i
t m
ay
 a
t a
ny
 s
ta
ge
 o
f 
th
e 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
 p
ro
po
se
 to
 th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
th
at
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
be
 s
et
tl
ed
 a
m
ic
ab
ly
. T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
re
ac
h 
it
s 
aw
ar
d 
ba
se
d 
up
on
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
is
 p
re
se
nt
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 d
om
es
tic
 la
w
s,
 th
e 
ag
re
em
en
ts
 b
ot
h 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s 
ha
ve
 c
on
cl
ud
ed
 a
nd
 th
e 
ge
ne
ra
ll
y 
re
co
gn
is
ed
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 o
f 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l l
aw
.
9.
T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
re
ac
h 
it
s 
de
ci
si
on
 b
y 
a 
m
aj
or
it
y 
of
 v
ot
es
. S
uc
h 
de
ci
si
on
 s
ha
ll 
be
 f
in
al
 a
nd
 b
in
di
ng
 o
n 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
.
W
he
n 
th
e 
tr
ib
un
al
 r
ea
ch
es
 it
s 
de
ci
si
on
, i
t s
ha
ll 
st
at
e 
th
e 
le
ga
l b
as
is
 o
f 
it
s 
aw
ar
d 
an
d,
 u
po
n 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
, p
ro
vi
de
 th
e 
co
ns
id
er
at
io
ns
 le
ad
in
g 
to
 it
.
10
.E
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 b
ea
r 
th
e 
co
st
s 
of
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 a
pp
oi
nt
ed
 b
y 
it
se
lf
. T
he
 c
os
t o
f 
th
e 
ch
ai
rm
an
 a
nd
 th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 c
os
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
ad
 h
oc
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
be
 b
or
ne
in
 e
qu
al
 p
ar
ts
 b
y 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
tie
s.
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A
rt
ic
le
 1
0 
1.
D
is
pu
te
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
ti
on
 o
r 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t s
ha
ll
 a
s 
fa
r 
as
 p
os
si
bl
e 
be
 s
et
tle
d 
th
ro
ug
h 
fr
ie
nd
ly
 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
. 
2.
If
 s
uc
h 
a 
di
sp
ut
e 
ca
nn
ot
 th
us
 b
e 
se
tt
le
d 
w
it
hi
n 
si
x 
m
on
th
s 
it 
sh
al
l, 
at
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
, b
e 
su
bm
itt
ed
 to
 a
n 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
tr
ib
un
al
.
3.
Su
ch
 a
n 
ad
 h
oc
 a
rb
itr
at
io
n 
tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
co
ns
ti
tu
te
d 
as
 f
ol
lo
w
s;
 e
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 a
pp
oi
nt
 a
n 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
, a
nd
 th
es
e 
tw
o 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l a
gr
ee
 u
po
n 
a
na
ti
on
al
 o
f 
a 
th
ir
d 
co
un
tr
y 
w
hi
ch
 h
as
 d
ip
lo
m
at
ic
 r
el
at
io
ns
 w
ith
 b
ot
h 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ti
es
 a
s 
th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 to
 b
e 
ap
po
in
te
d 
by
 th
e 
G
ov
er
nm
en
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
tw
o 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
pa
rt
ie
s.
 A
rb
it
ra
to
rs
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
ap
po
in
te
d 
w
it
hi
n 
tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
n 
w
hi
ch
 e
ith
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
pa
rt
y 
ha
s 
in
fo
rm
ed
 it
s 
co
un
te
rp
ar
t o
f 
its
 in
te
nt
io
n 
to
 s
ub
m
it
 th
e
di
sp
ut
e 
to
 a
n 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n,
 a
nd
 th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 b
e 
ap
po
in
te
d 
w
ith
in
 tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
th
er
ea
ft
er
.
4.
If
, w
it
hi
n 
th
e 
pe
ri
od
s 
sp
ec
if
ie
d 
in
 P
ar
ag
ra
ph
 3
 a
bo
ve
, t
he
 a
pp
oi
nt
m
en
ts
 h
av
e 
no
t b
ee
n 
m
ad
e,
 e
it
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
, i
n 
th
e 
ab
se
nc
e 
of
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t,
in
vi
te
 th
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
to
 m
ak
e 
an
y 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
. I
f 
th
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 is
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
or
 if
 h
e 
is
ot
he
rw
is
e 
pr
ev
en
te
d 
fr
om
 d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
 th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
n,
 th
e 
m
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
in
 s
en
io
ri
ty
 w
ho
 is
 n
ot
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
sh
al
l b
e 
in
vi
te
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
.
5.
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
m
ak
e 
it
s 
de
ci
si
on
 o
n 
th
e 
ba
si
s 
of
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
ot
he
r 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
ts
 c
on
cl
ud
ed
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ti
es
 a
nd
 g
en
er
al
 p
ri
nc
ip
le
s
of
 I
nt
er
na
tio
na
l l
aw
. S
uc
h 
de
ci
si
on
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
re
ac
he
d 
by
 a
 m
aj
or
it
y 
of
 v
ot
es
, a
nd
 s
ha
ll 
be
 f
in
al
 a
nd
 b
in
di
ng
.
6.
E
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
be
ar
 th
e 
co
st
 o
f 
it
s 
ow
n 
ap
po
in
te
d 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 a
nd
 o
f 
its
 r
ep
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
in
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s;
 th
e 
co
st
 o
f 
th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 a
nd
 th
e
re
m
ai
ni
ng
 c
os
ts
 s
ha
ll 
be
 b
or
ne
 e
qu
al
 p
ar
ts
 b
y 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ti
es
 c
on
ce
rn
ed
.
7.
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
de
te
rm
in
e 
it
s 
ow
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
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(1
)
D
is
pu
te
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
or
 a
pp
li
ca
tio
n 
of
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t s
ho
ul
d,
 a
s 
fa
r 
as
 p
os
si
bl
e,
 b
e 
se
ttl
ed
 th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
di
pl
om
at
ic
 
ch
an
ne
l.
(2
)
If
 a
 d
is
pu
te
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ti
es
 c
an
no
t t
hu
s 
be
 s
et
tl
ed
, i
t s
ha
ll
 u
po
n 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 b
e 
su
bm
it
te
d 
to
 a
n 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
.
(3
)
Su
ch
 a
n 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
be
 c
on
st
itu
te
d 
fo
r 
su
ch
 in
di
vi
du
al
 c
as
e 
in
 th
e 
fo
ll
ow
in
g 
w
ay
. W
ith
in
 tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
of
 th
e 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t f
or
 a
rb
it
ra
tio
n;
 e
ac
h
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
ap
po
in
t o
ne
 m
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
tr
ib
un
al
. T
ho
se
 tw
o 
m
em
be
rs
 s
ha
ll
 th
en
 s
el
ec
t a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
th
ir
d 
S
ta
te
 w
ho
 o
n 
ap
pr
ov
al
 b
y 
th
e 
tw
o 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
P
ar
ti
es
 s
ha
ll 
be
 a
pp
oi
nt
ed
 C
ha
ir
m
an
 o
f 
th
e 
tr
ib
un
al
. T
he
 C
ha
ir
m
an
 s
ha
ll 
be
 a
pp
oi
nt
ed
 w
it
hi
n 
tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
ap
po
in
tm
en
t o
f 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
tw
o 
m
em
be
rs
.
(4
)
If
 w
ith
in
 th
e 
pe
ri
od
s 
sp
ec
if
ie
d 
in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 (
3)
 o
f 
th
is
 A
rt
ic
le
 th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
 h
av
e 
no
t b
ee
n 
m
ad
e,
 e
ith
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
, i
n 
th
e 
ab
se
nc
e 
of
 a
ny
ot
he
r 
ag
re
em
en
t, 
in
vi
te
 th
e 
Pr
es
id
en
t o
f 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
to
 m
ak
e 
an
y 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
. I
f 
th
e 
Pr
es
id
en
t i
s 
a 
na
tio
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
or
 if
 h
e 
is
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
pr
ev
en
te
d 
fr
om
 d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
 th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
n,
 th
e 
V
ic
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
in
vi
te
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
. I
f 
th
e 
V
ic
e-
Pr
es
id
en
t i
s 
a
na
ti
on
al
 o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 o
r 
if
 h
e 
to
o 
is
 p
re
ve
nt
ed
 f
ro
m
 d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
 th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
n,
 th
e 
M
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
ne
xt
 in
 s
en
io
ri
ty
 w
ho
 is
no
t a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
in
vi
te
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
.
(5
)
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l s
ha
ll 
re
ac
h 
it
s 
de
ci
si
on
 b
y 
a 
m
aj
or
it
y 
of
 v
ot
es
. S
uc
h 
de
ci
si
on
 s
ha
ll 
be
 b
in
di
ng
 o
n 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s.
 E
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
sh
al
l b
ea
r 
th
e 
co
st
 o
f 
its
 o
w
n 
m
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
tr
ib
un
al
 a
nd
 o
f 
it
s 
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
in
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
; t
he
 c
os
t o
f 
th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 a
nd
 th
e 
re
m
ai
ni
ng
 c
os
ts
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
bo
rn
e 
in
 e
qu
al
 p
ar
ts
by
 th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s.
 T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
de
te
rm
in
e 
it
s 
ow
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
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1.
D
is
pu
te
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
or
 a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
of
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t s
ha
ll 
as
 f
ar
 a
s 
po
ss
ib
le
, b
e 
se
tt
le
d 
by
 c
on
su
lta
tio
n 
th
ro
ug
h 
di
pl
om
at
ic
 c
ha
nn
el
.
2.
If
 a
 d
is
pu
te
 c
an
no
t t
hu
s 
be
 s
et
tl
ed
 w
it
hi
n 
si
x 
m
on
th
s,
 it
 s
ha
ll,
 u
po
n 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
, b
e 
su
bm
it
te
d 
to
 a
n 
ad
 h
oc
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l.
3.
Su
ch
 a
d 
ho
c 
tr
ib
un
al
 c
om
pr
is
es
 o
f 
th
re
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s.
 W
ith
in
 tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
n 
w
hi
ch
 e
ith
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 r
ec
ei
ve
s 
th
e 
w
ri
tt
en
 n
ot
ic
e 
re
qu
es
tin
g 
fo
r
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
fr
om
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
, e
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 a
pp
oi
nt
 o
ne
 a
rb
it
ra
to
r.
 T
ho
se
 tw
o 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l, 
w
it
hi
n 
tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
af
te
r 
th
ei
r 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
,
to
ge
th
er
 s
el
ec
t a
 th
ir
d 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 w
ho
 is
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
a 
th
ir
d 
S
ta
te
 w
hi
ch
 h
as
 d
ip
lo
m
at
ic
 r
el
at
io
ns
 w
it
h 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ti
es
. T
he
 th
ir
d 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 s
ha
ll 
be
 a
pp
oi
nt
ed
 b
y
th
e 
tw
o 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ti
es
 a
s 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
.
4.
If
 th
e 
ad
 h
oc
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l h
as
 n
ot
 b
ee
n 
co
ns
tit
ut
ed
 w
ith
in
 f
ou
r 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
th
e 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
w
ri
tt
en
 n
ot
ic
e 
fo
r 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n,
 e
it
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
m
ay
, i
n 
th
e 
ab
se
nc
e 
of
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
in
vi
te
 th
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
. I
f 
th
e 
Pr
es
id
en
t i
s 
a 
na
ti
on
al
 
of
 e
it
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
or
 is
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
pr
ev
en
te
d 
fr
om
 d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
 th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
n,
 th
e 
ne
xt
 m
os
t s
en
io
r 
m
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
w
ho
 is
 n
ot
 a
 
na
ti
on
al
 o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
in
vi
te
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
t. 
5.
T
he
 a
d 
ho
c 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
de
te
rm
in
e 
its
 o
w
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
 T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
re
ac
h 
it
s 
aw
ar
d 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
la
w
s 
of
 th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 a
cc
ep
ti
ng
in
ve
st
m
en
t, 
th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 o
f 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l l
aw
 r
ec
og
ni
ze
d 
by
 b
ot
h 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s.
T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll
 r
ea
ch
 it
s 
aw
ar
d 
by
 a
 m
aj
or
ity
 o
f 
vo
te
s.
 S
uc
h 
aw
ar
d 
sh
al
l b
e 
fi
na
l a
nd
 b
in
di
ng
 o
n 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ti
es
. T
he
 a
d 
ho
c 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll
, u
po
n 
th
e
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y,
 e
xp
la
in
 th
e 
ba
si
s 
of
 it
s 
aw
ar
d.
6.
E
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
be
ar
 th
e 
co
st
 o
f 
it
s 
ap
po
in
te
d 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
. T
he
 r
el
ev
an
t c
os
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 a
nd
 th
e 
ad
 h
oc
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
bo
rn
e 
in
 e
qu
al
 p
ar
ts
 b
y 
th
e
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s.
12
 
B
ul
ga
ri
a 
27
.0
6.
19
89
 
21
.0
8.
19
94
 
A
rt
ic
le
 8
 
1.
D
is
pu
te
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 S
ta
te
s 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
ti
on
 o
r 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 th
is
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t s
ha
ll,
 a
s 
fa
r 
as
 p
os
si
bl
e,
 b
e 
se
ttl
ed
 b
y 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
n 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
di
pl
om
at
ic
 c
ha
nn
el
.
2.
If
 a
 d
is
pu
te
 c
an
no
t t
hu
s 
be
 s
et
tl
ed
 w
it
h 
si
x 
m
on
th
s,
 it
 s
ha
ll,
 u
po
n 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
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at
e,
 b
e 
su
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te
d 
to
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n 
ad
 h
oc
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l.
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c 
tr
ib
un
al
 c
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 C
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e 
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 f
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tr
at
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C
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ac
ti
ng
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te
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ra
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bi
tr
at
or
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al
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th
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ts
th
ir
d 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 w
ho
 is
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at
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 d
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 b
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o
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rm
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 o
f 
th
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 tr
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un
al
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l t
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 b
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r 
m
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th
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f 
th
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re
ce
ip
t o
f 
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w
ri
tt
en
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ot
ic
e 
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r 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n,
 e
it
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 S
ta
te
m
ay
, i
n 
th
e 
ab
se
nc
e 
of
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ny
 o
th
er
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
in
vi
te
 th
e 
pr
es
id
en
t o
f 
th
e 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l c
ou
rt
 o
f 
ju
st
ic
e 
to
 a
pp
oi
nt
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e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
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 w
ho
 h
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r 
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ve
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et
 b
ee
n 
ap
po
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 C
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en
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 d
is
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ng
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un
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io
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t s
en
io
r 
m
em
be
r 
of
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e 
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te
rn
at
io
na
l
co
ur
t o
f 
ju
st
ic
e 
w
ho
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ot
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 S
ta
te
 s
ha
ll 
be
 in
vi
te
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
t (
s)
. 
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at
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 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
St
at
es
.
6.
B
ef
or
e 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 d
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un
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 r
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 m
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l b
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 C
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ng
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n 
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f 
ei
th
er
 C
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tr
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at
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 b
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it
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d 
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el
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an
t c
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 o
f 
th
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oc
 tr
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un
al
 s
ha
ll 
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 b
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l p
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 b
y 
th
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C
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tr
ac
tin
g 
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at
es
.
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 c
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 b
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 d
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 c
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, b
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 c
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 C
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at
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C
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ac
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ra
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at
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 f
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at
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 d
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 C
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 b
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 b
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re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
w
ri
tt
en
 n
ot
ic
e 
fo
r 
ar
bi
tr
at
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 C
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 m
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l C
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 b
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 C
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 d
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l C
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at
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 C
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is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
th
e 
la
w
s 
of
 th
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 C
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ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l s
ha
ll,
 u
po
n 
th
e
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
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 b
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pr
es
en
ta
ti
on
 in
 a
rb
it
ra
l p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
. T
he
 r
el
ev
an
t c
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 b
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 b
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at
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 d
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 c
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, b
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 c
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 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 r
ec
ei
ve
s 
th
e 
w
ri
tte
n 
no
tic
e 
re
qu
es
ti
ng
 f
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ra
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P
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at
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ib
un
al
.
4.
If
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 h
as
 n
ot
 b
ee
n 
co
ns
ti
tu
te
d 
w
ith
in
 f
iv
e 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
th
e 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
w
ri
tt
en
 n
ot
ic
e 
re
qu
es
tin
g 
fo
r 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n,
 e
ith
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 
m
ay
, i
n 
th
e 
ab
se
nc
e 
of
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
in
vi
te
 th
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
to
 a
pp
oi
nt
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
(s
) 
w
ho
 h
as
 o
r 
ha
ve
 n
ot
 y
et
 b
ee
n 
ap
po
in
te
d.
 
If
 th
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 is
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 o
r 
is
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
pr
ev
en
te
d 
fr
om
 d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
 th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
n,
 th
e 
ne
xt
 m
os
t s
en
io
r 
m
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
w
ho
 is
 n
ot
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 c
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
be
 in
vi
te
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
t(
s)
. 
5.
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l s
ha
ll
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
it
s 
ow
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
 T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
re
ac
h 
it
s 
aw
ar
d 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t a
nd
 p
ri
nc
ip
le
s 
of
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l l
aw
 r
ec
og
ni
ze
d 
by
 c
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s.
6.
T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
re
ac
h 
it
s 
aw
ar
d 
by
 a
 m
aj
or
ity
 o
f 
vo
te
s.
 S
uc
h 
aw
ar
d 
sh
al
l b
e 
fi
na
l a
nd
 b
in
di
ng
 o
n 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s.
 T
he
 a
d 
ho
c 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll,
 u
po
n
th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 c
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s,
 e
xp
la
in
 th
e 
re
as
on
s 
of
 it
s 
aw
ar
d.
7.
E
ac
h 
co
nt
ra
ct
in
g 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
be
ar
 th
e 
co
st
 o
f 
it
s 
ap
po
in
te
d 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 a
nd
 o
f 
its
 r
ep
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
in
 a
rb
it
ra
l p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
. T
he
 r
el
ev
an
t c
os
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 a
nd
 th
e
tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
be
 b
or
ne
 in
 e
qu
al
 p
ar
ts
 b
y 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s.
 
15
 
P
or
tu
ga
l 
(T
er
m
in
at
ed
) 
03
.0
2.
19
92
 
01
.1
2.
19
92
 
A
rt
ic
le
 7
 
1.
A
ny
 d
is
pu
te
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
ti
on
 o
r 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t s
ha
ll.
 a
s 
fa
r 
as
 p
os
si
bl
e,
 b
e 
se
ttl
ed
 b
y 
co
ns
ul
ta
ti
on
 th
ro
ug
h
di
pl
om
at
ic
 c
ha
nn
el
. 
243
2.
If
 a
 d
is
pu
te
 c
an
no
t t
hu
s 
be
 s
et
tl
ed
 w
it
hi
n 
si
x 
m
on
th
s.
 it
 s
ha
ll,
 u
po
n 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
, b
e 
su
bm
it
te
d 
to
 a
n 
ad
 h
oc
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l.
3.
Su
ch
 tr
ib
un
al
 c
om
pr
is
es
 o
f 
th
re
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s.
 W
it
hi
n 
tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
n 
w
hi
ch
 e
ith
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 r
ec
ei
ve
s 
th
e 
w
ri
tte
n 
no
tic
e 
re
qu
es
ti
ng
 f
or
 a
rb
it
ra
tio
n
fr
om
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
, e
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
sh
al
l a
pp
oi
nt
 o
ne
 a
rb
itr
at
or
, T
ho
se
 tw
o 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l, 
w
ith
in
 f
ur
th
er
 tw
o 
m
on
th
s,
 to
ge
th
er
 s
el
ec
t a
 th
ir
d
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 w
ho
 is
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
a 
th
ir
d 
S
ta
te
 w
hi
ch
 h
as
 d
ip
lo
m
at
ic
 r
el
at
io
ns
 w
it
h 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ti
es
. T
he
 th
ir
d 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 s
ha
ll 
be
 a
pp
oi
nt
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
tw
o 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g
P
ar
ti
es
 a
s 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
. 
4.
If
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 h
as
 n
ot
 b
ee
n 
co
ns
ti
tu
te
d 
w
ith
in
 f
ou
r 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
th
e 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
w
ri
tt
en
 n
ot
ic
e 
fo
r 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n,
 e
ith
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
, i
n
th
e 
ab
se
nc
e 
of
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
in
vi
te
 th
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
to
 a
pp
oi
nt
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 (
s)
 w
ho
 h
as
 o
r 
ha
ve
 n
ot
 y
et
 b
ee
n 
ap
po
in
te
d.
 I
f 
th
e
P
re
si
de
nt
 is
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 o
r 
is
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
Pr
ev
en
te
d 
fr
om
 d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
 th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
n,
 th
e 
ne
xt
 m
os
t s
en
io
r 
m
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
of
 J
us
tic
e 
w
ho
 is
 n
ot
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
in
vi
te
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
t (
s)
. 
5.
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l s
ha
ll
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
it
s 
ow
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
 T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
re
ac
h 
it
s 
aw
ar
d 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 o
f
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l l
aw
 r
ec
og
ni
ze
d 
by
 b
ot
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s.
6.
T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
re
ac
h 
it
s 
aw
ar
d 
by
 a
 m
aj
or
ity
 o
f 
vo
te
s.
 S
uc
h 
aw
ar
d 
sh
al
l b
e 
fi
na
l a
nd
 b
in
di
ng
 o
n 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s.
 T
he
 a
d 
ho
c 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll,
 u
po
n
th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
, e
xp
la
in
 th
e 
re
as
on
s 
of
 it
s 
aw
ar
d.
7.
E
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
be
ar
 th
e 
co
st
 o
f 
it
s 
ap
po
in
te
d 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 a
nd
 o
f 
it
s 
re
pr
es
en
ta
ti
on
 in
 a
rb
it
ra
l p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
. T
he
 r
el
ev
an
t c
os
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 a
nd
 th
e
tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
be
 b
or
ne
 in
 e
qu
al
 p
ar
ts
 b
y 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s.
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1.
A
ny
 d
is
pu
te
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
ti
on
 o
r 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t s
ha
ll.
 a
s 
fa
r 
as
 p
os
si
bl
e,
 b
e 
se
ttl
ed
 b
y 
co
ns
ul
ta
ti
on
 th
ro
ug
h
di
pl
om
at
ic
 c
ha
nn
el
.
2.
If
 a
 d
is
pu
te
 c
an
no
t t
hu
s 
be
 s
et
tl
ed
 w
it
hi
n 
si
x 
m
on
th
s.
 it
 s
ha
ll,
 u
po
n 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
, b
e 
su
bm
it
te
d 
to
 a
n 
ad
 h
oc
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l.
3.
Su
ch
 tr
ib
un
al
 c
om
pr
is
es
 o
f 
th
re
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s.
 W
it
hi
n 
tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
n 
w
hi
ch
 e
ith
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 r
ec
ei
ve
s 
th
e 
w
ri
tte
n 
no
tic
e 
re
qu
es
ti
ng
 f
or
 a
rb
it
ra
tio
n
fr
om
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
, e
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
sh
al
l a
pp
oi
nt
 o
ne
 a
rb
itr
at
or
, T
ho
se
 tw
o 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l, 
w
ith
in
 f
ur
th
er
 tw
o 
m
on
th
s,
 to
ge
th
er
 s
el
ec
t a
 th
ir
d
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 w
ho
 is
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
a 
th
ir
d 
S
ta
te
 w
hi
ch
 h
as
 d
ip
lo
m
at
ic
 r
el
at
io
ns
 w
it
h 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ti
es
. T
he
 th
ir
d 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 s
ha
ll 
be
 a
pp
oi
nt
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
tw
o 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g
P
ar
ti
es
 a
s 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
. 
4.
If
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 h
as
 n
ot
 b
ee
n 
co
ns
ti
tu
te
d 
w
ith
in
 f
ou
r 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
th
e 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
w
ri
tt
en
 n
ot
ic
e 
fo
r 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n,
 e
ith
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
, i
n
th
e 
ab
se
nc
e 
of
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
in
vi
te
 th
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
to
 a
pp
oi
nt
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 (
s)
 w
ho
 h
as
 o
r 
ha
ve
 n
ot
 y
et
 b
ee
n 
ap
po
in
te
d.
  
If
 th
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 is
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 o
r 
is
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
Pr
ev
en
te
d 
fr
om
 d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
 th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
n,
 th
e 
ne
xt
 m
os
t s
en
io
r 
m
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
w
ho
 is
 n
ot
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
be
 in
vi
te
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
t (
s)
. 
5.
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l s
ha
ll
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
it
s 
ow
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
 T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
re
ac
h 
it
s 
aw
ar
d 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
it
h 
th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 o
f
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l l
aw
 r
ec
og
ni
ze
d 
by
 b
ot
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s.
6.
T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
re
ac
h 
it
s 
aw
ar
d 
by
 a
 m
aj
or
ity
 o
f 
vo
te
s.
 S
uc
h 
aw
ar
d 
sh
al
l b
e 
fi
na
l a
nd
 b
in
di
ng
 o
n 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s.
 T
he
 a
d 
ho
c 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll,
 u
po
n
th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
, e
xp
la
in
 th
e 
re
as
on
s 
of
 it
s 
aw
ar
d.
7.
E
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
be
ar
 th
e 
co
st
 o
f 
it
s 
ap
po
in
te
d 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 a
nd
 o
f 
it
s 
re
pr
es
en
ta
ti
on
 in
 a
rb
it
ra
l p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
. T
he
 r
el
ev
an
t c
os
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 a
nd
 th
e
tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
be
 b
or
ne
 in
 e
qu
al
 p
ar
ts
 b
y 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s.
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1.
A
ny
 d
is
pu
te
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
ti
on
 o
r 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t s
ha
ll,
 if
 p
os
si
bl
e,
 b
e 
se
ttl
ed
 th
ro
ug
h 
di
pl
om
at
ic
 c
ha
nn
el
s.
2.
If
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
ca
nn
ot
 th
us
 b
e 
se
tt
le
d 
w
ith
in
 s
ix
 m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
be
gi
nn
in
g 
of
 th
e 
ne
go
tia
ti
on
s,
 it
 s
ha
ll,
 u
po
n 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 b
e 
su
bm
it
te
d 
to
 a
n
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
tr
ib
un
al
.
3.
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
be
 c
on
st
it
ut
ed
 a
d 
ho
c 
as
 f
ol
lo
w
s,
 E
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
sh
al
l a
pp
oi
nt
 o
ne
 a
rb
it
ra
to
r 
an
d 
th
es
e 
tw
o 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l a
gr
ee
 u
po
n 
a 
na
tio
na
l
of
 a
 th
ir
d 
St
at
e 
as
 c
ha
ir
m
an
. T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
to
rs
 s
ha
ll 
be
 a
pp
oi
nt
ed
 w
ith
in
 th
re
e 
m
on
th
s,
 th
e 
ch
ai
rm
an
 w
it
hi
n 
fi
ve
 m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
n 
w
hi
ch
 e
it
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y
ha
s 
in
fo
rm
ed
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 th
at
 it
 in
te
nd
s 
to
 s
ub
m
it 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
to
 a
n 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
tr
ib
un
al
.
4.
If
 w
it
hi
n 
th
e 
pe
ri
od
s 
sp
ec
if
ie
d 
in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 3
 o
f 
th
is
 A
rt
ic
le
 th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
 h
av
e 
no
t b
ee
n 
m
ad
e,
 a
ny
 P
ar
ty
 to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
m
ay
, i
n 
th
e 
ab
se
nc
e 
of
 a
ny
 o
th
er
ag
re
em
en
t, 
in
vi
te
 th
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
to
 m
ak
e 
an
y 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
. I
f 
th
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
C
ou
rt
 is
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
an
y 
pa
rt
y 
to
 th
is
10
24
 T
he
re
 is
 n
o 
E
ng
lis
h 
ve
rs
io
n 
of
 th
is
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t a
va
ila
bl
e.
 T
he
 tr
an
sl
at
io
n 
is
 c
ar
ri
ed
 o
ut
 b
y 
th
e 
au
th
or
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
C
hi
ne
se
 v
er
si
on
 a
va
il
ab
le
 a
t:
 h
ttp
:/
/tf
s.
m
of
co
m
.g
ov
.c
n/
ar
ti
cl
e/
h/
au
/2
01
00
7/
20
10
07
07
04
10
31
.s
ht
m
l, 
la
st
 v
is
it
ed
 o
n 
05
.0
1.
20
19
. 
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di
sp
ut
e 
or
 if
 h
e 
is
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
pr
ev
en
te
d 
fr
om
 d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
 th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
n,
 th
e 
vi
ce
-P
re
si
de
nt
 o
r 
if
 h
e 
is
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
an
y 
P
ar
ty
 o
r 
is
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
pr
ev
en
te
d 
fr
om
 
di
sc
ha
rg
in
g 
th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
n,
 th
e 
M
em
be
r 
of
 o
ne
 C
ou
rt
 n
ex
t i
n 
se
ni
or
it
y 
w
ho
 is
 n
ot
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
an
y 
pa
rt
y 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
sh
al
l b
e 
in
vi
te
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
. 
5.
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
de
ci
de
 o
n 
th
e 
ba
si
s 
of
 r
es
pe
ct
 f
or
 th
e 
la
w
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
ly
 th
e 
pr
es
en
t A
gr
ee
m
en
t a
nd
 o
th
er
 r
el
ev
an
t a
gr
ee
m
en
ts
 e
xi
st
in
g 
be
tw
ee
n
th
e 
tw
o 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ti
es
 a
nd
 th
e 
ge
ne
ra
lly
 a
ck
no
w
le
dg
ed
 r
ul
es
 a
nd
 p
ri
nc
ip
le
s 
of
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l l
aw
.
6.
U
nl
es
s 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
de
ci
de
 o
th
er
w
is
e,
 th
e 
tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
it
s 
ow
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
7.
T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
re
ac
h 
it
s 
de
ci
si
on
 b
y 
a 
m
aj
or
it
y 
of
 v
ot
es
. S
uc
h 
de
ci
si
on
 s
ha
ll 
be
 f
in
al
 a
nd
 b
in
di
ng
 o
n 
th
e 
pa
rt
ie
s.
8.
E
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g-
Pa
rt
y 
sh
al
l b
ea
r 
th
e 
co
st
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 a
pp
oi
nt
ed
 b
y 
it
se
lf
 a
nd
 o
f 
it
s 
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n.
 T
he
 c
os
t o
f 
th
e 
ch
ai
rm
an
 a
s 
w
el
l a
s 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
co
at
s 
w
il
l b
e
bo
rn
 in
 e
qu
al
 p
ar
ts
 b
y 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s.
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1.
A
ll 
di
sp
ut
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
ti
on
 a
nd
 a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
of
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t s
ha
ll 
be
 s
et
tl
ed
 a
m
ic
ab
ly
 b
y 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
n 
an
d 
ne
go
ti
at
io
n
th
ro
ug
h 
di
pl
om
at
ic
 c
ha
nn
el
s.
2.
If
 a
 d
is
pu
te
 c
an
no
t t
hu
s 
be
 s
et
tl
ed
 w
it
hi
n 
si
x 
m
on
th
s.
 it
 s
ha
ll.
 u
po
n 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
, b
e 
su
bm
it
te
d 
to
 a
n 
ad
 h
oc
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l.
3.
Su
ch
 tr
ib
un
al
 c
om
pr
is
es
 o
f 
th
re
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s.
 W
it
hi
n 
tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
n 
w
hi
ch
 e
ith
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 r
ec
ei
ve
s 
th
e 
w
ri
tte
n 
no
tic
e 
re
qu
es
ti
ng
 f
or
 a
rb
it
ra
tio
n
fr
om
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
. e
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
sh
al
l a
pp
oi
nt
 o
ne
 a
rb
itr
at
or
. T
ho
se
 tw
o 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l w
ith
in
 f
ur
th
er
 tw
o 
m
on
th
s,
 to
ge
th
er
 s
el
ec
t a
 th
ir
d
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 w
ho
 is
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
a 
th
ir
d 
S
ta
te
 w
hi
ch
 h
as
 d
ip
lo
m
at
ic
 r
el
at
io
ns
 w
it
h 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
. T
he
 th
ir
d 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 s
ha
ll 
be
 a
pp
oi
nt
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
tw
o 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
P
ar
ti
es
 a
s 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
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 b
ee
n 
co
ns
ti
tu
te
d 
w
ith
in
 f
ou
r 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
th
e 
re
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at
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 C
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 m
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l C
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at
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 b
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 C
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 d
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l C
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 b
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 d
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at
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l l
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 b
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 m
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l b
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 C
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 C
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re
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P
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at
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re
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t c
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1.
A
ny
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is
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te
 b
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w
ee
n 
th
e 
C
on
ta
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in
g 
P
ar
ti
es
 c
on
ce
rn
in
g 
th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
or
 a
pp
li
ca
tio
n 
of
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t s
ha
ll
, a
s 
fa
r 
as
 p
os
si
bl
e,
 b
e 
se
tt
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d 
by
 c
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
 th
ro
ug
h
di
pl
om
at
ic
 c
ha
nn
el
s.
2.
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 d
is
pu
te
 c
an
no
t b
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us
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tle
d 
w
it
hi
n 
si
x 
m
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th
s,
 it
 s
ha
ll 
up
on
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qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
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tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
, b
e 
su
bm
it
te
d 
to
 a
n 
ad
 h
oc
 a
rb
itr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
.
3.
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 tr
ib
un
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 c
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f 
th
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ar
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or
s.
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th
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da
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 o
n 
w
hi
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 e
ith
er
 C
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ti
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 P
ar
ty
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ei
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th
e 
w
ri
tte
n 
no
tic
e 
re
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ti
ng
 f
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 a
rb
it
ra
tio
n
fr
om
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ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
, e
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
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rt
y 
sh
al
l a
pp
oi
nt
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 a
rb
itr
at
or
. T
ho
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 tw
o 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l, 
w
ith
in
 f
ur
th
er
 tw
o 
m
on
th
s,
 to
ge
th
er
 s
el
ec
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ir
d
ar
bi
tr
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or
 w
ho
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 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
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a 
th
ir
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ta
te
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 d
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m
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 r
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 C
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at
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 b
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re
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 m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
th
e 
w
ri
tte
n 
no
ti
ce
 f
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at
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C
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 o
th
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in
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th
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rn
at
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na
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 m
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at
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 C
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 d
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l C
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 C
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 d
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l C
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 b
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 d
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at
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l l
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 b
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 m
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l b
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 C
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 C
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d.
7.
E
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
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at
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re
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t c
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 c
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 b
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se
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by
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on
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th
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2.
If
 a
 d
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 c
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ng
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, b
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 c
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 C
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 f
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ra
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P
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ar
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at
or
s 
sh
al
l, 
w
ith
in
 f
ur
th
er
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m
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s,
 to
ge
th
er
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t a
 th
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d
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 w
ho
 is
 a
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at
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l o
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ir
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te
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 d
ip
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ns
 w
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 C
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ng
 P
ar
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es
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 th
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ar
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at
or
 s
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ll 
be
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ed
 b
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C
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 b
ee
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ti
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w
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re
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at
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 C
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 m
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m
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in
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te
 th
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 o
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th
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l C
ou
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 o
f 
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to
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at
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 b
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 C
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 d
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l C
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ng
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 s
ha
ll
 b
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 m
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l b
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 C
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P
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at
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re
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th
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C
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se
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by
 c
on
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at
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th
ro
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h
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2.
If
 a
 d
is
pu
te
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an
no
t t
hu
s 
be
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et
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ed
 w
it
hi
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m
on
th
s,
 it
 s
ha
ll,
 u
po
n 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
, b
e 
su
bm
it
te
d 
to
 a
n 
ad
 h
oc
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l.
3.
Su
ch
 a
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
be
 c
om
pr
is
ed
 o
f 
th
re
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s.
 W
ith
in
 tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
n 
w
hi
ch
 e
it
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 r
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ei
ve
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
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g 
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rt
y
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w
ri
tt
en
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st
 f
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 a
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it
ra
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ac
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C
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tr
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g 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
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nt
 o
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 a
rb
it
ra
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r.
 T
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o 
ar
bi
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at
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sh
al
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th
er
 w
it
hi
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rt
he
r 
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o 
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th
s 
pe
ri
od
 s
el
ec
t a
th
ir
d 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 w
ho
 is
 a
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at
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na
l o
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a 
th
ir
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S
ta
te
, s
uc
h 
Pa
rt
y 
ha
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ng
 d
ip
lo
m
at
ic
 r
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 w
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 b
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nt
ra
ct
in
g 
P
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S
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, s
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P
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pl
om
at
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tio
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 b
ot
h 
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tr
ac
ti
ng
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ar
ti
es
. T
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 th
ir
d 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
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 b
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 a
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ro
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d 
by
 th
e 
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o 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 p
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ti
es
 s
ha
ll 
be
 a
pp
oi
nt
ed
 a
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C
ha
ir
m
an
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
.
4.
If
 th
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ar
bi
tr
al
 h
as
 n
ot
 b
ee
n 
co
ns
ti
tu
te
d 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 th
e 
pe
ri
od
s 
sp
ec
if
ie
d 
in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 3
 o
f 
th
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rt
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le
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he
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tr
ac
tin
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ar
ty
 m
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 o
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t, 
in
vi
te
 th
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re
si
de
nt
 o
f 
th
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te
rn
at
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na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
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e 
to
 a
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oi
nt
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
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ho
 h
as
 o
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 n
ot
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et
 b
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n 
ap
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in
te
d.
 I
f 
th
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 is
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
or
 is
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
pr
ev
en
te
d 
fr
om
 d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
 th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
n,
 th
e 
ne
xt
 m
os
t s
en
io
r 
m
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
w
ho
 is
 n
ot
 a
 
na
ti
on
al
 o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
in
vi
te
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
t(
s)
. 
5.
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l s
ha
ll
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
it
s 
ow
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
 T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
re
ac
h 
it
s 
de
ci
si
on
 in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 o
f
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l l
aw
 w
hi
ch
 a
re
 r
ec
og
ni
ze
d 
by
 b
ot
h 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ti
es
.
6.
T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
re
ac
h 
it
s 
de
ci
si
on
 b
y 
a 
m
aj
or
it
y 
of
 v
ot
es
. S
uc
h 
a 
de
ci
si
on
 s
ha
ll 
be
 f
in
al
 a
nd
 b
in
di
ng
 o
n 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s.
 T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l s
ha
ll,
 u
po
n 
th
e
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
pa
rt
y,
 p
ro
vi
de
 r
ea
so
ns
 f
or
 it
s 
de
ci
si
on
.
7.
E
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
be
ar
 c
os
t o
f 
its
 a
pp
oi
nt
ed
 a
rb
itr
at
or
 a
nd
 a
ll
 o
th
er
 c
os
ts
 o
f 
it
s 
re
pr
es
en
ta
ti
on
 in
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
. A
ll 
co
st
s 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
it
h 
th
e
C
ha
ir
m
an
 o
f 
th
e 
tr
ib
un
al
 a
nd
 r
em
ai
ni
ng
 c
os
ts
 s
ha
ll 
be
 b
or
ne
 in
 e
qu
al
 p
ar
ts
 b
y 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ti
es
. T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 m
ay
, h
ow
ev
er
, i
n 
its
 d
ec
is
io
n 
di
re
ct
 th
at
 a
 h
ig
he
r
pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 c
os
ts
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
bo
rn
e 
by
 o
ne
 o
f 
th
e 
tw
o 
co
nt
ra
ct
in
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s,
 a
nd
 s
uc
h 
a 
de
ci
si
on
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
bi
nd
in
g 
on
 b
ot
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ti
es
.
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1.
A
ny
 d
is
pu
te
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
ti
on
 o
r 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t s
ha
ll,
 a
s 
fa
r 
as
 p
os
si
bl
e,
 b
e 
se
ttl
ed
 b
y 
co
ns
ul
ta
ti
on
 th
ro
ug
h
di
pl
om
at
ic
 c
ha
nn
el
.
2.
If
 a
 d
is
pu
te
 c
an
no
t t
hu
s 
be
 s
et
tl
ed
 w
it
hi
n 
si
x 
m
on
th
s,
 it
 s
ha
ll,
 u
po
n 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
, b
e 
su
bm
it
te
d 
to
 a
n 
ho
c 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
.
3.
Su
ch
 tr
ib
un
al
 c
om
pr
is
es
 o
f 
th
re
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s.
 W
it
hi
n 
tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
n 
w
hi
ch
 e
ith
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 r
ec
ei
ve
s 
th
e 
w
ri
tte
n 
no
tic
e 
re
qu
es
ti
ng
 f
or
 a
rb
it
ra
tio
n
fr
om
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
, e
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
sh
al
l a
pp
oi
nt
 o
ne
 a
rb
itr
at
or
. T
ho
se
 tw
o 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l, 
w
ith
in
 f
ur
th
er
 tw
o 
m
on
th
s,
 to
ge
th
er
 s
el
ec
t a
 th
ir
d
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 w
ho
 is
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
a 
th
ir
d 
S
ta
te
 w
hi
ch
 h
as
 d
ip
lo
m
at
ic
 r
el
at
io
ns
 w
it
h 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ti
es
. T
he
 th
ir
d 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 s
ha
ll 
be
 a
pp
oi
nt
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
tw
o 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g
P
ar
ti
es
 a
s 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
. 
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4.
If
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 h
as
 n
ot
 b
ee
n 
co
ns
ti
tu
te
d 
w
ith
in
 f
ou
r 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
th
e 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
w
ri
tt
en
 n
ot
ic
e 
fo
r 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n,
 e
ith
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
, i
n
th
e 
ab
se
nc
e 
of
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
in
vi
te
 th
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
to
 a
pp
oi
nt
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 (
s)
 w
ho
 h
as
 o
r 
ha
ve
 n
ot
 y
et
 b
ee
n 
ap
po
in
te
d.
 I
f 
th
e
P
re
si
de
nt
 is
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 o
r 
is
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
pr
ev
en
te
d 
fr
om
 d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
 th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
n,
 th
e 
ne
xt
 m
os
t s
en
io
r 
m
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
of
 J
us
tic
e 
w
ho
 is
 n
ot
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
in
vi
te
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
t (
s)
. 
5.
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l s
ha
ll
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
it
s 
ow
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
 T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
re
ac
h 
it
s 
aw
ar
d 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 o
f
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l l
aw
 r
ec
og
ni
ze
d 
by
 b
ot
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s.
6.
T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
re
ac
h 
it
s 
aw
ar
d 
by
 a
 m
aj
or
ity
 o
f 
vo
te
s.
 S
uc
h 
aw
ar
d 
sh
al
l b
e 
fi
na
l a
nd
 b
in
di
ng
 o
n 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s.
 T
he
 a
d 
ho
c 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll,
 u
po
n
th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
, e
xp
la
in
 th
e 
re
as
on
s 
of
 it
s 
aw
ar
d.
7.
E
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
be
ar
 th
e 
co
st
 o
f 
it
s 
ap
po
in
te
d 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 a
nd
 o
f 
it
s 
re
pr
es
en
ta
ti
on
 in
 a
rb
it
ra
l p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
. T
he
 r
el
ev
an
t c
os
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 a
nd
 th
e
tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
be
 b
or
ne
 in
 e
qu
al
 p
ar
ts
 b
y 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s.
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1.
A
ny
 d
is
pu
te
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
ti
on
 o
r 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
of
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t s
ha
ll 
be
 s
et
tle
d 
th
ro
ug
h 
di
pl
om
at
ic
 c
ha
nn
el
s.
 
2.
If
 a
 d
is
pu
te
 c
an
no
t t
hu
s 
be
 s
et
tl
ed
 w
it
hi
n 
si
x 
m
on
th
s,
 it
 s
ha
ll,
 u
po
n 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
, b
e 
su
bm
it
te
d 
to
 a
n 
ad
 h
oc
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l.
3.
Su
ch
 tr
ib
un
al
 c
om
pr
is
es
 o
f 
th
re
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s.
 W
it
hi
n 
tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
n 
w
hi
ch
 w
it
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
re
ce
iv
es
 th
e 
w
ri
tte
n 
no
ti
ce
 r
eq
ue
st
in
g 
fo
r 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n
fr
om
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
, e
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
sh
al
l a
pp
oi
nt
 o
ne
 a
rb
itr
at
or
. T
ho
se
 tw
o 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l, 
w
ith
in
 f
ur
th
er
 tw
o 
m
on
th
s,
 to
ge
th
er
 s
el
ec
t a
 th
ir
d
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 w
ho
 is
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
a 
th
ir
d 
S
ta
te
 w
hi
ch
 h
as
 d
ip
lo
m
at
ic
 r
el
at
io
ns
 w
it
h 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s.
 T
he
 th
ir
d 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 s
ha
ll 
be
 a
pp
oi
nt
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
tw
o 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
P
ar
ti
es
 a
s 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
. 
4.
If
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 h
as
 n
ot
 b
ee
n 
co
ns
ti
tu
te
d 
w
ith
in
 f
ou
r 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
w
ri
tt
en
 n
ot
ic
e 
re
qu
es
tin
g 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n,
 e
ith
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 m
ay
, i
n 
th
e
ab
se
nc
e 
of
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
in
vi
te
 th
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
to
 a
pp
oi
nt
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
(s
) 
w
ho
 h
as
 o
r 
ha
ve
 n
ot
 y
et
 b
ee
n 
ap
po
in
te
d.
 I
f 
th
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 is
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 o
r 
is
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
pr
ev
en
te
d 
fr
om
 d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
 th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
ns
, t
he
 n
ex
t m
os
t s
en
io
r 
m
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 
of
 J
us
tic
e 
ne
xt
 in
 s
en
io
ri
ty
 w
ho
 is
 n
ot
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
be
 in
vi
te
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
t(
s)
. 
5.
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l s
ha
ll
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
it
s 
ow
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
 T
he
 a
rb
itr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
re
ac
h 
it
s 
aw
ar
d 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
ge
ne
ra
l
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 o
f 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l l
aw
.
6.
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l s
ha
ll
 r
ea
ch
 it
s 
aw
ar
d 
by
 a
 m
aj
or
ity
 o
f 
vo
te
s.
 S
uc
h 
aw
ar
d 
sh
al
l b
e 
fi
na
l a
nd
 b
in
di
ng
 u
po
n 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s.
 T
he
 a
d-
ho
c 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
sh
al
l, 
up
on
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
, e
xp
la
in
 th
e 
re
as
on
s 
of
 it
s 
aw
ar
d.
7.
E
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
be
ar
 th
e 
co
st
s 
of
 it
s 
ap
po
in
te
d 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 a
nd
 o
f 
its
 r
ep
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
in
 a
rb
it
ra
l p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
. T
he
 r
el
ev
an
t c
os
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 a
nd
 th
e
tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
be
 b
or
ne
 in
 e
qu
al
 p
ar
ts
 b
y 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s.
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S
E
T
T
L
E
M
E
N
T
 O
F 
D
IS
P
U
T
E
S 
B
E
T
W
E
E
N
 C
O
N
T
R
A
C
T
IN
G
 P
A
R
T
IE
S
 
1)
A
ny
 d
is
pu
te
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ti
es
 c
on
ce
rn
in
g 
th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
or
 a
pp
li
ca
ti
on
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t s
ha
ll
, a
s 
fa
r 
as
 p
os
si
bl
e,
 b
e 
se
ttl
ed
 w
ith
 c
on
su
lta
tio
n 
th
ro
ug
h 
di
pl
om
at
ic
 c
ha
nn
el
.
2)
If
 a
 d
is
pu
te
 c
an
no
t t
hu
s 
be
 s
et
tl
ed
 w
ith
in
 s
ix
 m
on
th
s,
 it
 s
ha
ll,
 u
po
n 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y,
 b
e 
su
bm
it
te
d 
to
 a
n 
ad
 h
oc
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l.
3)
Su
ch
 tr
ib
un
al
 c
om
pr
is
es
 o
f 
th
re
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s.
 W
ith
in
 tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
of
 th
e 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
w
ri
tte
n 
no
ti
ce
 r
eq
ue
st
in
g 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n,
 e
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
ap
po
in
t o
ne
ar
bi
tr
at
or
. T
ho
se
 tw
o 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l, 
w
ith
in
 f
ur
th
er
 tw
o 
m
on
th
s,
 to
ge
th
er
 s
el
ec
t a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
a 
th
ir
d 
St
at
e 
ha
vi
ng
 d
ip
lo
m
at
ic
 r
el
at
io
ns
 w
it
h 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
as
C
ha
ir
m
an
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
.
4)
If
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 h
as
 n
ot
 b
ee
n 
co
ns
tit
ut
ed
 w
ith
in
 f
ou
r 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
w
ri
tte
n 
no
tic
e 
re
qu
es
tin
g 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n,
 e
ith
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
, i
n 
th
e
ab
se
nc
e 
of
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
in
vi
te
 th
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
to
 m
ak
e 
an
y 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
. I
f 
th
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 is
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 o
r 
is
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
pr
ev
en
te
d 
fr
om
 d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
 th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
ns
, t
he
 M
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
ne
xt
 in
 s
en
io
ri
ty
 w
ho
 is
 n
ot
 a
 n
at
io
na
l 
of
 e
it
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y,
 o
r 
is
 n
ot
 p
re
ve
nt
ed
 f
ro
m
 d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
 th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
ns
, s
ha
ll
 b
e 
in
vi
te
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
su
ch
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 a
pp
oi
nt
m
en
ts
. 
5)
T
he
 a
rb
itr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
de
te
rm
in
e 
it
s 
ow
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
 T
he
 a
rb
itr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
re
ac
h 
it
s 
aw
ar
d 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
it
h 
th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
ap
pl
ic
ab
le
 p
ri
nc
ip
le
s 
of
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l l
aw
.
6)
T
he
 a
rb
itr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
re
ac
h 
it
s 
aw
ar
d 
by
 a
 m
aj
or
it
y 
of
 v
ot
es
. S
uc
h 
aw
ar
d 
sh
al
l b
e 
fi
na
l a
nd
 b
in
di
ng
 u
po
n 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s.
 T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l s
ha
ll,
up
on
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y,
 e
xp
la
in
 th
e 
re
as
on
s 
of
 it
s 
aw
ar
d.
7)
E
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
sh
al
l b
ea
r 
th
e 
co
st
s 
of
 it
s 
ap
po
in
te
d 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 a
nd
 o
f 
its
 r
ep
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
in
 a
rb
it
ra
l p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
. T
he
 r
el
ev
an
t c
os
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 a
nd
 tr
ib
un
al
sh
al
l b
e 
bo
rn
e 
in
 e
qu
al
 p
ar
ts
 b
y 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s.
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(I
n
 f
or
ce
) 
11
.1
1.
20
05
 
(1
) 
A
ny
 d
is
pu
te
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
or
 a
pp
li
ca
ti
on
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t s
ha
ll,
 a
s 
fa
r 
as
 p
os
si
bl
e,
 b
e 
se
tt
le
d 
w
ith
 c
on
su
lt
at
io
n 
th
ro
ug
h 
di
pl
om
at
ic
 c
ha
nn
el
. 
(2
)
If
 a
 d
is
pu
te
 c
an
no
t t
hu
s 
be
 s
et
tl
ed
 w
it
hi
n 
si
x 
m
on
th
s,
 it
 s
ha
ll,
 u
po
n 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
, b
e 
su
bm
it
te
d 
to
 a
n 
ad
-h
oc
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l.
(3
)
Su
ch
 tr
ib
un
al
 c
om
pr
is
es
 th
re
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s.
 W
it
hi
n 
tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
of
 th
e 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
w
ri
tt
en
 n
ot
ic
e 
re
qu
es
ti
ng
 a
rb
itr
at
io
n,
 e
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
sh
al
l a
pp
oi
nt
 o
ne
ar
bi
tr
at
or
. T
ho
se
 tw
o 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l, 
w
ith
in
 f
ur
th
er
 tw
o 
m
on
th
s,
 to
ge
th
er
 s
el
ec
t a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
a 
th
ir
d 
S
ta
te
 h
av
in
g 
di
pl
om
at
ic
 r
el
at
io
ns
 w
it
h 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
as
C
ha
ir
m
an
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
.
(4
)
If
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 h
as
 n
ot
 b
ee
n 
co
ns
tit
ut
ed
 w
it
hi
n 
fo
ur
 m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
w
ri
tte
n 
no
ti
ce
 r
eq
ue
st
in
g 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n,
 e
ith
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
m
ay
, i
n 
th
e
ab
se
nc
e 
of
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
in
vi
te
 th
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
to
 m
ak
e 
an
y 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
. I
f 
th
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 is
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 o
r 
is
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
pr
ev
en
te
d 
fr
om
 d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
 th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
ns
, t
he
 M
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
ne
xt
 in
 s
en
io
ri
ty
 w
ho
 is
 n
ot
 a
 n
at
io
na
l
of
 e
it
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
or
 is
 n
ot
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
pr
ev
en
te
d 
fr
om
 d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
 th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
ns
 s
ha
ll 
be
 in
vi
te
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
su
ch
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 a
pp
oi
nt
m
en
ts
.
(5
)
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l s
ha
ll 
de
te
rm
in
e 
it
s 
ow
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
 T
he
 a
rb
itr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
re
ac
h 
it
s 
aw
ar
d 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t a
nd
 th
e
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 o
f 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l l
aw
 r
ec
og
ni
ze
d 
by
 b
ot
h 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ti
es
.
(6
)
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l s
ha
ll 
re
ac
h 
it
s 
aw
ar
d 
by
 a
 m
aj
or
it
y 
of
 v
ot
es
. S
uc
h 
aw
ar
d 
sh
al
l b
e 
fi
na
l a
nd
 b
in
di
ng
 u
po
n 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s.
 T
he
 a
rb
itr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll
,
up
on
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y,
 e
xp
la
in
 th
e 
re
as
on
s 
of
 it
s 
aw
ar
d.
(7
)
E
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
be
ar
 th
e 
co
st
s 
of
 it
s 
ap
po
in
te
d 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 a
nd
 o
f 
it
s 
re
pr
es
en
ta
ti
on
 in
 a
rb
itr
al
 p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
. T
he
 r
el
ev
an
t c
os
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 a
nd
tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
be
 b
or
ne
 in
 e
qu
al
 p
ar
ts
 b
y 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s.
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1.
A
ny
 d
is
pu
te
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
ti
on
 o
r 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t s
ha
ll,
 a
s 
fa
r 
as
 p
os
si
bl
e,
 b
e 
se
ttl
ed
 w
ith
 c
on
su
lt
at
io
n
th
ro
ug
h 
di
pl
om
at
ic
 c
ha
nn
el
s.
2.
If
 a
 d
is
pu
te
 c
an
no
t t
hu
s 
be
 s
et
tl
ed
 w
it
hi
n 
si
x 
m
on
th
s,
 it
 s
ha
ll,
 u
po
n 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
, b
e 
su
bm
it
te
d 
to
 a
n 
ad
 h
oc
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l.
3.
Su
ch
 tr
ib
un
al
 c
om
pr
is
es
 o
f 
th
re
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s.
 W
it
hi
n 
tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
of
 th
e 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
w
ri
tt
en
 n
ot
ic
e 
re
qu
es
ti
ng
 a
rb
itr
at
io
n,
 e
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
ap
po
in
t o
ne
ar
bi
tr
at
or
. T
ho
se
 tw
o 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l, 
w
ith
in
 f
ur
th
er
 tw
o 
m
on
th
s,
 to
ge
th
er
 s
el
ec
t a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
a 
th
ir
d 
St
at
e 
ha
vi
ng
 d
ip
lo
m
at
ic
 r
el
at
io
ns
 w
it
h 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
as
C
ha
ir
m
an
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
.
4.
If
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 h
as
 n
ot
 b
ee
n 
co
ns
ti
tu
te
d 
w
ith
in
 f
ou
r 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
w
ri
tt
en
 n
ot
ic
e 
re
qu
es
tin
g 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n,
 e
ith
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
m
ay
, i
n 
th
e
ab
se
nc
e 
of
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
in
vi
te
 th
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
to
 m
ak
e 
an
y 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
. I
f 
th
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 is
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 o
r 
is
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
pr
ev
en
te
d 
fr
om
 d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
 th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
ns
, t
he
 M
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
ne
xt
 in
 s
en
io
ri
ty
 w
ho
 is
 n
ot
 a
 n
at
io
na
l 
of
 e
it
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
or
 is
 n
ot
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
pr
ev
en
te
d 
fr
om
 d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
 th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
ns
 s
ha
ll 
be
 in
vi
te
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
su
ch
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 a
pp
oi
nt
m
en
ts
. 
5.
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l s
ha
ll
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
it
s 
ow
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
 T
he
 a
rb
itr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
re
ac
h 
it
s 
aw
ar
d 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t a
nd
 th
e
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 o
f 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l l
aw
 r
ec
og
ni
ze
d 
by
 b
ot
h 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ti
es
.
6.
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l s
ha
ll
 r
ea
ch
 it
s 
aw
ar
d 
by
 a
 m
aj
or
ity
 o
f 
vo
te
s.
 S
uc
h 
aw
ar
d 
sh
al
l b
e 
fi
na
l a
nd
 b
in
di
ng
 u
po
n 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s.
 T
he
 a
rb
itr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll
,
up
on
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y,
 e
xp
la
in
 th
e 
re
as
on
s 
of
 it
s 
aw
ar
d.
7.
E
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
be
ar
 th
e 
co
st
s 
of
 it
s 
ap
po
in
te
d 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 a
nd
 o
f 
its
 r
ep
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
in
 a
rb
it
ra
l p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
. T
he
 r
el
ev
an
t c
os
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 a
nd
 tr
ib
un
al
sh
al
l b
e 
bo
rn
e 
in
 e
qu
al
 p
ar
ts
 b
y 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s.
 
27
 
F
in
la
nd
 
(I
n
 f
or
ce
) 
15
.1
1.
20
04
 
15
.1
1.
20
06
 
A
rt
ic
le
 8
 
1.
A
ny
 d
is
pu
te
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
ti
on
 o
r 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t s
ha
ll,
 a
s 
fa
r 
as
 p
os
si
bl
e,
 b
e 
se
ttl
ed
 w
ith
 c
on
su
lt
at
io
n
th
ro
ug
h 
di
pl
om
at
ic
 c
ha
nn
el
s.
2.
If
 a
 d
is
pu
te
 c
an
no
t t
hu
s 
be
 s
et
tl
ed
 w
it
hi
n 
si
x 
(6
) 
m
on
th
s,
 it
 s
ha
ll,
 u
po
n 
th
e 
re
- 
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
, b
e 
su
bm
it
- 
te
d 
to
 a
n 
ad
 h
oc
 a
rb
itr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
.
3.
T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
co
m
pr
is
e 
of
 th
re
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s.
 W
it
hi
n 
tw
o 
(2
) 
m
on
th
s 
of
 th
e 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
w
ri
tt
en
 n
ot
ic
e 
re
qu
es
ti
ng
 a
rb
it
ra
tio
n,
 e
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
ap
po
in
t
on
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
. T
ho
se
 tw
o 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l, 
w
it
hi
n 
fu
rt
he
r 
tw
o 
(2
) 
m
on
th
s,
 to
ge
th
er
 s
el
ec
t a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
a 
th
ir
d 
S
ta
te
 h
av
in
g 
di
pl
om
at
ic
 r
el
at
io
ns
 w
ith
 b
ot
h 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
P
ar
ti
es
 a
s 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
. 
4.
If
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 h
as
 n
ot
 b
ee
n 
co
ns
ti
tu
te
d 
w
ith
in
 f
ou
r 
(4
) 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
w
ri
tt
en
 n
ot
ic
e 
re
qu
es
ti
ng
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
, e
it
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 m
ay
, i
n 
th
e
ab
se
nc
e 
of
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
in
vi
te
 th
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
. I
f 
th
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 is
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 o
r 
is
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
pr
ev
en
te
d 
fr
om
 d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
 th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
n,
 th
e 
M
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
ne
xt
 in
 s
en
io
ri
ty
 w
ho
 is
 n
ot
 a
 n
at
io
na
l 
of
 e
it
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
or
 is
 n
ot
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
pr
ev
en
te
d 
fr
om
 d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
 th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
n,
 s
ha
ll 
be
 in
vi
te
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
.
5.
Is
su
es
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 d
is
pu
te
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 1
 o
f 
th
is
 A
rt
ic
le
 s
ha
ll 
be
 d
ec
id
ed
 in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
ru
le
s 
of
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l
la
w
 a
pp
li
ca
bl
e 
to
 b
ot
h 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ti
es
. 
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6.
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l s
ha
ll
 r
ea
ch
 it
s 
aw
ar
d 
by
 a
 m
aj
or
ity
 o
f 
vo
te
s.
 S
uc
h 
aw
ar
d 
sh
al
l b
e 
fi
na
l a
nd
 b
in
di
ng
 u
po
n 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s.
 T
he
 a
rb
itr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll
,
up
on
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y,
 e
xp
la
in
 th
e 
re
as
on
s 
of
 it
s 
aw
ar
d.
7.
E
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
be
ar
 th
e 
co
st
s 
of
 it
s 
ap
po
in
te
d 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 a
nd
 o
f 
its
 r
ep
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
in
 a
rb
it
ra
l p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
. T
he
 r
el
ev
an
t c
os
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 a
nd
 tr
ib
un
al
sh
al
l b
e 
bo
rn
e 
in
 e
qu
al
 p
ar
ts
 b
y 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s.
 T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 m
ay
, h
ow
ev
er
, m
ak
e 
a 
di
ff
er
en
t d
ec
is
io
n 
re
ga
rd
in
g 
th
e 
sh
ar
in
g 
of
 th
e 
co
st
s.
 I
n 
al
l o
th
er
 r
es
pe
ct
s,
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
its
 o
w
n 
ru
le
s 
of
 p
ro
ce
du
re
. 
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1.
A
ny
 d
is
pu
te
 r
el
at
in
g 
to
 th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
ti
on
 o
r 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t s
ha
ll 
be
 s
et
tl
ed
 a
s 
fa
r 
as
 p
os
si
bl
e 
th
ro
ug
h 
di
pl
om
at
ic
 c
ha
nn
el
s.
2.
In
 th
e 
ab
se
nc
e 
of
 a
 s
et
tl
em
en
t t
hr
ou
gh
 d
ip
lo
m
at
ic
 c
ha
nn
el
s,
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
sh
al
l b
e 
su
bm
it
te
d 
to
 a
 jo
in
t c
om
m
is
si
on
 c
on
si
st
in
g 
of
 r
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
es
 o
f 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
P
ar
ti
es
; t
hi
s 
co
m
m
is
si
on
 s
ha
ll
 c
on
ve
ne
 w
it
ho
ut
 u
nd
ue
 d
el
ay
 a
t t
he
 r
eq
ue
st
 o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
.
3.
If
 th
e 
jo
in
t c
om
m
is
si
on
 c
an
no
t s
et
tl
e 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
w
ith
in
 s
ix
 m
on
th
s,
 th
e 
la
tte
r 
sh
al
l b
e 
su
bm
itt
ed
, a
t t
he
 r
eq
ue
st
 o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
, t
o 
an
 a
rb
itr
at
io
n 
tr
ib
un
al
se
t u
p 
as
 f
ol
lo
w
s 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 in
di
vi
du
al
 c
as
e:
a)
Su
ch
 tr
ib
un
al
 c
om
pr
is
es
 o
f 
th
re
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s.
 W
it
hi
n 
tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
of
 th
e 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
w
ri
tt
en
 n
ot
ic
e 
re
qu
es
ti
ng
 a
rb
itr
at
io
n,
 e
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
ap
po
in
t o
ne
ar
bi
tr
at
or
. T
ho
se
 tw
o 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l, 
w
ith
in
 f
ur
th
er
 tw
o 
m
on
th
s,
 to
ge
th
er
 s
el
ec
t a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
a 
th
ir
d 
St
at
e 
ha
vi
ng
 d
ip
lo
m
at
ic
 r
el
at
io
ns
 w
it
h 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
as
C
ha
ir
m
an
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
.
b)
If
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 h
as
 n
ot
 b
ee
n 
co
ns
tit
ut
ed
 w
ith
in
 f
ou
r 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
w
ri
tte
n 
no
tic
e 
re
qu
es
tin
g 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n,
 e
ith
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
, i
n 
th
e
ab
se
nc
e 
of
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
in
vi
te
 th
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
to
 m
ak
e 
an
y 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
. I
f 
th
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 is
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 o
r 
is
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
pr
ev
en
te
d 
fr
om
 d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
 th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
ns
, t
he
 M
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
ne
xt
 in
 s
en
io
ri
ty
 w
ho
 is
 n
ot
 a
 n
at
io
na
l
of
 e
it
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
or
 is
 n
ot
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
pr
ev
en
te
d 
fr
om
 d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
 th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
ns
 s
ha
ll 
be
 in
vi
te
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
su
ch
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 a
pp
oi
nt
m
en
ts
. 
c)
T
he
 a
rb
itr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
it
s 
ow
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
 T
he
 a
rb
itr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
re
ac
h 
it
s 
aw
ar
d 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 o
f 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l l
aw
 r
ec
og
ni
ze
d 
by
 b
ot
h 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ti
es
.
d)
T
he
 a
rb
itr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
re
ac
h 
it
s 
aw
ar
d 
by
 a
 m
aj
or
it
y 
of
 v
ot
es
. S
uc
h 
aw
ar
d 
sh
al
l b
e 
fi
na
l a
nd
 b
in
di
ng
 u
po
n 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s.
 T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l s
ha
ll,
up
on
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y,
 e
xp
la
in
 th
e 
re
as
on
s 
of
 it
s 
aw
ar
d.
3.
E
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
be
ar
 th
e 
co
st
s 
of
 it
s 
ap
po
in
te
d 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 a
nd
 o
f 
its
 r
ep
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
in
 a
rb
it
ra
l p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
. T
he
 r
el
ev
an
t c
os
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 a
nd
 tr
ib
un
al
sh
al
l b
e 
bo
rn
e 
in
 e
qu
al
 p
ar
ts
 b
y 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s.
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1.
A
ny
 d
is
pu
te
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
ti
on
 o
r 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t s
ha
ll,
 a
s 
fa
r 
as
 p
os
si
bl
e,
 b
e 
se
ttl
ed
 w
ith
 c
on
su
lt
at
io
ns
 
th
ro
ug
h 
di
pl
om
at
ic
 c
ha
nn
el
s.
2.
If
 a
 d
is
pu
te
 c
an
no
t t
hu
s 
be
 s
et
tl
ed
 w
it
hi
n 
si
x 
m
on
th
s,
 it
 s
ha
ll,
 u
po
n 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
, b
e 
su
bm
it
te
d,
 to
 a
n 
ad
 h
oc
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l.
3.
Su
ch
 tr
ib
un
al
 c
om
pr
is
es
 o
f 
th
re
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s.
 W
it
hi
n 
tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
of
 th
e 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
w
ri
tt
en
 n
ot
ic
e 
re
qu
es
ti
ng
 a
rb
itr
at
io
n,
 e
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
ap
po
in
t o
ne
ar
bi
tr
at
or
. T
ho
se
 tw
o 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l, 
w
ith
in
 f
ur
th
er
 tw
o 
m
on
th
s,
 to
ge
th
er
 s
el
ec
t a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
a 
th
ir
d 
S
ta
te
 h
av
in
g 
di
pl
om
at
ic
 r
el
at
io
ns
 w
it
h 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s 
as
C
ha
ir
m
an
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
.
4.
If
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 h
as
 n
ot
 b
ee
n 
co
ns
ti
tu
te
d 
w
ith
in
 f
ou
r 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
w
ri
tt
en
 n
ot
ic
e 
re
qu
es
tin
g 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n,
 e
ith
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
m
ay
, i
n 
th
e
ab
se
nc
e 
of
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
in
vi
te
 th
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
to
 m
ak
e 
an
y 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
. I
f 
th
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 is
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 o
r 
is
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
pr
ev
en
te
d 
fr
om
 d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
 th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
ns
, t
he
 M
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
ne
xt
 in
 s
en
io
ri
ty
 w
ho
 is
 n
ot
 a
 n
at
io
na
l 
of
 e
it
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
or
 is
 n
ot
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
pr
ev
en
te
d 
fr
om
 d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
 th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
ns
 s
ha
ll 
be
 in
vi
te
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
su
ch
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 a
pp
oi
nt
m
en
ts
. 
5.
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l s
ha
ll
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
it
s 
ow
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
 T
he
 a
rb
itr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
re
ac
h 
it
s 
aw
ar
d 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t a
nd
 th
e
ge
ne
ra
ll
y 
re
co
gn
iz
ed
 p
ri
nc
ip
le
s 
of
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l l
aw
.
6.
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l s
ha
ll
 r
ea
ch
 it
s 
aw
ar
d 
by
 a
 m
aj
or
ity
 o
f 
vo
te
s.
 S
uc
h 
aw
ar
d 
sh
al
l b
e 
fi
na
l a
nd
 b
in
di
ng
 u
po
n 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s.
 T
he
 a
rb
itr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll
,
up
on
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y,
 e
xp
la
in
 th
e 
re
as
on
s 
of
 it
s 
aw
ar
d.
7.
E
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
be
ar
 th
e 
co
st
s 
of
 it
s 
ap
po
in
te
d 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 a
nd
 o
f 
its
 r
ep
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
in
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
. T
he
 r
el
ev
an
t c
os
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 a
nd
tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
be
 b
or
ne
 in
 e
qu
al
 p
ar
ts
 b
y 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s.
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1.
A
ny
 d
is
pu
te
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
ti
on
 o
r 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t s
ha
ll,
 a
s 
fa
r 
as
 p
os
si
bl
e,
 b
e 
se
ttl
ed
 b
y 
co
ns
ul
ta
ti
on
 th
ro
ug
h
di
pl
om
at
ic
 c
ha
nn
el
.
2.
If
 a
 d
is
pu
te
 c
an
no
t t
hu
s 
be
 s
et
tl
ed
 w
it
hi
n 
si
x 
m
on
th
s,
 it
 s
ha
ll,
 u
po
n 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
, b
e 
su
bm
it
te
d 
to
 a
n 
ad
 h
oc
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l. 
249
3.
Su
ch
 tr
ib
un
al
 c
om
pr
is
es
 o
f 
th
re
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s.
 W
it
hi
n 
tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
n 
w
hi
ch
 e
ith
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 r
ec
ei
ve
s 
th
e 
w
ri
tte
n 
no
tic
e 
re
qu
es
ti
ng
 f
or
 a
rb
it
ra
tio
n
fr
om
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
, e
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
sh
al
l a
pp
oi
nt
 o
ne
 a
rb
itr
at
or
. T
ho
se
 tw
o 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l, 
w
ith
in
 th
re
e 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
th
ei
r
ap
po
in
tm
en
t, 
to
ge
th
er
 s
el
ec
t a
 th
ir
d 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 w
ho
 is
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
a 
th
ir
d 
S
ta
te
 w
hi
ch
 h
as
 d
ip
lo
m
at
ic
 r
el
at
io
ns
 w
ith
 b
ot
h 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ti
es
. T
he
 th
ir
d 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 s
ha
ll
 b
e
ap
po
in
te
d 
by
 th
e 
tw
o 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s 
as
 C
ha
ir
m
an
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
.
4.
If
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 h
as
 n
ot
 b
ee
n 
co
ns
ti
tu
te
d 
w
ith
in
 f
iv
e 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
th
e 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
w
ri
tt
en
 n
ot
ic
e 
re
qu
es
tin
g 
fo
r 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n,
 e
ith
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y
m
ay
, i
n 
th
e 
ab
se
nc
e 
of
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
in
vi
te
 th
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
to
 a
pp
oi
nt
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
(s
) 
w
ho
 h
as
 o
r 
ha
ve
 n
ot
 y
et
 b
ee
n 
ap
po
in
te
d.
If
 th
e 
P
re
si
de
nt
 is
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 o
r 
is
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
pr
ev
en
te
d 
fr
om
 d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
 th
e 
sa
id
 f
un
ct
io
n,
 th
e 
ne
xt
 m
os
t s
en
io
r 
m
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l
C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
w
ho
 is
 n
ot
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
be
 in
vi
te
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
t(
s)
.
5.
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l s
ha
ll
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
it
s 
ow
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
 T
he
 a
rb
itr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
re
ac
h 
it
s 
aw
ar
d 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t a
nd
 th
e
ap
pl
ic
ab
le
 p
ri
nc
ip
le
s 
of
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l l
aw
.
6.
T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
re
ac
h 
it
s 
aw
ar
d 
by
 a
 m
aj
or
ity
 o
f 
vo
te
s.
 S
uc
h 
aw
ar
d 
sh
al
l b
e 
fi
na
l a
nd
 b
in
di
ng
 o
n 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s.
 T
he
 a
d 
ho
c 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll,
 u
po
n
th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
, e
xp
la
in
 th
e 
re
as
on
s 
of
 it
s 
aw
ar
d.
7.
E
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
be
ar
 th
e 
co
st
s 
of
 it
s 
ap
po
in
te
d 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 а
nd
 o
f 
its
 r
ep
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
in
 a
rb
itr
al
 p
ro
ce
ed
in
gs
. T
he
 r
el
ev
an
t c
os
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 a
nd
 th
e
tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
be
 b
on
e 
in
 e
qu
al
 p
ar
ts
 b
y 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
tie
s.
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1.
A
ny
 d
is
pu
te
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
P
ar
ti
es
 c
on
ce
rn
in
g 
th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
or
 a
pp
li
ca
ti
on
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t s
ha
ll
 b
e 
se
tt
le
d,
 a
s 
fa
r 
as
 p
os
si
bl
e,
 w
ith
 c
on
su
lta
tio
n 
th
ro
ug
h
di
pl
om
at
ic
 c
ha
nn
el
.
2.
If
 a
 d
is
pu
te
 c
an
no
t t
hu
s 
be
 s
et
tl
ed
 w
it
hi
n 
si
x 
m
on
th
s,
 it
 s
ha
ll,
 u
po
n 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 P
ar
ty
, b
e 
su
bm
itt
ed
 to
 a
n 
ad
 h
oc
 a
rb
itr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
.
3.
Su
ch
 tr
ib
un
al
 c
om
pr
is
es
 o
f 
th
re
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s.
 W
it
hi
n 
tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
of
 th
e 
re
ce
ip
t o
f 
th
e 
w
ri
tt
en
 n
ot
ic
e 
re
qu
es
ti
ng
 a
rb
itr
at
io
n,
 e
ac
h 
Pa
rt
y 
sh
al
l a
pp
oi
nt
 o
ne
 a
rb
itr
at
or
.
T
ho
se
 tw
o 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l, 
w
ith
in
 f
ur
th
er
 tw
o 
m
on
th
s,
 to
ge
th
er
 s
el
ec
t a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
a 
th
ir
d 
S
ta
te
 h
av
in
g 
di
pl
om
at
ic
 r
el
at
io
ns
 w
it
h 
bo
th
 P
ar
ti
es
 to
 b
e 
ap
po
in
te
d 
as
C
ha
ir
m
an
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 b
y 
bo
th
 P
ar
tie
s.
4.
If
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 h
as
 n
ot
 b
ee
n 
co
ns
ti
tu
te
d 
w
ith
in
 f
ou
r 
m
on
th
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9.3.2 The Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in the Bilateral 
Investment Treaties between China and EU Member States 
In contrast to the similarities shared among the state-state DSMs, the investor-state 
DSMs contained in the BITs between China and EU Member States differ from each 
other.1026 As introduced in Section 6.2.3, supra, China’s approach to investor-state 
dispute settlement changed over time, and the changes in its different investment 
development stages are also reflected in its BITs concluded with EU Member States. 
Thus, the discussion will address the division of the two previously identified stages 
and introduce the investor-state DSMs in the BITs signed between China and EU 
Member States before 1996 and from 1997 to 2009 respectively.1027 
9.3.2.1 Stage One: 1982-1996 
During the first stage (1982-1996), 22 BITs were signed between China and EU 
Member States. Among these agreements, two BITs, the China-Sweden BIT (1982) 
and the China-Germany BIT (1983-terminated), did not address the issue of ISDS.1028 
The other 20 BITs provide for independent investor-state DSMs, including amicable 
and adjudicative DSMs,1029 which are introduced in turn. More details of these treaty 
provisions can be found in TABLE 9.3.2.1. 
(i) Amicable Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
In 13 of these 20 BITs, using negotiations to settle the disputes between investors and 
host states is expressly provided for. Very often, it is stated that the investment disputes 
between an investor of one treaty party and the other treaty party shall, as far as possible, 
be settled amicably through negotiations between the parties to the dispute, and no 
further guidance is provided.1030 Three other BITs only state that a dispute can resort 
to an adjudication process only if it cannot be settled within six months. 1031  The 
remaining four BITs did not touch upon this issue at all, which can be due to a lack of 
experience in treaty drafting at the early development stage of treaty parties.1032 The 
absence of such a provision should not be read as a negative attitude towards amicable 
1026 Wenhua Shan, The Legal Framework of EU-China Investment Relations: A Critical Appraisal, Hart Publishing, 
2005, p. 210. 
1027  As stated before, since the Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009, the competence for negotiating and 
concluding IIAs has been transferred from the level of the EU Member States to that of the Union. At the same time, 
China and the EU started negotiations on a China-EU BIT since 2013. Thus, no agreement was concluded between 
China and EU Member States after 2009. 
1028 The China-Sweden BIT (1982) does not contain any specific provision on ISDS, but a note of understanding 
was included at the end of the treaty, where Sweden acknowledged that China was currently not a signatory to the 
ICSID Convention and, if China acceded to the ICSID Convention in the future, a supplemental agreement would 
be signed to provide for binding dispute resolution. 
1029 These include the China-France BIT (1984-terminated), the China-Finland BIT (1984-terminated), the China-
BLEU BIT (1984-terminated), the China-Denmark BIT (1985), the China-Italy BIT (1984), the China-Netherlands 
BIT (1985-terminated), the China-Austria BIT (1985), the China-United Kingdom (1986), the China-Poland BIT 
(1988), the China-Bulgaria BIT (1989), the China-Hungary BIT (1991), the China-Czech and Slovak BIT (1991), 
the China-Portugal BIT (1992-terminated), the China-Spain BIT (1992-terminated), and the China-Greece BIT 
(1992). 
1030 See e.g. the China-Czech and Slovak BIT (1991), Art. 9.1. 
1031 These three BITs are the China-Italy BIT (1985), the China-United Kingdom BIT (1986), and the China-Spain 
BIT (1992-terminated). 
1032 These four BITs are the China-Austria BIT (1985), the China-Poland BIT (1988), the China-Bulgaria BIT (1989) 
and the China-Hungary BIT (1991). 
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settlement. In other words, amicable DSMs should always be available to disputing 
parties, as long as they consent to them, regardless whether there are relevant articles 
in the treaty texts or not. In addition, it is noted that independent conciliation is only 
addressed in the China-Czech and Slovak BIT (1991) by stating that investors “shall 
have the right to choose the conciliation procedure before the dispute is submitted for 
arbitration”. 1033  The China-Greece BIT (1992) mentioned conciliation in the 
ICSID.1034 
(ii) Adjudicative Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
For disputes that cannot be settled amicably, other mechanisms are available. 
Regarding forum selection, as a typical feature of the BITs concluded at this stage, the 
disputes about compensation for expropriation were treated differently from others, 
which is a reflection of the approach adopted by China’s first and second Model BITs 
(1984 & 1989). Specifically, any dispute between an investor and its host state can 
always resort to local remedies.1035 International arbitration is provided as an extra 
option for disputes about the amount of compensation, although specific prescriptions 
vary.1036 Two exceptions here are the China-United Kingdom BIT (1986) and the 
China-Spain BIT (1992-terminated), where a dispute concerning an amount of 
compensation shall be submitted to international arbitration, 1037  which means that 
international arbitration is the only available forum for such disputes, instead of 
providing an additional option. 
Where both local remedies and international arbitration are provided, different 
arrangements for how they interact can be found. Some BITs state that if the investor 
concerned has resorted to the host state’s competent court, it cannot resort to 
international arbitration.1038 These provisions are similar to the so-called “fork-in-the-
road” provisions.1039 It is not clear, if international arbitration has been referred to, 
whether domestic remedies can be used thereafter. Other BITs simply provide that 
investors are free to choose either domestic remedies or international arbitration, while 
1033 The China-Czech and Slovak BIT (1991), Art. 9.3. 
1034 The China-Greece BIT (1992), Art. 10.4. 
1035  Differences exist in the description of local remedies. Some BITs prescribe “the competent court of the 
Contracting Party accepting the investment”. See e.g. the China-Denmark BIT (1985), Art. 8(2). Some BITs choose 
“the competent court” or “the competent administrative authority”. See e.g. the China-France (1984-terminated), 
Art. 8.2. There is also a BIT generally providing “local remedies of the Contracting Party in question”. See: the 
China-Finland (1984-terminated), Protocol, Art. 3. 
1036 The terms used include “amount of compensation”, “the amount of compensation resulting from expropriation”, 
“the amount of compensation for expropriation, nationalization or other similar measures” and “compensation for 
expropriation and any other dispute agreed by parties”. For an example of each, see respectively: the China-United 
Kingdom BIT (1986), Art. 7(1); the China-Denmark BIT (1985), Art. 8(3); the China-BLEU (1984-terminated), Art. 
10.3; the China-Czech and Slovak BIT (1991-terminated), Art. 9.2. 
1037 The China-United Kingdom BIT (1986), Art. 7 (1); the China-Spain BIT (1992-terminated), Art. 9.1. 
1038 These provisions include the China-Denmark BIT (1985), Art. 8(3); the China-Portugal BIT (1992-terminated), 
Art. 8.3; the China-Croatia BIT (1993), Art. 8.3; the China-Estonia BIT (1993), Art. 8.3; the China-Slovenia BIT 
(1993), Art. 8.3. The China-France BIT (1984-terminated) contained a variation of this, where international 
arbitration will become unavailable to an investor if it resorted to the procedures in the competent domestic court 
and the court made its final decision within one year from the date on which either related party filed a request for 
settlement. See: the China-France BIT (1984-terminated), Art. 8.3. 
1039 For more information on “fork-in-the-road” provisions, see: August Reinisch, Fork-in-the-Road Provisions, at: 
Thomas Cottier & Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer (eds.), Elgar Encyclopedia of International Economic Law, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017, pp. 280-281. 
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leaving the issue of whether choosing one option would prohibit investors from 
resorting to another option.1040 
In the 20 BITs in which international arbitration is available for ISDS, procedural 
guidance is often provided, which covers applicable arbitration rules, constitution of 
tribunals, applicable law, decision making, enforcement, and allocation of costs. First, 
institutional or ad hoc arbitration is often provided for, while some BITs list both and 
the choice can be made based on the agreement of the disputing parties.1041 Members 
of tribunals are selected according to the tailored arbitration rules in institutional 
arbitration, while for ad hoc arbitration, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are often 
provided. If this is not the case, for the composition of tribunals, it is usually provided 
that each party should appoint one and the two designated arbitrators shall jointly 
appoint a third arbitrator whose nationality is of a third state which has diplomatic 
relations with the parties to the disputed BIT. If any member of the tribunal could not 
be appointed on time, a disputing party may request the Chairman of the Arbitration 
Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce or the President of the International 
Court of Justice to make the necessary appointments.1042 Tribunals are granted the 
power to establish the rules of procedure, for which they may use ICSID Arbitration 
Rules as guidance.1043 
In the BITs in which the issue of applicable law is touched upon, eight of them require 
tribunals to adjudicate in accordance with the law of the treaty party to the dispute 
accepting the investment, including its rules on the conflict of laws, the provisions of 
the involved BIT, as well as the generally recognized principles of international law 
accepted by both treaty parties. 1044  In another two BITs, only domestic law is 
mentioned as the applicable law.1045 
The rules on decision making and the enforcement of awards are quite similar among 
the BITs.1046 Tribunals are required to reach any decision by a majority of votes. Such 
1040 These provisions include the China-BLEU BIT (1984-terminated), Art. 10.3; the China-Finland BIT (1984-
terminated), Protocol Art. 2(3); the China-Italy BIT (1985), Art. 5(2)(i); the China-Netherlands BIT(1985-
terminated), Art. 9.3; the China-Austria BIT (1985), Art. 4.5; the China-Bulgaria BIT (1989), Art. 9.1; the China-
Hungary BIT (1991), Art. 10.1; the China-Czech and Slovak BIT (1991), Art. 9.2; the China-Greece BIT (1992), 
Art. 10.2; the China-Lithuania BIT (1993), Art. 8.2; and the China-Romania BIT (1994), Art. 9.2. 
1041 For examples of each category, see respectively: the China-Romania BIT (1994), Art. 9.2; the China-Slovenia 
BIT (1993), Art. 8.3; the China-Greece BIT (1992), Art. 10.4. An exception of the third category is the China-
Lithuania BIT (1993), which provides investors a choice between the ICSID and ad hoc arbitration, instead of relying 
on the agreement of disputing parties. See: the China-Lithuania BIT (1993), Art. 8.2. 
1042 Some BITs grant the power to the Chairman of the arbitration institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. 
See e.g. the China-Austria BIT (1985), Re Art. 4(2), Others choose the President of the International Court of Justice 
to make necessary appointments. See e.g. the China-Poland BIT (1988), Art. 10.2. 
1043 See e.g. the China-Hungary BIT (1991), Art. 10.3. 
1044 See e.g. the China-Bulgaria BIT (1989), Art. 9.5. 
1045 The China-Greece BIT (1992), Art. 10.2; the China-Austria BIT (1985), Re Art. 4(2). 
1046 There are 14 BITs where these two issues are regulated: the China-France BIT (1984-terminated), the China-
BLEU BIT (1984-terminated), the China-Finland BIT (1984-terminated), the China-Italy BIT (1985), the China-
Denmark BIT (1985), the China-Austria BIT (1985), the China-United Kingdom BIT (1986), the China-Bulgaria 
BIT (1989), the China-Czech and Slovak BIT (1991-terminated), the China-Portugal BIT (1992-terminated), the 
China-Croatia BIT (1993), the China-Estonia BIT (1993), the China-Slovenia BIT (1993), and the China-Lithuania 
BIT (1993). The China-Poland BIT (1988) only states that arbitral awards shall be final and binding on both sides, 
and the China-Greece BIT (1992) only states that awards shall be enforced in accordance with domestic law. 
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a decision is final and binding, the enforcement of which shall be realized in accordance 
with the domestic law of the host state involved. 
Most of these 20 BITs also stipulate rules on cost allocation by requiring each disputing 
party to bear the cost of its appointed arbitrator and representation. The cost of the 
chairman and the remaining cost in the arbitral proceedings shall be borne in equal parts 
by the parties to the dispute.
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pr
ia
ti
on
, 
na
tio
na
li
za
tio
n 
or
 o
th
er
 s
im
il
ar
 m
ea
su
re
s 
an
d 
ha
s 
no
t b
ee
n 
se
ttl
ed
 w
ith
in
 s
ix
 m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 d
at
e 
of
 n
ot
if
ic
at
io
n 
m
ay
, a
s 
th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 p
re
fe
rs
 r
ef
er
re
d 
fo
r 
se
ttl
em
en
t 
ei
th
er
 to
: 
(1
) 
a 
ju
di
ci
al
 b
od
y 
of
 th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 
ac
ce
pt
in
g 
th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t, 
or
, 
(2
) 
an
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
w
it
ho
ut
re
so
rt
 to
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 m
ea
ns
. 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
 A
rt
ic
le
 6
 
1.
 A
 d
is
pu
te
 o
n 
an
 a
m
ou
nt
 o
f 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
fo
r 
ex
pr
op
ri
at
io
n,
 n
at
io
na
liz
at
io
n 
or
 o
th
er
 
si
m
il
ar
 m
ea
su
re
s 
m
ay
, u
nd
er
 P
ar
ag
ra
ph
 3
 o
f 
A
rt
ic
le
 1
0 
of
 th
e 
A
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
be
 s
ub
m
itt
ed
 
to
 a
n 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
. 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
 A
rt
ic
le
 6
 
2.
 S
uc
h 
an
 a
rb
itr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
be
 
co
ns
tit
ut
ed
 f
or
 e
ac
h 
in
di
vi
du
al
 c
as
e 
in
 th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
w
ay
: e
ac
h 
pa
rt
y 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
sh
al
l a
pp
oi
nt
 a
n 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
, a
nd
 th
es
e 
tw
o 
sh
al
l s
el
ec
t a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
a 
th
ir
d 
St
at
e 
w
hi
ch
 h
as
 d
ip
lo
m
at
ic
 r
el
at
io
ns
 w
ith
 th
e 
tw
o 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ti
es
 a
s 
C
ha
ir
m
an
. 
T
he
 f
ir
st
 tw
o 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l b
e 
ap
po
in
te
d 
w
it
hi
n 
tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
of
 th
e 
w
ri
tt
en
 n
ot
ic
e 
fo
r 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
by
 e
it
he
r 
pa
rt
y 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
to
 th
e 
ot
he
r,
 a
nd
 th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 b
e 
se
le
ct
ed
 w
it
hi
n 
fo
ur
 
m
on
th
s.
 If
 w
it
hi
n 
th
e 
pe
ri
od
 s
pe
ci
fi
ed
 
ab
ov
e,
 th
e 
tr
ib
un
al
 h
as
 n
ot
 b
ee
n 
co
ns
tit
ut
ed
, e
ith
er
 p
ar
ty
 to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
m
ay
 in
vi
te
 th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 o
f 
th
e
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 In
st
itu
te
 o
f 
th
e 
S
to
ck
ho
lm
 
C
ha
m
be
r 
of
 C
om
m
er
ce
 to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
. 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
 A
rt
ic
le
 6
 
3.
 T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 
sh
al
l d
et
er
m
in
e 
it
s 
ow
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
 
H
ow
ev
er
, t
he
 
tr
ib
un
al
 m
ay
, i
n 
th
e 
co
ur
se
 o
f 
de
te
rm
in
at
io
n 
of
 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e,
 ta
ke
 a
s 
gu
id
an
ce
 th
e 
R
ul
es
 o
f 
th
e 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 
In
st
it
ut
e 
of
 th
e 
St
oc
kh
ol
m
 
C
ha
m
be
r 
of
 
C
om
m
er
ce
 o
r 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 R
ul
es
 
of
 th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
C
en
tr
e 
of
 
Se
tt
le
m
en
t o
f 
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
D
is
pu
te
s 
(I
C
S
ID
) 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
un
de
r 
C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
on
 th
e 
Se
tt
le
m
en
t o
f 
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
D
is
pu
te
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
St
at
es
 a
nd
 
N
at
io
na
ls
 o
f 
O
th
er
 
St
at
es
 o
pe
ne
d 
fo
r 
si
gn
at
ur
e 
on
 
M
ar
ch
 1
8,
 1
96
5,
 
at
 W
as
hi
ng
to
n.
 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
 A
rt
ic
le
 
6 5.
 T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 
sh
al
l a
dj
ud
ic
at
e 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e
w
it
h 
th
e 
la
w
 o
f 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
ac
ce
pt
in
g 
th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
it
s 
ru
le
s 
on
 th
e 
co
nf
lic
t o
f 
la
w
s,
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
A
gr
ee
m
en
t 
as
 w
el
l a
s 
th
e 
ge
ne
ra
lly
 
re
co
gn
iz
ed
 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 o
f 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
la
w
 a
cc
ep
te
d 
by
bo
th
 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s.
 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
 A
rt
ic
le
 
6 4.
 T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 
sh
al
l r
ea
ch
 it
s 
de
ci
si
on
 b
y 
a 
m
aj
or
it
y 
of
 v
ot
es
.
Su
ch
 d
ec
is
io
n 
sh
al
l b
e 
fi
na
l a
nd
 
bi
nd
in
g 
on
 b
ot
h 
pa
rt
ie
s 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e.
 B
ot
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
sh
al
l 
co
m
m
it 
th
em
se
lv
es
 to
 th
e 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t o
f 
th
e 
de
ci
si
on
 in
 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
ith
 
th
ei
r 
re
sp
ec
tiv
e 
do
m
es
tic
 la
w
. 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
 A
rt
ic
le
 6
 
6.
 E
ac
h 
pa
rt
y 
to
 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
sh
al
l 
be
ar
 th
e 
co
st
 o
f 
it
s 
ap
po
in
te
d 
m
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
tr
ib
un
al
 a
nd
 
of
 it
s 
re
pr
es
en
ta
ti
on
 in
 
th
e 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s 
an
d 
th
e 
ad
va
nc
ed
 
pa
ym
en
t o
f t
he
 
ap
po
in
te
d 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 a
nd
 th
e 
re
m
ai
ni
ng
 c
os
ts
 in
 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s 
sh
al
l 
be
 b
or
ne
 in
 e
qu
al
 
pa
rt
s 
by
 th
e 
pa
rt
ie
s 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e.
 
5  
F
in
la
n
d
 
(T
er
m
in
at
ed
)  
04
.0
9.
19
84
 
26
.0
1.
19
86
 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
 A
rt
ic
le
 2
 
(2
) 
If
 a
n 
in
ve
st
or
 
w
ho
se
 in
ve
st
m
en
t 
ha
s 
be
en
 
ex
pr
op
ri
at
ed
 
ch
al
le
ng
es
 th
e 
am
ou
nt
 o
f 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
fo
r 
hi
s 
as
se
ts
, t
he
 
in
ve
st
or
 a
nd
 th
e 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
 A
rt
ic
le
 2
 
(1
) 
If
 a
n 
in
ve
st
or
 c
on
si
de
rs
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
 o
f 
ex
pr
op
ri
at
io
n 
in
 A
rt
ic
le
 5
 in
co
m
pa
tib
le
 w
ith
 
th
e 
la
w
s 
of
 th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
ta
ki
ng
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
, t
he
 c
om
pe
te
nt
 c
ou
rt
 o
f 
th
at
 P
ar
ty
 
sh
al
l, 
up
on
 r
eq
ue
st
 o
f 
th
e 
in
ve
st
or
, r
ev
ie
w
 
th
e 
sa
id
 m
ea
su
re
. 
(3
) 
If
 th
e 
pa
rt
ie
s 
to
 th
e 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
 d
o 
no
t 
re
ac
h 
ag
re
em
en
t w
ith
in
 th
e 
pe
ri
od
 s
et
 o
ut
 in
 
su
bp
ar
ag
ra
ph
 (2
) 
th
e 
co
m
pe
te
nt
 c
ou
rt
 o
f 
th
e 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
 A
rt
ic
le
 2
 
(4
) 
T
he
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l 
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 a
bo
ve
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
co
ns
tit
ut
ed
 f
or
 
ea
ch
 c
as
e 
se
pa
ra
te
ly
. E
ac
h 
pa
rt
y 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
sh
al
l a
pp
oi
nt
 o
ne
 m
em
be
r o
f 
th
e 
tr
ib
un
al
. T
he
se
 tw
o 
m
em
be
rs
 s
ha
ll
 
ap
po
in
t a
 th
ir
d 
pe
rs
on
 a
s 
ch
ai
rm
an
 o
f 
th
e 
tr
ib
un
al
. T
he
 m
em
be
rs
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
ap
po
in
te
d 
w
ith
in
 tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
an
d 
th
e 
ch
ai
rm
an
 
w
ith
in
 f
ou
r 
m
on
th
s 
of
 th
e 
da
te
 o
n 
w
hi
ch
 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
 A
rt
ic
le
 2
 
(4
) 
T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
l 
tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
de
te
rm
in
e 
it
s 
ow
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 w
ith
 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
to
 th
e 
C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
on
 th
e 
Se
tt
le
m
en
t o
f 
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
D
is
pu
te
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
N
/A
 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
 A
rt
ic
le
 
2 (4
) 
T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 
sh
al
l d
ec
id
e 
by
 
m
aj
or
it
y 
vo
te
 a
nd
its
 d
ec
is
io
n 
sh
al
l 
be
 fi
na
l a
nd
 
bi
nd
in
g 
an
d 
ca
n 
be
 e
nf
or
ce
d 
in
 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
ith
 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
 A
rt
ic
le
 2
 
(4
) 
E
ac
h 
pa
rt
y 
to
 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
sh
al
l 
be
ar
 th
e 
co
st
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 it
 
ha
s 
ap
po
in
te
d.
 
T
he
 c
os
t o
f 
th
e 
ch
ai
rm
an
 a
nd
 
ot
he
r 
re
le
va
nt
 
co
st
s 
of
 th
e 
10
49
 B
el
gi
um
-L
ux
em
bo
ur
g 
E
co
no
m
ic
 
U
ni
on
  
257
 
N o.
 
E
U
 
M
em
be
r 
S
ta
te
s 
D
at
es
10
48
 
A
m
ic
ab
le
 
Se
tt
le
m
en
t 
F
or
u
m
 S
el
ec
ti
on
 
C
on
st
it
ut
io
n
 o
f 
T
ri
b
un
al
s 
A
p
p
li
ca
bl
e 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 
R
u
le
s 
A
p
pl
ic
ab
le
 
L
aw
 
D
ec
is
io
n 
M
ak
in
g 
an
d 
E
nf
or
ce
m
en
t  
C
os
t 
A
ll
oc
at
io
n  
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
w
hi
ch
 a
do
pt
ed
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
 o
f 
ex
pr
op
ri
at
io
n 
sh
al
l c
on
su
lt 
w
ith
 
a 
vi
ew
 to
 r
ea
ch
in
g 
ag
re
em
en
t o
n 
th
e 
am
ou
nt
 o
f 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
w
it
hi
n 
si
x 
m
on
th
s.
 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 a
do
pt
in
g 
th
e 
m
ea
su
re
 o
f 
ex
pr
op
ri
at
io
n 
or
 a
n 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
rb
itr
al
 
tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll
, u
po
n 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f t
he
 
in
ve
st
or
, r
ev
ie
w
 th
e 
am
ou
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n.
 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
 A
rt
ic
le
 3
 
U
nl
es
s 
ot
he
rw
is
e 
ag
re
ed
 a
ll
 o
th
er
 d
is
pu
te
s 
ov
er
 a
n 
in
ve
st
m
en
t b
et
w
ee
n 
an
 in
ve
st
or
 a
nd
 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
re
ce
iv
in
g 
th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t s
ha
ll
 b
e 
se
tt
le
d 
th
ro
ug
h 
lo
ca
l 
re
m
ed
ie
s 
of
 th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 in
 
qu
es
tio
n 
an
d 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 it
s 
la
w
s 
an
d 
re
gu
la
tio
ns
. 
ei
th
er
 p
ar
ty
 r
ec
ei
ve
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
pa
rt
y 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
a 
re
qu
es
t f
or
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
. 
Sh
ou
ld
 th
e 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
 o
f 
m
em
be
rs
 o
r 
ch
ai
rm
an
 n
ot
 ta
ke
 p
la
ce
 w
it
hi
n 
th
e 
tim
e 
pe
ri
od
s 
sp
ec
if
ie
d 
ab
ov
e,
 e
ith
er
 p
ar
ty
 
m
ay
, i
n 
ca
se
 n
o 
ot
he
r 
ag
re
em
en
t h
as
 b
ee
n 
m
ad
e,
 r
ef
er
 th
e 
ap
po
in
tm
en
t t
o 
th
e 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 In
st
itu
te
 o
f 
th
e 
S
to
ck
ho
lm
 
C
ha
m
be
r 
of
 C
om
m
er
ce
. 
St
at
es
 a
nd
 
N
at
io
na
ls
 o
f 
O
th
er
 
St
at
es
, d
on
e 
in
 
W
as
hi
ng
to
n 
on
 1
8 
M
ar
ch
, 1
96
5.
' 
do
m
es
tic
 la
w
. 
T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 
sh
al
l, 
up
on
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 
pa
rt
y 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e,
 s
ta
te
 th
e 
re
as
on
s 
up
on
 
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
aw
ar
d 
is
 b
as
ed
. 
tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
bo
rn
e 
in
 e
qu
al
 
pa
rt
s 
by
 th
e 
pa
rt
ie
s 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e.
 
6 
It
al
y 
28
.0
1.
19
85
 
28
.0
8.
19
87
 
A
d 
A
rt
ic
le
 5
 
(i
) 
W
he
n 
a 
di
sp
ut
e
ov
er
 th
e 
am
ou
nt
 
of
 c
om
pe
ns
at
io
n 
fo
r 
ex
pr
op
ri
at
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
on
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
an
d 
a 
na
tio
na
l (
or
 
co
m
pa
ny
) 
of
 th
e 
ot
he
r C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
ha
s 
no
t b
ee
n 
se
tt
le
d 
w
ith
in
 s
ix
 
m
on
th
s 
fo
rm
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
re
qu
es
t f
or
 
se
tt
le
m
en
t…
 
A
rt
ic
le
 5
 
(1
) 
D
is
pu
te
s 
on
 m
at
te
rs
 m
en
ti
on
ed
 in
 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
2,
 A
rt
ic
le
 4
 c
on
ce
rn
in
g 
th
e 
co
nf
or
m
ity
 o
f 
th
e 
ex
pr
op
ri
at
io
n 
w
ith
 th
e 
la
w
s 
an
d 
re
gu
la
tio
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
w
hi
ch
 m
ad
e 
th
e 
ex
pr
op
ri
at
io
n 
m
ay
, 
up
on
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f t
he
 in
te
re
st
ed
 P
ar
ty
, b
e
su
bm
itt
ed
 to
 th
e 
co
m
pe
te
nt
 c
ou
rt
 o
f 
th
at
 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 w
hi
ch
 m
ad
e 
th
e 
ex
pr
op
ri
at
io
n.
 
(2
) 
T
he
 d
is
pu
te
 o
ve
r 
th
e 
am
ou
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
m
en
ti
on
ed
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
, 
A
rt
ic
le
 4
, s
ha
ll 
be
 s
et
tle
d 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
in
 (
4)
 (
A
d 
A
rt
ic
le
 5
) 
in
 
th
e 
P
ro
to
co
l. 
A
d 
A
rt
ic
le
 5
 
(i
) 
W
he
n 
a 
di
sp
ut
e 
ov
er
 
th
e 
am
ou
nt
 
of
 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
fo
r e
xp
ro
pr
ia
ti
on
 b
et
w
ee
n 
on
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
an
d 
a 
na
ti
on
al
 
(o
r 
co
m
pa
ny
) 
of
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
ha
s 
no
t 
be
en
 s
et
tl
ed
 w
it
hi
n 
si
x 
m
on
th
s 
fo
rm
 t
he
 
da
te
 o
f 
re
qu
es
t 
fo
r 
se
ttl
em
en
t, 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
m
ay
, 
up
on
 t
he
 r
eq
ue
st
 o
f 
th
e 
na
tio
na
l 
or
 
co
m
pa
ny
 c
on
ce
rn
ed
, b
e 
su
bm
itt
ed
 to
: 
(a
) 
th
e 
co
m
pe
te
nt
 c
ou
rt
 o
f 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
w
hi
ch
 
m
ad
e 
th
e 
ex
pr
op
ri
at
io
n 
fo
r 
de
ci
si
on
; o
r 
(b
) 
an
 a
d 
ho
c 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
ar
bi
tr
al
 t
ri
bu
na
l 
fo
r 
aw
ar
d.
 
A
d 
A
rt
ic
le
 5
 
(a
) 
E
ac
h 
pa
rt
y 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
sh
al
l a
pp
oi
nt
 
on
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
; t
he
 tw
o 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
pr
op
os
e 
by
 m
ut
ua
l 
ag
re
em
en
t 
a 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 w
ho
 
sh
al
l 
be
 a
 n
at
io
na
l 
of
 a
 t
hi
rd
 S
ta
te
 w
hi
ch
 
ha
s 
di
pl
om
at
ic
 
re
la
ti
on
s 
w
ith
 
bo
th
 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s.
 T
he
 a
rb
itr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l 
be
 a
pp
oi
nt
ed
 w
ith
in
 t
w
o 
m
on
th
s 
an
d 
th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 w
it
hi
n 
fo
ur
 m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 t
he
 
da
te
 
w
he
n 
on
e 
of
 
th
e 
pa
rt
ie
s 
to
 
th
e 
(d
is
pu
te
 in
fo
rm
ed
 th
e 
ot
he
r o
f i
ts
 in
te
nt
io
n 
to
 s
ub
m
it 
th
e)
 d
is
pu
te
 to
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
. 
If
 t
he
 a
pp
oi
nt
m
en
ts
 a
re
 n
ot
 w
it
hi
n 
th
e 
pe
ri
od
 m
en
ti
on
ed
 a
bo
ve
, e
ith
er
 p
ar
ty
 m
ay
 
in
vi
te
 
th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 
of
 t
he
 A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 
In
st
itu
te
 o
f 
th
e 
S
to
ck
ho
lm
 C
ha
m
be
r 
of
 
C
om
m
er
ce
 
to
 
m
ak
e 
th
ei
r 
re
qu
ir
ed
 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
. 
A
d 
A
rt
ic
le
 5
 
(b
) 
T
he
 
ar
bi
tr
al
 
tr
ib
un
al
 
sh
al
l 
de
te
rm
in
e 
it
s 
ow
n 
ar
bi
tr
al
 p
ro
ce
du
re
. 
B
ut
 i
t 
m
ay
, 
w
hi
le
 
de
te
rm
in
in
g 
it
s 
ow
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e,
 
m
ak
e 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
to
 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 o
f 
th
e 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 
In
st
itu
te
 
of
 
th
e 
St
oc
kh
ol
m
 
C
ha
m
be
r 
of
 
C
om
m
er
ce
 
or
 
of
 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
C
en
tr
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
Se
tt
le
m
en
t 
of
 
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
D
is
pu
te
s 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 
th
e 
“C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
on
 
th
e 
Se
tt
le
m
en
t 
of
 
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
D
is
pu
te
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
St
at
es
 
an
d 
N
at
io
na
ls
 o
f 
ot
he
r 
St
at
es
” 
co
nc
lu
de
d 
on
 
M
ar
ch
 
18
, 
19
65
. 
A
d 
A
rt
ic
le
 5
 
(d
)
T
he
 a
rb
itr
al
 
aw
ar
d 
sh
al
l 
be
 
m
ad
e 
in
 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 
w
it
h 
th
e 
do
m
es
tic
 
la
w
s 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
th
e 
ru
le
s 
of
 c
on
fl
ic
t 
of
 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
w
hi
ch
 
ac
ce
pt
s 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 a
nd
 
in
 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 
w
it
h 
th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 
in
 
th
e 
pr
es
en
t 
A
gr
ee
m
en
t 
as
 
w
el
l 
as
 
th
e 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 
of
 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
la
w
 
ge
ne
ra
lly
 
re
co
gn
iz
ed
 
an
d 
ad
op
te
d 
by
 b
ot
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s.
 
A
d 
A
rt
ic
le
 5
 
(c
) 
T
he
 
ar
bi
tr
al
 
tr
ib
un
al
 
sh
al
l 
re
ac
h 
it
s 
de
ci
si
on
 
by
 a
 m
aj
or
ity
 o
f 
vo
te
s.
 
It
s 
aw
ar
d 
sh
al
l 
be
 f
in
al
 a
nd
 
bi
nd
in
g 
on
 
bo
th
 
pa
rt
ie
s 
to
 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e,
 a
nd
 s
ha
ll 
be
 
en
fo
rc
ed
 
by
 
bo
th
 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
in
 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 
w
it
h 
th
e 
do
m
es
tic
 
la
w
s.
 
A
d 
A
rt
ic
le
 5
 
(e
) 
E
ac
h 
pa
rt
y 
sh
al
l 
be
ar
 t
he
 c
os
t 
of
 
its
 
ow
n 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 a
nd
 o
f i
ts
 
co
un
se
l 
in
 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s.
 
T
he
 
co
st
 
of
 
th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 a
nd
 t
he
 
re
m
ai
ni
ng
 c
os
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 
tr
ib
un
al
 
sh
al
l 
be
 
bo
rn
e 
in
 
eq
ua
l 
pa
rt
s 
by
 
bo
th
 
pa
rt
ie
s 
to
 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e.
 
7  
D
en
m
ar
k 
29
.0
4.
19
85
 
29
.0
4.
19
85
 
A
rt
ic
le
 8
 
(1
)
In
 t
he
 e
ve
nt
 o
f 
a 
di
sp
ut
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
A
rt
ic
le
 8
 
(2
) 
If
 s
uc
h 
di
sp
ut
e 
ca
nn
ot
 b
e 
th
us
 s
et
tl
ed
 
w
it
hi
n 
si
x 
m
on
th
s,
 e
ith
er
 P
ar
ty
 to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
A
rt
ic
le
 8
 
(4
) 
T
he
 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
ar
bi
tr
al
 
tr
ib
un
al
 
m
en
tio
ne
d 
ab
ov
e 
sh
al
l 
be
 
es
pe
ci
al
ly
 
A
rt
ic
le
 8
 
(4
) 
T
he
 
ar
bi
tr
al
 
tr
ib
un
al
 
sh
al
l 
N
/A
 
A
rt
ic
le
 8
 
(4
)
T
he
 d
ec
is
io
n 
of
 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 
A
rt
ic
le
 8
 
(4
)
E
ac
h 
P
ar
ty
 
co
nc
er
ne
d 
sh
al
l 
258
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E
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M
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S
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D
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A
m
ic
ab
le
 
Se
tt
le
m
en
t 
F
or
u
m
 S
el
ec
ti
on
 
C
on
st
it
ut
io
n
 o
f 
T
ri
b
un
al
s 
A
p
p
li
ca
bl
e 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 
R
u
le
s 
A
p
pl
ic
ab
le
 
L
aw
 
D
ec
is
io
n 
M
ak
in
g 
an
d 
E
nf
or
ce
m
en
t  
C
os
t 
A
ll
oc
at
io
n  
a 
na
tio
na
l 
or
 
co
m
pa
ny
 
of
 
on
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
pa
rt
y 
an
d 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
in
 c
on
ne
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 
an
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
in
 
th
e 
te
rr
ito
ry
 o
f 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y,
 t
he
 n
at
io
na
l 
or
 
co
m
pa
ny
 
co
nc
er
ne
d 
m
ay
 
fi
le
 c
om
pl
ai
nt
 w
ith
 
th
e 
co
m
pe
te
nt
 
au
th
or
it
y 
of
 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y.
 
N
eg
ot
ia
tio
ns
 
fo
r 
se
tt
le
m
en
t 
w
ill
 
th
en
 
ta
ke
 
pl
ac
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
pa
rt
ie
s 
in
 d
is
pu
te
. 
sh
al
l b
e 
en
tit
le
d 
to
 s
ub
m
it
 t
he
 d
is
pu
te
 t
o 
th
e 
co
m
pe
te
nt
 c
ou
rt
 o
f 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
ac
ce
pt
in
g 
th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t. 
(3
) 
If
 a
 d
is
pu
te
 i
nv
ol
vi
ng
 t
he
 a
m
ou
nt
 o
f 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
re
su
lti
ng
 f
ro
m
 e
xp
ro
pr
ia
tio
n 
m
en
ti
on
ed
 
in
 
A
rt
ic
le
 4
 c
an
no
t 
be
 s
et
tle
d 
w
it
hi
n 
si
x 
m
on
th
s 
af
te
r 
co
m
pa
ny
 c
on
ce
rn
ed
, 
it
 
m
ay
 
be
 
su
bm
itt
ed
 
to
 
an
 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 e
st
ab
li
sh
ed
 b
y 
bo
th
 p
ar
ti
es
. 
If
 t
he
 n
at
io
na
l 
or
 c
om
pa
ny
 c
on
ce
rn
ed
 h
as
 
re
so
rt
ed
 t
o 
th
e 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e 
sp
ec
if
ie
d 
in
 t
he
 
ab
ov
e 
Pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
2 
of
 
th
is
 
A
rt
ic
le
, 
th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
is
 P
ar
ag
ra
ph
 s
ha
ll 
no
t a
pp
ly
. 
co
ns
tit
ut
ed
 i
n 
th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
w
ay
: 
ea
ch
 
Pa
rt
y 
co
nc
er
ne
d 
sh
al
l 
ap
po
in
t 
an
 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
. 
T
he
 
tw
o 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l 
ap
po
in
t a
n 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 a
s 
C
ha
ir
m
an
, w
ho
 i
s 
a 
na
tio
na
l o
f a
 th
ir
d 
st
at
e 
w
hi
ch
 s
ha
ll 
ha
ve
 
di
pl
om
at
ic
 
re
la
tio
ns
 
w
it
h 
bo
th
 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s.
 T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
to
rs
 s
ha
ll
 
be
 a
pp
oi
nt
ed
 w
ith
in
 t
w
o 
m
on
th
s 
an
d 
th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 w
it
hi
n 
fo
ur
 m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 t
he
 
da
te
 w
he
n 
on
e 
Pa
rt
y 
co
nc
er
ne
d 
no
tif
ie
s 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
Pa
rt
y 
of
 i
ts
 s
ub
m
is
si
on
 o
f 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
to
 a
rb
it
ra
tio
n.
 
If
 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
 
ar
e 
no
t 
m
ad
e 
w
it
hi
n 
th
e 
pe
ri
od
 s
pe
ci
fi
ed
 i
n 
th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 P
ar
ag
ra
ph
, 
ei
th
er
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
, 
in
 
th
e 
ab
se
nc
e 
of
 
an
y 
ot
he
r 
ag
re
em
en
t, 
re
qu
es
t 
th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 o
f 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 
In
st
it
ut
e 
of
 
th
e 
S
to
ck
ho
lm
 
C
ha
m
be
r 
of
 
C
om
m
er
ce
 
to
 
m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
. 
de
te
rm
in
e 
it
s 
ow
n 
ar
bi
tr
al
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s 
w
it
h 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
to
 
th
e 
"C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
on
 t
he
 S
et
tl
em
en
t 
of
 
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
D
is
pu
te
s 
B
et
w
ee
n 
St
at
es
 
an
d 
N
at
io
na
ls
 o
f 
O
th
er
 
St
at
es
",
 
do
ne
 
at
 
W
as
hi
ng
to
n 
on
 
M
ar
ch
 1
8,
19
65
.
tr
ib
un
al
 
sh
al
l 
be
 
fi
na
l 
an
d 
bi
nd
in
g,
 
an
d 
sh
al
l 
be
 
en
fo
rc
ea
bl
e 
in
 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 
w
it
h 
do
m
es
tic
 
la
w
s.
 
T
he
 
ar
bi
tr
al
 
tr
ib
un
al
 
sh
al
l 
st
at
e 
th
e 
ba
si
s 
of
 
its
 
de
ci
si
on
 
an
d 
st
at
e 
re
as
on
s 
up
on
 t
he
 r
eq
ue
st
 
of
 
ei
th
er
 
P
ar
ty
 
co
nc
er
ne
d.
 
be
ar
 th
e 
co
st
 o
f 
it
s 
ow
n 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 a
nd
 
its
 
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
in
 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s.
 
T
he
 
co
st
 
of
 
th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 
in
 
di
sc
ha
rg
in
g 
hi
s 
ar
bi
tr
al
 
fu
nc
tio
n 
an
d 
th
e 
re
m
ai
ni
ng
 
co
st
s 
of
 
th
e 
tr
ib
un
al
 
sh
al
l 
be
 
bo
rn
e 
eq
ua
ll
y 
by
 
th
e 
P
ar
tie
s 
co
nc
er
ne
d.
 
8  
N
et
he
rl
an
d
s 
(T
er
m
in
at
ed
)  
17
.0
6.
19
85
 
01
.0
2.
19
87
 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
1.
 D
is
pu
te
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
on
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
an
d 
an
 in
ve
st
or
 o
f 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 a
n 
in
ve
st
m
en
t o
f 
th
at
in
ve
st
or
 in
 th
e
te
rr
ito
ry
 o
f 
th
e 
fo
rm
er
 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
sh
al
l, 
if
 p
os
si
bl
e,
 
be
 s
et
tl
ed
 
am
ic
ab
ly
. 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
2.
 I
f 
su
ch
 d
is
pu
te
s 
ca
nn
ot
 b
e 
se
ttl
ed
 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
1 
of
 th
is
 A
rt
ic
le
 w
ith
in
 a
 p
er
io
d 
of
 s
ix
 m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 e
it
he
r 
pa
rt
y 
re
qu
es
te
d 
am
ic
ab
le
 s
et
tle
m
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
pa
rt
ie
s 
ha
ve
 n
ot
ag
re
ed
 to
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 d
is
pu
te
 s
et
tl
em
en
t 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 c
on
ce
rn
ed
 m
ay
 
ch
oo
se
 o
ne
 o
r 
bo
th
 o
f 
th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
m
ea
ns
 
of
 r
es
ol
ut
io
n:
 
(a
) 
fi
le
 c
om
pl
ai
nt
 w
it
h 
an
d 
se
ek
 r
el
ie
f 
fr
om
 
th
e 
co
m
pe
te
nt
 a
dm
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
ag
en
cy
 o
f 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 r
ec
ei
vi
ng
 th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t; 
(b
) 
fi
le
 s
ui
t w
ith
 th
e 
co
m
pe
te
nt
 c
ou
rt
 o
f 
la
w
 
of
 th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
re
ce
iv
in
g 
th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t. 
3.
 D
is
pu
te
s 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 th
e 
am
ou
nt
 o
f 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
to
 b
e 
pa
id
 w
he
n 
m
ea
su
re
s 
of
 
ex
pr
op
ri
at
io
n,
 n
at
io
na
li
za
tio
n 
or
 o
th
er
 
si
m
il
ar
 m
ea
su
re
s 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
ta
ke
n 
w
hi
ch
 
ca
nn
ot
 b
e 
se
tt
le
d 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
1 
of
 th
is
 A
rt
ic
le
 
w
it
hi
n 
a 
pe
ri
od
 o
f 
si
x 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
ei
th
er
 p
ar
ty
 r
eq
ue
st
ed
 a
m
ic
ab
le
 s
et
tle
m
en
t 
sh
al
l i
f 
th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 s
o 
w
is
he
s 
be
 s
ub
m
itt
ed
 
ei
th
er
 to
 th
e 
co
m
pe
te
nt
 c
ou
rt
 o
f 
la
w
 o
f 
th
e 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
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N o.
 
E
U
 
M
em
be
r 
S
ta
te
s 
D
at
es
10
48
 
A
m
ic
ab
le
 
Se
tt
le
m
en
t 
F
or
u
m
 S
el
ec
ti
on
 
C
on
st
it
ut
io
n
 o
f 
T
ri
b
un
al
s 
A
p
p
li
ca
bl
e 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 
R
u
le
s 
A
p
pl
ic
ab
le
 
L
aw
 
D
ec
is
io
n 
M
ak
in
g 
an
d 
E
nf
or
ce
m
en
t  
C
os
t 
A
ll
oc
at
io
n  
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 r
ec
ei
vi
ng
 th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
or
 to
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
rb
it
ra
tio
n.
 
9  
A
u
st
ri
a 
12
.0
9.
19
85
 
11
.1
0.
19
86
 
N
/A
 
A
rt
ic
le
 4
10
50
 
4.
 T
he
 in
ve
st
or
 in
 e
nt
itl
ed
 to
 r
eq
ue
st
 th
e 
co
m
pe
te
nt
 a
ut
ho
ri
ty
 o
f 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
ta
ki
ng
 e
xp
ro
pr
ia
to
ry
 m
ea
su
re
s 
to
 
re
vi
ew
 th
e 
le
ga
lit
y 
of
 th
e 
ex
pr
op
ri
at
io
n.
 
5.
 T
he
 in
ve
st
or
 is
 e
nt
itl
ed
 to
 r
eq
ue
st
 th
e 
co
m
pe
te
nt
 a
ut
ho
ri
ty
 o
f 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
ta
ki
ng
 th
e 
ex
pr
op
ri
at
or
y 
m
ea
su
re
s 
or
 
an
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
tr
ib
un
al
 to
 
re
vi
ew
 th
e 
am
ou
nt
 o
f 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
fo
r 
th
e 
ex
pr
op
ri
at
io
n.
 
R
e 
A
rt
ic
le
 4
 (
2)
  
T
he
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
tr
ib
un
al
 
m
en
tio
ne
d 
in
 P
ar
ag
ra
ph
 5
 o
f 
A
rt
ic
le
 4
 o
f 
th
e 
A
gr
ee
m
en
t s
ha
ll
 b
e 
co
ns
tit
ut
ed
 
sp
ec
if
ic
al
ly
 a
s 
fo
ll
ow
s:
 e
ac
h 
pa
rt
y 
co
nc
er
ne
d 
sh
al
l a
pp
oi
nt
 a
n 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 a
nd
 
th
e 
tw
o 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l a
pp
oi
nt
 a
 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 f
ro
m
 th
e 
na
ti
on
al
s 
of
 a
 th
ir
d 
co
un
tr
y 
w
hi
ch
 h
as
 d
ip
lo
m
at
ic
 r
el
at
io
ns
 
w
ith
 b
ot
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ti
es
. T
he
 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l b
e 
ap
po
in
te
d 
w
ith
in
 tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
y 
w
he
n 
th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
no
ti
fi
es
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
of
 it
s 
re
qu
es
t t
o 
su
bm
it 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
to
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 a
nd
 th
er
ea
ft
er
, 
th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 b
e 
ap
po
in
te
d 
w
ith
in
 
an
ot
he
r t
w
o 
m
on
th
s.
 
If
 th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
 a
re
 n
ot
 
m
ad
e 
w
ith
in
 th
e 
pe
ri
od
 s
pe
ci
fi
ed
 a
bo
ve
, 
ei
th
er
 P
ar
ty
 m
ay
, i
n 
th
e 
ab
se
nc
e 
of
 a
ny
 
ot
he
r 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
t, 
re
qu
es
t t
he
 C
ha
ir
m
an
 
of
 th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l A
rb
itr
at
io
n 
In
st
it
ut
e 
of
 th
e 
St
oc
kh
ol
m
 C
ha
m
be
r o
f 
C
om
m
er
ce
 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
. 
R
e 
A
rt
ic
le
 4
 (
2)
 
T
he
 A
rb
itr
at
io
n 
T
ri
bu
na
l s
ha
ll 
de
te
rm
in
e 
it
s 
ow
n 
ar
bi
tr
al
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s 
gu
id
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
on
 th
e 
Se
tt
le
m
en
t o
f 
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
D
is
pu
te
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
St
at
es
 a
nd
 
N
at
io
na
ls
 o
f 
O
th
er
 
St
at
es
 d
on
e 
on
 
M
ar
ch
 1
8,
 1
96
5.
 
R
e 
A
rt
ic
le
 4
 (
2)
 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
it
h 
th
e 
do
m
es
tic
 la
w
 
R
e 
A
rt
ic
le
 4
 (
2)
 
T
he
 d
ec
is
io
n 
sh
al
l b
e 
m
ad
e 
by
 
a 
m
aj
or
ity
 v
ot
e,
 
be
 fi
na
l, 
bi
nd
in
g 
an
d 
en
fo
rc
ea
bl
e 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
it
h 
th
e 
do
m
es
tic
 
la
w
. T
he
 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll
 
st
at
e 
th
e 
ba
si
s 
of
 
its
 d
ec
is
io
n 
an
d,
 
at
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
ei
th
er
 p
ar
ty
 
co
nc
er
ne
d,
 
ex
pl
ai
n 
th
e 
re
as
on
s 
fo
r 
its
 
de
ci
si
on
. 
R
e 
A
rt
ic
le
 4
 (
2)
 
E
ac
h 
P
ar
ty
 s
ha
ll 
be
ar
 th
e 
co
st
 o
f 
it
s 
ow
n 
ap
po
in
te
d 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 a
nd
 it
s 
re
pr
es
en
ta
ti
on
 in
 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s.
 T
he
 
co
st
 o
f 
th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 a
nd
 th
e 
re
m
ai
ni
ng
 c
os
ts
 
sh
al
l b
e 
bo
rn
e 
eq
ua
lly
 b
y 
th
e 
pa
rt
ie
s.
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U
n
it
ed
 
K
in
gd
om
 
15
.0
5.
19
86
 
15
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5.
19
86
 
A
rt
ic
le
 7
 
(1
) 
A
 d
is
pu
te
 
be
tw
ee
n 
a 
na
tio
na
l 
or
 c
om
pa
ny
 o
f 
on
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
an
d 
th
e 
ot
he
r C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 
an
 a
m
ou
nt
 o
f 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
w
hi
ch
 h
as
 n
ot
 
be
en
 a
m
ic
ab
ly
 
se
tt
le
d 
af
te
r 
a 
pe
ri
od
 o
f 
si
x 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 
w
ri
tt
en
 
no
tif
ic
at
io
n 
of
 th
at
 
di
sp
ut
e.
.. 
A
rt
ic
le
 7
 
(1
) 
A
 d
is
pu
te
 b
et
w
ee
n 
a 
na
tio
na
l o
r 
co
m
pa
ny
 o
f 
on
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
an
d 
th
e
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 a
n 
am
ou
nt
 o
f 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
w
hi
ch
 h
as
 n
ot
 
be
en
 a
m
ic
ab
ly
 s
et
tle
d 
af
te
r 
a 
pe
ri
od
 o
f 
si
x 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 w
ri
tte
n 
no
ti
fi
ca
tio
n 
of
 th
at
 
di
sp
ut
e 
sh
al
l b
e 
su
bm
itt
ed
 to
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n.
 
(2
) 
W
he
re
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
is
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
, t
he
 n
at
io
na
l o
r 
co
m
pa
ny
 a
nd
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
co
nc
er
ne
d 
in
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
m
ay
 a
gr
ee
 to
 r
ef
er
 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
ei
th
er
 to
: 
(a
) 
an
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
rb
itr
at
or
 a
pp
oi
nt
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
pa
rt
ie
s 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e;
 o
r 
(A
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 U
N
C
IT
R
A
L
 A
rb
itr
at
io
n 
R
ul
es
 (
su
bj
ec
t t
o 
pa
rt
ie
s’
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t)
 o
r 
ot
he
r 
A
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
R
ul
es
 a
gr
ee
d 
by
 
pa
rt
ie
s)
 
(U
N
C
IT
R
A
L
 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 R
ul
es
 
(s
ub
je
ct
 to
 p
ar
ti
es
’ 
ag
re
em
en
t)
 o
r 
ot
he
r 
A
rb
itr
at
io
n 
R
ul
es
 a
gr
ee
d 
by
 
pa
rt
ie
s)
 
(A
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 
U
N
C
IT
R
A
L
 
A
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
R
ul
es
 (
su
bj
ec
t 
to
 p
ar
tie
s’
 
ag
re
em
en
t)
 o
r 
ot
he
r 
A
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
R
ul
es
 a
gr
ee
d 
by
 
pa
rt
ie
s)
 
(A
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 
U
N
C
IT
R
A
L
 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 R
ul
es
 
(s
ub
je
ct
 to
 
pa
rt
ie
s’
 
ag
re
em
en
t)
 o
r 
ot
he
r 
A
rb
itr
at
io
n 
R
ul
es
 a
gr
ee
d 
by
 
pa
rt
ie
s)
 
(A
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 
U
N
C
IT
R
A
L
 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 R
ul
es
 
(s
ub
je
ct
 to
 p
ar
tie
s’
 
ag
re
em
en
t)
 o
r 
ot
he
r 
A
rb
itr
at
io
n 
R
ul
es
 a
gr
ee
d 
by
 
pa
rt
ie
s)
 
10
50
 P
ro
to
co
l 
R
e 
A
rt
ic
le
 4
: 
If
 e
ith
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
ex
pr
op
ri
at
es
 i
n 
it
s 
te
rr
ito
ry
 t
he
 i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
of
 a
 j
ur
id
ic
al
 p
er
so
n 
an
d 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n 
or
 a
ss
oc
ia
tio
n 
of
 a
 t
hi
rd
 c
ou
nt
ry
 w
he
th
er
 i
t 
po
ss
es
se
s 
a 
ju
ri
di
ca
l 
pe
rs
on
 s
ta
tu
s 
or
 n
ot
 a
nd
 i
n 
w
hi
ch
 t
he
 
in
ve
st
or
 o
f 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
a 
ju
ri
di
ca
l 
pe
rs
on
 s
ta
tu
s 
or
 n
ot
 a
nd
 i
n 
w
hi
ch
 t
he
 i
nv
es
to
r 
of
 t
he
 o
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 o
w
ns
 e
ss
en
tia
l 
in
te
re
st
s,
 t
he
 P
ro
vi
si
on
 o
f 
Pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
1 
of
 A
rt
ic
le
 4
 o
f 
th
e 
A
gr
ee
m
en
t 
sh
al
l 
ap
pl
y 
to
 s
uc
h 
in
ve
st
m
en
t, 
pr
ov
id
ed
 th
at
 s
uc
h 
ju
ri
di
ca
l p
er
so
n 
or
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
or
 a
ss
oc
ia
ti
on
 in
 a
 th
ir
d 
co
un
tr
y 
or
 s
uc
h 
th
ir
d 
co
un
tr
y 
is
 n
ot
 e
nt
it
le
d 
to
 o
r 
ab
an
do
ns
 it
s 
ri
gh
ts
 f
or
 c
om
pe
ns
at
io
n.
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E
U
 
M
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r 
S
ta
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s 
D
at
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48
 
A
m
ic
ab
le
 
Se
tt
le
m
en
t 
F
or
u
m
 S
el
ec
ti
on
 
C
on
st
it
ut
io
n
 o
f 
T
ri
b
un
al
s 
A
p
p
li
ca
bl
e 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 
R
u
le
s 
A
p
pl
ic
ab
le
 
L
aw
 
D
ec
is
io
n 
M
ak
in
g 
an
d 
E
nf
or
ce
m
en
t  
C
os
t 
A
ll
oc
at
io
n  
(b
) 
an
 a
d 
ho
c 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 to
 b
e 
ap
po
in
te
d 
un
de
r 
a 
sp
ec
ia
l a
gr
ee
m
en
t 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
pa
rt
ie
s 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e;
 o
r 
(c
) 
an
 a
d 
ho
c 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 e
st
ab
li
sh
ed
 
un
de
r 
th
e 
A
rb
itr
at
io
n 
R
ul
es
 o
f 
th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
N
at
io
ns
 C
om
m
is
si
on
 o
n 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l T
ra
de
L
aw
. 
(3
) 
If
 a
ft
er
 a
 p
er
io
d 
of
 th
re
e 
m
on
th
s 
af
te
r 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
is
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 a
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
un
de
r 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
(2
) 
ab
ov
e 
th
er
e 
is
 n
o 
su
ch
 
ag
re
em
en
t, 
th
e 
pa
rt
ie
s 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
sh
al
l b
e 
bo
un
d 
to
 s
ub
m
it
 it
 to
 a
rb
itr
at
io
n 
un
de
r 
th
e 
A
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
R
ul
es
 o
f 
th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
N
at
io
ns
 
C
om
m
is
si
on
 o
n 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l T
ra
de
 L
aw
 a
s 
th
en
 in
 f
or
ce
. T
he
 p
ar
tie
s 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
m
ay
 
ag
re
e 
in
 w
ri
tin
g 
to
 m
od
if
y 
th
es
e 
R
ul
es
.
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P
ol
an
d 
07
.0
6.
19
88
 
08
.0
1.
19
89
 
A
rt
ic
le
 1
0 
N
/A
 
A
rt
ic
le
 1
0 
1.
 I
f 
an
 in
ve
st
or
 c
ha
lle
ng
es
 th
e 
am
ou
nt
 o
f 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
fo
r t
he
 e
xp
ro
pr
ia
te
d 
in
ve
st
m
en
t a
ss
et
s,
 h
e 
m
ay
 f
ile
 c
om
pl
ai
nt
 
w
it
h 
th
e 
co
m
pe
te
nt
 a
ut
ho
ri
ty
 o
f 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 ta
ki
ng
 th
e 
ex
pr
op
ri
at
or
y 
m
ea
su
re
s.
 I
f 
it
 is
 n
ot
 s
ol
ve
d 
w
ith
in
 o
ne
 y
ea
r 
af
te
r 
th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
nt
 is
 f
ile
d,
 th
e 
co
m
pe
te
nt
 
co
ur
t o
f 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 ta
ki
ng
 th
e 
ex
pr
op
ri
at
or
y 
m
ea
su
re
s 
or
 a
n 
ad
 h
oc
 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l s
ha
ll,
 u
po
n 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f t
he
 in
ve
st
or
, r
ev
ie
w
 th
e 
am
ou
nt
 
of
 c
om
pe
ns
at
io
n.
 
A
rt
ic
le
 1
0 
2.
 S
uc
h 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
rb
itr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 
sh
al
l b
e 
co
ns
ti
tu
te
d 
ca
se
 b
y 
ca
se
 a
s 
fo
llo
w
s:
 e
ac
h 
si
de
 s
ha
ll
 a
pp
oi
nt
 o
ne
 
m
em
be
r 
an
d 
th
es
e 
tw
o 
m
em
be
rs
 s
ha
ll 
ag
re
e 
up
on
 a
 n
at
io
na
l a
s 
th
ei
r C
ha
ir
m
an
, 
of
 a
 th
ir
d 
S
ta
te
 w
hi
ch
 h
as
 d
ip
lo
m
at
ic
re
la
ti
on
s 
w
it
h 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ti
es
. 
Su
ch
 m
em
be
rs
 s
ha
ll 
be
 a
pp
oi
nt
ed
 w
ith
in
 
tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 
in
fo
rm
ed
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
th
at
 
it
 in
te
nd
s 
to
 s
ub
m
it
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
to
 a
n 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
, a
nd
 s
uc
h 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 s
ha
ll
 
be
 a
pp
oi
nt
ed
 w
ith
in
 tw
o 
fu
rt
he
r 
m
on
th
s.
 
If
 th
e 
pe
ri
od
s 
sp
ec
if
ie
d 
in
 th
e 
ab
ov
e 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
ha
ve
 n
ot
 b
ee
n 
ob
se
rv
ed
, e
it
he
r 
si
de
 m
ay
 in
 a
bs
en
ce
 o
f 
an
y 
ot
he
r 
re
le
va
nt
 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
t i
nv
it
e 
th
e 
pr
es
id
en
t o
f 
th
e
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
. 
A
rt
ic
le
 1
0 
2.
 T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
l 
tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
es
ta
bl
is
h 
it
s 
ru
le
s 
of
 p
ro
ce
du
re
. 
N
/A
 
A
rt
ic
le
 1
0 
3.
 T
he
 d
ec
is
io
n 
sh
al
l b
e 
fi
na
l a
nd
bi
nd
in
g 
on
 b
ot
h 
si
de
s.
 
A
rt
ic
le
 1
0 
4.
 E
ac
h 
si
de
 s
ha
ll
 
be
ar
 th
e 
co
st
s 
of
 
its
 o
w
n 
m
em
be
r 
in
 
th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s,
 th
e 
co
st
s 
of
 th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
bo
rn
e 
I 
eq
ua
l p
ar
ts
 
by
 b
ot
h 
si
de
s.
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B
ul
ga
ri
a 
27
.0
6.
19
89
 
21
.0
8.
19
94
 
N
/A
 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
1.
 A
ny
 d
is
pu
te
 b
et
w
ee
n 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
St
at
e 
an
d 
th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 o
f t
he
 o
th
er
 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
S
ta
te
 c
on
ce
rn
in
g 
th
e 
am
ou
nt
 o
f 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
fo
r e
xp
ro
pr
ia
ti
on
 m
ay
 b
e 
su
bm
itt
ed
 to
 a
n 
ad
 h
oc
 a
rb
itr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
. 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
2.
 S
uc
h 
an
 a
rb
itr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
be
 
co
ns
tit
ut
ed
 f
or
 e
ac
h 
in
di
vi
du
al
 c
as
e 
in
 th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
w
ay
: e
ac
h 
pa
rt
y 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
sh
al
l a
pp
oi
nt
 a
n 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
, a
nd
 th
es
e 
tw
o 
sh
al
l s
el
ec
t a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
a 
th
ir
d 
st
at
e 
w
hi
ch
 h
as
 d
ip
lo
m
at
ic
 r
el
at
io
ns
 w
ith
 th
e 
tw
o 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 S
ta
te
s 
as
 c
ha
ir
m
an
. T
he
 
fi
rs
t t
w
o 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l b
e 
ap
po
in
te
d 
w
ith
in
 tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
of
 th
e 
w
ri
tt
en
 n
ot
ic
e 
fo
r 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
by
 e
ith
er
 p
ar
ty
 to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
to
 th
e 
ot
he
r,
 a
nd
 th
e 
ch
ai
rm
an
 b
e 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
3.
 T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 
sh
al
l d
et
er
m
in
e 
it
s 
ow
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e,
 
ap
pl
yi
ng
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
ru
le
s 
of
 
th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
N
at
io
ns
 
C
om
m
is
si
on
 f
or
 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
T
ra
de
 L
aw
 
(U
N
C
IT
R
A
L
) 
O
F 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
5.
 T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 
sh
al
l a
dj
ud
ic
at
e 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e
w
it
h 
th
e 
la
w
s 
of
 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
St
at
e 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
ac
ce
pt
in
g 
th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
it
s 
ru
le
s 
on
 th
e 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
4.
 T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 
sh
al
l r
ea
ch
 it
s 
de
ci
si
on
 b
y 
a 
m
aj
or
it
y 
of
 v
ot
es
. 
Su
ch
 d
ec
is
io
n 
sh
al
l b
e 
fi
na
l a
nd
 
bi
nd
in
g 
on
 b
ot
h 
pa
rt
ie
s 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e.
 B
ot
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
St
at
es
 s
ha
ll 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
6.
 E
ac
h 
pa
rt
y 
to
 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
sh
al
l 
be
ar
 th
e 
co
st
 o
f 
it
s 
ap
po
in
te
d 
m
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
tr
ib
un
al
 a
nd
 
of
 it
s 
re
pr
es
en
ta
ti
on
 in
 
th
e 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s.
 
T
he
 c
os
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
ap
po
in
te
d 
ch
ai
rm
an
 a
nd
 th
e 
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A
m
ic
ab
le
 
Se
tt
le
m
en
t 
F
or
u
m
 S
el
ec
ti
on
 
C
on
st
it
ut
io
n
 o
f 
T
ri
b
un
al
s 
A
p
p
li
ca
bl
e 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 
R
u
le
s 
A
p
pl
ic
ab
le
 
L
aw
 
D
ec
is
io
n 
M
ak
in
g 
an
d 
E
nf
or
ce
m
en
t  
C
os
t 
A
ll
oc
at
io
n  
se
le
ct
ed
 w
ith
in
 f
ou
r 
m
on
th
s.
 I
f 
w
ith
in
 th
e 
pe
ri
od
 s
pe
ci
fi
ed
 a
bo
ve
, t
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 h
as
 
no
t b
ee
n 
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A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
2.
 I
f 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
is
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n,
 th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 a
nd
 th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
ca
n 
re
fe
r 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
to
: 
(1
) 
an
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
rb
it
ra
to
r 
ba
se
d 
on
 
pa
rt
ie
s’
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t; 
(2
) 
a 
sp
ec
ia
l t
ri
bu
na
l b
as
ed
 o
n 
pa
rt
ie
s’
 
ag
re
em
en
t; 
(3
) 
an
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
d 
ho
c 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
un
de
r t
he
 A
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
R
ul
es
 o
f 
th
e 
un
it
ed
 N
at
io
ns
 C
om
m
is
si
on
 o
n 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l T
ra
de
 L
aw
 (
U
N
C
IT
R
A
L
) 
 
(4
) 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
en
tr
e 
fo
r 
Se
tt
le
m
en
t 
of
 I
nv
es
tm
en
t D
is
pu
te
s 
in
 th
e 
ca
se
 b
ot
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ti
es
 h
av
e 
be
co
m
e 
m
em
be
rs
 
of
 th
e 
W
as
hi
ng
to
n 
D
.C
. C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
of
 1
8 
M
ar
ch
 1
96
5 
on
 th
e 
Se
tt
le
m
en
t o
f 
In
ve
st
m
en
ts
 D
is
pu
te
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
St
at
es
 a
nd
 
N
at
io
na
ls
 o
f t
he
 O
th
er
 S
ta
te
s.
 
(A
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 U
N
C
IT
R
A
L
 A
rb
itr
at
io
n 
R
ul
es
, o
r 
IC
S
ID
 C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
an
d 
IC
S
ID
 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 R
ul
es
, o
r 
ot
he
r 
A
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
R
ul
es
 a
gr
ee
d 
by
 p
ar
tie
s)
 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
3.
 I
f 
no
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t 
ca
n 
be
 r
ea
ch
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
ap
pl
ic
ab
le
 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e 
af
te
r 
th
re
e 
m
on
th
s 
th
e
di
sp
ut
e 
w
as
 
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n,
 p
ar
tie
s 
sh
al
l r
ef
er
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
to
 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 th
e
cu
rr
en
t v
er
si
on
 o
f 
th
e 
U
N
C
IT
R
A
L
 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 R
ul
es
. 
T
he
 A
rb
itr
at
io
n 
R
ul
es
 c
an
 b
e 
am
en
de
d 
by
 
pa
rt
ie
s’
 w
ri
tt
en
 
ag
re
em
en
t. 
(A
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 
U
N
C
IT
R
A
L
 
A
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
R
ul
es
, o
r 
IC
S
ID
 
C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
an
d 
IC
S
ID
 
A
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
R
ul
es
, o
r 
ot
he
r 
A
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
R
ul
es
 a
gr
ee
d 
by
 
pa
rt
ie
s)
 
(A
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 
U
N
C
IT
R
A
L
 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 
R
ul
es
, o
r 
IC
S
ID
 
C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
an
d 
IC
S
ID
 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 
R
ul
es
, o
r 
ot
he
r 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 R
ul
es
 
ag
re
ed
 b
y 
pa
rt
ie
s)
 
(A
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 
U
N
C
IT
R
A
L
 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 R
ul
es
, 
or
 I
C
S
ID
 
C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
an
d 
IC
S
ID
 A
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
R
ul
es
, o
r 
ot
he
r 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 R
ul
es
 
ag
re
ed
 b
y 
pa
rt
ie
s)
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A
rt
ic
le
 1
0 
1.
 D
is
pu
te
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
an
 
in
ve
st
or
 o
f 
a 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
pa
rt
y 
an
d 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 a
n 
ob
lig
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
le
tte
r u
nd
er
 th
is
 
A
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
in
 
re
la
tio
n 
to
 a
n 
in
ve
st
m
en
t o
f 
th
e 
fo
rm
er
, s
ha
ll,
 a
s 
fa
r 
as
 p
os
si
bl
e,
 b
e 
se
tt
le
d 
by
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
in
g 
pa
rt
ie
s 
in
 a
n 
am
ic
ab
le
 
w
ay
. 
A
rt
ic
le
 1
0 
2.
 I
f 
su
ch
 d
is
pu
te
s 
ca
nn
ot
 b
e 
se
ttl
ed
 w
ith
in
 
si
x 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 e
th
er
 p
ar
ty
 
re
qu
es
te
d 
am
ic
ab
le
 s
et
tl
em
en
t, 
th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 
co
nc
er
ne
d 
m
ay
 s
ub
m
it
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
ei
th
er
 to
 
th
e 
co
m
pe
te
nt
 c
ou
rt
 o
f 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 
Pa
rt
y,
 o
r 
to
 a
n 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
tr
ib
un
al
 if
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
co
nc
er
ns
 th
e 
am
ou
nt
 
of
 c
om
pe
ns
at
io
n 
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 in
 A
rt
. 4
 
(E
xp
ro
pr
ia
ti
on
).
 A
ny
 o
th
er
 d
is
pu
te
 b
et
w
ee
n 
an
 in
ve
st
or
 a
nd
 a
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y,
 m
ay
 b
e 
su
bm
itt
ed
 to
 a
n 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
tr
ib
un
al
, o
nl
y 
by
 m
ut
ua
l c
on
se
nt
. E
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 h
er
ew
ith
 d
ec
la
re
s 
its
 
ac
ce
pt
an
ce
 o
f 
su
ch
 a
n 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
 
4.
 I
n 
th
e 
ca
se
 b
ot
h 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ti
es
 h
av
e 
be
co
m
e 
m
em
be
rs
 o
f 
th
e 
W
as
hi
ng
to
n 
D
.C
. 
C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
of
 1
8 
M
ar
ch
 1
96
5 
on
 th
e 
Se
tt
le
m
en
t o
f 
In
ve
st
m
en
ts
 D
is
pu
te
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
St
at
es
 a
nd
 N
at
io
na
ls
 o
f 
th
e 
O
th
er
 S
ta
te
s,
 
di
sp
ut
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
ei
th
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
an
d 
th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 o
f 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 
Pa
rt
y 
un
de
r 
th
e 
fi
rs
t p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 o
f 
th
is
 
A
rt
ic
le
 m
ay
, b
y 
m
ut
ua
l c
on
se
nt
 b
e 
su
bm
itt
ed
 f
or
 s
et
tl
em
en
t b
y 
co
nc
ili
at
io
n 
or
 
A
rt
ic
le
 1
0 
2.
 I
n 
th
e 
la
tte
r 
ca
se
, t
he
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
of
 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
, p
ar
, 3
-3
 s
ha
ll 
be
 a
pp
li
ed
 
m
ut
at
is
 m
ut
an
di
s.
 N
ev
er
th
el
es
s 
th
e 
se
cr
et
ar
y 
G
en
er
al
 o
f 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
C
en
tr
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
se
ttl
em
en
t o
f i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
D
is
pu
te
s 
sh
al
l b
e 
in
vi
te
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
…
 
A
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le
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3.
 T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
be
 
co
ns
tit
ut
ed
 a
d 
ho
c 
as
 f
ol
lo
w
s.
 E
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
sh
al
l a
pp
oi
nt
 o
ne
 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
 a
nd
 th
es
e 
tw
o 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l 
ag
re
e 
up
on
 a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
a 
th
ir
d 
St
at
e 
as
 
ch
ai
rm
an
. T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
to
rs
 s
ha
ll 
be
 
ap
po
in
te
d 
w
it
hi
n 
th
re
e 
m
on
th
s,
 th
e 
ch
ai
rm
an
 w
ith
in
 f
iv
e 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
n 
w
hi
ch
 e
ith
er
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
ha
s 
in
fo
rm
ed
 th
e 
ot
he
r C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
th
at
 it
 in
te
nd
s 
to
 s
ub
m
it
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
to
 a
n 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
tr
ib
un
al
. 
A
rt
ic
le
 1
0 
2…
 w
he
re
as
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
tr
ib
un
al
 
sh
al
l d
et
er
m
in
e 
it
s 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e 
by
 
ap
pl
yi
ng
 th
e 
U
N
C
IT
R
A
L
, 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 R
ul
es
, 
as
 th
en
 in
 f
or
ce
. 
A
rt
ic
le
 1
0 
2.
 T
he
 a
w
ar
d 
sh
al
l b
e 
bu
il
di
ng
 a
nd
 
en
fo
rc
ed
 in
 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 
w
it
h 
do
m
es
tic
 
la
w
. 
A
rt
ic
le
 1
0 
3.
 D
ur
in
g 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
or
 th
e 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t o
f 
an
 a
w
ar
d,
 th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
sh
al
l n
ot
 
ra
is
e 
th
e 
ob
je
ct
io
n 
th
at
 th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 o
f 
th
e 
ot
he
r C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
ha
s 
re
ce
iv
ed
 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
un
de
r a
n 
in
su
ra
nc
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
 in
 
re
sp
ec
t o
f 
al
l p
ar
t 
of
 th
e 
da
m
ag
e.
 
(A
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 th
e 
ap
pl
ic
ab
le
 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
ru
le
s)
 
10
51
 O
nl
y 
th
e 
C
hi
ne
se
 v
er
si
on
 a
nd
 th
e 
S
pa
ni
sh
 v
er
si
on
 o
f 
th
is
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t a
re
 a
va
il
ab
le
. T
he
 E
ng
li
sh
 tr
an
sl
at
io
n 
he
re
 w
as
 d
on
e 
by
 th
e 
au
th
or
 w
it
h 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
to
 o
th
er
 C
hi
na
’s
 o
th
er
 
II
A
s.
  
264
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E
U
 
M
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S
ta
te
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D
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48
 
A
m
ic
ab
le
 
Se
tt
le
m
en
t 
F
or
u
m
 S
el
ec
ti
on
 
C
on
st
it
ut
io
n
 o
f 
T
ri
b
un
al
s 
A
p
p
li
ca
bl
e 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 
R
u
le
s 
A
p
pl
ic
ab
le
 
L
aw
 
D
ec
is
io
n 
M
ak
in
g 
an
d 
E
nf
or
ce
m
en
t  
C
os
t 
A
ll
oc
at
io
n  
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
to
 th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
en
tr
e 
fo
r 
Se
tt
le
m
en
t o
f 
In
ve
st
m
en
t D
is
pu
te
s.
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1.
 A
ny
 d
is
pu
te
 
be
tw
ee
n 
an
 
in
ve
st
or
 o
f 
on
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
an
d 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
in
 c
on
ne
ct
io
n 
w
it
h 
an
 in
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
th
e 
te
rr
ito
ry
 o
f 
th
e 
ot
he
r C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
sh
al
l, 
as
 f
ar
 
as
 p
os
si
bl
e,
 b
e 
se
tt
le
d 
am
ic
ab
ly
 
th
ro
ug
h 
ne
go
ti
at
io
ns
 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
pa
rt
ie
s 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e.
 
A
rt
ic
le
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2.
 I
f 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
ca
nn
ot
 b
e 
se
tt
le
d 
th
ro
ug
h 
ne
go
ti
at
io
ns
 w
ith
in
 s
ix
 m
on
th
s,
 e
ith
er
 p
ar
ty
 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
sh
al
l b
e 
en
tit
le
d 
to
 s
ub
m
it
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
to
 th
e 
co
m
pe
te
nt
 c
ou
rt
 o
f 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 a
cc
ep
tin
g 
th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t. 
3.
 I
f 
a 
di
sp
ut
e 
in
vo
lv
in
g 
th
e 
am
ou
nt
 o
f 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
fo
r e
xp
ro
pr
ia
ti
on
 c
an
no
t b
e 
se
ttl
ed
 w
ith
in
 s
ix
 m
on
th
s 
af
te
r 
re
so
rt
 to
 
ne
go
ti
at
io
ns
 a
s 
sp
ec
if
ie
d 
in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 1
 o
f 
th
is
 A
rt
ic
le
, i
t m
ay
 b
e 
su
bm
itt
ed
 a
t t
he
 
re
qu
es
t o
f e
ith
er
 p
ar
ty
 to
 a
n 
ad
 h
oc
 a
rb
it
ra
l 
tr
ib
un
al
. T
he
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
of
 th
is
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 
sh
al
l n
ot
 a
pp
ly
 if
 th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 c
on
ce
rn
ed
 h
as
 
re
so
rt
ed
 to
 th
e 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e 
sp
ec
if
ie
d 
in
 th
e 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
2 
of
 th
is
 A
rt
ic
le
. 
A
rt
ic
le
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4.
 S
uc
h 
an
 a
rb
itr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
be
 
co
ns
tit
ut
ed
 f
or
 e
ac
h 
in
di
vi
du
al
 c
as
e 
in
 th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
w
ay
: e
ac
h 
pa
rt
y 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
sh
al
l a
pp
oi
nt
 a
n 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
, a
nd
 th
es
e 
tw
o 
sh
al
l s
el
ec
t a
 n
at
io
na
l o
f 
a 
th
ir
d 
St
at
e 
w
hi
ch
 h
as
 d
ip
lo
m
at
ic
 r
el
at
io
ns
 w
ith
 th
e 
tw
o 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ti
es
 a
s 
C
ha
ir
m
an
. 
T
he
 f
ir
st
 tw
o 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l b
e 
ap
po
in
te
d 
w
it
hi
n 
tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
of
 th
e 
w
ri
tt
en
 n
ot
ic
e 
fo
r 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
by
 e
it
he
r 
pa
rt
y 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
to
 th
e 
ot
he
r,
 a
nd
 th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 b
e 
se
le
ct
ed
 w
it
hi
n 
fo
ur
 
m
on
th
s.
 If
 w
it
hi
n 
th
e 
pe
ri
od
 s
pe
ci
fi
ed
 
ab
ov
e,
 th
e 
tr
ib
un
al
 h
as
 n
ot
 b
ee
n 
co
ns
tit
ut
ed
, e
ith
er
 p
ar
ty
 to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
m
ay
 in
vi
te
 S
ec
re
ta
ry
 G
en
er
al
 o
f 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
en
te
r 
fo
r 
Se
ttl
em
en
t o
f 
In
ve
st
m
en
t D
is
pu
te
s 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
. 
A
rt
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le
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5.
 T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 
sh
al
l d
et
er
m
in
e 
it
s 
ow
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
 
H
ow
ev
er
, t
he
 
tr
ib
un
al
 m
ay
, i
n 
th
e 
co
ur
se
 o
f 
de
te
rm
in
at
io
n 
of
 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e,
 ta
ke
 a
s 
gu
id
an
ce
 th
e 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 R
ul
es
 
of
 th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
C
en
te
r 
fo
r 
Se
tt
le
m
en
t o
f 
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
D
is
pu
te
s.
 
A
rt
ic
le
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7.
 T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 
sh
al
l a
dj
ud
ic
at
e 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e
w
it
h 
th
e 
la
w
 o
f 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
ac
ce
pt
in
g 
th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
it
s 
ru
le
s 
on
 th
e 
co
nf
lic
t o
f 
la
w
s,
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t 
as
 w
el
l a
s 
th
e 
ge
ne
ra
lly
 
re
co
gn
iz
ed
 
pr
in
ci
pl
e 
of
 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
la
w
 a
cc
ep
te
d 
by
bo
th
 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s.
 
A
rt
ic
le
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6.
 T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 
sh
al
l r
ea
ch
 it
s 
de
ci
si
on
 b
y 
a 
m
aj
or
it
y 
of
 v
ot
es
.
Su
ch
 d
ec
is
io
n 
sh
al
l b
e 
fi
na
l a
nd
 
bi
nd
in
g 
on
 b
ot
h 
pa
rt
ie
s 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e.
 B
ot
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
sh
al
l 
co
m
m
it 
th
em
se
lv
es
 to
 th
e 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t o
f 
th
e 
de
ci
si
on
 in
 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
ith
 
th
ei
r 
re
sp
ec
tiv
e 
do
m
es
tic
 la
w
. 
A
rt
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le
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8.
 E
ac
h 
pa
rt
y 
to
 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
sh
al
l 
be
ar
 th
e 
co
st
 o
f 
it
s 
ap
po
in
te
d 
m
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
tr
ib
un
al
 a
nd
 
of
 it
s 
re
pr
es
en
ta
ti
on
 in
 
th
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9.3.2.2 Stage Two: 1997-2009 
During 1997-2009, four new BITs were concluded and seven BITs were updated 
between China and EU Member States. Compared to stage one, in line with the overall 
development of China’s BITs, two big changes took place in these 11 treaties related 
to investor-state DSMs: the elimination of the restrictions on the subject matter of 
investor-state arbitration and the adoption of ICSID arbitration. These two changes are 
in line with the corresponding provisions in the China Model BIT (1997).  
In general, as in the BITs concluded in Stage One, both amicable and adjudicative 
DSMs are provided for ISDS, which are introduced in the following. More details of 
relevant treaty provisions contained in these 11 BITs are provided in TABLE 9.3.2.2. 
(i) Amicable Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
Different from the Stage One, amicable settlement through negotiation is expressly 
mentioned in each of these 11 BITs. These provisions often state that disputes 
concerning investment between a treaty party and an investor of the other treaty party 
“shall, as far as possible, be settled amicably through negotiations between the parties 
to the dispute”.1052 Variations exist on three points. First, “legal dispute” instead of 
“dispute” is used in the China-Cyprus BIT (2001), the China-Latvia BIT (2004) and 
the China-BLEU BIT (2005),1053 although no definition is given to either term. Second, 
the China-Germany BIT (2003), the China-Finland BIT (2004) and the China-Portugal 
BIT (2005) use the word “should” instead of “shall”.1054 Third, a notification from the 
investor in writing to the host state is required as the signal that the dispute settlement 
process is being initiated in China’s BITs with Spain, the BLEU and Malta.1055 Of 
particular note here is that, in the China-Malta BIT (2009), the written notification shall 
be made to both the host state and the home state.1056 In addition to negotiation, in 
particular, the China-the Netherlands BIT (2001) mentions ICSID conciliation1057 and 
the China-BLEU BIT (2005) states the possibility of “seeking expert advice from a 
third party, or by conciliation between the Contracting Parties through diplomatic 
channels”.1058 In addition, a minimum time requirement of six months is stipulated in 
most of these BITs for going through amicable settlement.1059 
(ii) Adjudicative Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
If no settlement agreement can be reached, an investor may refer the dispute to the 
competent court of the host state or an international forum, which may require that local 
1052 See e.g. the China-Cyprus BIT (2001), Art. 9.1. 
1053 The China-Cyprus BIT (2001), Art. 9.1; the China-Latvia BIT (2004), Art. 9.1; the China-BLEU BIT (2005), 
Art. 8.1. 
1054 The China-Germany BIT (2003), Art. 9 (1); the China-Finland BIT (2004), Art. 9.1; the China-Portugal BIT 
(2005), Art. 9.1. 
1055 The China-Spain BIT (2005), Art. 9.1; the China-BLEU BIT (2005), Art. 8.1; the China-Malta BIT (2009), Art. 
9.1. 
1056 The China-Malta BIT (2009), Art. 9.1. 
1057 The China-the Netherlands BIT (2001), Art. 10.3. 
1058 The China-BLEU BIT (2005), Art. 8.1. 
1059 See e.g. the China-BLEU BIT (2005), Art. 8.2. An exception here is the China-Finland BIT (2004), where three 
months is required. See: the China-Finland BIT (2004), Art. 9.2. 
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remedies are exhausted.1060 Regarding international fora, a key feature of these 11 
BITs is that ICSID is provided as an option in each of them in addition to ad hoc 
arbitration, which reflects China’s new membership of the ICSID Convention since 
1993. In addition, the restriction on the subject matter of disputes about compensation 
for expropriation is eliminated. As a result, in the currently effective 26 BITs between 
China and EU Member States, there are various provisions on the jurisdiction of 
international arbitration, which can be divided into three categories: (i) only disputes 
about compensation for expropriation can be submitted to international arbitration;1061 
(ii) only disputes about compensation for expropriation and other disputes agreed by
disputing parties can be submitted to international arbitration;1062 (iii) any investment
dispute is eligible to be referred to international arbitration.1063
Under most BITs, the choice among available internal and international fora is final. 
Some BITs made a differentiation between the choice of international arbitration and 
that of the competent court of the host state: the former is final, while the latter is not. 
Namely, an investor that chooses a domestic court can withdraw the filing and then 
refer the dispute to international arbitration.1064 In addition, some BITs set another 
precondition for using international arbitration: the host state may require the investor 
concerned to exhaust “the domestic administrative review procedure specified by the 
laws and regulations of that Contracting Party” before the dispute can be submitted to 
international arbitration.1065 
Regarding international arbitration proceedings, these 11 BITs often provide two 
options, ICSID and ad hoc arbitration. If ICSID is chosen, the ICSID Convention and 
its arbitration rules will apply. When the dispute settlement process is under ad hoc 
arbitration, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are often suggested or even required.1066 
It is likely that these two sets of arbitration rules already contain comprehensive 
procedural regulations, because many of these BITs do not set out rules on issues such 
as the constitution of tribunals, decision making and cost allocation. Not all BITs 
concluded at this stage touch upon the issue of applicable law. Where it is regulated, 
the law of the host state, the provisions of the BIT at issue and generally recognized 
principles of international law are provided.1067 While the China-Romania BIT (1994) 
does not include any provision on the enforcement of awards, all the other 10 BITs 
1060 See e.g. the China-BLEU BIT (2005), Protocol, Ad Art. 8. 
1061 This category includes the China-Denmark BIT (1985), the China-Italy BIT (1985), the China-Austria BIT 
(1985), the China-United Kingdom BIT (1986), the China-Poland BIT (1988), the China-Hungary BIT (1991), the 
China-Croatia BIT (1993), the China-Estonia BIT (1993), and the China-Slovenia BIT (1993). 
1062 This category includes the China-Greece BIT (1992) and the China-Lithuania BIT (1993). 
1063 This category includes the China-Bulgaria BIT (1989), the China- Czech and Slovak BIT (2005), the China-
Romania BIT (1994), the China-Cyprus BIT (2001), the China-the Netherlands BIT (2001), the China-Germany BIT 
(2003), the China-Finland BIT (2004), the China-Latvia BIT (2004), the China-Sweden BIT Amendment Protocol 
(2004), the China-BLEU BIT (2005), the China-Czech Republic BIT (2005), the China-Portugal BIT (2005), the 
China-Spain BIT (2005), the China-France BIT (2007), and the China-Malta BIT (2009). 
1064 See e.g. the China-Czech Republic BIT (2005), Art. 9.4. In particular, under the China-Netherlands BIT (2001), 
Art. 10.2 provides that “[i]f a dispute concerns an investment in the territory of the Kingdom of the Netherlands an 
investor may choose to submit a dispute to international dispute settlement at any time”. Thus, even successful 
withdrawing from a domestic court seems to be unnecessary.  
1065 See e.g. the China-Cyprus BIT (2001), Art. 9.2. 
1066 See e.g. the China-Portugal BIT (2005), Art. 9.2. 
1067 See e.g. the China-Spain BIT (2005), Art. 9.3. 
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incorporate articles stipulating that arbitration awards shall be final and binding upon 
parties to the dispute, and treaty parties shall commit themselves to the enforcement of 
the award.1068
1068 See e.g. the China-Malta BIT (2009), Art. 9.5.  
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th
e 
tw
o 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
as
 th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
. 
T
he
 f
ir
st
 tw
o 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s 
sh
al
l b
e
ap
po
in
te
d 
w
it
hi
n 
tw
o 
m
on
th
s 
of
 th
e 
w
ri
tt
en
 n
ot
ic
e 
fo
r a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 b
y 
ei
th
er
 
pa
rt
y 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
to
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
an
d 
th
e 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 s
ha
ll 
be
 s
el
ec
te
d 
w
it
hi
n 
fo
ur
 
m
on
th
s.
 I
f,
 w
ith
in
 th
e 
pe
ri
od
 s
pe
ci
fi
ed
 
ab
ov
e,
 th
e 
tr
ib
un
al
 h
as
 n
ot
 b
ee
n 
co
ns
tit
ut
ed
, e
ith
er
 p
ar
ty
 to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
m
ay
 in
vi
te
 th
e 
S
ec
re
ta
ry
 G
en
er
al
 o
f 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
en
te
r 
fo
r 
Se
ttl
em
en
t o
f 
In
ve
st
m
en
t D
is
pu
te
s 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
. 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
5.
 T
he
 a
d-
ho
c 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 
sh
al
l d
et
er
m
in
e 
it
s 
ow
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
 
H
ow
ev
er
, t
he
 
tr
ib
un
al
 m
ay
, i
n 
th
e 
co
ur
se
 o
f 
de
te
rm
in
at
io
n 
of
 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e,
 ta
ke
 a
s 
gu
id
an
ce
 th
e 
A
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 R
ul
es
 
of
 I
nt
er
na
tio
na
l 
C
en
te
r 
fo
r 
Se
ttl
em
en
t o
f 
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
D
is
pu
te
s.
 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
7.
 T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 in
 
Pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
3(
a)
 
an
d 
(b
) 
of
 th
is
 
A
rt
ic
le
 s
ha
ll
 
ad
ju
di
ca
te
 in
 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 
w
ith
 th
e 
la
w
 o
f 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
ac
ce
pt
in
g 
th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
it
s 
ru
le
s 
on
 th
e 
co
nf
li
ct
 o
f 
la
w
s,
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t 
as
 w
el
l a
s 
th
e 
ge
ne
ra
lly
 
re
co
gn
iz
ed
 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 o
f 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
la
w
. 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
6.
 T
he
 tr
ib
un
al
 
sh
al
l r
ea
ch
 it
s 
de
ci
si
on
 b
y 
a 
m
aj
or
it
y 
of
 
vo
te
s.
 S
uc
h 
de
ci
si
on
 s
ha
ll 
be
 
fi
na
l a
nd
 b
in
di
ng
 
up
on
 b
ot
h 
pa
rt
ie
s 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e.
 
B
ot
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
sh
al
l 
co
m
m
it 
th
em
se
lv
es
 to
 th
e 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t o
f 
th
e 
aw
ar
d.
 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
8.
 E
ac
h 
Pa
rt
y 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
sh
al
l b
ea
r 
th
e 
co
st
s 
of
 it
s 
ap
po
in
te
d 
m
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 a
nd
 
of
 it
s 
re
pr
es
en
ta
ti
on
 
in
 th
e 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
s.
 
T
he
 c
os
t o
f 
th
e 
ap
po
in
te
d 
C
ha
ir
m
an
 a
nd
 th
e 
re
m
ai
ni
ng
 c
os
ts
 
sh
al
l b
e 
bo
rn
e 
in
 
eq
ua
l p
ar
ts
 b
y 
th
e 
pa
rt
ie
s 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e.
 
2 
N
et
he
rl
a
nd
s-
In
 
fo
rc
e 
26
.1
1.
20
01
 
01
.0
8.
20
04
 
A
rt
ic
le
 1
0 
1)
 D
is
pu
te
s 
w
hi
ch
 
m
ig
ht
 a
ri
se
 b
et
w
ee
n 
on
e 
of
 th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
an
d 
an
 in
ve
st
or
 
of
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 
A
rt
ic
le
 1
0 
2)
 A
n 
in
ve
st
or
 m
ay
 d
ec
id
e 
to
 s
ub
m
it
 a
 
di
sp
ut
e 
to
 a
 c
om
pe
te
nt
 d
om
es
ti
c 
co
ur
t. 
In
 
ca
se
 a
 le
ga
l d
is
pu
te
 c
on
ce
rn
in
g 
an
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
th
e 
te
rr
ito
ry
 o
f 
th
e 
Pe
op
le
’s
 
R
ep
ub
lic
 o
f 
C
hi
na
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
su
bm
it
te
d 
to
 a
 
co
m
pe
te
nt
 d
om
es
ti
c 
co
ur
t, 
th
is
 d
is
pu
te
 m
ay
 
A
rt
ic
le
 1
0 
4)
 T
he
 a
d 
ho
c 
tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
de
ci
de
 a
 
di
sp
ut
e 
in
 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 
w
ith
 s
uc
h 
ru
le
s 
A
rt
ic
le
 1
0 
5)
 T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
l 
aw
ar
ds
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
fi
na
l a
nd
 b
in
di
ng
 
on
 b
ot
h 
pa
rt
ie
s 
to
 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e.
 
10
69
 S
ou
rc
e 
of
 d
at
a:
 I
nt
er
na
tio
na
l 
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
A
gr
ee
m
en
ts
 N
av
ig
at
or
_C
hi
na
, 
U
ni
te
d 
N
at
io
ns
 C
on
fe
re
nc
e 
on
 T
ra
de
 a
nd
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
(U
N
C
TA
D
),
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
: 
ht
tp
:/
/in
ve
st
m
en
tp
ol
ic
yh
ub
.u
nc
ta
d.
or
g/
II
A
/C
ou
nt
ry
B
its
/4
2#
ii
aI
nn
er
M
en
u,
 l
as
t 
vi
si
te
d 
on
 0
5.
01
.2
01
9.
 T
hi
s 
ha
s 
be
en
 p
ar
tl
y 
cr
os
s-
ch
ec
ke
d 
ba
se
d 
on
 th
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
pu
bl
is
he
d 
on
 th
e 
of
fi
ci
al
 w
eb
si
te
 o
f 
th
e 
M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 C
om
m
er
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
P
eo
pl
e’
s 
R
ep
ub
lic
 o
f 
C
hi
na
 (
M
O
F
C
O
M
),
 s
ee
: D
ep
ar
tm
en
t o
f 
T
re
at
y 
an
d 
L
aw
 M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 
C
om
m
er
ce
 
of
 
th
e 
Pe
op
le
's
 
R
ep
ub
li
c 
of
 
C
hi
na
, 
Li
st
 
of
 
B
il
at
er
al
 
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
Tr
ea
tie
s 
co
nc
lu
de
d 
by
 
C
hi
na
 
我
国
对
外
签
订
双
边
投
资
协
定
一
览
表
 
(0
8.
11
.2
01
1)
, 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
at
: 
ht
tp
://
tf
s.
m
of
co
m
.g
ov
.c
n/
ar
ti
cl
e/
N
oc
at
eg
or
y/
20
11
11
/2
01
11
10
78
19
47
4.
sh
tm
l, 
la
st
 v
is
ite
d 
on
 0
5.
01
.2
01
9.
 In
 a
dd
iti
on
, o
ne
 m
or
e 
B
IT
s,
 C
hi
na
-S
oc
ia
lis
t R
ep
ub
lic
 o
f 
R
om
an
ia
 B
IT
 (1
98
3)
, w
as
 a
dd
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
au
th
or
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ga
th
er
ed
 
fr
om
: N
or
ah
 G
al
la
gh
er
 &
 W
en
hu
a 
Sh
an
, C
hi
ne
se
 I
nv
es
tm
en
t T
re
at
ie
s 
--
 P
ol
ic
ie
s 
an
d 
P
ra
ct
ic
e,
 O
xf
or
d 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 P
re
ss
, 2
00
9,
 p
p.
 3
8,
 4
17
. T
hi
s 
ta
bl
e 
is
 o
rd
er
ed
 c
hr
on
ol
og
ic
al
ly
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
si
gn
in
g 
da
te
s.
 
10
70
 S
ig
ni
ng
 d
at
es
 a
nd
 e
ff
ec
ti
ve
 d
at
es
. 
 
271
 
N o.
 
E
U
 
M
em
be
r 
St
at
es
 
D
at
es
10
70
 
A
m
ic
ab
le
 
Se
tt
le
m
en
t 
Ju
ri
sd
ic
ti
on
 
C
on
st
it
ut
io
n
 o
f 
T
ri
b
un
al
s 
A
pp
lic
ab
le
 
R
ul
es
 
A
pp
lic
ab
le
 
L
aw
 
D
ec
is
io
n 
an
d 
E
nf
or
ce
m
en
t  
C
os
ts
 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 a
n 
in
ve
st
m
en
t o
f 
th
at
 
in
ve
st
or
 in
 th
e 
te
rr
it
or
y 
of
 th
e 
fo
rm
er
 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 
sh
al
l, 
w
he
ne
ve
r 
po
ss
ib
le
, b
e 
se
ttl
ed
 
am
ic
ab
ly
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
co
nc
er
ne
d.
 
be
 s
ub
m
it
te
d 
to
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l d
is
pu
te
 
se
ttl
em
en
t, 
on
 th
e 
co
nd
iti
on
 th
at
 th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 c
on
ce
rn
ed
 h
as
 w
it
hd
ra
w
n 
it
s 
ca
se
 
fr
om
 th
e 
do
m
es
tic
 c
ou
rt
. I
f 
a 
di
sp
ut
e 
co
nc
er
ns
 a
n 
in
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
th
e 
te
rr
it
or
y 
of
 
th
e 
K
in
gd
om
 o
f 
th
e 
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
 a
n 
in
ve
st
or
 
m
ay
 c
ho
os
e 
to
 s
ub
m
it
 a
 d
is
pu
te
 to
 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l d
is
pu
te
 s
et
tle
m
en
t a
t a
ny
 ti
m
e.
 
3)
 If
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
ha
s 
no
t b
ee
n 
se
tt
le
d 
am
ic
ab
ly
 w
it
hi
n 
a 
pe
ri
od
 o
f 
si
x 
m
on
th
s,
 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 e
ith
er
 p
ar
ty
 to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
re
qu
es
te
d 
am
ic
ab
le
 s
et
tle
m
en
t, 
ea
ch
 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 g
iv
es
 it
s 
un
co
nd
iti
on
al
 
co
ns
en
t t
o 
su
bm
it
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
at
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t 
of
 th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 c
on
ce
rn
ed
 to
: 
a)
 th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
en
tr
e 
fo
r 
Se
tt
le
m
en
t o
f 
In
ve
st
m
en
t D
is
pu
te
s,
 f
or
 s
et
tl
em
en
t b
y 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
or
 c
on
ci
li
at
io
n 
un
de
r 
th
e 
C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
on
 th
e 
Se
ttl
em
en
t o
f 
In
ve
st
m
en
t D
is
pu
te
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
St
at
es
 a
nd
 
N
at
io
na
ls
 o
f 
ot
he
r 
S
ta
te
s,
 o
pe
ne
d 
fo
r 
si
gn
at
ur
e 
at
 W
as
hi
ng
to
n 
on
 1
8 
M
ar
ch
 1
96
5;
 
or
 
b)
 a
n 
ad
 h
oc
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l, 
un
le
ss
 
ot
he
rw
is
e 
ag
re
ed
 u
po
n 
by
 th
e 
pa
rt
ie
s 
to
 th
e
di
sp
ut
e,
 to
 b
e 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
un
de
r 
th
e 
A
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
R
ul
es
 o
f 
th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
N
at
io
ns
 
C
om
m
is
si
on
 o
n 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l T
ra
de
 L
aw
 
(U
N
C
IT
R
A
L
).
 
of
 la
w
 a
s 
m
ay
 
be
 a
gr
ee
d 
by
 
th
e 
pa
rt
ie
s.
 I
n 
ab
se
nc
e 
of
 s
uc
h 
ag
re
em
en
t t
he
 
tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
ap
pl
y 
th
e 
la
w
 
of
 th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
(i
nc
lu
di
ng
 it
s 
ru
le
s 
on
 th
e 
co
nf
li
ct
 o
f 
la
w
s)
, t
he
 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t 
an
d 
su
ch
 r
ul
es
 
of
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
la
w
 a
s 
m
ay
 b
e 
ap
pl
ic
ab
le
. 
3 
G
er
m
an
y
-I
n
 f
or
ce
 
01
.1
2.
20
03
 
11
.1
1.
20
05
 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
(1
) 
A
ny
 d
is
pu
te
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 b
et
w
ee
n 
a
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 
an
 in
ve
st
or
 o
f 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 
Pa
rt
y 
sh
ou
ld
 a
s 
fa
r 
as
 
po
ss
ib
le
 b
e 
se
ttl
ed
 
am
ic
ab
ly
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
pa
rt
ie
s 
in
 d
is
pu
te
. 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
(2
) 
If
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
ca
nn
ot
 b
e 
se
tt
le
d 
w
it
hi
n
si
x 
m
on
th
s 
of
 th
e 
da
te
 w
he
n 
it 
ha
s 
be
en
 
ra
is
ed
 b
y 
on
e 
of
 th
e 
pa
rt
ie
s 
in
 d
is
pu
te
, i
t 
sh
al
l, 
at
 th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 o
f 
th
e
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
St
at
e,
 b
e 
su
bm
itt
ed
 f
or
 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n.
 
(3
) 
T
he
 d
is
pu
te
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
su
bm
itt
ed
 f
or
 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
un
de
r 
th
e 
C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
of
 1
8 
M
ar
ch
 1
96
5 
on
 th
e 
Se
ttl
em
en
t o
f 
In
ve
st
m
en
t D
is
pu
te
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
St
at
es
 a
nd
 
N
at
io
na
ls
 o
f 
O
th
er
 S
ta
te
s 
(I
C
S
ID
),
 u
nl
es
s 
th
e 
pa
rt
ie
s 
in
 d
is
pu
te
 a
gr
ee
 o
n 
an
 a
d-
ho
c 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 to
 b
e 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
un
de
r 
th
e 
A
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
R
ul
es
 o
f 
th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
N
at
io
ns
 
C
om
m
is
si
on
 o
n 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l T
ra
de
 
L
aw
 (
U
N
C
IT
R
A
L
) 
or
 o
th
er
 a
rb
itr
at
io
n 
ru
le
s.
 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
(4
) 
A
ny
 a
w
ar
d 
by
 a
n 
ad
-h
oc
 
tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
fi
na
l a
nd
 
bi
nd
in
g.
 A
ny
 
aw
ar
d 
un
de
r 
th
e 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 o
f 
th
e
sa
id
 C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
sh
al
l b
e 
bi
nd
in
g 
an
d 
su
bj
ec
t o
nl
y 
to
 th
os
e 
ap
pe
al
s 
or
 r
em
ed
ie
s 
pr
ov
id
ed
 f
or
 in
 
th
is
 C
on
ve
nt
io
n.
 
T
he
 a
w
ar
ds
 s
ha
ll 
be
 e
nf
or
ce
d 
in
 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
ith
 
do
m
es
tic
 la
w
. 
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A
m
ic
ab
le
 
Se
tt
le
m
en
t 
Ju
ri
sd
ic
ti
on
 
C
on
st
it
ut
io
n
 o
f 
T
ri
b
un
al
s 
A
pp
lic
ab
le
 
R
ul
es
 
A
pp
lic
ab
le
 
L
aw
 
D
ec
is
io
n 
an
d 
E
nf
or
ce
m
en
t  
C
os
ts
 
4  
L
at
vi
a 
15
.0
4.
20
04
 
01
.0
2.
20
06
 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
1.
 A
ny
 le
ga
l d
is
pu
te
 
be
tw
ee
n 
an
 in
ve
st
or
 o
f 
on
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 
an
d 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 in
 
co
nn
ec
ti
on
 w
it
h 
an
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
th
e 
te
rr
it
or
y 
of
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
pa
rt
y 
sh
al
l, 
as
 f
ar
 a
s 
po
ss
ib
le
, b
e 
se
ttl
ed
 
am
ic
ab
ly
 th
ro
ug
h 
ne
go
ti
at
io
ns
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
pa
rt
ie
s 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e.
 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
2.
 I
f 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
ca
nn
ot
 b
e 
se
ttl
ed
 th
ro
ug
h 
ne
go
ti
at
io
ns
 w
it
hi
n 
si
x 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 it
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
ra
is
ed
 b
y 
ei
th
er
 p
ar
ty
 to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e,
 it
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
su
bm
it
te
d 
by
 th
e 
ch
oi
ce
of
 th
e 
in
ve
st
or
: 
(a
) 
to
 th
e 
co
m
pe
te
nt
 c
ou
rt
 o
f t
he
 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 th
at
 is
 a
 p
ar
ty
 to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e;
 
(b
) 
to
 I
nt
er
na
ti
on
al
 C
en
te
r 
fo
r 
Se
ttl
em
en
t o
f 
In
ve
st
m
en
t D
is
pu
te
s 
(I
C
SI
D
) 
un
de
r 
th
e 
C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
on
 th
e 
Se
ttl
em
en
t o
f 
D
is
pu
te
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
St
at
es
 a
nd
 N
at
io
na
ls
 o
f 
O
th
er
 
St
at
es
, d
on
e 
at
 W
as
hi
ng
to
n 
on
 M
ar
ch
 1
8,
 
19
65
. O
nc
e 
th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 h
as
 s
ub
m
itt
ed
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
to
 th
e 
co
m
pe
te
nt
 c
ou
rt
 o
f 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 c
on
ce
rn
ed
 o
r 
to
 th
e 
IC
S
ID
, t
he
 c
ho
ic
e 
of
 o
ne
 o
f 
th
e 
tw
o 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 s
ha
ll 
be
 f
in
al
. H
ow
ev
er
, a
n 
in
ve
st
or
 w
ho
 h
as
 s
ub
m
it
te
d 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
to
 a
na
tio
na
l c
ou
rt
 m
ay
 n
ev
er
th
el
es
s 
ha
ve
 
re
co
ur
se
 to
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
 m
en
tio
ne
d 
in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 (
b)
 o
f 
th
is
 A
rt
ic
le
, i
f 
th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 h
as
 w
it
hd
ra
w
n 
hi
s 
ca
se
 f
ro
m
 
na
tio
na
l c
ou
rt
 a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 th
e 
pr
oc
ed
ur
al
 
la
w
s 
of
 th
at
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
be
fo
re
 
ju
dg
m
en
t h
as
 b
ee
n 
de
li
ve
re
d 
on
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
t 
m
at
te
r.
 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
3.
 T
he
 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
aw
ar
d 
sh
al
l b
e 
ba
se
d 
on
 th
e 
la
w
 o
f 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
it
s 
ru
le
s 
on
 th
e 
co
nf
li
ct
 o
f 
la
w
s,
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t
as
 w
el
l a
s 
th
e 
un
iv
er
sa
ll
y 
ac
ce
pt
ed
 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 o
f 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
la
w
. 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
4.
 T
he
 a
rb
itr
at
io
n 
aw
ar
d 
sh
al
l b
e 
fi
na
l a
nd
 b
in
di
ng
 
up
on
 b
ot
h 
pa
rt
ie
s 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e.
 
B
ot
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
sh
al
l 
co
m
m
it 
th
em
se
lv
es
 to
 th
e 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t o
f 
th
e 
aw
ar
d.
 
5 
C
ze
ch
 
R
ep
ub
li
c 
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.1
2.
20
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A
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le
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1.
 A
ny
 d
is
pu
te
 w
hi
ch
 
m
ay
 a
ri
se
 b
et
w
ee
n 
an
 
in
ve
st
or
 o
f 
on
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
in
 c
on
ne
ct
io
n 
w
it
h 
an
 in
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
th
e 
te
rr
it
or
y 
of
 th
at
 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 
Pa
rt
y 
sh
al
l b
e 
su
bj
ec
t 
to
 n
eg
ot
ia
ti
on
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
pa
rt
ie
s 
to
 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e.
 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
2.
 I
f 
аn
у 
di
sp
ut
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
an
 in
ve
st
or
 o
f 
on
e
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
ca
nn
ot
 b
e 
th
us
 s
et
tl
ed
 w
ith
in
 s
ix
 
m
on
th
s 
of
 th
e 
da
te
 w
he
n 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t f
or
 th
e 
se
ttl
em
en
t h
as
 b
ee
n 
su
bm
it
te
d,
 th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 
sh
al
l b
e 
en
tit
le
d 
to
 s
ub
m
it
 th
e 
ca
se
, a
t h
is
 
ch
oi
ce
, f
or
 s
et
tl
em
en
t t
o:
 
(a
) 
th
e 
co
m
pe
te
nt
 c
ou
rt
 o
f 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
w
hi
ch
 is
 th
e 
pa
rt
y 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e;
 o
r 
(b
) 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
en
tr
e 
fo
r 
Se
ttl
em
en
t 
of
 In
ve
st
m
en
t D
is
pu
te
s 
(I
C
S
ID
) 
ha
vi
ng
 
re
ga
rd
 to
 th
e 
ap
pl
ic
ab
le
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
of
 th
e 
C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
on
 th
e 
Se
ttl
em
en
t o
f 
In
ve
st
m
en
t D
is
pu
te
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
St
at
es
 a
nd
 
N
at
io
na
ls
 o
f 
ot
he
r 
S
ta
te
s 
op
en
ed
 f
or
 
si
gn
at
ur
e 
at
 W
as
hi
ng
to
n 
D
.C
. o
n 
18
 M
ar
ch
 
19
65
, o
r 
(c
) 
an
 a
d 
ho
c 
ar
bi
tr
al
 tr
ib
un
al
, u
nl
es
s 
ot
he
rw
is
e 
ag
re
ed
 u
po
n 
by
 th
e 
pa
rt
ie
s 
to
 th
e
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
5.
 T
he
 a
rb
it
ra
l 
tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll 
de
ci
de
 o
n 
th
e 
ba
si
s 
of
 th
e 
la
w
, t
ak
in
g 
in
to
 
ac
co
un
t:
 
- 
th
e 
la
w
 in
 
fo
rc
e 
of
 th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
co
nc
er
ne
d;
 
- 
th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 
of
 th
is
 
A
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
an
d 
ot
he
r 
re
le
va
nt
 
A
gr
ee
m
en
ts
 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
6.
 T
he
 a
rb
itr
al
 
aw
ar
ds
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
fi
na
l a
nd
 b
in
di
ng
 
on
 b
ot
h 
pa
rt
ie
s 
to
 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
an
d 
sh
al
l b
e 
en
fo
rc
ea
bl
e 
in
 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
ith
 
th
e 
do
m
es
tic
 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n.
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A
m
ic
ab
le
 
Se
tt
le
m
en
t 
Ju
ri
sd
ic
ti
on
 
C
on
st
it
ut
io
n
 o
f 
T
ri
b
un
al
s 
A
pp
lic
ab
le
 
R
ul
es
 
A
pp
lic
ab
le
 
L
aw
 
D
ec
is
io
n 
an
d 
E
nf
or
ce
m
en
t  
C
os
ts
 
di
sp
ut
e,
 to
 b
e 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
un
de
r 
th
e 
A
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
R
ul
es
 o
f 
th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
N
at
io
ns
 
C
om
m
is
si
on
 o
n 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l T
ra
de
 L
aw
 
(U
N
C
IT
R
A
L
).
 
3.
 W
it
h 
re
sp
ec
t t
o 
th
e 
po
ss
ib
ili
ti
es
 o
f 
su
bm
is
si
on
 o
f 
a 
di
sp
ut
e 
to
 th
e 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
ns
 s
et
 f
or
th
 u
nd
er
 th
is
 A
rt
ic
le
, t
he
Pe
op
le
’s
 R
ep
ub
lic
 o
f 
C
hi
na
 w
il
l r
eq
ui
re
 th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 c
on
ce
rn
ed
 to
 g
o 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
do
m
es
tic
 a
dm
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
re
vi
ew
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s 
sp
ec
if
ie
d 
by
 th
e 
la
w
s 
an
d 
re
gu
la
tio
ns
 o
f 
ch
at
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
be
fo
re
 th
e 
su
bm
is
si
on
 o
f 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
to
 th
e 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
rb
itr
at
io
n.
 S
uc
h 
a 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e 
sh
al
l n
ot
 e
xc
ee
d 
a 
pe
ri
od
 o
f 
th
re
e 
m
on
th
s.
 
4.
 O
nc
e 
th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 h
as
 s
ub
m
itt
ed
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
to
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
rb
it
ra
tio
n,
 th
at
 
su
bm
is
si
on
 s
ha
ll 
be
 d
ef
in
it
iv
e.
 I
f 
th
e
in
ve
st
or
 h
as
 s
ub
m
it
te
d 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
to
 th
e 
co
m
pe
te
nt
 c
ou
rt
 o
f 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
w
he
re
 th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t h
as
 b
ee
n 
m
ad
e,
 th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 m
ay
 w
ith
dr
aw
 h
is
 c
la
im
 a
cc
or
di
ng
 
to
 th
e 
la
w
s 
an
d 
re
gu
la
tio
ns
 o
f 
th
at
 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
, a
nd
 s
ub
m
it
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
to
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
rb
itr
at
io
n 
as
 d
es
cr
ib
ed
 in
 
th
is
 A
rt
ic
le
. T
hi
s 
su
bm
is
si
on
 to
 a
n 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
af
te
r 
th
e 
w
ith
dr
aw
al
 f
ro
m
 th
e 
na
tio
na
l c
ou
rt
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
de
fi
ni
tiv
e.
 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s;
 
- 
th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 
of
 s
pe
ci
al
 
co
nt
ra
ct
s 
re
la
ti
ng
 to
 th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
co
nc
lu
de
d 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
an
d 
th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 o
f 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y;
 
- 
th
e 
ge
ne
ra
l 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 o
f 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
la
w
. 
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F
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1.
 A
ny
 d
is
pu
te
 a
ri
si
ng
 
ou
t o
f 
an
 in
ve
st
m
en
t 
be
tw
ee
n 
on
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 
an
 in
ve
st
or
 o
f 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 
Pa
rt
y 
sh
ou
ld
, 
w
he
ne
ve
r p
os
si
bl
e,
 b
e 
se
tt
le
d 
am
ic
ab
ly
 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
tw
o 
pa
rt
ie
s 
co
nc
er
ne
d.
 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
2.
 I
f 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
ha
s 
no
t b
ee
n 
se
tt
le
d 
w
it
hi
n
th
re
e 
(3
) 
m
on
th
s,
 f
ro
m
 th
e 
da
te
 a
t w
hi
ch
 it
 
w
as
 r
ai
se
d 
in
 w
ri
tin
g,
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
m
ay
, a
t 
th
e 
ch
oi
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
in
ve
st
or
, b
e 
su
bm
it
te
d:
 
(a
) 
to
 th
e 
co
m
pe
te
nt
 c
ou
rt
s 
of
 th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 in
 w
ho
se
 te
rr
ito
ry
 th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t i
s 
m
ad
e;
 o
r 
(b
) 
to
 a
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
by
 th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
en
tr
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
Se
ttl
em
en
t o
f 
In
ve
st
m
en
t D
is
pu
te
s 
(I
C
S
ID
),
 e
st
ab
lis
he
d 
by
 th
e 
C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
on
 
th
e 
S
et
tl
em
en
t o
f 
In
ve
st
m
en
t D
is
pu
te
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
St
at
es
 a
nd
 N
at
io
na
ls
 o
f 
ot
he
r 
St
at
es
, o
pe
ne
d 
fo
r 
si
gn
at
ur
e 
at
 W
as
hi
ng
to
n 
on
 1
8 
M
ar
ch
 1
96
5;
 o
r 
(c
) 
an
 a
d 
ho
c 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
tr
ib
un
al
, w
hi
ch
 
un
le
ss
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
ag
re
ed
 u
po
n 
by
 th
e 
pa
rt
ie
s 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e,
 is
 to
 b
e 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
un
de
r 
th
e 
A
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
R
ul
es
 o
f 
th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
N
at
io
ns
 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
4.
 T
he
 A
rb
itr
al
 T
ri
bu
na
l m
en
ti
on
ed
 in
 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
2 
(c
) 
sh
al
l c
on
si
st
 o
f 
th
re
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
or
s.
 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
5.
 T
he
 T
ri
bu
na
l 
sh
al
l a
dj
ud
ic
at
e 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
is
 
A
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
th
e 
la
w
 o
f 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
in
vo
lv
ed
 
in
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
(i
nc
lu
di
ng
 th
e 
ru
le
s 
on
 th
e 
co
nf
li
ct
 o
f 
la
w
s)
 a
nd
 th
e 
ru
le
s 
of
 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
la
w
 a
pp
lic
ab
le
 
to
 b
ot
h 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
4.
 T
he
 T
ri
bu
na
l 
sh
al
l r
ea
ch
 it
s 
aw
ar
d 
by
 a
 
m
aj
or
it
y 
of
 
vo
te
s.
 
6.
 T
he
 a
w
ar
d 
sh
al
l b
e 
fi
na
l a
nd
bi
nd
in
g 
fo
r 
th
e 
pa
rt
ie
s 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
an
d 
sh
al
l 
be
 e
xe
cu
te
d 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 
na
tio
na
l l
aw
. 
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A
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A
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L
aw
 
D
ec
is
io
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E
nf
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C
os
ts
 
C
om
m
is
si
on
 o
n 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l T
ra
de
 L
aw
 
(U
N
C
IT
R
A
L
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3.
 A
n 
in
ve
st
or
 w
ho
 h
as
 s
ub
m
itt
ed
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
to
 n
at
io
na
l c
ou
rt
 r
ef
er
re
d 
to
 in
 p
ar
a-
 
gr
ap
h 
2 
(a
) o
f 
th
is
 A
rt
ic
le
 m
ay
 n
ev
er
th
el
es
s 
ha
ve
 r
ec
ou
rs
e 
to
 o
ne
 o
f 
th
e 
A
rb
it
ra
l 
T
ri
bu
na
ls
 m
en
tio
ne
d 
in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
 (b
) 
an
d 
2 
(c
) o
f 
th
is
 A
rt
ic
le
, i
f 
th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 h
as
 
w
it
hd
ra
w
n 
hi
s 
ca
se
 f
ro
m
 n
at
io
na
l c
ou
rt
 
be
fo
re
 ju
dg
em
en
t h
as
 b
ee
n 
de
liv
er
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
su
bj
ec
t m
at
te
r. 
In
 th
at
 c
as
e 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
sh
al
l a
gr
ee
 to
 th
e 
su
bm
is
si
on
 o
f 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
it 
an
d 
an
 
in
ve
st
or
 o
f 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
to
 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
rb
itr
at
io
n 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
it
h 
th
is
 A
rt
ic
le
. 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s.
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P
or
tu
ga
l-
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 f
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ce
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1.
 A
ny
 d
is
pu
te
 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 b
et
w
ee
n 
a
Pa
rt
y 
an
d 
an
 in
ve
st
or
 
of
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
Pa
rt
y 
sh
ou
ld
 a
s 
fa
r 
as
 
po
ss
ib
le
 b
e 
se
ttl
ed
 
am
ic
ab
ly
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
pa
rt
ie
s 
in
 d
is
pu
te
. 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
2.
 I
f 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
ca
nn
ot
 b
e 
se
ttl
ed
 w
ith
in
 s
ix
 
m
on
th
s 
of
 th
e 
da
te
 w
he
n 
it 
ha
s 
be
en
 r
ai
se
d 
by
 o
ne
 o
f 
th
e 
pa
rt
ie
s 
in
 d
is
pu
te
, i
t s
ha
ll,
 a
t 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 o
f 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
St
at
e,
 b
e 
su
bm
it
te
d 
at
 th
e 
ch
oi
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 to
: 
a)
 th
e 
co
m
pe
te
nt
 c
ou
rt
 o
f 
th
e 
P
ar
ty
 th
at
 is
 a
 
pa
rt
y 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e;
 
b)
 a
rb
it
ra
ti
on
 u
nd
er
 th
e 
C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
of
 1
8 
M
ar
ch
 1
96
5 
on
 th
e 
Se
ttl
em
en
t o
f 
In
ve
st
m
en
t D
is
pu
te
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
St
at
es
 a
nd
 
N
at
io
na
ls
 o
f 
O
th
er
 S
ta
te
s 
(I
C
S
ID
);
 
c)
 a
n 
ad
-h
oc
 a
rb
it
ra
l t
ri
bu
na
l t
o 
be
 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
un
de
r 
th
e 
A
rb
itr
at
io
n 
R
ul
es
 o
f 
th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
N
at
io
ns
 C
om
m
is
si
on
 o
n 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l T
ra
de
 L
aw
 (
U
N
C
IT
R
A
L
) 
or
 
ot
he
r 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
ru
le
s.
 
3.
T
he
 d
ec
is
io
n 
to
 s
ub
m
it 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
to
 o
ne
of
 th
e 
ab
ov
em
en
tio
ne
d 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
fi
na
l. 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
4.
 A
ny
 a
w
ar
d 
by
 
an
 a
d-
ho
c 
tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
fi
na
l a
nd
 
bi
nd
in
g.
 A
ny
 
aw
ar
d 
un
de
r 
th
e 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 o
f 
th
e
C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
m
en
tio
ne
d 
in
 2
. 
b)
 a
bo
ve
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
bi
nd
in
g 
an
d 
su
bj
ec
t o
nl
y 
to
 
th
os
e 
ap
pe
al
s 
or
 
re
m
ed
ie
s 
pr
ov
id
ed
 f
or
 in
 
th
is
 C
on
ve
nt
io
n.
 
T
he
 a
w
ar
ds
 s
ha
ll 
be
 e
nf
or
ce
d 
in
 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
ith
 
do
m
es
tic
 la
w
. 
8  
Sp
ai
n-
In
 
fo
rc
e 
14
.1
1.
20
05
 
01
.0
7.
20
08
 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
1.
 A
ny
 d
is
pu
te
 
be
tw
ee
n 
an
 in
ve
st
or
 o
f 
on
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 
an
d 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 in
 
co
nn
ec
ti
on
 w
it
h 
an
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
th
e 
te
rr
it
or
y 
of
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 
sh
al
l b
e 
no
ti
fi
ed
 in
 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
2.
 I
f 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
ca
nn
ot
 b
e 
se
ttl
ed
 th
ro
ug
h 
ne
go
ti
at
io
ns
 w
it
hi
n 
si
x 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
th
e 
w
ri
tte
n 
no
tif
ic
at
io
n,
 it
 s
ha
ll 
be
 
su
bm
it
te
d 
by
 th
e 
ch
oi
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
in
ve
st
or
: 
a)
 to
 th
e 
co
m
pe
te
nt
 c
ou
rt
 o
f 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
th
at
 is
 p
ar
ty
 to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e;
 o
r 
b)
 to
 th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
en
tr
e 
fo
r 
Se
tt
le
m
en
t 
of
 In
ve
st
m
en
t D
is
pu
te
s 
(I
C
S
ID
) 
un
de
r 
th
e 
"C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
on
 th
e 
Se
ttl
em
en
t o
f 
In
ve
st
m
en
t D
is
pu
te
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
St
at
es
 a
nd
 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
3.
 T
he
 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
aw
ar
d 
sh
al
l b
e 
ba
se
d 
on
 th
e 
la
w
 o
f 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e,
 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
it
s 
ru
le
s 
on
 th
e 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
4.
 T
he
 a
rb
itr
at
io
n 
aw
ar
d 
sh
al
l b
e 
fi
na
l a
nd
 b
in
di
ng
 
up
on
 b
ot
h 
pa
rt
ie
s 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e.
 
B
ot
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
sh
al
l 
co
m
m
it 
th
em
se
lv
es
 to
 th
e 
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A
m
ic
ab
le
 
Se
tt
le
m
en
t 
Ju
ri
sd
ic
ti
on
 
C
on
st
it
ut
io
n
 o
f 
T
ri
b
un
al
s 
A
pp
lic
ab
le
 
R
ul
es
 
A
pp
lic
ab
le
 
L
aw
 
D
ec
is
io
n 
an
d 
E
nf
or
ce
m
en
t  
C
os
ts
 
w
ri
tin
g 
by
 th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 
to
 th
e 
la
tt
er
 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 a
nd
, 
as
 f
ar
 a
s 
po
ss
ib
le
, b
e 
se
tt
le
d 
am
ic
ab
ly
 
th
ro
ug
h 
ne
go
tia
tio
ns
 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
pa
rt
ie
s 
to
 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e.
 
N
at
io
na
ls
 o
f 
ot
he
r 
S
ta
te
s"
, o
pe
ne
d 
fo
r 
si
gn
at
ur
e 
at
 W
as
hi
ng
to
n 
on
 1
8 
M
ar
ch
 1
96
5;
 
or
 
c)
 to
 a
n 
ad
 h
oc
 tr
ib
un
al
 o
f 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
un
de
r 
th
e 
A
rb
itr
at
io
n 
R
ul
es
 o
f 
th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
N
at
io
ns
 C
om
m
is
si
on
 o
n 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l T
ra
de
 L
aw
 (
U
N
C
IT
R
A
L
).
 
O
nc
e 
th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 h
as
 s
ub
m
it
te
d 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
to
 th
e 
co
m
pe
te
nt
 c
ou
rt
 o
f 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
co
nc
er
ne
d 
or
 to
 th
e 
IC
SI
D
 o
r 
to
 a
n 
ad
 
ho
c 
tr
ib
un
al
 e
st
ab
li
sh
ed
 u
nd
er
 th
e 
A
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
R
ul
es
 o
f 
U
N
C
IT
R
A
L
, t
he
 
ch
oi
ce
 o
f 
on
e 
of
 th
e 
th
re
e 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 s
ha
ll
 
be
 f
in
al
. 
co
nf
li
ct
 o
f 
la
w
s,
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
is
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t 
as
 w
el
l a
s 
th
e 
un
iv
er
sa
ll
y 
ac
ce
pt
ed
 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 o
f 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
la
w
. 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t o
f 
th
e 
aw
ar
d.
 
9 
M
al
ta
 
22
.0
2.
20
09
 
01
.0
4.
20
09
 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
1.
 T
he
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
sh
al
l e
nd
ea
vo
r 
to
 a
ss
is
t i
n 
th
e 
se
tt
le
m
en
t o
f 
an
y 
in
ve
st
m
en
t d
is
pu
te
s 
re
gu
la
te
d 
by
 th
is
 
A
gr
ee
m
en
t b
et
w
ee
n 
on
e 
of
 th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
an
d 
an
 in
ve
st
or
 
of
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 b
y 
m
ea
ns
 o
f 
a 
fr
ie
nd
ly
 
se
tt
le
m
en
t. 
A
ny
 s
uc
h 
di
sp
ut
es
 s
ha
ll 
be
 
ad
op
te
d 
in
 w
ri
tin
g,
 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
de
ta
il
ed
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 b
y 
th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 a
t t
he
 s
am
e 
ti
m
e 
to
 b
ot
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
tie
s.
 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
2.
 I
f 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
ca
nn
ot
 b
e 
se
ttl
ed
 th
ro
ug
h 
ne
go
ti
at
io
ns
 w
it
hi
n 
si
x 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f 
th
e 
w
ri
tte
n 
no
tif
ic
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e,
 it
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
su
bm
it
te
d 
by
 th
e 
ch
oi
ce
of
 th
e 
in
ve
st
or
: 
(a
) 
to
 th
e 
co
m
pe
te
nt
 c
ou
rt
 o
f t
he
 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 th
at
 is
 a
 p
ar
ty
 to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e;
 
(b
) 
to
 I
nt
er
na
ti
on
al
 C
en
tr
e 
fo
r 
Se
ttl
em
en
t o
f 
In
ve
st
m
en
t D
is
pu
te
s 
(I
C
SI
D
) 
un
de
r 
th
e 
C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
on
 th
e 
Se
ttl
em
en
t o
f 
D
is
pu
te
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
St
at
es
 a
nd
 N
at
io
na
ls
 o
f 
O
th
er
 
St
at
es
, d
on
e 
at
 W
as
hi
ng
to
n 
on
 M
ar
ch
 
18
,1
96
5;
 
(c
) 
to
 a
n 
ad
 h
oc
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
rb
itr
at
io
n 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 th
e 
A
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
R
ul
es
 o
f 
th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
N
at
io
ns
 C
om
m
is
si
on
 o
n 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l T
ra
de
 L
aw
. 
O
nc
e 
th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 h
as
 s
ub
m
it
te
d 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
to
 th
e 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l t
ri
bu
na
ls
, t
he
 c
ho
ic
e 
of
 
on
e 
of
 th
e 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 s
ha
ll 
be
 f
in
al
. 
3.
 N
ot
w
it
hs
ta
nd
in
g 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
2:
 
a)
 w
ith
 r
es
pe
ct
 to
 P
eo
pl
e’
s 
R
ep
ub
li
c 
of
 
C
hi
na
, t
he
 in
ve
st
or
 c
on
ce
rn
ed
 m
ay
 o
nl
y 
su
bm
it
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
to
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
un
de
r 
th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s:
 
(i
) 
th
at
 th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 h
as
 g
on
e 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
re
vi
ew
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 th
e 
la
w
s 
of
 P
eo
pl
e’
s 
R
ep
ub
li
c 
of
 C
hi
na
 
an
d 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
re
m
ai
ns
; a
nd
 
A
rt
ic
le
 9
 
5.
 T
he
 a
rb
itr
al
 
tr
ib
un
al
 s
ha
ll
 
re
ac
h 
its
 a
w
ar
d 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
it
h 
th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
is
 
A
gr
ee
m
en
t a
nd
 
th
e 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 o
f 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l l
aw
 
re
co
gn
is
ed
 b
y 
bo
th
 C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s.
 
6.
 T
he
 a
rb
itr
at
io
n 
aw
ar
d 
sh
al
l b
e 
fi
na
l a
nd
 b
in
di
ng
 
up
on
 b
ot
h 
pa
rt
ie
s 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e.
 
B
ot
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
ie
s 
sh
al
l 
co
m
m
it 
th
em
se
lv
es
 to
 th
e 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t o
f 
th
e 
aw
ar
d.
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A
m
ic
ab
le
 
Se
tt
le
m
en
t 
Ju
ri
sd
ic
ti
on
 
C
on
st
it
ut
io
n
 o
f 
T
ri
b
un
al
s 
A
pp
lic
ab
le
 
R
ul
es
 
A
pp
lic
ab
le
 
L
aw
 
D
ec
is
io
n 
an
d 
E
nf
or
ce
m
en
t  
C
os
ts
 
(i
i)
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
ha
s 
no
t b
ee
n 
su
bm
it
te
d 
to
 a
 
co
ur
t o
f 
th
e 
P
eo
pl
e’
s 
R
ep
ub
lic
 o
f 
C
hi
na
; 
an
d 
b)
 w
ith
 r
es
pe
ct
 to
 M
al
ta
 th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 
co
nc
er
ne
d 
sh
al
l s
ub
m
it 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
to
 a
do
m
es
tic
 c
ou
rt
, t
ri
bu
na
l o
r 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
so
 a
s
to
 e
xh
au
st
 th
e 
lo
ca
l p
ro
ce
du
re
s 
be
fo
re
 
pr
oc
ee
di
ng
 to
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
rb
itr
at
io
n.
 
4.
 F
or
 th
e 
pu
rp
os
e 
of
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
s 
2 
an
d 
3,
 
ea
ch
 C
on
tr
ac
ti
ng
 P
ar
ty
 g
iv
es
 it
s 
ad
va
nc
e 
an
d 
ir
re
vo
ca
bl
e 
co
ns
en
t t
o 
su
bm
it 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
to
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
rb
it
ra
tio
n.
 
10
 
B
L
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U
-I
n 
fo
rc
e 
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.0
6.
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.1
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A
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1.
 W
he
n 
a 
le
ga
l 
di
sp
ut
e 
ar
is
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
an
 in
ve
st
or
 o
f 
on
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 a
nd
 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y,
 e
ith
er
 p
ar
ty
 to
 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
sh
al
l 
no
ti
fy
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
pa
rt
y 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
in
 
w
ri
tin
g.
 
A
s 
fa
r 
as
 p
os
si
bl
e,
 th
e 
pa
rt
ie
s 
to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
sh
al
l e
nd
ea
vo
r 
to
 
se
tt
le
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
th
ro
ug
h 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
, 
fo
r 
A
rt
ic
le
 8
 
2.
 I
f 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
ca
nn
ot
 b
e 
se
ttl
ed
 th
ro
ug
h 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
 w
it
hi
n 
si
x 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 it
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
no
ti
fi
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
pa
rt
y 
to
 th
e
di
sp
ut
e,
 e
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
co
ns
en
ts
 to
th
e 
su
bm
is
si
on
 o
f 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e,
 a
t t
he
 
in
ve
st
or
’s
 c
ho
ic
e:
 
a)
 to
 th
e 
co
m
pe
te
nt
 c
ou
rt
 o
f 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
th
at
 is
 a
 p
ar
ty
 to
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e;
 
b)
 to
 th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
en
te
r 
fo
r 
Se
tt
le
m
en
t 
of
 In
ve
st
m
en
t D
is
pu
te
s 
(I
C
S
ID
) 
un
de
r 
th
e 
C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
on
 th
e 
Se
ttl
em
en
t o
f 
D
is
pu
te
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
St
at
es
 a
nd
 N
at
io
na
ls
 o
f 
O
th
er
 
St
at
es
, d
on
e 
at
 W
as
hi
ng
to
n 
on
 M
ar
ch
 1
8,
 
19
65
. 
O
nc
e 
th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 h
as
 s
ub
m
it
te
d 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
to
 th
e 
co
m
pe
te
nt
 c
ou
rt
 o
f 
th
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
co
nc
er
ne
d 
or
 to
 th
e 
IC
SI
D
, t
he
 c
ho
ic
e 
of
 o
ne
 o
f 
th
e 
tw
o 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 s
ha
ll 
be
 fi
na
l. 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
 A
d 
A
rt
ic
le
 8
 
It
’s
 m
ut
ua
lly
 u
nd
er
st
oo
d 
th
at
 th
e 
Pe
op
le
’s
 
R
ep
ub
lic
 o
f 
C
hi
na
 r
eq
ui
re
s 
th
at
 th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 
co
nc
er
ne
d 
ex
ha
us
ts
 th
e 
do
m
es
tic
 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
re
vi
ew
 p
ro
ce
du
re
 s
pe
ci
fi
ed
 
by
 th
e 
la
w
s 
an
d 
re
gu
la
ti
on
s 
of
 th
e 
Pe
op
le
’s
 
R
ep
ub
lic
 o
f 
C
hi
na
, b
ef
or
e 
su
bm
is
si
on
 o
f 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
to
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
rb
it
ra
tio
n 
un
de
r 
A
rt
ic
le
 8
, p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 2
. T
he
 P
eo
pl
e’
s 
R
ep
ub
lic
 o
f 
C
hi
na
 d
ec
la
re
s 
th
at
 s
uc
h 
a 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e 
w
ill
 ta
ke
 a
 m
ax
im
um
 p
er
io
d 
of
 
th
re
e 
m
on
th
s.
 
A
rt
ic
le
 1
0 
T
ra
ns
iti
on
 
2.
 T
he
 p
re
se
nt
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t …
 s
ha
ll 
no
t 
ap
pl
y 
to
 a
ny
 d
is
pu
te
 o
r 
an
y 
cl
ai
m
 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 a
n 
in
ve
st
m
en
t w
hi
ch
 w
as
 
al
re
ad
y 
un
de
r 
ju
di
ci
al
 o
r 
ar
bi
tr
al
 p
ro
ce
ss
 
A
rt
ic
le
 8
 
3.
 T
he
 a
rb
itr
al
 
aw
ar
ds
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
fi
na
l a
nd
 b
in
di
ng
 
on
 th
e 
pa
rt
ie
s 
to
 
th
e 
di
sp
ut
e.
 E
ac
h 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
un
de
rt
ak
es
 
to
 e
xe
cu
te
 th
e 
aw
ar
ds
 in
 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
ith
 
its
 n
at
io
na
l 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n.
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A
m
ic
ab
le
 
Se
tt
le
m
en
t 
Ju
ri
sd
ic
ti
on
 
C
on
st
it
ut
io
n
 o
f 
T
ri
b
un
al
s 
A
pp
lic
ab
le
 
R
ul
es
 
A
pp
lic
ab
le
 
L
aw
 
D
ec
is
io
n 
an
d 
E
nf
or
ce
m
en
t  
C
os
ts
 
be
fo
re
 it
s 
en
tr
y 
in
to
 f
or
ce
. S
uc
h 
di
sp
ut
es
 
an
d 
cl
ai
m
s 
sh
al
l c
on
tin
ue
 to
 b
e 
se
ttl
ed
 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
A
gr
ee
m
en
t o
f 
19
84
 m
en
ti
on
ed
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 
1 
of
 th
is
 A
rt
ic
le
. 
11
 
F
ra
nc
e-
In
 
fo
rc
e1
07
1  
26
.1
1.
20
07
 
20
.0
8.
20
10
 
A
rt
ic
le
 7
 
A
ny
 d
is
pu
te
 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 in
ve
st
m
en
t 
be
tw
ee
n 
in
ve
st
or
s 
of
 
on
e 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
ty
 
an
d 
ot
he
r 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
Pa
rt
y 
sh
al
l b
e 
se
ttl
ed
 
am
ic
ab
ly
 a
s 
fa
r 
as
 
po
ss
ib
le
 b
y 
th
e 
tw
o 
pa
rt
ie
s 
co
nc
er
ne
d.
 
A
rt
ic
le
 7
 
If
 th
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
ca
nn
ot
 b
e 
se
tt
le
d 
w
it
hi
n 
si
x 
m
on
th
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 o
n 
w
hi
ch
 e
it
he
r 
re
la
te
d 
pa
rt
y 
fi
le
s 
a 
re
qu
es
t f
or
 s
et
tl
em
en
t i
t 
sh
al
l b
e 
re
so
lv
ed
 b
y 
ei
th
er
 o
ne
 o
f 
th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 c
ho
se
n 
by
 th
e 
in
ve
st
or
s:
 
(a
) 
to
 th
e 
co
m
pe
te
nt
 c
ou
rt
 o
f t
he
 
C
on
tr
ac
tin
g 
P
ar
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9.3.3 Cases under the Bilateral Investment Treaties between China and EU 
Member States 
Until now, there have been only two cases brought under the BITs between China and 
the EU Member States. One was brought by Chinese investors, Ping An Life Insurance 
Company of China, Limited and Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, 
Limited, against the Kingdom of Belgium. The other one was brought by a German 
investor, Hela Schwarz GmbH, against China. Since these two cases were introduced 
in Section 6.2.3.3, supra, the discussion will not be repeated here. 
Although the number of cases under the BITs between China and the EU Member 
States is very limited, as introduced in Section 7.3.1.1, supra, EU investors have been 
quite active in international investment arbitration. This is in stark contrast with the fact 
that only one case has been brought to date by an EU investor against China. Regarding 
the attitudes of EU investors towards ISDS with China, the public consultation on “The 
future investment relationship between the EU and China” provides some 
inspiration,1072 which helps to explain the very limited use of international arbitration 
to resolve disputes between EU investors and China. Regarding the ways of dealing 
with legal conflicts with the Chinese government on investment, amicable settlement 
has emerged as the most common approach. Only when this did not work out, some EU 
investors would consider “end of contract/cooperation” and recourse to local legal 
proceedings, international arbitration and diplomatic support. 1073  Furthermore, 
although international arbitration is an option for at least unfair and discriminatory 
treatment or expropriation without compensation, only 40 per cent of investors would 
consider starting international arbitration proceedings on the basis of an investment 
treaty. In terms of the reasons for such a result, alongside the concerns about the time 
and costs of international arbitration, EU investors worried that international arbitration 
would seriously damage the relationship with the Chinese government, and thus would 
negatively impact other investments that they had made there and their business 
opportunities in China’s significant market. In addition, EU investors generally lacked 
confidence in China’s domestic legal system, and there local remedies were also not 
desired. Unfortunately, no similar public consultation report on Chinese investors’ 
views on ISDS with the EU are available. The absence of such concrete empirical 
evidence makes it difficult to assess the reasons for the limited use of international 
arbitration between Chinese investors and EU Member States. 
9.4 Conclusion 
The Lisbon Treaty led to a ground-breaking change in the investment relationship 
between China and the EU. Before 2009, the Union only concluded general economic 
1072 European Commission-Director-General for Trade, Summary of Contributions to the European Commission’s 
Public Consultation on “The Future Investment Relationship Between the EU and China", 2011, available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/december/tradoc_148394.pdf, last visited on 29.05.2020. 
1073 Id, p. 10. 
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cooperation agreements with China. On the other hand, by exercising their treaty 
negotiating and concluding competences, EU Member States concluded 26 BITs with 
China. The Lisbon Treaty allocated the competence for foreign direct investment to the 
Union and, since 2013, a China-EU BIT has been under negotiation. 
In addition to other applicable international law and rules, such as the ICSID 
Convention, the current international legal framework for the China-EU investment 
relationship is mainly constructed on the existing BITs between China and EU Member 
States. Two categories of DSMs exist in these BITs for investment dispute settlement: 
one for state-state and one for investor-state disputes. The provisions on state-state 
DSMs have been quite similar to each other. Compulsory consultations through 
diplomatic channels with a minimum time limit is required as the initial step. Only if 
this fails, disputes can be submitted to ad hoc arbitration. Rules on arbitration 
procedures, decision making, effect of arbitral awards, and allocation of costs are 
normally provided for. In general, diplomatic elements, such as the contracting parties’ 
approval of the chairman, only exist in the BITs that were concluded in the early days. 
At the same time, the BITs negotiated recently often provide for more detailed 
procedural rules. 
In contrast, the situation of investor-state DSMs is complex. In general, a division can 
be seen to have developed in 1997: the BITs concluded before this date are 
characterized by limited acceptance of investor-state arbitration, while, thereafter, the 
BITs signed in the second stage adopted an overall acceptance of international 
arbitration for ISDS. The BITs signed in both stages provide for amicable and 
adjudicative DSMs. Amicable DSMs are consistently stressed in these treaties and the 
BITs drafted as a later time are even more clear. In terms of adjudicative DSMs, the 
BITs signed at the first stage limit international arbitration to disputes about the amount 
of compensation for expropriation. Such a requirement disappeared in the BITs at the 
second stage. Another noticeable change which happened to the BITs later was the 
acceptance of ICSID arbitration. In addition, rules on key procedural issues are often 
provided for in the BITs in which international arbitration is provided. 
Based on publicly available information, only two ISDS cases represent the real use of 
the DSMs in the BITs between China and EU Member States. The public consultation 
conducted by the European Commission indicates that EU investors prefer amicable 
settlement for investment disputes with the Chinese government, which was largely 
affected by concerns about China’s domestic legal system and the preservation of the 
relationship with the Chinese government. 
280
 
Chapter 10 The State-State Dispute Settlement System in the Prospective China-
EU Bilateral Investment Treaty 
This Chapter tackles the system for resolving investment disputes between treaty 
parties in the prospective China-EU BIT.  
As explained in the Introduction to Part 4, the discussion in this chapter is based on the 
relevant practice of both parties as introduced in Part 3, supra, with due consideration 
for their legal cultural characteristics in dispute resolution as analysed in Part 2, supra, 
while bearing in mind the investment relationship between China and the EU, which 
was addressed in Chapter 8, supra. The discussion is also supplemented with the 
relevant practice of other states in the world, including treaties and relevant cases. The 
factors that are addressed in the present chapter do not strictly follow the analysis in 
previous chapters on the existing practice of both parties. This is mainly for two reasons. 
First, some procedural issues that have been regulated in their treaties are not likely to 
be problematic, because both parties have presented an established understanding and 
practice. Thus, for most of those issues, it is not worthwhile to repeat this in the present 
analysis.1074 Second, the existing practice in both parties does not necessarily touch 
upon all issues that deserve to be addressed in a China-EU BIT. 
Specifically, this chapter starts with a discussion of the objective of the SSDS system, 
addressing the theme of the whole system and providing general guidance for the 
following discussion. This is followed by an analysis of the jurisdiction of the SSDS 
system, including the covered scope of disputes and acceptable claims. Thereafter it 
addresses the procedural designs of specific DSMs that are expected to be incorporated 
into a China-EU BIT for SSDS, including amicable options, negotiation/consultations 
and mediation, as well as adjudicative mechanisms. Regarding the latter, it selects and 
discusses three issues: adjudication model, transparency and third-party participation, 
and the effect of state-state adjudication decisions. Each of these DSMs is explored 
with a particular focus on identifying possible thorny issues that may stand in the way 
of the successful conclusion of negotiations in pursuit of potential mutually acceptable 
solutions for the both parties to consider. 
10.1 The Objective of the State-State Dispute Settlement System 
As analysed in Chapters 3, 4, 6 and 7, supra, the legal cultural characteristics in China 
and the EU, as well as their practice in dispute settlement at the internal and 
international levels, reveal their different perceptions in relation to the objective of 
dispute settlement. It is reasonable to expect that such differences would affect their 
1074 However, there are also some issues where both sides had a similar practice but the possibility of being 
problematic in the future may make it necessary to be addressed and is thus covered in the following discussion. 
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corresponding approaches in the context of the negotiations of a China-EU BIT, 
including each parties’ proposals and their response to the proposals of each party. 
Focusing on SSDS, from the failure to use state-state adjudication in the past 
experiences of both parties, it is clear that amicable DSMs in this system should have 
played and are expected to continue to play a role as the main method of resolving 
investment disputes between China and the EU. Therefore, it is appropriate to have a 
more modest objective in relation to settling disputes within the SSDS system. This 
does not refute the fact that a differentiation should be made between amicable and 
adjudicative DSMs within this system and the overall aim of settling disputes should 
not affect the rules-based nature of adjudicative DSMs. However, the general theme of 
the whole system will still have an influence on the choice where there is more than 
one available solution to a procedural issue in adjudication. 
10.2 The Jurisdiction of the State-State Dispute Settlement System 
The existing practice in both China and the EU consistently defines the scope of SSDS 
systems as concerning any dispute between the treaty parties related to the 
interpretation and/or application of provisions of the IIA at issue.1075 As evidenced by 
the case Ecuador v. the US, at least the term “dispute” can be problematic, since the 
jurisdiction of a tribunal may be frustrated by one treaty party’s silence.1076 Based on 
this, in the prospective China-EU BIT, it is suggested to provide a further explanation 
for the covered situations, making it clear that one party’s silence should not prohibit 
the tribunal from having jurisdiction as this does not confirm the absence of a dispute. 
To achieve this, treaty parties can, for instance, explicitly stipulate in the treaty texts 
that “dispute” is broadly understood as incorporating a situation in which one party 
refuses to take a position. Another option is to allow tribunals to issue an advisory 
opinion1077 or a preliminary ruling.1078 The difference between these two is that the 
former is binding while the latter is not. Both of them may help to avoid the problematic 
situation that arose in the Ecuador v. the US case, but it could be too great a step for 
China and the EU to take at the current stage of negotiations for their prospective BIT. 
Granting an adjudicative body the power to issue a preliminary ruling should not be 
completely unfamiliar in the EU, considering it is a common internal practice of the 
CJEU. This practice does not exist, however, in China’s or the EU’s concluded IIAs or 
FTAs. In particular, considering China’s traditional reluctance to give up sovereignty 
to international adjudicative bodies, issuing advisory opinions or preliminary rulings, 
1075 See, e.g. China Model BIT (1984, 1989, 1997, 2010), Art. 1; CETA (2012), Art. 29.2; the China-Netherlands 
BIT (2001), Art. 9. 
1076 Republic of Ecuador v. United States of America, PCA Case No. 2012-5, Award, 29.09.2012. 
1077 Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, State-State Dispute Settlement in Investment Treaties, 10.2014, available at: 
https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/best-practices-state-state-dispute-settlement-investment-
treaties.pdf, pp. 20-21, last visited on 30.07.2020. 
1078 When an EU Member State’s national court is in doubt about the interpretation or validity of an EU law, or 
whether a national law or practice is compatible with EU law, it can ask the CJEU for clarification in the form of a 
preliminary ruling. 
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which can be understood as a step furthering a tribunal’s compulsory jurisdiction to 
resolve disputes, is very likely to face resistance from China. 
Three categories of specific claims that can be brought through state-state DSMs are 
identified, as introduced in Section 2.3.1.2, supra: diplomatic protection claims brought 
by the home state seeking redress on behalf its investors, interpretive claims for 
decisions interpreting and applying investment treaty provisions, and declaratory relief 
claims regarding the conformity of host states’ specific measures with the treaty at issue. 
Despite the scarcity, some lessons still can be learned from the limited existing cases 
under the dispute settlement systems in other IIAs to define the jurisdiction of the SSDS 
system for the prospective China-EU BIT better. As indicated by the tribunal in the 
Italy v. Cuba case, a diplomatic protection claim based on a SSDS clause in an IIA 
needs to adhere to the same conditions that are required for diplomatic protection under 
customary international law, namely having correct nationality status and exhausting 
local remedies, unless regulated otherwise in the treaty. Therefore, if the treaty parties 
wish to change these two conditions, specific provisions need to be introduced into the 
treaty texts. Problems mainly exist in relation to interpretive claims and declaratory 
relief claims in whether they can co-exist with ISDS procedures, as argued by the US 
in the case Mexico v. US.1079 This issue in the prospective China-EU BIT will be 
addressed in the discussion on separation and connection between the SSDS system 
and the ISDS system in Section 12.2, infra. 
10.3 Procedural Designs of State-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
SSDS systems in IIAs often include amicable and adjudicative DSMs. Such an 
approach has also been followed by China and by the EU, including their most recently 
concluded IIAs. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that this will continue to be the case in 
the prospective China-EU BIT. 
10.3.1 Amicable Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
Amicable settlement reached through mutually agreed solutions is normally provided 
at the beginning of the dispute settlement chapter of an IIA, with or without explicit 
reference to specific DSMs. In this regard, the mechanisms that are explicitly 
mentioned in China’s and the EU’s concluded treaties, negotiation or consultations and 
mediation, are expected to also be proposed for the prospective China-EU BIT. 
Considering both parties’ increased emphasis on the amicable settlement of investment 
disputes, the proper procedural design of these DSMs can ensure that these amicable 
DSMs function in investment dispute settlement under the prospective BIT, and, in turn, 
increase their real use in practice. 
1079 Mexico v. United States (in the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services), NAFTA Chapter 20 State-to-State 
Arbitration, Final Report of the Panel, 06.02.2001, paras. 147, 283. Although a positive confirmation was given by 
the tribunal in this case, it is uncertain whether such claims fall within the scope of state-state arbitration provisions 
outside the context of NAFTA. 
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10.3.1.1 Negotiation/Consultations 
Negotiation and consultations are often used interchangeably as SSDS mechanisms in 
IIAs. 1080  They are the same in nature, being confidential, informal and bilateral 
processes for disputing parties to exchange opinions, which are normally resorted to by 
the disputing parties at the very beginning, with or without a reference in the underlying 
treaty. In this vein, IIAs often refer to either negotiations or consultations, with the 
possibility of making them a condition to initiating adjudication process, as evidenced 
by most of the BITs concluded between China and EU Member States. Such a reference 
is usually simple and does not provide detailed procedural rules. 
It is noticeable, however, that consultations are different in the context of the China-
Australia FTA (2015) and the EU’s ICS, where this DSM is not only set as a 
precondition to adjudication, but it provides detailed procedural requirements, such as 
a minimum time period, as well as the identification of the specific measure at issue 
and the legal basis for the complaint. This is in line with the provision on consultations 
in the DSU. Thus, the purpose of such consultations should be similar to allowing 
disputing parties “to exchange information, assess the strengths and weaknesses of their 
respective cases, narrow the scope of the differences between them and in many cases, 
reach a mutually agreed solution”. 1081  Given that such a way of regulating 
consultations is adopted in the EU’s ICS and China’s recently concluded IIAs, it is very 
likely to be followed in a China-EU BIT. A further suggestion here is to incorporate a 
reference to the potential use of the joint committee’s periodic meetings as the forum 
for holding consultations. Although it may happen without such a reference, a clear 
expression in the treaty texts would make the availability of the joint committee clearer 
and remind disputing parties of this possibility. This should not be faced with objections 
from either China or the EU, especially given that both sides have presented their 
intention to increase the role of a joint committee in investment dispute settlement.  
10.3.1.2 Mediation 
Similar to negotiations, mediation should be available to resolve disputes with or 
without explicit reference. Probably because of this, together with the difficulties in 
using this DSM in practice, not many IIAs have mentioned this option explicitly and 
state-state mediation seems to only have existed in theory.  
Against such a background, the EU’s recently concluded IIAs present some innovation. 
All of them, namely CETA (2012), the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), and the EU-Vietnam 
IPA (2018), incorporate separate sets of state-state mediation rules along with an 
explicit reference to state-state mediation in the main body of the treaty texts. These 
separate sets of rules cover issues like initiation of mediation, selection of the mediator, 
1080 It seems that the use of negotiation and consultations are different in SSDS and ISDS, since ISDS sometimes 
give negotiation and consultations different functions. For a further analysis on the use of negotiation and 
consultations in the context of ISDS in IIAs, see Sections 11.3.1 and 11.3.3, infra. 
1081 This was used to describe the role of consultations in the WTO Dispute Settlement System. See: Mexico—Anti-
Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU by the United States, AB-2001-5, Appellate Body Report, para. 54. See also: Todd Allee & Manfred Elsig, 
Dispute Settlement Provisions in PTAs: New Data and New Concepts, at: Trade Cooperation: The Purpose, Design 
and Effects of Preferential Trade Agreements, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 325. 
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implementation of mutually agreed solutions, time limits, costs, all of which build the 
basic structure of state-state mediation, while leaving disputing parties and mediators 
much discretion in deciding procedural details. In particular, the mediators’ role is 
defined as “bringing clarity to the measure and its possible adverse effects” and thus 
assist treaty parties in reaching a mutually agreed solution.1082 At the same time, they 
“shall not advise or give comments on the consistency of the measure at issue” with the 
treaty. 1083  It is also noted that, although the process of mediation is confidential, 
mutually agreed solutions, if reached, “shall be made publicly available”, excluding the 
information that a treaty party has designated as confidential.1084 
On the side of China, neither its model BITs nor its IIAs with EU Member States 
explicitly referred to mediation for SSDS. Although this should not be read as 
prohibiting disputing parties from resorting to state-state mediation, it may decrease the 
real use of the mechanism, because it can lack procedural predictability. At the same 
time, this may indicate China’s failure to consider it when it drafted or negotiated these 
IIAs or its lack of trust in resolving state-state investment disputes through mediation. 
The latter position may be further supported by its traditional distrust in international 
DSMs that have not been used very often, such as state-state mediation. In other words, 
without seeing its real function, it is likely that China hesitated to subject itself to using 
such a mechanism in order to avoid potential risks.1085 Although there is a general 
preference for amicable DSMs, and mediation is particularly taken by China as a 
representative of “oriental wisdom” in dispute resolution,1086 the fate of state-state 
mediation is different from commercial mediation, since China is quite familiar with 
the latter. It is noted that, in this regard, the China-Australia FTA (2015) is an exception, 
where mediation is explicitly referred to in treaty texts.1087 
For a China-EU BIT, if state-state mediation is proposed by the EU in negotiations, the 
absence of such a reference or regulation in China’s existing IIAs should not be strong 
enough to infer that China would reject an explicit incorporation of state-state 
mediation. This is particularly supported by its recently consistent emphasis on the 
amicable settlement of investment disputes and the use of mediation under its “One 
Belt One Road” Initiative. Furthermore, incorporating an explicit reference to state-
state mediation in the main body of a China-EU BIT is suggested here strongly. This is 
mainly because such a reference would give a clear indication of the availability of this 
DSM and thus increase the possibility of it being used in practice. Attaching additional 
rules to state-state mediation in order to give necessary procedural guidance is also 
1082 See e.g. the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Annex 10, Art. 3.4. 
1083 See e.g. the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Annex 10, Art. 4.3. 
1084 See e.g. the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Annex 10, Art. 4.6. 
1085 As previously argued in Section 5.2.2.4, supra, at least part of the reason for joining the WTO and accepting 
the jurisdiction of the WTO Dispute Settlement System is seeing its function in existing cases. 
1086 Edna Sussman, Developing an Effective Med-Arb/Arb-Med Process, New York Dispute Resolution Lawyer, Vol. 
2, 2009, pp. 71-74. 
1087 Specifically, probably by copying the relevant article in the WTO DSU, good offices and conciliation are 
mentioned together with mediation in one article as alternative DSMs to adjudication. See: the China-Australia FTA 
(2015), Art. 15.6; DSU, Art. 5. 
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desirable. For this, the state-state mediation rules in the treaties concluded by the EU 
could serve as the starting point for further negotiations between the two parties.  
In this sense, it is noted that some provisions contained in the EU’s current state-state 
mediation rules are likely to be faced with hesitation and even resistance from China, a 
typical example of which is the requirement to publish mutually agreed solutions. 
Although the settlement agreements disclosed to the public must exclude information 
that is designated as confidential by a disputing party, such a transparency requirement 
would mean that at least the existence of mediation and basic information about the 
concerned dispute are revealed to the public. Given the fact that this does not exist in 
China’s relevant practice, together with the concern from the perspective of its 
traditional negative attitude towards disputes, it is possible that China will ask for 
complete confidentiality in relation to state-state mediation in the negotiations of a 
China-EU BIT.  
In addition, by referring to the recent progress made by other entities around the world, 
such as the IBA Rules for Investor-State Mediation (2012), some issues are argued to 
be worth being considered in the negotiations of the prospective China-EU BIT. First, 
introducing the possible use of co-mediators can be useful to maximize mediators’ 
skills and to address the concerns about equality in the process. Second, in order to 
create a forum for relevant stakeholders to engage in direct communication to resolve 
the whole dispute, the possible involvement of interested parties with the consent of the 
disputing parties may be an option in state-state mediation.1088 Such interested parties 
can include investors and industrial organizations which have substantial interests in 
the case at issue. This may undermine the chances of successful mediation, since it 
increases the number of possibly diverging interests. However, compared to its 
potential benefits, which is resolving the dispute by taking into account all key 
stakeholders’ interests, such an arrangement still deserves a try. 
In summary, an agreement is likely to be reached regarding amicable mechanisms for 
SSDS, providing for consultations with additional requirements for a certain amount of 
time as a precondition to initiating the adjudication process and encouraging the use of 
state-state mediation with some procedural guidance. Such an approach not only 
already exists in the existing practice of both China and the EU, but it goes along with 
China’s legal cultural characteristic of preferring amicable DSMs and it does not go 
against the EU’s legal tradition of respecting the rule of law for which alternative 
dispute resolution is another way of having access to justice.1089 
1088  Chang-fa Lo et. al., Concept Paper on the Creation of a Permanent "Asia-Pacific Regional Mediation 
Organization" for State-to-State (Economy-to-Economy) Disputes, Comtemporary Asia Arbitration Journal, Vol. 10, 
2017, p. 327. 
1089 To further promote the use of amicable DSMs, additional inspiration may be found in the new Netherlands 
Model BIT (2018), where tribunals are explicitly allowed to propose to disputing states at any stage to settle the 
dispute amicably, which may be realized through the settlement of the dispute ex aequo et bono if disputing states 
agree. See: The Netherlands Model BIT (2018), Art. 25.5. 
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10.3.2 The Adjudicative Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
When amicable DSMs are not effective in settling state-state disputes, an adjudication 
mechanism can come into play to ensure the resolution of the dispute. Adjudication for 
state-state disputes in IIAs, and more broadly in FTAs and comprehensive economic 
agreements, is often built upon arbitration. A China-EU BIT may not follow such a 
practice, but it may adopt a quasi-WTO dispute settlement panel proceedings model as 
the basic structure. Despite such a possible consensus, the rules on transparency and 
third-party intervention, as well as the effect of state-state adjudication decisions are 
likely to be problematic, in particular. These three issues are thus addressed in turn as 
follows. 
10.3.2.1 A quasi-WTO dispute settlement Panel Proceedings Mechanism 
China’s concluded IIAs and the EU’s ICS present different practices of state-state 
adjudication: the former adopts ad hoc arbitration, while the latter uses a DSM that 
greatly resembles the WTO panel proceedings. In comparison, the adjudicative DSM 
in the EU’s ICS further incorporates more judicial features than the design of panel 
proceedings in the WTO. A typical example is the pre-established list of adjudicators, 
from which the adjudicators for specific cases are selected. This resembles the practice 
of the WTO Appellate Body, although disputing parties may still enjoy some power to 
choose their own adjudicators from the list in the ICS.1090 At the same time, it is in line 
with the relevant operation in courts and thus shows a greater extent of judicialization. 
This is in clear contrast with the way in which adjudicators are selected in ad hoc 
arbitration, where each party is free to choose their preferred adjudicator according to 
the specific situation of each case. Although China’s existing IIAs and FTAs mostly 
adopt ad hoc arbitration, the state-state adjudication mechanism in the China-Australia 
FTA (2015) also seems to have been inspired by the WTO DSU. This is evidenced by 
the general structure as well as detailed procedural designs contained in this Agreement. 
Such a change in China’s practice might be based on Australia’s insistence, but at least 
the conclusion of the final deal proves China’s acceptance of the use of a quasi-WTO 
dispute settlement panel proceedings mechanism. This is probably due to China’s 
positive experience in resolving trade disputes in the WTO and the lack of a real use of 
ad hoc state-state arbitration in practice. However, it deserves attention that, on the 
issue of the composition of tribunals, the approach used in ad hoc arbitration is still 
followed in the China-Australia FTA (2015), which indicates to the emphasis put on 
party autonomy in selecting adjudicators by treaty parties, including China. 
Therefore, for a China-EU BIT, in general, the provisions on the panel proceedings in 
the WTO DSU are expected to be used as the reference for the adjudication process in 
the SSDS system. From initiation of arbitration, composition of tribunals, issuance of 
 
1090 Under the EU-Singapore IPA (2018) and the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), each disputing party can select one 
arbitrator from its proposed list and the chairman is to be chosen by the Chair of the Joint Committee by drawing a 
lot from the list of chairs. In contrast, under CETA (2012), all arbitrators are selected by drawing a lot from pre-
established lists by the Chair of the Joint Committee, and thus disputing parties do not have a say in selecting 
adjudicators if no agreement can be reached. See: the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.29; the EU-Vietnam IPA 
(2018), Art. 3.7; CETA (2012), Art. 29.7. 
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interim and final reports, to compliance proceedings, the prospective treaty would cover 
the whole process with detailed rules on specific issues. Although China has 
traditionally been hesitant to accept international judicialized systems, especially those 
that have been rarely used due to a fear of uncertainty, its experience in the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System is likely to have a positive effect on China accepting to 
participate in a similar system. It is important to note that China’s positive experience 
in the WTO Dispute Settlement System also included appellate review, which is absent 
from the design of SSDS here. However, the procedural arrangements in the panel 
proceedings should undoubtedly also be an indispensable element that is seen to have 
contributed to China’s trust in the whole dispute settlement system. 
With regard to the potential problematic issue of selecting adjudicators, although a pre-
established roster is not used in the China-Australia FTA (2015), in consideration of 
China’s open attitude towards such an approach in ISDS, 1091  changing the major 
approach in its concluded IIAs and accepting the EU’s proposal on this issue is possible. 
In fact, if using pre-selected adjudicators is accepted by China for ISDS, it should be 
reasonable to expect that China would not reject it for SSDS, where the adjudicators 
are still in fact chosen by the disputing parties. The use of a pre-established roster is 
suggested to include a certain respect for party autonomy regarding the composition of 
the division for a specific case. Namely, each disputing party can select one arbitrator 
from its proposed list and the chairman is to be chosen by the Chair of the Joint 
Committee by drawing a lot from the list of chairs if no agreement can be reached 
between disputing parties.1092 This resembles China’s existing practice in the sense that 
a division is still composed at the beginning of each dispute. At the same time, this was 
in fact adopted in the EU-Singapore IPA (2018) and the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), 
although not in CETA (2012). Therefore, it is expected to be the option that is likely to 
be agreed upon by China and the EU. 
10.3.2.2 Transparency and Third-Party Participation 
Another innovation in the EU’s ICS, which also constitutes a striking difference with 
China’s practice, are the rules on transparency and third-party participation. In most of 
China’s concluded IIAs, ad hoc arbitration is the basic mechanism and thus 
confidentiality of proceedings is a key feature. In particular, the requirement of holding 
hearings in closed session also exists in the China-Australia FTA (2015). In addition, 
no provision on third-party participation can be found in any of China’s IIAs. However, 
in the EU-Singapore IPA (2018) and the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), a public hearing is 
explicitly prescribed and the possibility of accepting amicus curiae submissions is 
addressed. Such changes in SSDS is probably a result of the spill-over effect of the 
increased transparency and openness in ISDS, mainly due to the public interests 
involved, which is also present in SSDS. In fact, examples of transparency being 
 
1091 This can be evidenced by the newly released CIETAC Investment Arbitration Rules. See: CIETAC Investment 
Arbitration Rules (2017), Art. 11.1. 
1092 The list of chairs is expected to be established by the Joint Committee composed of the representatives from 
treaty parties no later than a certain time after the date of the entry into force of a China-EU IIA, and this should be 
provided in the text of this treaty. This is based on the inspiration drawn from the EU’s concluded IIAs. See: CETA 
(2012), Art. 29.8; the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.44; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.23. 
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extended to state-state adjudication can be traced back to 2012. The 2012 US Model 
BIT provides that transparency rules in investor-state arbitration apply mutatis 
mutandis to interstate arbitration. 1093  The WTO Dispute Settlement System also 
provides an example of the possibility of opening hearings and accepting amicus curiae 
briefs. 
In terms of a China-EU BIT, transparency of state-state adjudication may be not 
acceptable to China. First, in the WTO Dispute Settlement System, procedural 
transparency has not received clear support from China. Second, different from ISDS, 
there is not a very strong support for transparency in SSDS, either at the international 
level or within in China. Third, ad hoc arbitration, which constitutes the main part of 
China’s existing practice of state-state adjudication, is normally required to be held 
behind closed doors. Therefore, it is likely that the overall procedural transparency of 
state-state adjudication process will not be welcomed and may even be rejected by 
China. In terms of third-party participation, it is advised to open the door for accepting 
amicus curiae submissions in SSDS adjudication under a China-EU BIT. Although this 
does not exist in China’s concluded IIAs either, the reasons for China to refuse this are 
not as strong as the reasons to accept transparency. 1094  Furthermore, such an 
acceptance will particularly give interested investors an opportunity to have their 
opinions heard by state-state tribunals and thus may help to find a solution that is 
satisfying for diverse stakeholders and to settle all relevant disputes efficiently. 
10.3.2.3 The Effect of State-State Adjudication Decisions 
A crucial but controversial issue is the legal effect of decisions reached by state-state 
tribunals. Three possibilities have been categorized: the narrowest one is binding on 
treaty parties with respect to a particular dispute only; the intermediate construction is 
binding on the treaty parties generally rather than simply with regard to that dispute; 
while the broadest one was defined as binding in general, i.e., binding on the treaty 
parties, investors, and future state-state and investor-state tribunals. 1095  From the 
perspective of ensuring certainty and consistency, the third option is clearly preferable. 
However, its suitability in the context of a China-EU BIT needs to be given a second 
thought. First, there seems to be no provision setting an overall rule on the effect of 
decisions of state-state tribunals in China’s or the EU’s relevant treaties. Second, based 
on the analysis in Section 10.3.2.1, supra, state-state adjudication in the prospective 
China-EU BIT is likely to adopt a quasi-WTO dispute settlement panel proceedings 
mechanism and, in the DSU, there is no discussion regarding the binding force of panel 
and Appellate Body reports adopted under the DSU for the parties to the dispute at 
issue.1096 In such a situation, a provision setting a clear boundary of the legal effect of 
1093 The 2012 US Model BIT, Art. 37(4). Another example is the Investment Agreement for the Common Investment 
Area of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Art. 27(3)-(4) and Annex A, Art. 9. 
1094 It is admitted that third parties will be able to submit an amicus curiae brief only when there is a certain degree 
of transparency in the proceedings. Relevant information can be disclosed by disputing parties to selected entities, 
such as potential third parties, to enable them to submit amicus curiae briefs. 
1095 Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of Interdependent Rights and 
Shared Interpretive Authority, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 55, 2014, pp. 59-60.  
1096 Nevertheless, there has been great consistency in the WTO Dispute Settlement System, mainly because of the 
requirement of the system to provide “security and predictability to the multilateral trading system”. See: DSU, Art. 
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decisions by tribunals may result in hesitation from both sides because of a lack of 
experience. 
However, complete silence on this potentially problematic issue would leave it open to 
arguments and thus create uncertainty and unpredictability in future cases.1097 Thus, it 
is recommended that certain guidance be stated in treaty texts. In this regard, instead of 
formulating a provision setting out the clear scope, incorporating a provision similar to 
the DSU Article 3.2 is a preferable option. Such a provision could realize the goal of 
maintaining consistency, establishing jurisprudence and realizing the rule of law within 
the system to a large extent, while leaving a certain amount of flexibility. In particular, 
like the practice in the WTO Appellate Body, this can be realized through routine 
communications among the listed adjudicators. Furthermore, considering the fact that 
the adjudicators for any state-state adjudication case are chosen by treaty parties from 
the pre-established list and treaty parties can reach an agreement if any tribunal’s 
decision is undesirable, the possible uncertainty created by this proposed general 
guidance should be acceptable. At the same time, considering China’s and the EU’s 
positive perception of the functioning of the WTO Dispute Settlement System, this is 
more likely to be accepted by both sides. 
10.4 Conclusion 
Evidenced by the absence of the real use of state-state adjudication in the past practice 
of both sides, amicable DSMs have probably played the main role in resolving state-
state investment disputes for both China and the EU, which is expected to continue 
under the prospective China-EU BIT. Thus, it is appropriate to take settling disputes as 
the goal of the whole SSDS system. 
In an IIA, a SSDS system is normally applicable to disputes about the interpretation 
and application of treaty provisions, based on which treaty parties can raise diplomatic 
protection claims, interpretive claims and claims for declaratory relief. Such an 
approach is likely to continue in a China-EU BIT. Within the SSDS system under this 
BIT, specific DSMs can be divided into two categories—amicable DSMs and 
adjudicative DSMs. The former normally comes into play in the first place, possibly 
through consultations and mediation. In particular, consultations are likely to be set as 
a precondition to initiating the state-state adjudication process. 
Regarding adjudication, the most recent treaty practice of both China and the EU 
represents their interests in using a quasi-WTO dispute settlement panel proceedings 
mechanism, and this may also serve as the general structure under a China-EU BIT. 
Based on this, a problematic issue is likely to be the composition of tribunals. In this 
regard, China and the EU are likely to reach an agreement on pre-establishing a roster 
3.2. 
1097 Aron Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States, Recueil des Cours, Vol. 136, 1972, p. 377. Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A 
Hybrid Theory of Interdependent Rights and Shared Interpretive Authority, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 
55, 2014, p. 29. 
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of adjudicators and leave room for party autonomy in specific cases. Another issue that 
should be considered is procedural transparency. For a China-EU BIT, opening the 
whole process of adjudication to the public may be rejected by China, but third party 
participation, for example by submitting amicus curiae briefs is likely to be acceptable 
and even recommended. In terms of the effect of tribunals’ decisions in state-state 
adjudication, a moderate approach, incorporating a provision similar to Article 3.2 of 
the DSU may be the most acceptable option. This means that the rulings would only 
have a precedential value, instead of being binding on all following cases. 
Although state-state DSMs only played a minor role in investment dispute resolution 
in the past, this should not be the reason to underestimate its potential use under a 
China-EU BIT. Considering the clear intention behind increasing the states’ role in 
investment dispute settlement evidenced by recent practice in China and the EU, it is 
reasonable to expect that, with proper procedural arrangements which satisfy practical 
needs of both sides and eliminate the concerns from the legal culture on dispute 
settlement, such a system in the prospective China-EU BIT is likely to make real 
contribution to investment dispute settlement. 
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Chapter 11 The Investor-State Dispute Settlement System in the Prospective 
China-EU Bilateral Investment Treaty 
As addressed in Section 2.2, supra, international investment dispute settlement (ISDS) 
has two components. In addition to state-state DSMs, investor-state DSMs constitute 
another part of the whole system, and has been the most used in practice. As evidenced 
the concluded treaties of China and the EU, in the past decade, incorporating DSMs for 
investor-state dispute settlement in IIAs has been the common practice. Furthermore, 
with regard to the prospective China-EU BIT, there is no sign of a reluctance to have 
an ISDS system included in the BIT.1098 It is thus fair to say that there are no doubts 
about the intention to incorporate such a system in general; instead, potential problems 
may exist in relation to its procedural design.  
Although the EU has not published a model BIT serving as a reference for future 
negotiations,1099 it has developed some strong ideas about the direction it wants to go 
in from its consistent practice in its concluded IIAs after the Lisbon Treaty. Specifically, 
the Investment Court System (hereinafter “the ICS”) in CETA (2012), the EU-Vietnam 
IPA (2018) and the EU-Singapore IPA (2018) arguably constitutes a blueprint of the 
EU’s proposal for investor-state dispute settlement provisions for its prospective IIAs. 
On the other hand, although China has published its model BITs, which are expected 
to be followed in general and thus help somewhat in achieving consistency, the practice 
in reality has not been as stable as the practice in the EU. In fact, China’s various IIAs 
with different partners differ to a large extent. Against this background, for the purpose 
of the present chapter, which explores the procedural design of the ISDS system in the 
prospective China-EU BIT, it is reasonable to expect that using the EU’s ICS as the 
basis and further predicting China’s attitude thereto will deliver an effective and 
efficient result to the research question. 
Although in the past in the field of international law China was largely a rule-taker 
rather than a rule-maker, it is noted that, with its increasing economic power and the 
corresponding enhanced position in international economic law, China has changed its 
role from being a partner that would easily agree to any ready-made proposal put on 
 
1098 Unlike the situation for negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), there seems to 
be no debate within the EU regarding the incorporation of an ISDS system in a China-EU BIT. In fact, having such 
a system in a China-EU BIT was even taken as an argument for incorporating one in the TTIP, by stating that the 
exclusion of the latter would hinder the way it would be incorporated into other prospective IIAs with other states, 
such as China. See: Axel Berger & Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership, Investor-State Dispute Settlement and China, Columbia FDI Perspectives, Vol. 140, 2015. Wolfgang 
Koeth, Can the Investment Court System (ICS) Save TTIP and CETA?, European Institute of Public Administration 
Working Paper, Vol. 2016/W/01, 2016, p. 8. Similarly, China has not shown any hesitation in relation to the 
incorporation of an ISDS system in its BIT with the EU. 
1099  The EU Commission has steadfastly refused to publish a model investment treaty since receiving the 
competence for foreign direct investment from the Lisbon Treaty. See: Calamita N. Jansen, The Making of Europe's 
International Investment Policy: Uncertain First Steps, Legal Issues of Economic Integration, Vol. 39, 2012, pp. 
316-322. 
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the negotiation table.1100 As witnessed by the measures it has taken under the OBOR 
Initiative, China now seems to be willing to contribute “Chinese elements” to 
international law making. Thus, in the negotiations for a China-EU BIT, both parties 
should be in equal positions to negotiate an ISDS system that satisfies their respective 
needs. Previous discussions in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 have revealed different 
preferences of China and the EU in investor-state dispute settlement on various 
procedural issues, which are likely to lead to difficulties in the negotiations for the 
prospective China-EU BIT. In particular, some features are rooted in the legal culture 
of dispute settlement in China and the EU respectively and relate to the fundamental 
values that one side intends to protect, making them difficult to abandon or even change. 
Similar to Chapter 10, supra, this chapter focuses on anticipating the proposals that are 
likely to be brought to the negotiation table for the ISDS system by China and by the 
EU, in order to see whether they are mutually complementary or contradictory and 
conflicting with each other. The discussion in this chapter is mainly based on the 
relevant practice of both parties addressed in Part 3, supra, with due consideration for 
their legal cultural characteristics in dispute resolution analysed in Part 2, supra, as well 
as their investment legal relationship discussed in Chapter 9, supra. Specifically, it 
covers the objective and jurisdiction of the ISDS system, as well as the amicable DSMs, 
the international adjudication mechanism and the local remedies contained therein. 
Considering the ongoing heated discussions on ISDS reform, which should be borne in 
mind by both parties, the present discussion is also supplemented by the status quo of 
the development of investment dispute settlement in the world and takes into account 
the relevant practice from other entities. It does not aim to provide a comprehensive 
analysis of all the details of each DSM contained in the ISDS system in a China-EU 
BIT; instead, it focuses on exploring the crucial but potentially thorny issues and offers 
reflections on the possible solutions thereto. 
 
11.1 The Objective of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement System 
The differences in the understanding of the general objective of a dispute settlement 
system between China and the EU is expected to also have an influence on their attitude 
towards ISDS. Resolving disputes amicably and restoring the relationship between 
disputing parties is taken as the key concern for China, while the EU puts more weight 
on access to justice, developing jurisprudence and preserving the rule of law. Such 
differences can be traced back to the traditional Chinese philosophies that still affect 
the current ideology in Chinese society and China’s domestic legal system, as well as 
the constants in the EU’s legal tradition and the Union’s relevant internal measures.  
Regarding the objective of having amicable ISDS mechanisms in a China-EU BIT, 
similar to SSDS, they must be differentiated from adjudicative mechanisms in the sense 
that they focus on settling disputes. Given the fact that investor-state adjudication has 
been considered to be the “teeth” of ISDS, as proven by the large number of existing 
 
1100 Tomáš Fecák, International Investment Agreements and EU Law, Kluwer Law International, 2016, p. 291. 
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cases, it should be an appropriate choice to take the developing jurisprudence and the 
international rule of law as the overall relevant theme in investor-state adjudication. 
Therefore, an adjudication mechanism that is independent, neutral and capable of 
producing binding decisions to enhance the legitimacy of the international treaty is 
indispensable.1101  Such an effective and legitimized DSM can also function as an 
important component of international cooperation by reducing the number of economic 
and political disputes.1102  
 
11.2 The Jurisdiction of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement System 
Like SSDS, rules on the ISDS system in an IIA normally start with a provision setting 
out the system’s jurisdiction by identifying the types of covered disputes. The 
jurisdiction of the ISDS system is often defined as any dispute between a claimant of 
one treaty party and the other treaty party concerning treatment alleged to breach the 
provisions of investment protection provided by the IIA at issue and to cause loss or 
damage to the claimant or its locally established enterprise.1103 The exact scope of 
investment protection depends on treaty parties’ agreement on the substantive 
obligations of host states, which goes beyond the scope of the present thesis. What 
deserves particular attention in this regard is that investor-state arbitration is limited to 
disputes about the amount of compensation for expropriation. This exists in China’s 
early IIAs, but it basically disappeared in its IIAs concluded after 2000. Thus, such a 
provision is not likely to be supported by China in the China-EU BIT negotiation. 
Furthermore, as evidenced by the concluded IIAs of both parties, the normal practice 
that only monetary damages and returning the original property to investors are 
measures that can be awarded by tribunals is expected to continue in a China-EU BIT, 
and thus the applicable claims in investor-state adjudication are limited in this way. 
 
11.3 Amicable Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
In general, the desire to settle disputes in a swift and cost-effective way and to preserve 
the long-term relationship between investors and host states were particularly viewed 
as the motivation for using amicable investor-state DSMs.1104 In addition, investment 
disputes are likely to be complex, involving both legal and non-legal issues, which 
requires a thorough consideration of the various elements. Therefore, solutions based 
on the interests of the parties, instead of strictly and solely interpreting legal provisions, 
 
1101 Frank J. Garcia, New Frontiers in International Trade: Decision-making and Dispute Resolution in the Free 
Trade Area of the Americas: An Essay in Trade Governance, Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 18, 1997, 
pp. 365-367. 
1102 Edward D. Mansfield & Brian M. Pollins (eds.), Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New 
Perspectives on an Enduring Debate, The University of Michigan Press, 2003, p. 222. 
1103 See e.g. the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.1.1. In China’s model BITs, the description is simpler by describing 
the ISDS system’s jurisdiction as “[a]ny dispute between an investor of one Contracting Party and the other 
Contracting Party in connection with an investment in the territory of the other Contracting Party”. See: China Model 
BITs (1984, 1989, 1997), Arts. 9.1; China Model BIT (2010), Art. 13.1. 
1104 Barton Legum & Anna Joubin-Bret & Inna Manassyan, Rules for Investor–State Mediation: Draft Prepared by 
the International Bar Association State Mediation Subcommittee, at: Roberto Echandi & Pierre Sauvé, Prospects in 
International Investment Law and Policy-World Trade Forum, Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 265-266. 
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should be preferred in many situations. Such solutions are easier to realize through 
amicable DSMs. In particular, considering the increasing recognition of the potential 
function of amicable mechanisms for investment dispute settlement for China and the 
EU, it is reasonable to expect that such DSMs would gain the attention of both parties 
during their negotiations for a China-EU BIT. 
By referring to the existing practice in China and the EU, the often-incorporated 
amicable DSMs for ISDS, negotiation, consultations and mediation, are expected to be 
referred to in a China-EU BIT. Considering that currently the use of amicable DSMs in 
practice is rare and the possible reasons for this, two questions are considered in 
particular to provide guidance for the following analysis: first, whether an amicable 
DSM should be mandated or recommended as the first-tier of dispute resolution; and 
second, whether and, if so, to what extent procedural guidance should be provided for 
the operation of these mechanisms in treaty texts. 
11.3.1 Negotiation 
Negotiation, or at least an attempt to negotiate, is usually the starting point of ISDS, 
which is affected by the trust of disputing parties in their bilateral relationship and the 
expectation of continuing cooperation in the investment project at issue. The 
negotiation process is bilateral, confidential and voluntary. In IIAs, including most 
existing BITs between China and EU Member States, this DSM is not explicitly 
referred to. A general statement is provided requiring that any dispute between an 
investor of one treaty party and the other treaty party “shall be settled amicably as far 
as possible by the two parties concerned”.1105 On this point, it deserves attention that 
the EU’s two most recently concluded IIAs, the EU-Singapore IPA (2018) and the EU-
Vietnam IPA (2018), mention negotiation in particular as an available DSM for 
reaching amicable settlement in treaty texts.1106 
Although it is difficult to assess the real use of negotiation in practice, because the 
required confidentiality, it was pointed out that negotiation is China’s usual approach 
to resolving disputes with foreign investors as a host state, which was the major reason 
for its low numbers of ISDS cases.1107 This may come from China’s intention to 
maintain its reputation as a desirable investment destination and its consistent pro-
amicable DSMs attitude, which is also in line with its similar preferences in other 
relevant areas, such as international trade law. 
For the prospective China-EU BIT, it is thus expected that amicable settlement through 
negotiation would be explicitly stated and encouraged in the treaty text. Procedural 
rules are not necessary for the negotiation process, since it is the least formal 
mechanism among all DSMs. In order to increase the possibility of amicable settlement, 
it is suggested that it should be made explicit in the treaty that, when negotiations 
 
1105 See e.g. the China-France BIT (2007), Art. 7.  
1106 The EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.2; the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.29. 
1107 Peter Malanczuk, China and the Emerging Standard of Transparency in Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
(ISDS), New Zealand Association for Comparative Law, Vol. 19, 2015, pp. 90-91. 
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between disputing parties are difficult, the joint committee can play a role to facilitate 
the process, similar to transforming negotiation into good offices. 
11.3.2 Consultations 
In addition to negotiation, consultations are another bilateral amicable DSM. Although, 
by nature, consultations are the same as negotiations, they are differentiated in the EU’s 
ICS. Specifically, the ICS first stresses that disputes can be resolved amicably through 
negotiation.1108  It also provides explicit provisions on consultations. This DSM is 
established as a compulsory step before adjudication, which means that, unless it is not 
possible to settle disputes within the minimum amount of time through consultations, 
they cannot be brought to adjudication. This can be read as a guarantee that disputing 
parties make an effort to resolve disputes through bilateral communication, and thus it 
constitutes a necessary supplement to voluntary negotiations. At the same time, the 
EU’s ICS provides detailed procedural requirements for the consultation process, such 
as the place of consultations, the content of requests for consultations and time limits. 
In particular, the content requirement of requests for consultations includes the treaty 
provisions alleged to have been breached, the legal and the factual basis for the claim, 
the relief sought and the estimated amount of damages claimed, which confirms the 
difference between consultations and negotiation. Another difference between 
negotiation and consultations is that requests for consultations are to be public, which 
does not apply to negotiation. All of these elements seem to be borrowed from the WTO 
DSU. In practice, disputing parties may start negotiations on the dispute at an early 
stage before identifying specific provisions of the IIA at issue or formulating legal and 
factual arguments to seek certain relief. In other words, when it is not possible to resolve 
the disputes using negotiation behind closed doors, disputing parties would publicly 
initiate consultations with a more solid legal basis. 
Considering China’s accumulated experience in the WTO, where consultations have 
been productive in settling disputes amicably, as well as amicable DSMs being in 
conformity with the Chinese approach to resolving disputes, such compulsory 
consultations in the EU’s ICS should be acceptable to China. In fact, Chinese scholars 
even suggested that, under the OBOR Initiative, China should refine and specify the 
rules on consultations by learning from the corresponding regulations in the EU’s ICS 
in order to ensure that consultations have a real function.1109 In this respect, it is 
noticeable that in investment arbitration cases, where going through negotiation and/or 
consultations is provided for in the IIAs at issue, some tribunals let investors proceed 
to arbitration without fulfilling such obligations.1110 Thus, for a China-EU BIT, it is 
suggested that an explicit statement of the compulsory nature of and the minimum time 
 
1108 See e.g. the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.2. 
1109 Jingxia Shi & Nuan Dong 石静霞、董暖, The Construction of Investment Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
under 'One Belt One Road' Initiatives “一带一路”倡议下投资争端解决机制的构建, Wuhan University 
International Law Review 武大国际法评论, Vol. 2, 2018, p. 5. 
1110 See e.g. Ethyl Corporation v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction, Reprinted in 
38 I.L.M. 700, 729 (1999). For some academic discussion on this, see: Christoph Schreuer, Traveling the BIT Route 
of Waiting Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the Road, The Journal of World Investment & Trade, Vol. 5, 
2004, pp. 231-239. 
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required for consultations should be added to treaty texts. In addition, one sensitive 
issue in consultations can be publishing the requests for consultations and the settlement 
agreement, if an agreement is reached. The process of consultations is widely 
recognized as confidential, and there seems to be no clear consensus on whether a right 
to know of other stakeholders would require disputing parties to publish their initial 
documents when initiating the dispute settlement process and their settlement 
agreements. It is explicitly required for the initial documents to be made public under 
the EU’s ICS.1111 Regarding the latter, the EU’s ICS does not explicitly touch upon 
this issue, and settlement agreements reached through consultations are not included in 
the list of documents that must be published. Considering China’s less radical pro-
transparency attitude, keeping not only the process but also at least the settlement 
agreements confidential is expected to be its preferred approach. In terms of the 
requests for consultations, considering the relevant requirement in the DSU, it may be 
acceptable to China to make such documents public. 
11.3.3 Mediation 
Mediation is available as another amicable mechanism for ISDS. In particular, recent 
years witnessed an increasing awareness and recognition of investor-state mediation. 
In particular, China and the EU have expressed clear intentions and have taken 
measures to develop mediation as one of the mechanisms to resolve investor-state 
disputes. Supporting evidence for this comes from the existing practice of both parties 
at the international as well as internal levels.1112 
As introduced in Section 6.3, supra, China presented its interest in using investor-state 
mediation by explicitly incorporating it into the latest China Model BIT (2010) and 
some recently concluded IIAs.1113 In these treaty documents, only a simple reference 
is provided without further guidance. Discussions on detailed investor-state mediation 
rules can be found in the academic works of Chinese scholars.1114 In China’s domestic 
legal system, as introduced in Section 3.2, supra, as far as foreign investment is 
concerned, mediation plays a significant role in dispute resolution, where both 
independent and mixed mediation mechanisms are available. In particular, since 2006, 
a quasi-mediation process designed for foreign investment dispute resolution, 
“complaints coordination”, has been promulgated. It is also noted that under the OBOR 
Initiative, using mediation for commercial dispute settlement has gained much attention 
and concrete progress has been made in this direction accordingly.1115 Such efforts may 
 
1111 See e.g. the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Annex 8, Art. 1.1(a). 
1112 In this regard, China’s and the EU’s internal legal systems not only prove their general approaches towards 
mediation, but they also indicate the elements that probably affect their investors’ attitudes towards mediation. This 
is important in the sense that mediation as a familiar and possibly functional option in investors’ home states’ legal 
systems affects the real use of investor-state mediation. 
1113 The most recent example is the Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments between 
the Government of the Republic of Colombia and the Government of the People’s Republic of China (2013). A more 
comprehensive reflection can be found in Mainland China and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership 
Arrangement Investment Agreement (signed on 22.11.2008, entered into force on 02.07.2013). 
1114  See e.g. Jingxia Shi & Nuan Dong 石静霞、董暖 , The Construction of Investment Dispute Settlement 
Mechanisms under 'One Belt One Road' Initiatives “一带一路”倡议下投资争端解决机制的构建, Wuhan 
University International Law Review 武大国际法评论, Vol. 2, 2018. 
1115 For instance, on 10 October 2018, 21 institutions from 12 states, including some EU Member States, signed the 
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have certain spill-over effect on ISDS in the near future, and therefore a similar practice 
can be expected. In fact, mediation has been referred to as the “Oriental Experience” 
by China, which contains Chinese the traditional Confucius wisdom of prioritizing 
harmony. 1116  As introduced in Section 7.2.4, supra, the intention of the EU to 
incorporate mediation in ISDS has been clearly and concretely shown in its recently 
concluded IIAs, which include separate investor-state mediation rules. It is expected 
that this will continue in the EU’s proposals for other prospective IIAs in the near future. 
Internally, the EU has also promoted the use of mediation.1117  
It is noticeable that, although mediation has been promoted by both China and the EU, 
the motivation for this seems to be different in each jurisdiction. Compared to 
adversarial adjudication, for China’s perspective mediation can eliminate disputes and 
restore harmonious relationship, which is in line with its traditional ideologies. In this 
vein, procedural justice and other basic due process requirements under the rule of law 
may be overlooked. In fact, mediation is even argued to be a threat to the rule of law in 
China.1118 For the EU, on the other hand, mediation provides for a relative ease of 
access to justice with few formalities, technicality and jargon that might otherwise 
restrict access to justice for disputing parties. 1119  Such differences in perspectives 
affect the general understanding of China and the EU of mediation and are reflected in 
their preferences for their different procedural arrangements in mediation. 
Therefore, despite China’s and the EU’s recognition of mediation for ISDS, it is 
reasonable to predict that there would be some difficulties for them to reach an 
agreement on the procedural design of investor-state mediation. In addition to the issues 
that can be inferred from their distinctive existing practice, considering both parties’ 
intention to promote a greater use of mediation, more innovative designs and thus more 
uncertainties can be expected. In particular, five crucial but controversial issues may 
stand in the way of concluding provisions on an investor-state mediation mechanism in 
 
Rome Declaration on international commercial mediation with China to promote the use of mediation for dispute 
settlement under the “One Belt One Road” Initiative. See: www.legaldaily.com.cn 法制网, "One Belt One Road" 
International Commercial Mediation Forum Took Place in Rome and Issued Rome Declaration “一带一路”国
际 商 事 调 解 论 坛 在 罗 马 召 开 并 发 布 《 罗 马 宣 言 》 , 11.10.2018, available at: 
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/Lawyer/content/2018-10/11/content_7664185.htm, last visited on 07.08.2020. 
1116 Edna Sussman, Developing an Effective Med-Arb/Arb-Med Process, New York Dispute Resolution Lawyer, Vol. 
2, 2009, pp. 71-74. 
1117 Typical examples include: European Parliament, Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 21 May 2008 on Certain Aspects of Mediation in Civil and Commercial Matters, Directive 2008/52/EC, 
24.05.2008. European Parliament, Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 
2008 on Certain Aspects of Mediation in Civil and Commercial Matters, Directive 2008/52/EC, 24.05.2008. 
European Parliament-Directorate-General for Internal Policies-Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs, 'Rebooting' the Mediation Directive: Assessing the Limited Impact of Its Implementation and 
Proposing Measures to Increase the Number of Mediations in the EU, 2014, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/493042/IPOL-JURI_ET(2014)493042_EN.pdf, 
last visited on 31.07.2020. 
1118 Knut B. Pissler, Mediation in China: Threat to the Rule of Law?, at: Klaus J. Hopt & Felix Steffek (eds.), 
Mediation: Principles and Regulation in Comparative Perspective, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 959-1009. 
1119 Laurence Boulle, Mediation: Principles, Process, Practice (3rd ed), LexisNexis Butterworths, 2011, Sections 
3.51, 6.15. See also: Jean R. Sternlight, Is Alternative Dispute Resolution Consistent with the Rule of Law? Lessons 
from Abroad, DePaul Law Review, Vol. 56, 2006, p. 570. It was also argued that mediation was not compatible with 
and supportive of the traditional rule of law values associated with adjudication. See: Sundaresh Menon, Mediation 
and the Rule of Law, The Law Society Mediation Forum, Singapore, 10.03.2017. 
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a China-EU BIT: voluntariness, selection of mediators, mediation styles, transparency, 
and enforcement of settlement agreements, which are addressed in turn in the following. 
11.3.3.1 Voluntariness 
A preliminary question is the voluntariness of initiating investor-state mediation: 
should this DSM be a compulsory or a voluntary stop on the way to adjudication? 
Arguments supporting each position exist. On the one hand, to increase the possibility 
of an amicable settlement, robust engagement in mediation is preferred. Namely, 
mediation is compulsory and accompanied by a minimum time period, in order to push 
the disputing parties to try to resolve the dispute using this amicable mechanism. On 
the other hand, voluntariness is one of the fundamental features of mediation. Even if a 
disputing party is free to terminate its participation at any point, the compulsory 
initiation of mediation prolongs the dispute resolution process. On this issue, the 
existing practice of both China and the EU supports voluntariness. 
For a China-EU BIT, adhering to voluntariness in mediation is thus considered to be 
the suitable choice, but some procedural adjustments can be made to realize a greater 
use of investor-state mediation. As pointed out by the International Bar Association, 
the use of investor-state mediation was largely affected by a lack of awareness of the 
disputing parties and practitioners. 1120  Therefore, it is suggested that, under the 
prospective China-EU BIT, if it is not chosen spontaneously, mediation should be 
offered to disputing parties by the adjudicators at the beginning of the adjudication 
process. Any party that rejects mediation can then choose to opt out but must 
demonstrate why mediation would duplicate earlier efforts, be unlikely to be productive 
or might even cause harm. 1121  Such an arrangement can be productive from the 
perspective that it ensures a clear understanding and concrete consideration of investor-
state mediation by the parties, and thus it promotes its use without prejudicing party 
autonomy. When the dispute is not suitable for mediation, compared to compulsory 
mediation, it minimizes the time wasted. 
11.3.3.2 Selection of Mediators 
Once disputing parties decide to use mediation to resolve their disputes, the next crucial 
step is to select the proper person to act as the mediator. In the EU’s ICS, disputing 
parties are expected to reach an agreement on the selection of mediators, who “shall 
not be a national of either Party, unless the disputing parties agree otherwise”.1122 It is 
indicated in particular that “such agreement may include appointing a mediator from 
the Members of the Tribunal”.1123 If the disputing parties cannot agree on the mediator, 
 
1120  Herbert Smith Freehills LLP, International Bar Association Launches Investor-State Mediation Rules, 
23.10.2012, available at: http://hsfnotes.com/adr/2012/10/23/international-bar-association-launches-investor-state-
mediation-rules/, last visited on 04.08.2020. See also: Barton Legum & Anna Joubin-Bret & Inna Manassyan, Rules 
for Investor–State Mediation: Draft Prepared by the International Bar Association State Mediation Subcommittee, 
at: Prospects in International Investment Law and Policy-World Trade Forum, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 
266. 
1121  Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy Welsh, Court-Connected General Civil ADR Programs: Aiming for 
Institutionalization, Efficient Resolution and the Experience of Justice, at: Donna Stienstra & Susan Yates (eds.), 
ADR Handbook For Judges, American Bar Association, 2004, pp. 16-17. 
1122 The EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Annex 6, Art.3.3. 
1123 The EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Annex 6, Art.3.1. 
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either of them may request the President of the Tribunal to draw the mediator by lot 
from the Members of the Tribunal. Based on this, it seems that, in the EU’s ICS, the 
selection standard for mediators is quite similar to the standard used for adjudicators. 
In fact, a code of conduct for mediators is attached to CETA, which is the same for 
arbitrators. This code particularly stresses the disclosure obligations for mediators, as 
well as their independence and impartiality. China has not included a rule on the 
selection of mediators in any of its IIAs or FTAs. Analysing this issue from a legal 
cultural perspective,  
Against this background, in the prospective China-EU BIT, it is likely to be difficult 
for treaty parties to reach an agreement on the qualifications required for mediators, 
especially related to independence and impartiality. In this regard, it is suggested that 
this issue should not be regulated in the treaty texts explicitly; instead, it is suggested 
to leave it to be determined by the disputing parties in specific cases. Such an 
arrangement would give priority to party autonomy and necessary freedom to choose 
the best person to act as a mediator in a particular case. In addition, considering the 
different functions of mediation and adjudication, it is also justifiable to apply different 
standards for adjudicators and mediators. 
11.3.3.3 Mediation Styles 
As introduced in Section 2.3.2.2, supra, mediation can be interest-based or rule-based. 
Although interest-based mediation is arguably preferable for ISDS, rule-based 
mediation also has its value, especially when disputing parties prefer this option. 
Regarding this issue, in its ICS, the EU chooses to explicitly prevent mediators from 
giving advice or comments on the consistency of the measure at issue with the 
applicable IIA,1124 which means that only interest-based mediation is allowed. There 
has been no concrete procedural rule in China’s concluded IIAs or its model BITs on 
mediation and its domestic legislation also does not give useful clues on the mediation 
style. Some scholars described the dominant approach in practice as evaluative and 
rights-based,1125 while others argue that Chinese mediation joins together the Western 
concepts of mediation, arbitration, and litigation.1126 
Therefore, a combined model is recommended for a China-EU BIT, taking interest-
based mediation as the default type and rule-based mediation as a supplement.1127 In 
other words, non-evaluative mediation based on the interests of the parties is the normal 
practice. When disputing parties reach a different agreement, it is possible to change to 
 
1124 See e.g. the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Annex 10, Art. 4.3. 
1125 See e.g. Peter Chi Hin Chan, The Position of Mediation in Contemporary Chinese Civil Justice: A Proceduralist 
Perspective, to obtain the Doctoral Degree at Maastricht University, 2016, p. 224. In this doctoral thesis, the author 
explored the features of mediation in China’ s contemporary legal system based on a doctrinal analysis and empirical 
legal research. 
1126 See e.g. Donald C. Clarke, Dispute Resolution in China, at: Tahirih V. Lee (ed.), Contract, Guanxi, and Dispute 
Resolution in China, Garland Publishing, Inc., 1997, pp. 369-422. 
1127 A similar arrangement was argued by Nancy Welsh and Andrea Kupfer Schneider for investor-state mediation 
in general. Specifically, the authors suggested that the process should begin in a facilitative manner. Discussions of 
relevant legal norms and evaluations by the mediator are supposed to be permitted at a later stage. See: Nancy A. 
Welsh & Andrea K. Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation into Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration, 
Harvard Negotiation Law Review, Vol. 18, 2013, p. 71. 
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an evaluative rule-based type. In addition to taking the preferences of the disputing 
parties into account in each case, such a combination ensures that mediation is an 
interest-based process to a large extent, which is beneficial for trust-building and 
information exchange. It also gives necessary freedom to mediators to customize the 
style as the process evolves. Specifically, mediators can make a proposal to change the 
mediation style, if a change is deemed appropriate at any point during the process.1128 
As argued, mediation is “most likely to be helpful when it includes both legal analysis 
and probing for interests”.1129  In Particular, when complex disputes are involved, 
disputing parties possibly prefer a type of mediation that can uncover their extra-legal 
interests as well as discuss applicable laws and litigation realities.1130  
This combined model is recommended to be prescribed explicitly in the prospective 
China-EU BIT, in order to give disputing parties clear information, increase the 
predictability of the process and to decrease undue influence from elements such as the 
peculiarities of mediators.1131 Other detailed procedural arrangements, such as the 
number of mediators, whether to convene or not and time management, can be left to 
disputing parties and mediators to decide on a case-by-case basis, 1132  but these 
agreements should always be clearly specified at the beginning of the mediation 
process.1133 In order to realize this, a checklist that lists key procedural issues and 
describes possible choices or offers some guidelines, which parties are free to choose 
from, can be attached to the provided mediation rules. In this regard, a reference to the 
International Bar Association Investor-Mediation Rules can be another option, subject 
to the provisions in the prospective China-EU BIT and disputing parties’ agreements. 
The overarching guiding principle here should be make the investor-state mediation 
 
1128 For example, a mediator may start with an interest-based approach, then propose to transit to a rule-based style 
of reaching a settlement agreement. 
1129 Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea K. Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation into Bilateral Investment 
Treaty Arbitration, Harvard Negotiation Law Review, Vol. 18, 2013, p. 114. 
1130 Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea K. Schneider, Becoming "Investor-State Mediation", Penn State Journal of Law & 
International Affairs, Vol. 1, 2012, p. 94. 
1131 It was argued that the existence of different types of legal-cultural idiosyncrasies would call for rules should 
clarify the models that may be used if mediation is added to the investment context. See: A. Timothy Martin, 
International Mediation: An Evolving Market, at: Arthur W. Rovine (ed.), Contemporary Issues in International 
Arbitration and Mediation: The Fordham Papers (2010), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011, p. 415. 
1132 In this regard, some innovative designs in the IBA Rules for Investor-State Mediation can be good references, 
such as co-mediators and mediation management conferences. See: IBA Rules for Investor-State Mediation (2012), 
Art. 4.1 and 9. For some comments on these innovations, see: Munir Maniruzzaman, A Rethink of Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 30.05.2013, available at: 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2013/05/30/a-rethink-of-investor-state-dispute-settlement/, last visited on 
04.08.2020. Herbert Smith Freehills LLP, International Bar Association Launches Investor-State Mediation Rules, 
23.10.2012, available at: http://hsfnotes.com/adr/2012/10/23/international-bar-association-launches-investor-state-
mediation-rules/, last visited on 04.08.2020. Barton Legum & Anna Joubin-Bret & Inna Manassyan, Rules for 
Investor–State Mediation: Draft Prepared by the International Bar Association State Mediation Subcommittee, at: 
Prospects in International Investment Law and Policy-World Trade Forum, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 
269. 
1133 As pointed out, on procedural arrangements of international mediation, “difficulties could easily be addressed 
by providing clear guidelines and definitions on mutually identified parameter”, which would “at least inform 
disputants of differences and how they may have an impact on the process or the outcome to their dispute”. See: 
Manon Schonewille & Jeremy Lack, Mediation in the European Union and Abroad: 60 States Divided by a Common 
Word?, at: The Variegated Landscape of Mediation: A Comparative Study of Mediation Regulation and Practices in 
Europe and the World, Eleven International Publishing, 2014, p. 21. 
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process accessible to a wide range of end-users by balancing procedural flexibility and 
predictability. 
11.3.3.4 Transparency 
Transparency has been discussed extensively and increasingly realized in investor-state 
arbitration in the past decades. Although most of the characteristics also exist in 
mediation,1134  confidentiality is one of the core advantages of mediation which is 
different from arbitration. It creates a desirable environment for parties to negotiate 
freely, without the fear of their positions being disclosed or being used against them in 
future dispute resolution proceedings. Consequently, mediators are can gather the 
necessary information to help parties to reach a satisfying settlement. If transparency 
would be required, disputing parties would probably reconsider their approaches and 
be more cautious about their interactions, and thus the possibility of resolving the 
dispute with a settlement agreement could be negatively affected. 
Under the EU’s investor-state mediation rules in the ICS, at least the existence of cases 
and final settlement agreements are made available to the public.1135 This may have 
been inspired by the IBA Rules for Investor-State Mediation (2012), which provide 
similar provisions.1136 Such a practice helps to ensure that settlement agreements are 
consistent with the IIA at issue, which is in line with the EU’s perception of mediation 
as a way of having access to justice and the rule of law in its legal culture. However, 
such a deviation from confidentiality can raise concerns from China. Various reasons 
contribute to such a speculation. First, the confidentiality of the proceedings and 
outcomes is recognized as one of the advantages of mediation over arbitration, in the 
sense that a litigated dispute with a major investor “can have negative consequences for 
international perceptions of the investment climate in the host country”,1137 which has 
been one of China’s main concerns. Second, mediation is prescribed as confidential in 
the Chinese mediation rules, unless the disputing parties agree otherwise.1138 This is 
affected by the fact that confidential nature of mediation is in line with the Chinese 
legal cultural tradition of “no litigation” (Wúsòng, 无讼).1139 Such a tradition means 
that disputes are expected to be avoided, and resolving a dispute in a transparent way 
is similar to washing the dirty linen in public. Making the existence and some elements 
of parties’ disputes public would cause discomfort for the disputing parties and thus 
reduce the attractiveness of mediation. Third, mediation is considered by China as the 
DSM with Chinese characteristics, and therefore the prospect of accepting a practice 
that deviates from one of the fundamental features of Chinese mediation looks bleak. 
In this vein, it deserves attention that the newly published Arbitration Rules of the 
 
1134 This refers to the involvement of public interest and the requirement for the accountability of the host state’s 
government. 
1135 See e.g. the EU-Singapore IPA, Annex 6, Arts. 4.6, 6.3. 
1136 IBA Rules for Investor-State Mediation (2012), Arts. 10.1, 10.3. 
1137 Jeswald W. Salacuse, Is There a Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, Investor-State Dispute 
Resolution, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 31, 2007, p. 177. 
1138 See e.g. China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT)/China Chamber of International 
Commerce (CCOIC), CCPIT/CCOIC Mediation Rules (enforced on 01.05.2012), Art. 22. 
1139 Jinfan Zhang, The Tradition and Modern Transition of Chinese Law, Springer, 2014, pp. 429-456. 
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China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission for International 
Investment Disputes (2017) create the possibility of engaging in investor-state 
mediation and it is clearly stated that such mediation shall be confidential. 1140 
Furthermore, although it seems that China has changed its attitude towards transparency 
in investor-state arbitration from first rejecting it now to acceptance,1141 this is not the 
same story for mediation. There is no sign of an increase in transparency in investor-
state mediation domestically in China or in the international community. Therefore, it 
is reasonable to expect that the transparency requirement of investor-state mediation, 
albeit limited to the existence of a case and the settlement agreement reached in the end, 
would be difficult for China to accept. Furthermore, even if it is accepted in the 
prospective China-EU BIT, it is likely to diminish the attractiveness of mediation and 
become a big hurdle in its use in practice by China or Chinese investors. 
For a China-EU BIT, confidentiality is proposed to be respected as a rule, but an 
exception can be created for party autonomy. Namely, disputing parties can disclose 
the existence of mediation, certain aspects of their settlement agreement or other details 
of the process, if this is agreed upon. 1142  In this way, the confidential nature of 
mediation is largely maintained and the possibility of other arrangements is not 
excluded. In addition, considering the fact that transparency would very likely exist in 
investor-state adjudication, maintaining confidentiality in mediation as the default rule 
should be preferred in order to provide disputing parties with different levels of 
procedural transparency in various DSMs within the ISDS system.1143 
11.3.3.5 Enforcement of Settlement Agreements 
The enforcement of settlement agreements is a practical issue that may lead to 
mediation being faced with scepticism as a way of resolving investor-state disputes. 
Successful mediation leads to a new agreement between disputing parties, the 
implementation of which is not guaranteed, since it is not readily enforceable as an 
arbitral award which benefits from the enforcement regimes under the ICSID 
Convention or the 1958 New York Convention. As a result, mediation may simply 
prolong the dispute resolution process without any reliable result. Although resolving 
a dispute through mediation implies an expectation of a high level of voluntary 
compliance, disputing parties would likely prefer to have a certain guarantee of 
compliance. Therefore, providing a sufficient guarantee of the implementation of 
 
1140 Arbitration Rules of the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission for International 
Investment Disputes (enforced on 01.10.2017), Art. 43(2). 
1141 Peter Malanczuk, China and the Emerging Standard of Transparency in Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
(ISDS), New Zealand Association for Comparative Law, Vol. 19, 2015, pp. 91-93. 
1142 There have been several examples of non-confidential public sector resource mediations, which demonstrate 
the possibility of transparency in investor-state mediation cases to various extents. See e.g. Francis McGovern, 
Mediation of the Snake River Basin Adjudication, Idaho Law Review, Vol. 42, 2006, pp. 548-553. 
1143  In this regard, another possible way of compromising diverse preferences of both parties may be the 
intermediate approach taken by ICSID in its newly proposed investor-state mediation rules, where only the 
disclosure of the fact that the parties are mediating, or have mediated, is required, and all other information related 
to mediation, including any settlement agreement, shall be kept confidential. See: ICSID Mediation Rules, Rule 8. 
See: International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID 
Rules-Working Paper #2-Volume 1, 03.2019, available at: https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/Vol_1.pdf, last 
visited on 03.08.2020. 
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settlement agreements is of significance, which would increase the attractiveness of 
investor-state mediation and thus contribute to the amicable settlement of investor-state 
disputes. 
Neither China nor the EU explicitly dealt with this issue in their existing IIAs, where 
relevant provisions only stress that “each disputing party shall endeavour to take the 
measures necessary to implement the mutually agreed solution within the agreed 
timeframe” and “[t]he implementing disputing party shall inform the other disputing 
party in writing of any steps or measures taken to implement the mutually agreed 
solution”.1144 While internally both parties have created mechanisms to ensure the 
enforceability of settlement agreements resulting from mediation,1145 it is difficult to 
transpose such domestic arrangements to the international level. 
In this regard, lessons can be learned from international commercial arbitration: if a 
settlement agreement is reached through mediation, disputing parties can refer to 
arbitration, asking an arbitral tribunal to transform the settlement into an award by 
consent.1146 As a result, the enforceability of a final award under the ICSID Convention 
or the 1958 New York Convention would be available.1147 This is also possible in the 
context of the EU’s ICS, by incorporating settlement agreements into the decision-
making stage of the adjudication process and thus the realization of settlement 
agreements is guaranteed by the enforcement system. 1148  Another possible 
arrangement can be found in the EU’s proposal for TTIP, where a mutually agreed 
solution shall be notified to the non-disputing treaty party and the joint committee shall 
keep the implementation of the settlement under surveillance with disputing parties’ 
regular report.1149 
 
 
1144 See e.g. EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Annex 6, Arts. 5.1, 5.2. 
1145 Regarding the EU, see: European Parliament, Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 21 May 2008 on Certain Aspects of Mediation in Civil and Commercial Matters, Directive 2008/52/EC, 
24.05.2008, Art. 6. In terms of China’ s legal system, there are different ways to add an enforcement effect to a 
settlement agreement from mediation. For example, parties may make an application to the competent people’s court 
to confirm their settlement agreement. See: Civil Procedure Law of the People’ s Republic of China (enforced on 
09.04.1991, as amended on 31.08.2012), Art. 26. 
1146 In fact, there have been at least 15 ICSID cases where the arbitral tribunals were asked to transform parties’ 
settlements into consent awards. See: Jean Kalicki, Mediation of Investor-State Disputes: Revisiting the Prospects, 
Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 14.06.2013, available at: http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2013/06/14/mediation-of-
investor-state-disputes-revisiting-the-prospects/, last visited on 03.08.2020. 
1147 As mentioned in academic discussions, another more straightforward option could be to grant the settlement 
agreements reached through mediation the same effect as adjudicators’ decisions. See: Jingxia Shi & Nuan Dong 
石静霞、董暖 , The Construction of Investment Dispute Settlement Mechanisms under 'One Belt One Road' 
Initiatives “一带一路”倡议下投资争端解决机制的构建, Wuhan University International Law Review 武大
国际法评论, Vol. 2, 2018, p. 22. 
1148 It is noticeable that this does not deal with the unavoidable weakness of the EU’ s ICS that its judgments may 
not be enforced in states which are not subject to this system. For a further analysis on this point, see: Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce-ISDS BLOG, Just Published: Analysis of EU’s “Investment Court System”, available at: 
http://isdsblog.com/2016/10/27/just-published-analysis-of-eus-investment-court-system/, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
1149 The EU’s TTIP proposal (tabled for discussion with the United States and made public on 12.11.2015), Chapter 
II Section 3 Art. 2. From a procedural arrangement perspective, such surveillance and report mechanisms should 
recall a similar report mechanism for mutually agreed solutions to disputes reached between WTO Members to the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body with sufficient information for other WTO Members. See: DSU, Art. 21. 
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11.4 The International Adjudication Mechanism 
Various amicable DSMs provide investors and states with an opportunity to resolve 
their disputes in a friendly environment. However, they are not enough to guarantee the 
effective resolution of investor-state disputes. The real “teeth” of an ISDS system is 
often from the international adjudication mechanisms. 
This sub-section discusses the adjudication mechanism for ISDS in the prospective 
China-EU BIT, by identifying the potential thorny issues that may cause difficulties in 
the negotiations and by proposing possible procedural arrangements that could serve as 
the solutions. This exploration is arranged under five headings: adjudication forum, 
selection of adjudicators, the role of the joint committee in dispute settlement, 
procedural transparency and, finally, the appeal process. 
11.4.1 Adjudication Forum: Arbitration or an Investment Court? 
At the first glance, China and the EU seem to have different preferences regarding the 
forum for adjudicating investor-state disputes. In all of China’s IIAs where international 
adjudication is provided, arbitration is the consistent and only choice. Investors are 
often granted the right to choose arbitration under the framework of ICSID or ad hoc 
arbitration under other rules. In the EU, despite arbitration being the common practice 
in the Member States’ existing IIAs, it is quite clear that the intention is to insist on the 
proposed ICS for the IIAs to be concluded in the near future.1150 This will likely also 
be the case for its prospective investment agreement with China. However, as 
introduced in Section 6.1, supra, traditionally China is resistant to engaging with 
international courts, particularly because of not having control over, or even an impact 
on, the constitution of the tribunals and their decisions. Therefore, an initial and 
fundamental question that needs to be dealt with here is whether the ICS proposed by 
the EU would face a hostile attitude from China at the negotiation table for a China-EU 
BIT. 
As noted previously, recent decades have witnessed the softening of China’s traditional 
resistance towards international adjudication, such as joining the WTO which includes 
a compulsory quasi-judicial dispute settlement system. In this vein, it is more 
appropriate to predict China’s possible attitude towards the ICS on the basis of the 
system’s specific features. In addition, although the EU’s proposal is widely referred to 
as a “court” system,1151 its real differences from investment arbitration deserves a 
 
1150 It was stated by the EU that the reformed system for investment dispute settlement was to be included in its 
ongoing and future negotiations with other states. See: European Commission, Establishment of a Multilateral 
Investment Court for Investment Dispute Resolution, DG Trade – F2, 01.08.2016, p. 3. In particular, during the recent 
investment treaty negotiations between Japan and the EU, the European Commission stressed that “anything less 
ambitious, including coming back to the old investor-to-state dispute settlement, is not acceptable”. See: European 
Commission, A New EU Trade Agreement with Japan, 07.2018, available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/july/tradoc_155684.pdf, last visited on 31.07.2020. 
1151 The reference to “Investment Court System (ICS)” can be found in the EU’s official documents as well as 
academic discussions. See e.g. European Parliament-Directorate General for External Policies-Policy Department, 
In Pursuit of an International Investment Court-Recently Negotiated Investment Chapters in EU Comprehensive 
Free Trade Agreements in Comparative Perspective, 2017, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EXPO_STU%282017%29603844, last 
visited on 01.08.2020. Szilárd Gáspár-Szilágyi, A Standing Investment Court under TTIP from the Perspective of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union, Journal of World Investment & Trade, Vol. 17, 2016. Shixi Huang 黄世席, 
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second thought. As was occasionally pointed out, the EU’s proposal is different from a 
typical standing international court.1152 In fact, the use of “court” and “judge” is only 
used in the EU’s proposal for the TTIP,1153 but not in its three concluded IIAs and other 
treaty proposals. More importantly, the resemblance of the ICS to investment 
arbitration is evidenced in various aspects. First, both of them are adjudicative by nature, 
where disputes are decided by a third independent and impartial body according to 
applicable laws. Second, institutionally, the ICS does not establish a permanent 
secretariat for the adjudication body, which can be seen in other international courts 
like the ICJ. The costs of the adjudication process are still mostly paid by disputing 
parties, which means that ad hoc features still exist. Third, procedurally, the 
adjudication process in the ICS uses existing arbitration rules, like those of UNCITRAL 
and ICSID.1154 Furthermore, regarding enforcement, the ICS partly relies on the ICSID 
Convention and the 1958 New York Convention. Therefore, it is arguable that many 
similarities exist between the EU’s ICS and investor-state arbitration. Considering 
China has accepted the latter, for its prospective BIT with the EU, incorporating an 
international adjudication mechanism for ISDS that does not deviate much from its 
existing practice of arbitration should not face hesitation from China. Although the 
nomenclature of a “court” system may raise certain concerns considering China’s 
traditional resistance to subjecting its sovereignty to an international court, at least from 
the perspective of the adjudicative nature of the ICS, institutional arrangements, 
applicable procedural rules, and enforcement process, such worries do not seem to be 
justifiable. 
In addition, two features of the ICS are even argued to be desirable for China. First, 
compared to the existing practice of investor-state arbitration, the level of 
institutionalization of the ICS is enhanced. Despite some remaining ad hoc 
arrangements, in general, the ICS is supposed to be a permanent institution staffed with 
standing adjudicators pre-selected by treaty parties using autonomous rules. Moreover, 
a joint committee composed of representatives from treaty parties is established with a 
broad range of functions, including supervising the treaty’s daily operation, issuing the 
interpretation of treaty provisions and delivering supplement agreements. Considering 
 
The Origin of and the Response to the EU's Investment Court System 欧盟国际投资仲裁法庭制度的缘起与因应, 
Studies in Law and Business 法商研究, Vol. 4, 2016. 
1152 See: e.g. Céline Lévesque, The European Union Commission Proposal for the Creation of an “Investment Court 
System”: The Q and A that the Commission Won’t be Issuing, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 06.04.2016, available at: 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2016/04/06/the-european-union-commission-proposal-for-the-
creation-of-an-investment-court-system-the-q-and-a-that-the-commission-wont-be-issuing/, last visited on 
03.08.2020. 
1153 The EU’s proposal for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (tabled for discussion with the United 
States and made public on 12.11.2015), Chapter II Section 3. 
1154 In this regard, it deserves attention that the recent reform proposal for ICSID rules includes revising the 
Additional Facility rules so that a regional economic integration organization can be a party to Additional Facility 
proceedings. This appears to “open a more straightforward path for the European Union–a non-party to the ICSID 
Convention–to be a party to some form of ICSID-based arbitration”. See: Luke Eric Peterson, A First Look at 
ICSID's Proposed Rules Changes, Including in Relation to Provisional Measures, Third-party Funding, Security for 
Costs, and Arbitrator Disqualification, IAReporter, 03.08.2018, available at: https://www.iareporter.com/articles/a-
first-look-at-icsids-proposed-rules-changes-including-in-relation-to-provisional-measures-third-party-funding-
security-for-costs-and-arbitrator-disqualification/, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
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China’s preference for institutionalization rather than ad hoc arrangements,1155 such 
intensified institutionalization is likely to be welcomed by China. Second, the 
adjudication function of the ICS is realized under great influence from the treaty parties. 
As introduced in Section 7.3.3.2, supra, this is particularly reflected in the joint 
committee’s power to issue binding treaty interpretations, as well as the treaty parties’ 
right to make individual submissions on treaty interpretation and binding domestic law 
interpretation. It is admitted that this will not determine the ultimate interpretation 
adopted by the adjudicators, but it confirms the right of treaty parties to make 
submissions on treaty interpretation before the adjudicators make a decision and the 
binding effect of a domestic law interpretation given by treaty parties. Such 
arrangements decrease the delegation to the adjudication body and reserve more control 
for treaty parties over the adjudication process of ISDS.1156 In fact, the enhancement 
of the treaty parties’ role in ICS in ISDS mainly aims at responding to the criticism 
against the investment arbitration decisions where IIAs were interpreted as going 
against the treaty parties’ domestic law, deviating from their alleged intention, or 
conflicting with other cases, which was also supported by China.1157 It is arguable that 
the increased power for treaty parties in the EU’s ICS should at least partly reduce 
China’s anxiety about not having an influence on the result of international adjudication. 
In addition, the involvement of investors’ home states in the ICS may increase the 
chance of an amicable settlement of disputes, considering the possible strong intention 
of states to settle disputes amicably, which is in line with China’s consistent preference 
for maintaining harmonious relationships. 
In brief, regarding the adjudication forum, the approach of China and that of the EU 
can be reconciled, since they do not deviate much from each other. Furthermore, 
considering the enhanced institutionalization and the treaty parties’ increased influence 
on adjudicators, the general structure of the EU’s ICS should not be a stumbling block 
for both parties to reach an agreement. It is also suggested that China should not reject 
the ICS as a whole only because of its novelty and China’s unfamiliarity with it.1158 
However, one point that China may resist is the exclusive jurisdiction of the ICS. As 
has been suggested by many Chinese scholars, China will need to argue for adding the 
 
1155 This can be typically evidenced by China’s different attitudes towards institutional commercial arbitration and 
ad hoc commercial arbitration. At the beginning, only the awards from the former were recognized and enforceable 
in China. Furthermore, until now, ad hoc commercial arbitration is still not allowed to be conducted in China. 
1156 Two issues, who selects adjudicators and whether there is any standing body composed of treaty parties, were 
argued to be the two elements relevant to the degree of delegation. See: Todd Allee & Manfred Elsig, Dispute 
Settlement Provisions in PTAs: New Data and New Concepts, at: Trade Cooperation: The Purpose, Design and 
Effects of Preferential Trade Agreements, Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 341-342.  
1157 Anthea Roberts & Zeineb Bouraoui, UNCITRAL and ISDS Reforms: Concerns about Arbitral Appointments, 
Incentives and Legitimacy, EJIL: Talk!, 06.06.2018, available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-reforms-
concerns-about-arbitral-appointments-incentives-and-legitimacy/, last visited on 05.08.2020. On this issue, it 
deserves attention that the newly released CIETAC Investment Arbitration Rules explicitly stipulate the non-
disputing state party’s right to make submissions on treaty interpretation. See: The CIETAC Investment Arbitration 
Rules, Art. 44.1. 
1158 It was argued that, as evidenced by the development of the ICSID, the positive effect of an institution may only 
be noticed gradually with its development after the establishment. See: Thomas Wälde, Alternatives for Obtaining 
Greater Consistency in Investment Arbitration: An Appellate Institution after the WTO, Authoritative Treaty 
Arbitration or Mandatory Consolidation?, Transnational Dispute Management (TDM), 2005, available at: 
https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=421, last visited on 06.08.2020. 
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possibility of submitting disputes to any arbitration institution agreed upon by the 
disputing parties, in order to include Chinese arbitration institutions, such as the 
CIETAC, for them to play a role in potential ISDS cases. 1159  In addition to the 
familiarity of using its own arbitration institutions and the comfort afforded by this, 
there are some typical features of the procedural rules of Chinese arbitration institutions 
that China may have strong preference for. A typical example would be the practice of 
combining mediation and arbitration, which reflects China’s consistent preference for 
mediation; it is an approach that it is proud of. However, this approach may be rejected 
by the EU. In addition to its unfamiliarity with such a practice, the mix of informal 
settings and arbitration brought by “Arb- Med” may violate the EU’s perception of 
procedural justice and the rule of law.1160  Furthermore, considering the consistent 
practice of using the ICS as the only forum for investor-state adjudication in the EU’s 
concluded IIAs, even if accepted in a China-EU BIT, the possibility of involving other 
arbitration institutions based on the consent of the disputing parties is likely to happen 
only in the case of EU investors going up against the Chinese government. This is 
because, when the Union acts as the respondent, it would prefer to resort to the ICS. 
When EU investors are involved, the Union may have a more open attitude towards the 
choice of forum. 
11.4.2 Selection of Adjudicators: by Disputing Parties or by Treaty Parties? 
In China’s IIAs, investor-state adjudication normally takes the form of arbitration, 
where disputing parties enjoy the right to select the adjudicators in their own cases. 
Specifically, a tribunal is often composed of three arbitrators, one appointed by the 
claimant, one appointed by the respondent and the chair being chosen based on the 
agreement of the disputing parties or the two selected arbitrators. In the EU’s ICS, 
members of the Tribunal and the Appeal Tribunal are pre-selected by treaty parties. The 
members of a division for a specific case are appointed randomly and unpredictably by 
the President of the Tribunal or the Appeal Tribunal from the pre-established rosters, 
composed of one national of a Member State of the EU, one national of the other treaty 
party and one national of a third state. As a result, no room is left for party autonomy, 
and investors do not have a say in the composition of the tribunals of their own cases. 
The difference in the selection of adjudicators between the practice of the two parties 
relates to the different adjudication fora adopted. With regard to arbitration, party 
autonomy is a top concern, as reflected in the arbitrators being selected by the disputing 
parties, while in a court-type system, the role played by disputing parties in the selection 
of adjudicators is limited. Similar to the practice in a domestic court or the EU’s internal 
adjudication body, the CJEU, the EU’s ICS does not give the right to disputing parties 
to decide or exert any influence on the composition of adjudicators. 
 
1159  See e.g. Jingxia Shi & Nuan Dong 石静霞、董暖 , The Construction of Investment Dispute Settlement 
Mechanisms under 'One Belt One Road' Initiatives “一带一路”倡议下投资争端解决机制的构建, Wuhan 
University International Law Review 武大国际法评论, Vol. 2, 2018. 
1160  “Med-Arb” refers to combining mediation and arbitration by conducting mediation during the arbitration 
process when there is the consent of the disputing parties. For a further explanation of such a practice, see Section 
3.2.2.4, supra. 
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The impetus for changing the existing practice in investment arbitration to selecting 
adjudicators in advance is considered to ensuring that tribunals would be particularly 
mindful of the intentions of the treaty parties.1161 In addition, compared to selecting 
adjudicators after a case is filed, where disputing parties would seek to appoint 
adjudicators that they believe are broadly sympathetic to their positions, pre-selection 
by treaty parties is more likely to result in having a balance of adjudicators.1162 From 
this perspective, China seems to share similar ideas. During the meetings of the 
UNCITRAL Working Group III sessions on states’ concerns about ISDS, China 
pointed out that it was concerned about adjudicators making a decision which went 
against the treaty parties’ original intent.1163 China also recognized that ensuring the 
independence and impartiality of arbitrators was a systemic issue, which required an 
integral approach.1164 In this regard, the new CIETAC Investment Arbitration Rules 
are noticeable, where the practice of determining a pre-established roster of arbitrators 
was introduced. However, party autonomy is still preserved by allowing the disputing 
parties in a specific case to select their adjudicators from the roster.1165 This is also the 
practice adopted in the China-Australia FTA (2015), where the establishment of a list 
of potential arbitrators for investor-state arbitration is envisaged, while party autonomy 
is still respected.1166 Furthermore, China also presented such a preference during the 
discussion of ISDS reform at the UNCITRAL Working Group III.1167 Thus, it is fair 
1161 As pointed out by the EU, treaty parties are likely to choose the ones that would “best respect the balance of 
interest that has been struck during the negotiations of the substantive rules of the underlying treaties” especially 
when adjudicators are expected to serve long term. See: Anthea Roberts & Zeineb Bouraoui, UNCITRAL and ISDS 
Reforms: Concerns about Arbitral Appointments, Incentives and Legitimacy, EJIL: Talk!, 06.06.2018, available at: 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-reforms-concerns-about-arbitral-appointments-incentives-and-
legitimacy/, last visited on 05.08.2020. In this sense, it deserves attention that being in favour of the treaty parties 
does not mean being pro-investor or pro-state; instead, it is about honouring the deal and adhering to the bargain that 
treaty parties have reached. See: Anthea Roberts, Would a Multilateral Investment Court be Biased? Shifting to a 
Treaty Party Framework of Analysis, EJIL: Talk!, 28.04.2017, available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/would-a-
multilateral-investment-court-be-biased-shifting-to-a-treaty-party-framework-of-analysis/, last visited on 
05.08.2020. 
1162 Julian Donaubauer & Eric Neumayer & Peter Nunnenkamp, Winning or Losing in Investor-to-State Dispute 
Resolution: The Role of Arbitrator Bias and Experience, Kiel Working Paper, Vol. 2074, 2017. On the other hand, it 
was also argued that the presumption that an investor-appointed arbitrator is biased in favour of the appointing 
investor had been proven untrue by empirical statistics and the allegation that party-appointed commercial arbitrators 
were unable to handle disputes involving public interest was equally unfounded. See: Chi-Chung Kao, The Inclusion 
of Investment Court System into the EU-China BIT: Innovations, Prospects and Problems, at: Julien Chaisse (ed.), 
China-European Union Investment Relationships: Towards a New Leadership in Global Investment Governance?, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018, p. 265. 
1163 Anthea Roberts & Zeineb Bouraoui, UNCITRAL and ISDS Reforms: Concerns about Arbitral Appointments, 
Incentives and Legitimacy, EJIL: Talk!, 06.06.2018, available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-reforms-
concerns-about-arbitral-appointments-incentives-and-legitimacy/, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
1164 Id. 
1165 If disputing parties want to nominate someone outside the roster, subject to the fulfilment of qualifications set 
forth in the rules, a further confirmation by the Chairman of CIETAC is needed. See: CIETAC Investment Arbitration 
Rules (2018), Art. 11.1. 
1166 According to Art. 9.15 of the China-Australia FTA (2015), the Committee on Investment “shall, no later than 2 
years after the entry into force of this Agreement, establish a list of individuals who are willing and able to serve as 
arbitrators”. In a dispute, “[u]nless the disputing parties have agreed to appoint a sole arbitrator, the tribunal shall 
comprise three arbitrators, one arbitrator appointed by each of the disputing parties and the third, who shall be the 
chairperson, appointed by agreement of the disputing parties”. When “a tribunal has not been constituted within 90 
days from the date that a claim is submitted to arbitration under this Section, the appointing authority, on the request 
of a disputing party, shall appoint, in his or her discretion, the remaining arbitrators from the list established”. 
1167 China indicated that it did not necessarily believe there was a problem with the party appointment mechanism 
itself. See: Anthea Roberts, UNCITRAL and ISDS Reforms: Moving to Reform Options…the Politics, EJIL: Talk!, 
08.11.2018, available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-reforms-moving-to-reform-options-the-process/, 
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to say that China and the EU have the same intention to ensure the impartiality of the 
tribunals and adherence to the original intent of the treaty parties reflected in IIAs. They 
have diverse views, however, on the issue of respecting party autonomy. Specifically, 
party autonomy has been a key concern for China, which should not be changed even 
when systemic reform of ISDS is called for. This can be understood from the point of 
view that China uses DSMs as a way of providing a service to disputing parties to 
resolve their disputes. In other words, disputing parties are seen as the customers and 
adjudicators are service providers. Thus, satisfying the disputing parties’ needs takes 
priority and can be taken even further as realizing “justice”. However, to the EU, 
resolving disputes is just part of the result of the dispute settlement process. More 
importantly, dispute settlement, especially adjudication, bears the responsibility of 
realizing the rule of law, and thus due process and developing jurisprudence come 
before the disputing parties’ needs. Thus, from the EU’s perspective, respecting the rule 
of law should be indispensable in realizing “justice” in dispute settlement. 
Therefore, the problematic issue here for a China-EU BIT is how to acknowledge party 
autonomy. Regarding this, it should be borne in mind that the recognition by both states 
and investors of an investor-state DSM is key to its function in practice. The possible 
perception of adjudicators lacking impartiality and fairness by investors would affect 
the system’s efficacy and use in practice. Thus, satisfying not only the treaty parties’ 
but also investors’ needs is necessary. In this vein, completely disregarding party 
autonomy in the composition to tribunals is argued to be undesirable for investors and, 
in fact, unnecessary to reach the EU’s goal of guaranteeing the independence, 
impartiality and qualification adjudicators. In the ICS, before composing the division 
for a specific case, there are already two levels of safeguards. The first level comes 
from the fact that the Tribunal and the Appeal Tribunal are composed of members 
appointed by the treaty parties. In exercising their power of selecting members from the 
roster, treaty parties would balance their diverse interests and select impartial 
adjudicators that would not always be pro-investors or pro-states. The second safeguard 
is the qualification requirements stated in the body of the treaty text and the attached 
binding Code of Conduct for adjudicators. These two safeguards would guarantee the 
professional and ethical qualifications of the adjudicators. As a result, in specific cases, 
letting disputing parties choose their own adjudicators respectively from the pre-
established roster would not negatively affect the functioning of the system. In fact, this 
is the practice that was adopted in the EU’s IIAs for state-state adjudication.1168  
If no agreement can be reached between disputing parties on the selection of the chair 
of a tribunal, the president of the Tribunal or the Appeal Tribunal can designate a chair 
from the roster of adjudicators of third states by a random draw. Such an approach is 
argued to be acceptable and even desirable for China, since it leaves room for party 
autonomy and is to some extent similar to how panels are composed in the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System, which has already been accepted by China and China has 
last visited on 05.08.2020. 
1168 See e.g. the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.29. 
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gotten used to it. 1169  Although the disputing parties do not have rights to select 
adjudicators at the WTO Appellate Body level, before China’s accession, existing 
practice had proven the functioning of the WTO Appellate Body, which is not yet the 
case for the EU’s ICS, since there has been no real use of this system. More concrete 
support for China’s possible preference for the approach recommended here comes 
from relevant practice under the CIETAC Investment Arbitration Rules and the China-
Australia FTA (2015). Last but not least, the discretion given to disputing parties would 
contribute to the attractiveness of the ICS for potential users and correspondingly 
increases their satisfaction with the system. It could also constitute a proper adjustment 
to the criticism of the ICS being “a setback in the de-politicization of investor-state 
dispute settlement”.1170 
In brief, regarding the selection of adjudicators for investor-state adjudication, letting 
treaty parties compose the roster of adjudicators and allowing disputing parties to select 
the decision makers for their own cases from the pre-established list is argued to result 
in a proper balance between treaty parties’ and investors’ rights, as well as a balance 
between China’s and the EU’s preferred practice and correspondingly preserved values.  
11.4.3 The Role of the Joint Committee in Dispute Settlement: Influential or 
Decisive? 
Despite the academic debate about the weight of joint agreements on treaty 
interpretation,1171 many IIAs expressly grant them binding effect. When it comes to 
certain specified matters, tribunals are even required to suspend the ongoing 
proceedings and resort to treaty parties for binding joint decisions.1172 Some of China’s 
concluded IIAs provide that treaty interpretations reached through joint committees are 
binding on ISDS tribunals.1173 In the EU’s ICS, the joint committee is afforded great 
power, particularly on treaty interpretation. During the adjudication process of ISDS, 
the joint committee can issue binding interpretations of the IIA at issue, which must be 
respected by the tribunals. This aims at ensuring that the treaty parties’ real intentions 
are reflected and presented in specific cases and can contribute to a “more harmonious, 
authoritative and linear development” of treaty interpretation.1174 The ICS goes even 
 
1169 It is admitted that it is different in the sense that in the WTO Dispute Settlement System, while there is an 
indicative list of panelists, parties and the Director General are free to select a person not on that list. 
1170 Chi-Chung Kao, The Inclusion of Investment Court System into the EU-China BIT: Innovations, Prospects and 
Problems, at: China-European Union Investment Relationships: Towards a New Leadership in Global Investment 
Governance?, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018, p. 265. 
1171 Disagreement generally exists in whether an “authentic” interpretation by treaty parties is binding or simply 
very persuasive. See, e.g. Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role 
of States, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 104, 2010, pp. 75-76. Mark E. Villiger, Commentary on the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, p. 429. Richard Gardiner, Treaty 
Interpretation, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 32. 
1172 Sheng Zhang 张生, Study on Treaty Parties' Interpretation under the Framework of International Investment 
Law 国际投资法制框架下的缔约国解释研究, Modern Law Science 现代法学, Vol. 37, 2015, pp. 167-168. 
1173 See e.g. the China-Canada BIT (2012), Art. 18. For a further discussion on such provisions in China’s concluded 
IIAs, see: Norah Gallagher, China's BIT's and Arbitration Practice: Progress and Problems, at: China and 
International Investment Law: Twenty Years of ICSID Membership, Brill | Nijhoff, 2014, p. 212. 
1174  Sophie Nappert, Escaping from Freedom? The Dilemma of an Improved ISDS Mechanism, at: European 
Investment Law and Arbitration Review (Volume 1), Brill | Nijhoff, 2016, p. 189. 
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further in this direction by giving the joint committee the power to determine the 
effective dates for its interpretations, which may open the door for retroactivity.1175  
Although the possibility of reaching a joint interpretation during certain investor-state 
dispute settlement processes is low in practice,1176 how the joint committee’s role as a 
treaty interpreter can be defined during ISDS deserves a second thought. As was 
pointed out, while acknowledging the inevitable tensions resulting from the co-
existence of states and tribunals, an investment treaty system aims at developing “a 
hybrid theory”, which recognizes and values their independent and shared interpretive 
authorities.1177 Joint interpretations are preferred, since they reflect the treaty parties’ 
true intentions, and especially in some difficult or sensitive cases, joint interpretations 
can work as the “safety valve”.1178 However, the blurring line between interpretations 
and amendments can cause difficulties and risks. A joint declaration reached after a 
dispute arises can take the form of an interpretation explaining the meaning of existing 
words in the treaty, or an amendment which changes the original deal and thus should 
just constitute an element in the holistic method of interpretation. 1179  As a result, 
granting any joint committee’s declaration reached at any time the status of a binding 
interpretation may violate the principle of non-retroactivity, when it in fact amends the 
IIA at issue. 1180  Possible retroactive interpretations from the joint committee also 
conflict with the rule of law if the rights and obligations in the treaty are changed1181 
and, further, if they go against the original intent of depoliticizing the investment 
dispute settlement process. However, at the same time, it is admitted that making a 
difference between treaty interpretations and treaty amendments is not an easy job.1182 
 
1175 On this point, a draft text on ISDS for the EU’s IIAs negotiation that was leaked in June 2012 adopted a narrower 
approach by limiting interpretive agreements to be prospective only. See: The European Commission, Note for the 
Attention of the Trade Policy Committee (Services and Investment)-Text on Investor State Dispute Settlement for 
EU agreements (05.06.2012), 69/12, Art. 9(2). Such a statement seems to have been abandoned and does not exist 
in any of the EU’s concluded IIAs. 
1176 As has been pointed out, coordinating interpretation mechanisms are significantly underutilized in ISDS. See: 
Michael Waibel, International Investment Law and Treaty Interpretation, at: Rainer Hofmann & Christian J. Tams 
(eds.), International Investment Law and General International Law: From Clinical Isolation to Systemic 
Integration?, Nomos Publishers, 2011, p. 30. For example, so far, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission has called for 
light to be shed on the meaning of a treaty provision only once. See: North American Free Trade Agreement, Notes 
of interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, NAFTA Free Trade Commission (31.07.2001).  
1177 Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of Interdependent Rights and 
Shared Interpretive Authority, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 55, 2014, p. 28. 
1178 Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States, American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 104, 2010, p. 215. 
1179 Sheng Zhang 张生, Study on Treaty Parties' Interpretation under the Framework of International Investment 
Law 国际投资法制框架下的缔约国解释研究, Modern Law Science 现代法学, Vol. 37, 2015, p. 171. 
1180 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretive Powers of the Free Trade Commission and the Rule of Law, at: 
Emmanuel Gaillard & Frédéric Bachand (eds.), Fifteen Years of NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitration, JurisNet, 2011, p. 
152. It was also argued that a delicate differentiation between interpretations and amendments was particularly 
compelling when dealing with treaties that create rights or benefits for and legitimate expectations of third parties, 
like investors, which should curb the ability of the treaty parties to reinterpret the treaty at will. See: Anthea Roberts, 
Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States, American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 104, 2010, p. 104. Anthea Roberts, Subsequent Agreements and Practice: The Battle Over 
Interpretive Power, at: Georg Nolte (ed.), Treaties and Subsequent Practice, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 101-
102. 
1181 Based on the principle of the rule of law, law should be certain and prospective. A retroactive interpretation 
would conflict with the rule of law to the extent that it negatively affects investors’ rights and legal interests. 
1182 It was even argued that a clear line between these two did not exist. See: Charles H. Brower II, Why the FTC 
Notes of Interpretation Constitute a Partial Amendment of NAFTA Article 1105, Virginia Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 46, 2006, pp. 347-363. Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The 
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In existing investment arbitration cases, tribunals have presented different attitudes 
towards joint interpretations by treaty parties, especially those issued after certain 
investor-state disputes had arisen.1183 When the relevant document is defined as a 
subsequent agreement or subsequent practice, its effect changes from being “binding” 
to “persuasive”. 1184  Probably because of such uncertainty, the EU’s ICS takes a 
rigorous approach to ensuring decisive power of treaty parties in relation to treaty 
interpretation, by providing that a joint interpretation is always binding and treaty 
parties may even decide its effective date. In this regard, it deserves particular attention 
that the CJEU’s Opinion 1/17 seems to correct this practice. In this Opinion, the CJEU 
clearly stated that the requirement of independence of the ICS presupposed that the 
body concerned exercised its functions “wholly autonomously” and “without taking 
orders or instructions from any source whatsoever, thus being protected against external 
interventions or pressure”.1185 Based on this, it should be reasonable to expect that 
similar provisions granting joint committees the power to decide the effective dates of 
their joint interpretations would not appear in the EU’s future IIAs. At the same time, 
in practice, any joint interpretation, including those under the three concluded IIAs, is 
likely to be considered as being binding on future cases only. 
In spite of the doubts about its legitimacy introduced above, giving the joint committee 
a decisive role in ISDS may not face harsh objection from China. This inference is 
particularly based on China’s experience in the case Sanum Investments Limited v. Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic, where the treaty parties’ joint interpretation was not 
recognized by the tribunal as an interpretation but an amendment, and thus it was not 
granted binding effect.1186 At the same time, supporting elements may also come from 
China’s legal culture. A joint committee uses diplomatic cooperation, which means the 
resolution and implementation of many matters are realized through informal bilateral 
negotiations, instead of formal legal procedures. This should work well with China’s 
 
Dual Role of States, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 104, 2010, pp. 212-215. Rahim Moloo, When 
Actions Speak Louder Than Words: The Relevance of Subsequent Party Conduct to Treaty Interpretation, Berkeley 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 31, 2013, pp. 75-76. 
1183 For example, in Mondev International Ltd. v. the US, the tribunal accepted the NAFTA Free Trade Commission’s 
statement on treaty interpretation and respected the binding effect thereof. See: Mondev Internaional Ltd. v. United 
States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, 11.10.2002, para. 121. A similar attitude was also taken 
by the tribunal in the cases ADF Group Inc. v. the US and Chemtura Corp. v. Canada. See: ADF Group Inc. v. United 
States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1, Award, 09.01.2003, para. 177; Chemtura Corp. v. Government 
of Canada, ad hoc arbitration under UNCITRAL Rules, Award, 02.08.2010, para. 120. 
On the other hand, in Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, the tribunal challenged the joint statement issued by the NAFTA 
Free Trade Commission, deeming it as “amendment” of the treaty instead of “interpretation”. See: Pope & Talbot 
Inc. v. Government of Canada, NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitration, Award in Respect of Damages, 31.05.2002, para. 23. 
Support for such a position can also be found in cases such as Merrill & Ring Forestry LP v. Canada. See: Merrill 
and Ring Forestry L.P. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/07/1, Award, 31.03.2010, para. 192. 
1184 See e.g. Interpretation of the Air Transport Services Agreement between the United States of America and Italy, 
Award of 17 July 1965, 16 RIAA 75, 99. It was addressed here that the subsequent practice of treaty parties is not 
“in itself decisive for the interpretation of the disputed text; it can however serve as additional evidence as regards 
the meaning to be attributed to the text”. See also: International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion of 
11 July 1950, ICJ, paras. 135-136. 
1185 Opinion 1/17 of the Court (Full Court), 30.04.2019, para. 202. 
1186 In response to a jurisdictional challenge, the Singapore Court of Appeal took a decision where it determined the 
joint statement of China and Lao did not constitute a treaty interpretation, but a subsequent agreement. See: The 
Government of the Law People’s Democratic Republic v. Sanum Investments Limited, the Court of Appeal of the 
Republic of Singapore, [2016]SGCA 57, 29.09.2016, paras. 116-118. 
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legal cultural characteristic of relying heavily on relationships (“guānxi”, 关系). In 
other words, in a general sense it corresponds to China’s popular legal culture of the 
system depending on people instead of rules.1187  
In the context of the prospective China-EU BIT, if the EU changes its existing practice 
under the influence of the CJEU’s Opinion 1/17, agreement is expected to be reached 
that the joint committee’s treaty interpretations have binding force on future cases only. 
Although China may also prefer to at least let joint interpretations be binding in any 
ongoing case, this may not be acceptable to the EU and, even if accepted, the EU may 
resist concluding a joint interpretation with China in future cases. 
11.4.4 Procedural Transparency: Default or Exceptions? 
The default of confidentiality in investment arbitration has been harshly criticized for 
excluding the public and thus being undemocratic. 1188  Recent decades witnessed 
transparency in investment arbitration being one of the most topical issues in different 
fora, 1189  and great efforts have been made to increase transparency 
correspondingly. 1190  This was motivated by various concerns, including public 
interests and the accountability requirement of the host states’ government,1191 the 
need of developing consistent case law, development of jurisprudence and legal 
certainty,1192 as well as improving understanding and engagement by stakeholders.1193 
It is also noted that, on the other hand, there are elements that support confidentiality, 
 
1187 Colin B. Picker, China, Global Governance & Legal Culture: The Example of China & the WTO, at: China and 
Global Economic Governance: Ideas and Concepts, The University of Tokyo-Institute of Social Science (ISS) 
Research Series No.45, 2011, pp. 86-87. 
1188 Pia Eberhardt & Cecilia Olivet with contributions from Tyler Amos & Nick Buxton, Profiting from Injustice: 
How Law Firms, Arbitrators and Financiers are Fueling an Investment Arbitration Boom, Corporate Europe 
Observatory and the Transnational Institute, 2012. See also: Stephan W. Schill, International Investment Law and 
the Rule of Law, at: Rule of Law Symposium 2014: The Importance of the Rule of Law in Promoting Development, 
Singapore: Academy Publishing, 2015, pp. 81, 84. 
1189 In particular, in the context of UNCITRAL, in 2013, Working Group II agreed to higher levels of transparency 
in disputes on the basis of future investment agreements. See: United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL), Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the Work of Its Fifty-eighth 
Session, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Forty-sixth session, New York, 4-8.02. 2013. For 
some academic discussions on this, see: Marc Bungenberg & Catharine Titi, Developments in International 
Investment Law, at: Christoph Herrmann & Markus Krajewski & Joerg Philipp Terhechte (eds.), European Yearbook 
of International Economic Law 2014, Springer, 2013, pp. 425-442. Catharine Titi, International Investment Law and 
Good Governance, at: Marc Bungenberg & Jörn Griebel & Stephan Hobe & August Reinisch (eds.), International 
Investment Law, C.H. Beck·Hart·Nomos, 2015, pp. 1817-1832.  
1190 The development of the ICSID Arbitration rules is a typical example. According to the current ICSID Arbitration 
Rules (2006), even without the parties’ consent, excerpts of legal reasoning of tribunals shall be published by the 
ICSID. See: ICSID Arbitration Rules (2006), Rule 48(4). Now the ICSID is undertaking a new round of amendments 
of the rules, where the transparency of proceedings is suggested to be further enhanced. For more information, see: 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), ICSID Rules and Regulations Amendment 
Process, 2018, available at: https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/amendments, last visited on 03.08.2020. Luke Eric 
Peterson, An In-depth Look at ICSID’s Proposed Transparency Changes (Including Non Disputing Party 
Participation), IAReporter, 06.08.2018, available at: https://www.iareporter.com/articles/an-in-depth-look-at-icsids-
proposed-transparency-changes-including-non-disputing-party-participation/, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
1191 Public interest considerations mainly arise where foreign investments involve public utilities or legislative or 
administrative acts that are directed at preserving public interests. See: Dominik Horodyski, Democratic Deficit of 
Investment Arbitration in the View of Rules on Transparency and Mauritius Convention on Transparency, US-China 
Law Review, Vol. 13, 2016, pp. 166-167. 
1192 Note: Mediation of Investor-State Conflicts, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 127, 2014, p. 2556. 
1193  Marc Bungenberg & Catharine Titi, The Evolution of EU Investment Law and the Future of EU-China 
Investment Relations, at: China and International Investment Law: Twenty Years of ICSID Membership, Brill | 
Nijhoff, 2015, p. 339. 
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such as the need to protect business secrets and governmental information, as well as 
prevent politicizing cases.1194 
In the EU’s ICS, as assessed in Section 7.3.3.2, supra, by adopting the UNCITRAL 
Rules on Transparency or incorporating similar provisions, procedural transparency in 
the ISDS process has been greatly intensified. Almost all documents produced during 
the adjudication process must be public. In particular, exhibits, which are excluded 
from being public under the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, may also be published 
under the ICS.1195 Hearings are also supposed to be transparent, except for the situation 
in which the tribunal determines that it is necessary to protect confidential or protected 
information. At the same time, third parties are explicitly permitted to submit amicus 
curiae briefs, provided that these parties have submitted their status and their interests 
in the proceedings to the Tribunal. In particular, regarding the prospective China-EU 
BIT, the “European Parliament’s resolution on the EU-China negotiations for a bilateral 
investment agreement” states that the investor-state DSMs contained therein should be 
established “within a suitable legal framework and subject to strict transparency 
criteria”.1196 In China, most of its IIAs respect the confidentiality feature of arbitration 
and none of the 26 BITs concluded by EU Member States with China contain any 
transparency obligation in ISDS. It deserves attention that, in line with the recent global 
trend of increasing transparency, China’s attitude to this issue has gone through a 
change: its public statement in 2013 showed that China is moving towards accepting 
greater procedural transparency in ISDS, 1197  which can be further proven by its 
recently signed IIAs with the states that have a strong intention to adopt transparency, 
such as the China-Canada BIT (2012) and the China-Australia FTA (2015). However, 
it is noted that, even under these two treaties, the extent of procedural transparency in 
investor-state adjudication is relatively limited.1198 
The different practices in relation to transparency respectively resonates each party’s 
legal cultural characteristics and protected values. China traditionally prefers 
confidential dispute settlement processes, since resolving disputes transparently causes 
disputing parties to “lose face”. This should be the same with ISDS. As was pointed 
out, by accepting transparency, China will have to “manage lay opinions and media 
 
1194 It was pointed out that, in some quarters, transparency in ISDS may particularly be contrary to the interests of 
investors. See: Christina Knahr & August Reinisch, Transparency Versus Confidentiality in International Investment 
Arbitration-The Biwater Gauff Compromise, The Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, Vol. 6, 2007, 
p. 111. Klaus Peter Berger, The International Arbitrators’ Application of Precedents, Journal of International 
Arbitration, Vol. 9, 1992, pp. 5-22. Geoffrey Gertz & Srividya Jandhyala & Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, 
Legalization, Diplomacy, and Development: Do Investment Treaties De-politicize Investment Disputes?, World 
Development, Vol. 107, 2018, p. 243. 
1195 CETA (2012), Art. 8.36.3. A similar provision is also available in the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018), Art. 3.46.3. The 
EU-Singapore IPA (2018) does not contain such a provision. 
1196 European Parliament resolution of 9 October 2013 on the EU-China negotiations for a bilateral investment 
agreement 2013/2674(RSP), P7_TA(2013)0411, 09.10.2013, para. 43. 
1197 Statement by Mr Shang Zhen, Chinese Delegate at the 68th Session of the UN General Assembly on Agenda 
Item 79 Report of UNCITRAL on the Work of Its 46th Session, 14.10.2013, available at: http://www.china-
un.org/eng/chinaandun/legalaffairs/sixthcommittee1/t1091525.htm, last visited on 13.02.2017. 
1198 The extent of transparency under these two treaties is much lower than those under the EU’s concluded IIAs. 
As analysed in Section 6.2.3.4, supra, under these two treaties, the realization of transparency is largely in the hand 
of the disputing parties and especially host states. 
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reactions to the state’s legal case, decisions to settle and perceived loss of face”.1199 In 
the EU, transparency is considered to guide both its internal and external actions, which 
is required and supported by its core protected values of the rule of law and due process. 
It is, therefore, reasonable to expect that transparency in investor-state adjudication 
would be accepted by both China and the EU in general, and the UNCITRAL Rules on 
Transparency could be adopted as the default rules subject to specific treaty provisions. 
However, the unavoidable difference in the practice of both sides regarding the level of 
transparency and detailed arrangements may still constitute stumbling blocks for China 
and the EU in reaching an agreement. In addition, although Chinese scholars support 
China in accepting greater transparency in prospective IIAs in principle, they also 
caution the Chinese government to reduce the speed of development so that China’s 
relevant legislation to protect national secrecy information is comprehensive first.1200 
Thus, to what extent China would accept the extensive levels of transparency in the ICS 
is uncertain, and it is essential to contemplate a way of realizing transparency to an 
appropriate level under a China-EU BIT. As introduced above, there are tenable 
arguments for both requiring and rejecting transparency in ISDS. In specific cases, 
investors and states may also have particular reasons to argue for keeping the process 
transparent or confidential. Thus, it is suggested to leave room for disputing parties to 
agree on the level of public disclosure under the default rule of transparency. The final 
say could be left to tribunals in the case an agreement would potentially disrupt the 
proceedings or unduly prejudice or burden any party. Such a compromise of 
transparency and party autonomy would not only balance the existing practice and 
preferences in China and the EU, but it would be a way of showing respect to their 
respective legal cultural characteristics and preserved values. Specifically, the default 
rule of transparency should ensure that the publication of documents and open hearings 
would be realized to a large extent, which is in line with the EU’s preference, while the 
exceptions created for party autonomy would make it easier for China to accept this at 
the current stage, for both practical and legal cultural reasons. 
11.4.5 An Appeal Mechanism: Necessary for Consistency and Correctness? 
The inconsistency and unpredictability in the current investor-state arbitration system 
have been criticized greatly, especially considering the tribunals’ divergent decisions 
on similar legal and factual issues.1201 In comparison to the two-tiered system in the 
WTO for international trade dispute settlement, the absence of an appeal mechanism 
 
1199 Sophie Nappert, The Other Side of Transparency, Columbia FDI Perspectives, Vol. 141, 2015.  
1200 See e.g. Jun Zhao & Yun Liu 赵骏、刘芸, The Reform of Transparency in International Investment Arbitration 
and China's Response 国际投资仲裁透明度改革及我国的应对, Journal of Zhejiang University (Humanities and 
Social Science) 浙江大学学报（人文社会科学版）, Vol. 44, 2014, pp. 159, 161.  
1201 Evidence of this can typically be found in the series of CME and Lauder v. Czech Republic awards. The two 
simultaneous arbitration cases dealt with the same facts, while in the end one tribunal dismissed the claim and the 
other tribunal awarded $353 million to the investor. See: CME v. Czech Republic, Partial Award of 13 September 
2001, reprinted in World Trade and Arbitration Materials (2002), p. 109 et seq.; Lauder v. Czech Republic, Award of 
3 September 2001, reprinted in World Trade and Arbitration Materials (2002), p. 35 et seq. For some academic 
discussion on this issue, see e.g. Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: 
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 73, 2005. Thomas 
Wälde, Introductory Note to Svea Court of Appeals: Czech Republic v. CME Czech Republic B.V., Internatioanl 
Legal Materials, Vol. 42, 2003. 
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has been considered to be an important reason.1202 An appeal mechanism in ISDS is 
expected to resolve the problem of zigzagging decisions of different ad hoc tribunals, 
to strengthen the legal correctness of arbitral awards, to ensure consistency and 
coherence in jurisprudence, to re-establish stakeholders’ trust in ISDS, and thus make 
the whole international investment legal system more sustainable.1203 On the other 
hand, it is also noted that inserting another tier of adjudication may extend the duration 
of the dispute settlement process, increase costs, and erode the principle of the finality 
of investment awards.1204 The necessity of an appeal mechanism is also doubted in the 
sense that most decisions have been consistent with each other1205 and, even in the 
situations where there has been a divergence of opinions, certain legal interpretations 
would stand out and become more acceptable, which results in supporting further 
consistency.1206  
In addition to heated academic debate, the idea of creating an appeal mechanism for 
ISDS has also been put into treaty-making practice. As early as 2004, a provision 
envisaging a multilateral agreement on establishing an appellate body was incorporated 
into the US Model BIT (2004).1207 More concrete efforts in this trend were made by 
the EU through creating an Appeal Tribunal in its ICS. This Appeal Tribunal is 
established in a permanent manner with a fixed number of pre-ordained members who 
are nationals of treaty parties and third states for a fixed term. Recourse to appeal is 
intended to be had on prescribed grounds and, in the end, an Appeal Tribunal can 
maintain, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions in the provisional award 
 
1202  Marc Bungenberg & Catharine Titi, The Evolution of EU Investment Law and the Future of EU-China 
Investment Relations, at: China and International Investment Law: Twenty Years of ICSID Membership, Brill | 
Nijhoff, 2015, p. 344. Christian J. Tams, An Appealing Option? The Debate about an ICSID Appellate Structure, 
Essays in Transnational Economic Law, Vol. 57, 2006. Karl P. Sauvant & Michael Chiswick-Patterson (eds.), 
Appeals Mechanism in International Investment Disputes, Oxford University Press, 2008. 
1203 Audley Sheppard & Hugo Warner, Appeals and Challenges to Investment Treaty Awards: Is It Time for an 
International Appellate System?-Editorial Note, Transnational Dispute Management (TDM), 04.2005, available at: 
https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=399, last visited on 06.08.2020. Doak Bishop, 
The Case for an Appellate Panel and its Scope of Review, 04.2005, available at: https://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/article.asp?key=403, last visited on 30.07.2020. 
In this regard, it is noted that the function of an appeal mechanism cannot be realized by the existing review 
mechanisms, such as the ICSID annulment proceedings, reviewing or setting aside mechanisms under the lex arbitri 
in domestic courts, or the recognition and enforcement process under the 1958 New York Convention. A more 
detailed analysis of why existing review mechanisms are not able to function appeal process can be found in the 
literature. See e.g. Noah Rubins, Judicial Review of Investment Arbitration Awards, at: Federico Ortino & Audley 
Sheppard & Hugo Warner (eds.), Investment Treaty Law: Current Issues, Volume I, British Institute of International 
and Comparative Law, 2006, pp. 75-81. Sun Liu 刘笋, Discussion on Establishing an Appellate Mechanism of 
International Investment Arbitration 建立国际投资仲裁的上诉机制问题析评, Modern Law Science 现代法学, 
Vol. 5, 2009. 
1204 A comprehensive summary of the advantages and disadvantages of an appeal mechanism in ISDS can be found 
in a study prepared for the European Parliament. See: Stephen Woolcock, The EU Approach to International 
Investment Policy after the Lisbon Treaty, European Parliament-Directorate-General for External Policies of the 
Union, 2010, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2010/433854/EXPO-
INTA_ET(2010)433854_EN.pdf, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
1205 Guido Tawil, An international Appellate System: Progress or Pitfall, at: Federico Ortino & Audley Sheppard & 
Hugo Warner (eds.), Investment Treaty Law: Current Issues (Volume 1), British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law, 2006, p. 23. In other words, “soft precedent” had been followed to a great extent. See: Ian Laird 
& Rebecca Askew, Finality Versus Consistency: Does Investor-State Arbitration Need an Appellate System?, Journal 
of Appellate Practice and Process, Vol. 7, 2005, p. 301. 
1206 Judith Gill, Inconsistent Decisions: An Issue to be Addressed or a Fact of Life?, at: Federico Ortino & Audley 
Sheppard & Hugo Warner (eds.), Investment Treaty Law-Current Issues, British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law, 2006, pp. 23-28. 
1207 The US Model BIT (2004), Art. 28.10.  
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by a Tribunal in whole or in part. With regard to China’s relevant practice, the China-
Australia FTA (2015) is the only treaty which contains a provision dealing with the 
issue of appellate procedures and it simply envisages future negotiations.1208 Although 
such a provision was argued as somewhat presenting supportive attitude from China, 
or at least an open mind towards having appeal in ISDS,1209 it is still the only piece of 
evidence in this regard. 
In terms of a China-EU BIT, both parties recognize the need to increase systemic 
consistency and predictability in ISDS, and therefore the key issue here should be 
whether an appeal mechanism is necessary to reach this goal. In the context of the EU’s 
ICS, it is argued here that consistency within the system and correctness of the tribunals’ 
decisions can be ensured by other arrangements, and thus the contribution of an 
additional appeal mechanism seems to be limited. First, the requirements for expertise, 
independence and impartiality of adjudicators ensures the quality of their decisions. 
Second, consistency in jurisprudence under the treaty at issue could be realized through 
effective communication among members of the Tribunal, like the way in which the 
WTO Appellate Body works. In this regard, a provision similar to Article 3.2 of the 
DSU could be added to a China-EU BIT, setting “providing security and predictability” 
as a guiding principle, to create a de facto precedent system. 1210  In other words, 
adjudicators are mandated to pursue the general goal of developing the consistency of 
the dispute settlement system with such an expression. In addition, the systemic 
consistency could also benefit from the power granted to the joint committee on issuing 
binding interpretations. All of these can work together to realize a satisfactory level of 
consistency in jurisprudence and the correctness of the tribunals’ decisions, without an 
additional appeal mechanism. In addition, overall consistency and predictability in a 
coherent legal system in international investment adjudication “may solely be 
envisaged in a future multilateral system, or at least a plurilateral or regional one”.1211 
Considering the positive progress that has been achieved by the UNCITRAL Working 
Group III on ISDS reform, it is better for China and the EU to negotiate the possibility 
of establishing an appeal mechanism in this plurilateral forum.1212 
Even if the EU succeeds in persuading China to incorporate an appeal mechanism under 
a China-EU BIT, relevant procedural arrangements in the ICS could also be viewed as 
1208 The China-Australia FTA (2015), Art. 9.23. 
1209 Jun Xiao 肖军, A Study on the Feasibility of Building an Appeal Mechanism in International Investment 
Arbitration: Starting with the Negotiations on a China-US Bilateral Investment Treaty 建立国际投资仲裁上诉机
制的可行性研究——从中美双边投资条约谈判说起, Studies in Law and Business 法商研究, Vol. 2, 2015. 
1210 This has also been suggested for the SSDS system in a China-EU BIT. See: Section 10.3.2.3, supra. If such a 
provision is accepted by China and the EU for both SSDS and ISDS, it can be set as the guidance for the overall 
comprehensive dispute settlement system under a China-EU BIT, which is composed of a SSDS system and an ISDS 
system. 
1211  Marc Bungenberg & Catharine Titi, The Evolution of EU Investment Law and the Future of EU-China 
Investment Relations, at: China and International Investment Law: Twenty Years of ICSID Membership, Brill | 
Nijhoff, 2015, p. 345. Barry Appleton, The Song Is Over: Why It’s Time to Stop Talking About an International 
Investment Arbitration Appellate Body, International Law in a Multipolar World, Vol. 107, 2013, pp. 23-24. 
1212 There are scholars that expect that China would feel comfortable with developing an appellate mechanism in 
general because of its experience in the WTO. See: Anthea Roberts, The Shifting Landscape of Investor-State 
Arbitration: Loyalists, Reformists, Revolutionaries and Undecideds, EJIL: Talk!, 15.06.2017, available at: 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-shifting-landscape-of-investor-state-arbitration-loyalists-reformists-revolutionaries-
and-undecideds/, last visited on 05.08.2020. 
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problematic by China. For example, the scope of appeal is not limited to questions of 
law, as China accepted in the China-Australia FTA (2015),  but it includes questions of 
fact. Such a broad basis of appeal does not exist in either China’s IIAs or any other 
existing international review mechanisms.1213 Furthermore, this has been criticized by 
scholars as making the appeal mechanism a second chance to seek remedies, instead of 
ensuring consistency.1214 It is noted that, in contrast to the Appellate Body in the WTO, 
in the ICS, an Appeal Tribunal is granted the power to refer the case back to the 
Tribunal without specific guidance, which may lead to divergent practices. 1215 
Therefore, it is more likely that China would argue to eliminate the appeal mechanism 
found in the EU’s ICS for the prospective China-EU BIT, and it is suggested here that 
such a mechanism is not necessary in realizing the EU’s goal of creating systemic 
consistency and ensuring the correctness of decisions. 
11.5 Local Remedies 
About 60 per cent of the currently effective IIAs in the world provide for international 
DSMs and local remedies, through domestic administrative or judicial procedures in 
parallel, as possible ways to address investor-state disputes.1216 This is particularly the 
case for most of the BITs between China and EU Member States. Although they are 
not mentioned in IIAs, local remedies are often available in the host states’ domestic 
legal systems, which mainly serve the goal of reserving the right of host states to try to 
resolve the disputes internally. 
Detailed regulations on local remedies come from the host states’ domestic legal 
systems, while IIAs usually focus on their relationship with international fora. Focusing 
on the BITs between China and EU Member States, the rules on this issue can be 
categorized into three groups. 1217  First, only the disputes about the amount of 
1213 The grounds of annulment under the ICSID and the basis for refusing recognition and enforcement under the 
New York Convention only focus on violating fundamental procedural principles. In specific, under the ICSID 
Convention, the grounds of an annulment request include that: (a) the Tribunal was not properly constituted; (b) the 
Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers; (c) there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal; (d) 
there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or (e) the award has failed to state the 
reasons on which it is based. See: ICSID Convention, Art. 52(1). Under New York Convention, denying recognition 
and enforcement should be based on no valid arbitration agreement, violation of due process, exceeding the scope 
of jurisdiction, pathological composition of the tribunal, and no binding award. See: New York Convention (1985), 
Art. V.1. 
1214 See e.g. Luca Pantaleo, Lights and Shadows of the TTIP Investment Court System, CLEER Paper Series, Vol. 1, 
2016. Tingting Deng 邓婷婷, The Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism in a China-EU Bilateral Investment 
Treaty: From the Perspective of the EU's Investment Court System 中欧双边投资条约中的投资者—国家争端解
决机制——以欧盟投资法庭制度为视角, Politics and Law 政治与法律, Vol. 4, 2017, p. 108. 
1215 Tingting Deng 邓婷婷, The Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism in a China-EU Bilateral Investment 
Treaty: From the Perspective of the EU's Investment Court System 中欧双边投资条约中的投资者—国家争端解
决机制——以欧盟投资法庭制度为视角, Politics and Law 政治与法律, Vol. 4, 2017, p. 108. 
1216 Jingxia Shi & Nuan Dong 石静霞、董暖, The Construction of Investment Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
under 'One Belt One Road' Initiatives “一带一路”倡议下投资争端解决机制的构建, Wuhan University 
International Law Review 武大国际法评论, Vol. 2, 2018, p. 10. 
1217 There are other procedural arrangements regarding the relationship between local remedies and international 
DSMs in existing IIAs in the world. For a further discussion on this, see: United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), Dispute Settlement: Investor–State (UNCTAD Series on Issues in International 
Investment Agreements), 2003, available at: https://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteiit30_en.pdf, last visited on 06.08.2020. 
Jayoung Jeon, Drafting an Optimal Dispute Resolution Clause in Investment Treaties, Peking University 
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compensation for expropriation which have not been brought to any domestic court 
may be referred to international arbitration. For other types of disputes, local remedies 
are the only choice.1218 Second, complaints about any kind of disputes can be brought 
to international arbitration if they have not been filed in a domestic court. This is the 
so-called “fork-in-the-road” or “no U-turn” approach, which means that investors have 
the right to choose between local remedies or international arbitration, and the choice 
of one forum would exhaust other possibilities.1219 Third, international arbitration is 
available in disputes that have not been brought to any domestic court or have been 
withdrawn from the court before a decision concerning the same treatment as that 
alleged to be inconsistent with the underlying IIA is delivered. This can be described 
as a variant of the “fork-in-the-road” approach, which can be found, in particular, in 
several IIAs between China and EU Member States signed after 2000, such as China- 
Netherlands BIT (2001). 1220  At the same time, this has been the EU’s consistent 
approach in its three concluded IIAs.1221 Regarding the prospective China-EU BIT, an 
agreement is likely to be reached on the third option—the variant of the “fork-in-the-
road” approach. Such an arrangement can encourage the use of domestic courts, while 
keeping the door to international adjudication open, reduce the concern that national 
courts may hinder the advancement and realization of the international rule of law and 
prevent investors from resorting to both domestic and international fora as well as being 
subject to redress respectively.1222 
Another relevant issue here is the requirement to exhaust administrative reconsideration 
procedures. This is a typical feature of most of China’s IIAs, where investors are 
required to “go through the appropriate domestic administrative review process before 
seeking to arbitrate”. 1223  However, it is noticeable that only five BITs concluded 
between China and EU Member States incorporated this requirement.1224 At the same 
time, although the European Parliament’s Resolution of 6 April 2011 seems to suggest 
that exhausting local remedies is required where those remedies are “reliable enough to 
 
Transnational Law Review, Vol. 4, 2016. In the interest of the present thesis, only the BITs between China and EU 
Member States are focused on. 
1218 See e.g. the China-Italy BIT (1985), Protocol Ad Art. 5(i). 
1219 See e.g. the China-Denmark BIT (1985), Art. 8.2. 
1220 The China- Netherlands BIT (2001), Art. 10.2. 
1221 See e.g. CETA (2012), Art. 8.22.1. 
1222 European Commission, Reading Guide-Draft Text on Investment Protection and Investment Court System in the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 16.09.2015, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-15-5652_en.htm, last visited on 31.07.2020. 
In reality, there have been many investor-state arbitration cases where investors resorted to the domestic courts of 
host states to challenge the legality of certain domestic legislation before, after or at the same time as resorting to 
international arbitration. For example, in the case Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany, the 
investor initiated arbitration against Germany before the ICSID and filed a lawsuit before the Federal Constitutional 
Court of Germany. See: Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12, 
Decision pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rule 41(5), 2 July 2013; Judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court of 
Germany, 06.12.2016. See also: Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder & Martin Dietrich Brauch, The State of Play in 
Vattenfall v. Germany II: Leaving the German Public in the Dark, 10.2014, available at: 
https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/state-of-play-vattenfall-vs-germany-II-leaving-german-public-
dark-en.pdf, p. 2, last visited on 30.07.2020. 
1223 Wenhua Shan & Sheng Zhang, The Potential EU-China BIT: Issues and Implications, at: EU and Investment 
Agreements: Open Questions and Remaining Challenges, Hart Publishing, 2013, p. 117. 
1224 These five BITs and relevant articles are: the China-Cyprus BIT (2001), Art. 9.3(b); the China-Czech Republic 
BIT (2005), Art. 9.3; the China-BLEU BIT (2005), Art. 8.2; the China-France BIT (2007), Art. 7; and the China-
Malta BIT (2009), Art. 9.3. 
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guarantee due process”,1225 until now, the EU’s practice has not adopted and appears 
unlikely to adopt such an approach in the near future.1226 In particular, considering the 
general distrust of EU investors in relation to China’s legal system,1227 the EU probably 
would argue against having such a compulsory procedure. Considering the absence of 
the requirement to exhaust administrative reconsideration procedures in China’s 
recently concluded relevant treaties, such as the China-Australia FTA (2015), China 
may change its predominant practice if this is proposed by the EU, and thus such a 
requirement would not appear in a China-EU BIT. In fact, this is also in line with what 
Chinese scholars have strongly advised the Chinese government to do in China’s 
prospective IIAs.1228 
 
11.6 Conclusion 
In the ISDS system under the prospective China-EU BIT, a differentiation should be 
made between the objective of amicable DSMs and that of the adjudication process. 
The former is intended to focus on settling disputes amicably. Considering investor-
state adjudication has played and would continue to play the role as being the real “teeth” 
of the ISDS system, the aim of the adjudication process is suggested to be developing 
jurisprudence and realizing the international rule of law. 
Regarding the jurisdiction of the ISDS system, any dispute between an investor of one 
treaty party and the other treaty party concerning treatment alleged to breach a 
provision of investment protection and to cause damages should be covered. Within 
this broad scope, two issues must be pointed out: first, the limit on the scope of investor-
state adjudication to disputes about the amount of compensation for expropriation is 
not likely to be argued by China; second, only monetary damages and returning the 
original property would be allowed to be claimed by investors in investor-state 
adjudication and issued by tribunals as remedies. 
Specific DSMs within this system can be divided into three categories: amicable 
mechanisms, adjudication mechanisms and local remedies. Amicable DSMs are 
valuable in the context of ISDS, since very often there is a need for restoring the 
relationship and ensuring further cooperation between investors and the host state. In 
this regard, the prospective China-EU BIT is expected to include voluntary negotiation 
and mediation, as well as compulsory consultations as a precondition to adjudication. 
Among these three DSMs, given the intention presented by both sides to increase the 
 
1225 European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution of 6 April 2011 on the Future European International 
Investment Policy (2010/2203(INI)), P7_TA(2011)0141, 06.04.2011, para. 31. 
1226 The Arif Report (2011) showed that the EU Parliament once contemplated the re-introduction of the obligation 
to exhaust local remedies in the EU’s future IIAs. However, in its Resolution on EU-China negotiations (2013), 
effective ISDS was listed as a “key priority”, but nothing was mentioned on the local remedies requirement. 
1227 It was further argued that, for a Chinese investor, to bring a dispute before an EU court “might be less of a risk 
and easier to put up with than the other way round”. See: Wolfgang Koeth, Can the Investment Court System (ICS) 
Save TTIP and CETA?, European Institute of Public Administration Working Paper, Vol. 2016/W/01, 2016, p. 2. 
1228  See e.g. Jingxia Shi & Nuan Dong 石静霞、董暖 , The Construction of Investment Dispute Settlement 
Mechanisms under 'One Belt One Road' Initiatives “一带一路”倡议下投资争端解决机制的构建, Wuhan 
University International Law Review 武大国际法评论, Vol. 2, 2018, p. 13. 
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use of mediation for ISDS, the procedural design of this mechanism, especially in 
relation to five issues, deserves attention. First, the basic principle of voluntariness 
should be adhered to. In addition to that, if disputing parties do not choose mediation 
spontaneously, it should be offered at the beginning of adjudication process. Second, 
the qualification of potential mediators should be left to the disputing parties’ autonomy, 
and it is appropriate to establish different rules for mediators and adjudicators. Third, 
interest-based mediation is suggested to be prescribed as the default DSM, unless the 
disputing parties have agreed otherwise. Fourth, it is better to keep confidentiality as a 
fundamental feature of investor-state mediation, except if parties reach a different 
agreement. Finally, in terms of the enforcement of settlement agreements, a possible 
solution is to incorporate such agreements into the decision-making stage of 
adjudication to trigger the enforcement system.  
In international adjudication, China’s attitude towards the EU’s ICS is expected to be 
modestly positive. First, regarding the type of forum, the adjudicatory nature of the ICS 
would be generally acceptable, but China may argue to eliminate the system’s exclusive 
jurisdiction to open the door for other arbitration institutions, such as CIETAC. Second, 
a pre-established roster of adjudicators selected by treaty parties can be the preferred 
way for both parties, but this is suggested to come with the disputing parties’ right to 
choose the adjudicators from the roster for their own cases. Third, both parties are 
compatible in their shared intention to strengthen the treaty parties’ role in ISDS by 
increasing the joint committee’s power. A possible agreement is likely to be reached 
on the prospective binding force of the joint committee’s treaty interpretations. Fourth, 
procedural transparency should be respected in general, but it is better to allow a 
reasonable degree of party autonomy to prevent public disclosure. Last but not least, it 
does not seem to be necessary to have an appeal mechanism in a China-EU BIT. Instead, 
it is better for both parties to consider this in a plurilateral forum. 
Regarding the relationship between local remedies and international DSMs, the 
prospective China-EU BIT may incorporate an article adopting the variant of the “fork-
in-the-road” approach. This means that international adjudication is available for the 
disputes that have not been brought to any domestic court or have been withdrawn from 
the domestic court before a decision has been delivered. In addition, exhausting local 
remedies would not be required as a precondition to international adjudication. 
In brief, it is fair to say that, in general, China’s and the EU’s proposals for the ISDS 
system would probably be mutually complementary, although they may have some 
unavoidable contradictory and conflicting points. Taking into account the preferred 
practice and legal cultural characteristics of both parties, a system comprising both 
amicable and adjudicative and both compulsory and voluntary DSMs is suggested for 
the prospective China-EU BIT. With thoughtful procedural designs, such a system 
would be palatable to the treaty parties and attractive to potential users, contributing to 
successful investment dispute settlement and the sustainable development of a China-
EU BIT. 
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Chapter 12 The Relationship between the State-State Dispute Settlement System 
and the Investor-State Dispute Settlement System  
In the prospective China-EU BIT, a SSDS system and an ISDS system are very likely 
to exist in parallel with each other. The IIAs concluded by China and by the EU 
respectively, especially the most recent ones, confirm their support for incorporating 
both state-state and investor-state dispute settlement systems in one IIA. Therefore, it 
is very likely that, in a China-EU BIT, these two tracks for investment dispute 
settlement will co-exist with each other. 
Keeping SSDS mechanisms would not negatively affect the sufficiently powerful 
procedural rights of investors and the power of investor-state tribunals in ISDS.1229 At 
the same time, the combination of SSDS and ISDS systems provides different 
stakeholders with various options to address their complaints under an IIA, and thus 
this increases the possibility of successful investment dispute settlement. However, it 
should also be noted that such coexistence creates potential conflicts. In particular, the 
compulsory and enforceable state-state and investor-state adjudication mechanisms, 
which are the “teeth” in enforcing the obligations under an IIA,1230 bring with them the 
possibility of competing jurisdiction, conflicting decisions and other potential problems. 
As there are rows of teeth, if these two tracks of DSMs work together well, it can “chew 
up” the disputes; however, if they are not properly positioned in relation to each other, 
they may attack each other and thus leave the disputes unresolved and even more 
blurred. Therefore, establishing proper rules regarding the relationship between state-
state and investor-state adjudication is necessary, especially for their respective 
jurisdiction and its effects. Unfortunately, in both theory and practice, this relationship 
has gained little attention, despite the long-time dual nature of state-state and investor-
state investment adjudication. Some recent cases bring this problem into view and 
demonstrate the need for a careful examination.  
With the increasing attention paid by China and the EU to the states’ role in investment 
dispute settlement, the potential conflicts between SSDS system and ISDS system, 
especially the adjudication mechanisms therein, could probably arise more frequently 
and cause more controversies under their investment agreements in the future. 
Therefore, the importance of a proper arrangement is ever more pronounced. The 
present section explores the relationship between these two dispute settlement systems 
under the prospective China-EU BIT, in an attempt to answer the following two basic 
 
1229 This can be arguably proven by the long-term co-existence of SSDS and ISDS mechanisms. In addition, such 
duality demonstrates that investment protection and de-politicizing ISDS are important, but they are not absolute. 
See: Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of Interdependent Rights and 
Shared Interpretive Authority, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 55, 2014, p. 28. 
1230 Shu Xv 徐树, The Conflicts and Coordination between the Dule Tracks of the Enforcement Mechanisms of 
International Investment Agreements 国际投资条约“双轨”执行机制的冲突及协调 , Studies in Law and 
Business 法商研究, Vol. 2, 2017, p. 149. 
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but controversial questions: first, what are the situations subject to the jurisdiction of 
state-state adjudication and that of investor-state adjudication respectively, and what 
situations are subject to both? Second, regarding the situations that can resort to both, 
how should these two dispute settlement systems cooperate with each other? Bearing 
this in mind, the relationship between the SSDS system and the ISDS system in a China-
EU BIT is explored from the perspectives of their separation, connection and possible 
combination. Thoughtful pre-established rules would not only prevent one dispute 
settlement system from stalling or thwarting the other, minimizing the side effects 
brought about by the hybridity, but rather facilitate that they complement and cooperate 
with each other to realize the settlement of investment disputes, maximizing the 
advantages of a comprehensive investment dispute settlement system. 
 
12.1 The Separation and Connection between the State-State Dispute Settlement 
System and the Investor-State Dispute Settlement System 
Although the general practice defines the scopes of SSDS and ISDS respectively as the 
interpretation and application of any provision in the IIA at issue and any alleged 
violation of specific commitments by host states, as explained in Section 2.2.3, supra, 
these two elements are nonetheless connected with each other. This connection results 
in a dual-track jurisdictional regime with different disputes being assigned exclusively 
to one or the other being difficult and even impracticable. Regarding this, the EU’s ICS 
incorporates a provision similar to the ICSID Convention Article 27, providing that an 
investor’s home state is prevented from giving diplomatic protection or bringing a case 
against the other treaty party if the investor and the other treaty party have consented 
to submitting to or have submitted to investor-state adjudication, unless this treaty party 
has failed to abide by and comply with the award rendered in ISDS. 1231  It also 
stipulates that, even if a specific investment dispute has been submitted to an investor-
state tribunal, SSDS is not precluded in respect of a measure of general application.1232 
On the part of China, existing practice has included importing the ICSID Convention 
Article 27, 1233  and generally stipulating that investor-state arbitration is without 
prejudice to SSDS where a dispute concerns the interpretation and application of the 
same provision at issue.1234 Thus, China and the EU seem to at least have a clear idea 
on the prohibition of diplomatic claim after ISDS has been resorted to by investors, as 
stated in the ICSID Convention Article 27. For other types of claims in SSDS, the EU 
explicitly allows treaty parties to bring declaratory relief claims while China chooses 
interpretive claims instead. It is not clear whether the other types of claims that are left 
unmentioned in the practice of each party are allowed or not. At the same time, whether 
 
1231 See e.g. the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.23.1 
1232 See e.g. the EU-Singapore IPA (2018), Art. 3.23.2. 
1233 See e.g. the Investment Agreement of the ASEAN-China FTA (2009), Art. 14(8). 
1234 See e.g. the China-Singapore BIT (1985), Art. 13(12); the China-Sri Lanka BIT (1986), Art. 13.11; the China-
New Zealand BIT (1988), Art. 13.12. These articles seem to allow parallel proceedings under ISDS and SSDS 
respectively without providing further guidance. However, if the investor-state arbitration is conducted under ICSID 
Convention, Art. 27 applies and thus later SSDS is prevented. 
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ISDS can be resorted to by investors if any related SSDS proceeding exists is also left 
untouched. 
Given the distinct purposes of the three types of claims in SSDS, except for diplomatic 
protection claims which have the same goal as ISDS, both declaratory relief claims 
concerning a measure of general application and interpretive claims regarding the 
interpretation and application of the same provision in the related ISDS process should 
to be allowed within a relevant ISDS proceeding. Such SSDS proceedings can help to 
resolve the disputed situation more completely by having a concrete idea of the 
meaning of the disputed treaty provisions and/or the compliance of a measure of general 
application. However, this does not warrant the permitting simultaneous SSDS and 
ISDS proceedings. The existing practice in China and the EU seems to generally allow 
ISDS and SSDS proceedings not only in sequence but also in parallel, except for 
explicitly prohibited situations. This makes sense from the perspective that interpretive 
claims and declaratory relief claims normally do not overlap with the claims in ISDS. 
However, it does not deal with the issue brought about by the unavoidably related 
disputes in these two types of proceedings, which results in the fact that the decisions 
reached by different tribunals are necessarily relevant for each other. In this regard, 
considering the possible complicated situations brought about by parallel proceedings 
and the potential tension arising from the co-existence of a SSDS tribunal and an ISDS 
tribunal, it is better to explicitly prohibit parallel proceedings concerning the same 
challenged measure. 
In terms of relevant SSDS and ISDS cases raised in sequence, especially the effect of 
the decisions reached therein, it is widely accepted that a decision made for a specific 
dispute is binding on the disputing parties, but there are different opinions about 
whether previous decisions should have any influence on the decisions of tribunals in 
later cases. Some view jurisprudence as persuasive, rather than authoritative.1235 Some 
argue that relevant decisions made in previous cases should be binding on treaty parties 
as well as for subsequent cases under the same IIA. 1236  In this regard, under 
the prospective China-EU BIT, for the sake of systemic consistency and 
predictability, it is suggested to incorporate a provision stressing the key role of 
the overall dispute settlement system, covering both SSDS and ISDS, in 
providing security and predictability in relation to the treaty. In this vein, Article 
3.2 of the DSU provides a good example. Such a provision would result in 
adjudicators with a general obligation to at least take existing decisions into account, 
as is the practice in the WTO Dispute Settlement System.1237 Instead of creating 
detailed rules trying to cover all possible 
1235  See e.g. Jamal Seifi, Investor-State Arbitration v. State-State Arbitration in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 
Transnational Dispute Management (TDM), 2004, available at: https://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/article.asp?key=112, last visited on 05.08.2020. Michele Potestà, State-to-State Dispute 
Settlement Pursuant to Bilateral Investment Treaties: Is there Potential?, at: Nerina Boschiero & Tullio Scovazzi & 
Cesare Pitea & Chiara Ragni (eds.), International Courts and the Development of International Law-Essays in 
Honour of Tullio Treves, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2013, p. 341. 
1236 See e.g. Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of Interdependent Rights 
and Shared Interpretive Authority, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 55, 2014, pp. 61-66. 
1237 This is greatly contested by some WTO Members and in particular by the United States. See e.g. United States 
Trade Representative, Report on the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, February 2020. 
325
 
· 
situations, this is arguably a more appropriate and acceptable approach to both China 
and the EU, at least for the current stage. 
 
12.2 Combining the State-State Dispute Settlement System and the Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement System 
As explained above, investment disputes are very often complex and, during the 
settlement of such disputes, it is not only expected to resolve the disputes but also to 
restore the relationship for further cooperation. In addition, regardless of whether a 
dispute arises between an investor and its host state, or the host state and the investor’s 
home state, the interests of these three parties are often all involved at the same time. 
Such a complex situation is further intensified by the inter-related investor-state and 
state-state disputes and the shared interpretive authorities of state-state and investor-
state tribunals. Taking all these features of investment dispute settlement into 
consideration, this section makes innovative proposals of combining SSDS and ISDS, 
with a view to exploring the possibility of resolving state-state and investor-state 
disputes in a single forum. Such innovations are expected to address the comprehensive 
settlement of investment disputes and create greater certainty, consistency and 
predictability under the prospective China-EU BIT. 
12.2.1 State-Investor-State Mediation 
An amicable mechanism that is able to include the three stakeholders, the investor, its 
home state and the host state, in direct negotiations is arguably effective and beneficial 
for complex investment dispute settlement. Such a trilateral arrangement can offer a 
unique opportunity to accommodate the diverse interests of the three involved parties. 
It could also resolve the long-standing issue that one stakeholder’s rights and interests 
are neglected in any available bilateral DSM. In this vein, a state-investor-state 
mediation mechanism is suggested as a suitable option. It can give the three parties a 
pre-established forum to discuss existing disputes with professional assistance from a 
mediator to ensure the proper conduct of negotiations. Furthermore, as was analysed in 
Chapters 6, 7 and 9, supra, both parties recently showed interest in using mediation for 
international investment dispute settlement and this proves that the prospective China-
EU BIT can be a suitable starting point to put this innovation into practice. 
In a bilateral mediation process, a non-disputing party may also get involved in the 
confidential process, with the disputing parties’ consent, but this has only existed as an 
exceptional case and the role of such a non-disputing party in mediation is not clear or, 
needless to say, guaranteed. That is far from the suggested pre-established state-
investor-state mediation here, which enjoys greater procedural predictability in which 
three parties are put on an equal footing. If accepted by the treaty parties, it can be 
realized through explicitly stipulating the possibility of having trilateral mediation or 
pointing out the possibility of transforming bilateral mediation into a trilateral 
mediation when necessary. Applicable procedural rules can be borrowed from state-
state mediation and investor-state mediation, but more discretion is suggested to be left 
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to the parties through party autonomy and mediators, especially considering the need 
to coordinate the three parties. 
12.2.2 Combining the Rosters of Adjudicators for State-State and Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement 
A further step to pre-selecting adjudicators for both SSDS and ISDS can be combining 
the two separate rosters. This means that the same group of adjudicators selected by 
treaty parties would be available for both SSDS and ISDS. As a result, a fixed small 
group would be in place to provide judicial authority. Such an institutional design 
should be acceptable, and even arguably desirable, for China and the EU, especially 
considering that the existing practice of both parties already adopts quite similar 
qualification requirements for SSDS and ISDS adjudicators. Furthermore, such an 
approach could reduce the institutional costs of the dispute settlement system under 
their prospective BIT and, more importantly, help realize better communication among 
adjudicators and thus contribute to the system’s consistency. 
12.2.3 Granting Investors Procedural Rights in State-State Dispute Settlement 
The possibility of sequential correlated SSDS and ISDS proceedings may create a race 
to adjudication. Although, until now, this problem has rarely occurred, the recent 
reassertion of the states’ role in investment dispute settlement should bring this 
important but untested issue back to the table. In particular, the race to adjudication 
between an investor and its home state may lead to negatively affecting investor’s 
interests by settling relevant disputes through SSDS without their knowledge.1238 Even 
when investors are informed, it is likely that they are bound by the result of state-state 
awards without having the opportunity to present opinions during adjudication.1239 In 
response to this, it is suggested that directly affected investors should be treated as third-
parties in SSDS, if no objection is raised by the disputing parties. This goes further than 
granting investors the right to submit amicus curiae briefs,1240 since investors not only 
enjoy the right to submit their opinions but also to have their views considered by SSDS 
tribunals. Namely, this would ensure state-state tribunals actually consider the impact 
of their decisions on affected investors. Considering the non-disputing treaty party’s 
interest in treaty interpretation, both China’s and the EU’s recently concluded IIAs 
grant the non-disputing treaty party the right to make submissions on treaty 
interpretation during ISDS. Given the fact that investors may also be stakeholders in 
SSDS, a similar arrangement should also be considered for investors in SSDS 
proceedings. 
 
 
1238 There are different positions on whether investors’ consent needs to be achieved before their home states 
represent them to resolve relevant disputes through SSDS. See: Kate Parlett, The Individual in the International 
Legal System: Continuity and Change in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 53, 82. 
1239 Ecuador v. United States, PCA Case No. 2012-5, Expert Opinion with Respect to Jurisdiction in the Interstate 
Arbitration Initiated by Ecuador Against the United States (W. Michael Reisman), 24.04.2012, pp. 19-20. 
1240 Some model treaties have granted investors the right to submit amicus curiae briefs. See e.g. the US Model BIT 
(2012), Arts. 37(2), 28(3). In the absence of such a provision, tribunals could accept such an intervention by 
exercising their general power in relation to procedural arrangements. 
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12.3 Conclusion 
In the prospective China-EU BIT, it is highly likely that a SSDS system and an ISDS 
system will co-exist with each other. The unavoidably related SSDS and ISDS could 
bring about potential conflicts between these two aspects of the comprehensive 
investment dispute settlement system under this treaty. Therefore, it is suggested that 
both sides consider proper separation, connection and a combination between the SSDS 
system and the ISDS system.  
Existing practice in China and the EU has presented a specific idea on the prohibition 
of pursuing diplomatic claims in SSDS after ISDS has been resorted to by investors, as 
stipulated in the ICSID Convention Article 27. Considering their different aims from 
those in ISDS, interpretive claims and declaratory relief claims should be generally 
allowed in SSDS. However, because of the possible complicated situations brought by 
parallel proceedings and the potential tension brought by the co-existence of a SSDS 
tribunal and an ISDS tribunal, it is recommended to explicitly prohibit parallel 
proceedings concerning the same challenged measure. In order to preserve the system’s 
consistency and predictability, for sequential relevant SSDS and ISDS cases, it is 
necessary to incorporate a provision stressing the role of the dispute settlement system 
in providing security and predictability.  
As a step further, an innovative combination of SSDS and ISDS deserves consideration, 
which may be realized through the establishment of state-investor-state mediation, 
combining the rosters of adjudicators for SSDS and ISDS and granting relevant 
investors procedural rights in SSDS proceedings. 
Thoughtfully-designed procedural arrangements regarding the relationship between 
SSDS and ISDS systems is essential in realizing the goal of establishing a 
comprehensive system under the prospective China-EU BIT. Without much existing 
practice, how the suggestions provided in the present chapter would function admittedly 
remains to be seen. Nevertheless, theoretically well-founded innovative procedural 
designs deserve a try, not only to avoid potential problematic situations, but also to 
ensure that the two dispute settlement systems for SSDS and ISDS function 
cooperatively and coherently, heading towards successful investment dispute 
settlement under a China-EU BIT. 
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Part 5 Conclusion 
Chapter 13 Summary of Conclusions 
Since the formal launch of the negotiations for a China-EU BIT at the 16th EU-China 
Summit of November 2013, as of April 2020, 28 rounds of negotiations were held 
between the two parties. This prospective BIT will replace the 26 existing BITs between 
China and EU Member States with one single comprehensive agreement, with a view 
to removing market access barriers to investment, promoting economic transactions and 
cooperation between China and the EU in the field of international investment and 
providing a high level of protection to investors and investment in the EU and the 
Chinese markets. 
Based on the fact that China and the EU have different preferences in various issues in 
investment dispute resolution, the disagreement about what constitutes appropriate 
dispute settlement systems in the prospective China-EU BIT is expected to be one of 
the major stumbling blocks in the negotiations. This thesis analyses the proper 
procedural design of the investment dispute settlement mechanisms in the prospective 
China-EU BIT, tackling this issue by exploring the mechanisms for both state-state and 
investor-state disputes respectively. In general, anticipating the possible proposals of 
both parties, the analysis focuses on the potential thorny issues that may become the 
stumbling blocks in concluding this prospective investment agreement and 
recommends possible solutions to overcome those obstacles.  
Among the various factors that are expected to affect each parties’ proposals and the 
reactions to the proposals of the parties, this thesis focuses on two essential aspects: the 
negotiating parties’ existing practice and their legal culture in dispute settlement. The 
former includes the state-state dispute settlement systems and the investor-state dispute 
settlement systems in the concluded IIAs by China and the EU and the cases brought 
thereunder, the state-state dispute settlement systems in their Free Trade Agreements, 
as well as relevant practice under the WTO Dispute Settlement System. All of these 
provide direct evidence to predict each party’s possible proposal regarding the design 
of the investment dispute settlement systems in future treaty negotiations. The latter 
concerns the legal tradition and internal practice in dispute settlement for China and the 
EU respectively. Some underlying reasons for certain dispute resolution approaches 
reveals the ideological predilections of the treaty parties, and it helps to identify the 
procedural arrangements that are difficult to change because they reflect the values and 
principles embedded in the party’s legal culture. Three main research questions, are 
raised and answered in the present thesis, namely:  
 Whether, and if so to what extent, differences in legal culture determine China’s 
and the EU’s respective approaches to investment dispute settlement at the 
internal level?  
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 Whether, and if so to what extent, differences in legal culture determine China’s 
and the EU’s respective approaches to investment dispute settlement at the 
international level?  
 What would/could the dispute settlement system in the prospective China-EU 
BIT look like? 
 
13.1 Comparison between the Legal Culture in Dispute Settlement of China and 
the EU 
The first research question concerns the legal cultural characteristics of China and those 
of the EU in dispute settlement and, in order to answer this question, the legal cultural 
features influenced by the legal tradition and their internal dispute settlement systems 
are discussed respectively. With regard to China, traditional philosophies, especially 
Confucianism, constituted the ideological foundation of Chinese legal culture and, 
instead of law, the values and teachings advocated by these philosophies played a 
significant role in regulating ancient Chinese society. Under Confucianism, community 
came before individuals, social responsibility was more important than freedom and, 
most importantly, harmony was prioritized and took the central position. As a result, 
dispute settlement focused on restoring a harmonious relationship through amicable 
informal DSMs. Bringing a dispute to a formal DSM, like litigation, was not desired 
and was even disapproved of. The core values of traditional Chinese philosophies have 
been arguably inherited by contemporary Chinese ideology, as reflected in the goal of 
constructing a harmonious socialist society. Thus, non-adjudicated solutions to disputes 
through amicable mechanisms are consistently preferred. Moving from traditional 
Chinese philosophies to contemporary Chinese ideology, the core values have been 
insisted on and, in particular, the amicable settlement of disputes has been the consistent 
preference. Different from traditional philosophies, law is seen by China in modern 
times as an indispensable part of socialist construction and the socialist rule of law is 
established, which is, however, subject to the overall objective of socialist harmony. 
Concerning dispute settlement in the Chinese legal system, six DSMs act as the main 
avenues for disputes arising from foreign investment, including negotiation, mediation, 
arbitration, complaints coordination for foreign investment, administrative review, and 
litigation. Among these DSMs, there is a preference for amicable ones, especially 
mediation, is clear. When examining the procedural design of these DSMs and the 
general structure of China’s dispute settlement system, which is composed of those 
DSMs, from a legal cultural perspective, elements from Chinese ideologies can be 
identified: the promotion of amicable DSMs aims at restoring harmony between 
disputing parties as well as in the society; the extensive use of mediation is in line with 
the requirements of various legal cultural elements; and even the construction of the 
socialist rule of law is combined with the pursuit of harmony. All of these elements 
nudge the disputing parties in the same direction of retaining a harmonious socialist 
society. 
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Regarding the traditional values preserved in European legal history, three constants—
personalism, legalism and intellectualism—in particular formed the basis of the 
European legal culture of dispute settlement. Against this background, law is taken as 
the guarantor of justice, fairness and legal rights; the insistence on the rule of law 
ensures the supremacy of law; as a normal way of resolving disputes, litigation focuses 
on preserving substantive rights and procedural justice and, correspondingly, judges 
must make decisions according to law following due process. With regard to the 
commonly available DSMs for investment disputes in EU Member States, mediation, 
arbitration and litigation are identified. First, partly contributed to by the various legal 
traditions of the EU Member States, the current legislative situation related to mediation 
is quite different among the EU Member States in terms of their general attitude and 
the detailed procedural rules. Legislation on arbitration is less diversified and consensus 
has been generally reached on certain basic principles, such as due process and equal 
treatment, which was inherited from the European legal tradition and is a reflection of 
European legal culture. In addition to its Member States’ relevant rules, the Union has 
also taken actions to regulate DSMs, which include primary law, secondary legislation, 
the CJEU’s practice on procedural justice, and other efforts like the Joint ELI-
UNIDROIT Project “From Transnational Principles to European Rules of Civil 
Procedure”. The common underlying motivation here is to preserve individuals’ rights 
to access to justice, effective remedies and fair trial, which reflect the common values 
and principles arising from the constitutional tradition shared by the EU Member States. 
In other words, it is fair to say that the value-oriented identity of the EU acts as one of 
the driving forces in the Union in relation to regulating DSMs. Taking a legal cultural 
perspective to analyse the DSMs in the EU Member States and the Union’s relevant 
regulating measures, three points deserve attention. First, a consistent pursuit of the rule 
of law can be identified in dispute settlement. Second, litigation has been commonly 
used, which focuses on realizing substantive and procedural justice. Third, recently, 
increased attention on mediation is based on the recognition of its function in ensuring 
access to justice. Therefore, the relevant practice of EU Member States and the Union 
to a large extent reflects the EU’s legal cultural characteristics in dispute settlement, 
which, in turn, arguably reinforce the underlying values and principles. 
By comparison, the diverse features of dispute resolution employed by China and by 
the EU are typically reflected within legal culture, the perception of law, the role of law, 
and the objective of dispute settlement. In general, Chinese legal culture stresses the 
society’s overall goal of preserving harmony and, as a result, the interests of individuals 
are secondary to this goal. In contrast, the legal culture of the EU shows clear signs of 
individualism, where individuals’ rights are respected and protected as constitutional 
rights and democratic principles. Regarding the perception of law, despite the negative 
influence coming from the traditional understanding of law as a tool of punishment, 
contemporary Chinese ideology recognizes the importance of law in setting rules and 
protecting individuals’ legal rights. It deserves attention that the “socialist rule of law” 
combines law with, and even takes law as a tool of realizing, extrinsic social values, 
with a view to constructing a harmonious socialist society. On the side of the EU, law 
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is separated from morality, enjoying its own value and fundamental importance, 
protecting individuals’ rights and balancing the power of the ruler. The rule of law 
constitutes part of “Europe’s DNA” and guarantees the supremacy of law. With regard 
to dispute settlement, in Chinese legal culture, the objective can be described as 
resolving disputes, restoring the relationship between disputing parties and preserving 
social harmony, while the EU’s corresponding practice seems to focus more on 
realizing individual procedural and substantive justice and developing jurisprudence. 
Furthermore, the legal cultural characteristics of dispute settlement in China and those 
of the EU have affected their legal systems, respectively. In particular, China’s dispute 
settlement system shows a strong preference for amicable DSMs, while in the EU the 
focus is on the use of litigation, especially its conformity with the rule of law. In 
addition, China arguably adopts a service-based doctrine of dispute settlement, with 
DSMs providing a service to disputing parties. This seems to be different from the 
approach of the EU, where DSMs are used to realize justice and to serve a justice-based 
doctrine. Influence from legal culture is particularly reflected in approaches to 
mediation in China and the EU: both parties have made efforts to enhance the use of 
mediation in dispute settlement, but the underlying motivation is different. China’s 
preference for mediation is based on the pursuit of social harmony, while the EU uses 
this DSM as an alternative way of realizing access to justice. In short, there are clear 
differences between China and the EU regarding the legal culture in dispute settlement 
and the design of internal DSMs, which is likely to lead to difficulties when they try to 
reach an agreement on relevant issues.  
 
13.2 The Approaches of China and the EU in International Investment Dispute 
Settlement 
Based on the analysis in the first part, in response to the second research question, the 
thesis explores how the differences in the legal cultural characteristics in dispute 
settlement in China and the EU, as reflected in their internal legal systems, determine 
each party’s approach to investment dispute settlement at the international level. It first 
looks at what China and the EU have done to date regarding international investment 
dispute settlement, including state-state mechanisms for resolving disputes about treaty 
application and implementation as well as investor-state mechanisms for investors to 
bring cases against host states regarding complaints related to specific investments. As 
a further step, it compares the legal cultural characteristics of China and the EU with 
their performance in international investment dispute settlement, in order to examine 
how the former has affected the latter. 
With regard to China’s engagement in investment dispute settlement, for state-state 
dispute settlement, a hybrid approach combining diplomatic consultations and ad hoc 
arbitration has been consistently adopted in China’s Model BITs and most of its 
concluded IIAs. By examining the state-state DSMs in China’s IIAs chronologically, it 
is noted that, first, the treaties concluded at a later stage often contain more detailed 
procedural rules. Second, certain diplomatic elements in the early treaties disappeared 
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from those concluded at a later stage, which can be taken as evidence showing China’s 
increasing confidence in international adjudication. In addition, China’s most recent 
treaty practice adjusts this hybrid approach to a quasi-WTO dispute settlement panel 
proceedings model, which in fact has been the practice of the state-state DSMs under 
its FTAs. In general, China’s FTAs emphasized amicable DSMs and mutually 
satisfactory solutions, which is the practice that is expected to be continued. At the same 
time, the adoption of a system similar to the WTO panel proceedings can indicate its 
confidence in this system and the intention to learn from relevant experience in 
international trade dispute settlement. In the WTO, generally speaking, China has 
transformed from being reluctant and even afraid to use the Dispute Settlement System 
to being confident and using the system regularly. The features of its performance in 
this system present a combination of practical concerns and influence from its legal 
culture on dispute settlement. Regarding ISDS, both the China Model BITs and its 
concluded IIAs witnessed the changes of China’s approach over time. These changes 
are particularly evidenced by the attitude towards investor-state arbitration: in the first 
stage (1982-1996), there was no acceptance of investor-state arbitration or acceptance 
of international arbitration only for disputes about the amount of compensation for 
expropriation; in the second stage (1997-2009), an overall acceptance of investor-state 
arbitration was the choice; in the third stage (2010-), the acceptance of investor-state 
arbitration is being carefully revised. In addition, since signing the ICSID Convention 
in 1993, it has become China’s normal practice to incorporate ICSID arbitration for 
ISDS into its IIAs. Detailed procedural designs of the DSMs for ISDS in China’s IIAs 
vary between each other, which shows China’s flexibility and open attitude. Until now, 
there have been eight ISDS arbitration cases brought under the IIAs concluded by China. 
Compared to its large number of IIAs and ever-increasing investment flows, this 
number is relatively small. Possible underlying reasons for this include the Chinese 
government’s preference for the amicable settlement of investment disputes to preserve 
harmony and its political image as a friendly host state, together with foreign investors’ 
worries about the Chinese government’s retaliation and the lucrativeness of the Chinese 
market. In addition, China has joined the worldwide ongoing reform of ISDS, 
presenting its perceptions on specific issues in different international fora and adopting 
new practices in its IIAs. In brief, China’s practice in both SSDS and ISDS resonate 
with some of its legal cultural characteristics in dispute settlement, such as the 
preference for amicable settlements and confidentiality in the dispute settlement 
process, as already shown at its domestic level. However, at the same time, from 
accepting the jurisdiction of an international adjudication body to actively participating 
in discussions on the reform of international dispute settlement, it is also clear that 
China has increasingly recognized the function of international adjudication in state-
state and investor-state dispute settlement. 
Similarly, the EU’s approach to state-state trade and investment dispute settlement is 
mainly reflected in its IIAs, while at the same time, the FTAs concluded by the EU and 
its performance in the WTO Dispute Settlement System is also of relevance here. After 
the Lisbon Treaty, the EU concluded three IIAs, CETA (2012), the EU-Singapore IPA 
333
 
· 
(2018) and the EU-Vietnam IPA (2018). The state-state DSMs contained in these three 
agreements basically follow the design of the WTO panel proceedings. In terms of the 
state-state DSMs laid out in the EU’s FTAs, chronologically, a shift from a diplomatic 
approach to a quasi-WTO dispute settlement panel proceedings model can be identified. 
In addition, more judicial features were gradually added to these DSMs. The 
resemblance between the DSMs in the EU’s FTAs and IIAs, on the one hand, and the 
WTO DSU on panel proceedings, on the other, may have been inspired by the EU’s 
positive experience in the WTO Dispute Settlement System. The EU has consistently 
been a frequent user of this system for resolving disputes between states, taking it as a 
normal tool to ensure the realization of its legitimate substantive and procedural rights. 
Along with its supportive attitude towards alternative DSMs, the EU has shown a 
preference for the judicial characteristics of the WTO Dispute Settlement System by 
not only its frequent use of the adjudication proceedings, but also in its reform proposal 
for the establishment of a permanent Panel Body and enhancing procedural 
transparency. Regarding ISDS, before 2009, EU Member States had the competence to 
conclude IIAs with third states, and they were quite active and productive in this regard. 
Most of these IIAs provide for amicable DSMs as well as arbitration for ISDS, and 
many cases have been heard under the latter, in which mostly EU investors initiated 
investor-state arbitration but the EU was rarely challenged by non-EU investors. The 
Lisbon Treaty brought about a shift in competence to conclude IIAs from the EU 
Member States to the Union. In the three IIAs that have been concluded by the Union 
since 2009, a ground-breaking approach to ISDS—the Investment Court System 
(ICS)—has been adopted consistently, which also represents the EU’s position in its 
future negotiations for any prospective IIA in bilateral and multilateral fora. In the ICS, 
amicable DSMs, including negotiation, mediation and consultations are provided and 
strengthened, acting as alternative ways to have access to justice. For adjudication, the 
ICS establishes a standing two-tiered court-like mechanism with typical judicial 
characteristics. For example, the pool of arbitrators who may be appointed to adjudicate 
a particular dispute in a specific case is supposed to be pre-selected by treaty parties, 
and the dispute settlement proceedings are to be operated with great procedural 
transparency, with a view to enhancing the system’s soundness of jurisprudence. At the 
same time, the joint committee and treaty parties are afforded significant roles in ISDS 
and mechanisms for scrutinizing claims are created in particular, which to some extent 
reshapes the balance between investors and states as well as stresses the public law 
nature of international investment law. The procedural designs of the DSMs in the ICS 
echoes the WTO Dispute Settlement System and the state-state DSMs in the EU’s FTAs. 
At the same time, it deserves attention that the EU’s most recent proposal on the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System reform, such as strengthening the interaction between the 
Appellate Body and the WTO Members, is in line with its increasing intention of 
strengthening the role of the states in the dispute settlement process, as shown in the 
ICS. All of this confirms the EU’s persistent preference for a permanent two-tiered 
court-like system for dispute settlement in the area of international investment law and, 
more broadly, international economic law. In other words, from the proposal to reform 
the WTO Dispute Settlement System, the gradually improved state-state DSMs in its 
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FTAs and IIAs, to the ICS, the EU’s direction is clear and calls for building a 
multilateral, judicialized and permanent system that respects the international rule of 
law to resolve international economic disputes. 
Comparing China’s and the EU’s practice in international investment dispute 
settlement, both similarities and differences can be identified. For SSDS, China’s and 
the EU’s most recent IIAs similarly adopt a quasi-WTO dispute settlement panel 
proceedings model, although there are differences in the details. Regarding ISDS, the 
two parties seem to have different perceptions on the objective of the whole system and 
the focus among the various DSMs. China puts its emphasis on settling disputes 
amicably and restoring harmonious relationships, while the EU cares more about 
realizing the international rule of law and developing jurisprudence through the system. 
Such differences correspondingly resonate with their internal practice and legal cultural 
characteristics, especially China’s traditional preference for harmony and the EU’s 
consistent pursuit of the rule of law. At the same time, each party’s approach has been 
affected by its interaction with international practice. Compared to the situation in 
China, where there is more emphasis on compromise and the acceptance of 
international practice, the EU’s practice in international investment dispute settlement 
seems to further stress and intensify its preferences that are rooted in its legal culture. 
 
13.3 Exploration of the Dispute Settlement System in a China-EU Bilateral 
Investment Treaty 
Equipped with the knowledge of China’s and the EU’s legal cultural characteristics in 
dispute settlement and their relevant practice at the internal and international levels, the 
discussion addresses the exploration of the dispute settlement system in the prospective 
China-EU BIT. To build a necessary basis for exploration, a brief overview of the 
investment legal relationship between China and the EU, including its historical 
development, current status and, particularly, the dispute settlement systems in the 
existing IIAs between China and EU Member States are provided in the first place. 
Before 2009, the Union only concluded general economic cooperation agreements with 
China. While, at the same time, by exercising their treaty negotiating and concluding 
competence, China and EU Member States concluded 26 IIAs. In addition to other 
applicable international law, such as the ICSID Convention, the current international 
legal framework of the China-EU investment relationship is constructed mainly on 
these IIAs. Two categories of DSMs exist in these Agreements for investment dispute 
settlement: one for state-state and one for investor-state dispute settlement. The 
provisions on state-state DSMs are quite similar to each other. First, compulsory 
consultations through diplomatic channels is required. Only if this fails, disputes can 
be submitted to ad hoc arbitration. Rules on arbitration procedures, decision making, 
the effect of arbitral awards and allocation of costs are normally provided for. In 
particular, diplomatic elements, such as approval by the contracting parties of the 
chairman of a tribunal, only exist in the BITs concluded in the early days. At the same 
time, the BITs negotiated more recently often set out more detailed procedural rules. In 
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contrast, the situation of investor-state DSMs is more complex. A division can be drawn 
in 1997: at the first stage (1982-1996), the IIAs are characterized by a limited 
acceptance of investor-state arbitration, while the IIAs signed in the second stage 
(1997-2009) reflect an overall acceptance of international arbitration for ISDS. All of 
these treaties provide for amicable and adjudicative DSMs simultaneously. Amicable 
DSMs are usually stressed in these treaties and, in particular, the BITs drafted at later 
time have explicit provisions in the treaty texts. In terms of the adjudicative 
mechanisms, the IIAs signed at the first stage limit international arbitration to disputes 
about the amount of compensation for expropriation. Such a requirement disappears in 
the IIAs at the second stage. Another noticeable change is the acceptance of ICSID 
arbitration. In addition, in the IIAs where international arbitration is provided for, rules 
on key procedural issues are provided. Regarding the real use of these DSMs, based on 
publicly available information, there have only been two ISDS arbitration cases. The 
public consultation conducted by the European Commission indicated the preference 
of EU investors for the amicable settlement for investment disputes with the Chinese 
government, which was largely affected by concerns about China’s domestic legal 
system and the preservation of the relationship with the Chinese government. 
As mentioned above, the Lisbon Treaty led to a ground-breaking change in the 
investment relationship between China and the EU by allocating competence for 
foreign direct investment to the Union and, since 2013, a China-EU BIT has been under 
negotiation. The overall dispute settlement system in the prospective China-EU BIT is 
expected to be composed of two sub-systems—one for state-state dispute settlement 
and one for investor-state dispute settlement. In terms of the former, as evidenced by 
the absence of any real use of state-state adjudication in the past practice of both parties, 
amicable DSMs have probably played a main role in resolving state-state investment 
disputes for both China and the EU, which is expected to continue under the prospective 
China-EU BIT. Thus, it is appropriate to take the amicable resolution of disputes as the 
core objective of the SSDS system. Regarding jurisdiction, disputes about the 
interpretation and application of treaty provisions are expected to be allowed, based on 
which, treaty parties can raise diplomatic protection claims, interpretive claims and 
claims for declaratory relief. Specific DSMs within the SSDS system can be divided 
into two categories—amicable DSMs and adjudicative DSMs. The former normally 
comes into play in the first place possibly through negotiation/consultations and/or 
mediation. In particular, consultations are likely to be required as a precondition for 
initiating a state-state adjudication process. In relation to adjudication, the most recent 
treaty practice of both parties reflects their interest in using a quasi-WTO dispute 
settlement dispute settlement panel proceedings mechanism, and this may also serve as 
the general structure for state-state adjudication under a China-EU BIT. In this regard, 
a problematic issue may be the composition of tribunals, for which China and the EU 
are likely to reach an agreement on pre-establishing a roster of adjudicators while 
leaving some room for party autonomy in specific cases. Another issue that deserves 
attention is procedural transparency. For a China-EU BIT, opening the whole process 
of adjudication to the public may be rejected by China, but third-party participation by 
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submitting amicus curiae briefs is likely to be acceptable and even recommended. In 
terms of the effect of the decisions of tribunals in state-state adjudication, a moderate 
approach, incorporating a provision similar to Article 3.2 of the DSU, is anticipated to 
be the most acceptable option. This means the rulings would only have a precedential 
value, instead of being binding on all following cases. Although state-state DSMs 
played a minor role in investment dispute resolution in the past, this should not be the 
reason to underestimate their potential use under a China-EU BIT. Considering the 
clear intention of both parties to increase the states’ role in investment dispute 
settlement, it is reasonable to expect that, with proper procedural arrangements which 
satisfy practical needs and the concerns coming from legal culture on dispute settlement 
of both parties, such a system in the prospective China-EU BIT is likely to make a real 
contribution to the settlement of investment disputes. 
Regarding the ISDS system under the prospective China-EU BIT, first, a differentiation 
should be made between the objective of amicable DSMs and that of adjudication. The 
former should focus on settling disputes amicably. In comparison, considering investor-
state adjudication has played and would continue to play the role of the real “teeth” in 
ISDS, the key objective of investor-state adjudication is suggested to be the 
development of jurisprudence and the realization of the international rule of law. Both 
amicable DSMs and the adjudication process should cover disputes between an investor 
of one treaty party and the other treaty party concerning treatment alleged to breach a 
provision of investment protection and to cause damages. Within this broad scope, two 
issues deserve attention: first, the limit on the scope of investor-state adjudication to 
disputes about the amount of compensation for expropriation is not likely to be argued 
by China; second, only monetary damages and returning the original property to 
investors would be allowed to be claimed by investors in investor-state adjudication 
and thereby possibly issued by tribunals as remedies. Specific DSMs within this system 
can be divided into three categories: amicable mechanisms, adjudication mechanisms 
and local remedies. Amicable DSMs are valuable in the context of ISDS, since very 
often there is a need to restore the relationship and to ensure further cooperation 
between investors and the host state. In this regard, the prospective China-EU BIT is 
expected to include voluntary negotiation and mediation, as well as compulsory 
consultations as a precondition to adjudication. Among these three DSMs, given the 
intention presented by both parties to increase the use of mediation for ISDS, the 
procedural design of this mechanism, especially with respect to five issues, deserves 
attention. First, the basic principle of voluntariness should be adhered to. In addition to 
that, if disputing parties do not choose mediation spontaneously, it should be offered to 
disputing parties by the adjudicators at the beginning of the adjudication process. 
Second, the qualification of potential mediators should be based upon the agreement of 
disputing parties, and it is appropriate to establish various standards for mediators and 
adjudicators. Third, interest-based mediation should be prescribed as the default type 
of mechanism, unless disputing parties agree otherwise. Fourth, it is better to keep 
confidentiality as a fundamental feature of investor-state mediation, unless disputing 
parties reach a different agreement. Finally, the settlement agreements reached in 
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mediation can be incorporated into the decision-making stage of adjudication, in order 
to trigger the enforcement system. In international adjudication, China’s attitude 
towards the EU’s ICS is expected to be modestly positive. First, regarding the type of 
forum, the adjudicatory nature of the ICS would be generally acceptable, but China 
may argue for eliminating the system’s exclusive jurisdiction to open the door for other 
arbitration institutions, such as CIETAC. Second, a pre-established roster of 
adjudicators selected by treaty parties could be preferred by both parties. However, this 
is suggested to come with the disputing parties’ right to choose the adjudicators from 
the roster. Third, the perception of both parties of strengthening the treaty parties’ role 
in ISDS by increasing the power of the joint committee are compatible with each other. 
A possible agreement is likely to be reached on the prospective binding force of the 
joint committee’s treaty interpretations. Fourth, procedural transparency should be 
respected in general, but it is better to allow for a reasonable degree of party autonomy 
to prevent public disclosure. Last but not least, it does not seem to be necessary to have 
an appeal mechanism in a China-EU BIT. Instead, both sides should consider appeal 
within a plurilateral forum. Regarding the relationship between local remedies and 
international DSMs, the prospective China-EU BIT may incorporate an article adopting 
the variant of the “fork-in-the-road” approach. This means that international 
adjudication is available in the disputes that have not been brought to any domestic 
court or have been withdrawn from the domestic court procedure before a decision is 
delivered. In addition, exhausting local remedies would not be required as a 
precondition to international adjudication. In brief, it is fair to say that, in general, the 
proposals by China and the EU for the ISDS system would probably be mutually 
complementary, although with some unavoidable contradictory and conflicting points. 
Taking into account both parties’ preferred practice and legal cultural characteristics, a 
system comprising both amicable and adjudicative and both compulsory and voluntary 
DSMs is suggested for the prospective China-EU BIT. 
As a necessary further step, the relationship between the state-state and investor-state 
dispute settlement systems in the prospective China-EU BIT, including their separation, 
connection and possible combination, are assessed. Existing practice in China and the 
EU presented a concerted idea on the prohibition of diplomatic claims in SSDS after 
ISDS has been resorted to by investors, as stipulated in the ICSID Convention Article 
27. Considering their different aims from those in ISDS, interpretive claims and 
declaratory relief claims should be generally allowed in SSDS. However, because of 
the possible complicated situations brought about by parallel proceedings and the 
potential tension coming from the co-existence of a SSDS tribunal and an ISDS tribunal, 
it is recommended to explicitly prohibit parallel proceedings concerning the same 
challenged measure. In order to preserve the system’s consistency and predictability, 
for sequential relevant SSDS and ISDS cases, it is necessary to incorporate a provision 
stressing the role of the dispute settlement system in providing security and 
predictability. Furthermore, an innovative combination of SSDS and ISDS may be 
realized through establishing state-investor-state mediation, combining the rosters of 
adjudicators for SSDS and ISDS and granting relevant investors procedural rights in 
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SSDS proceedings. Without much existing practice, how these suggestions would 
function in practice admittedly remains to be seen. Nevertheless, theoretically well-
founded innovative procedural designs deserve a try, not only to avoid potential 
problematic situations, but also to ensure that the dispute settlement systems for state-
state disputes and investor-state disputes function cooperatively and coherently. 
In short, this thesis tackles the comprehensive dispute settlement system in the 
prospective China-EU BIT by exploring its procedural design, including the systems 
for both state-state and investor-state disputes. Based on the exploration of the legal 
cultural characteristics in China’s and the EU’s dispute settlement mechanisms and the 
influence thereof on their relevant internal and international practice, as well as their 
current investment legal relationship, it anticipates both parties’ possible proposals, 
discusses the potential thorny issues and recommends solutions that are worthy of 
consideration. It is believed that, with thoughtfully-designed procedural arrangements, 
this comprehensive dispute settlement system would be palatable to the treaty parties 
and attractive to potential users and, more importantly, may contribute to successful 
investment dispute settlement under, and sustainable development of, the prospective 
China-EU BIT. 
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Summary 
China and the EU are two of the biggest players in international investment. With the 
proliferation of international investment agreements throughout the world, China and 
the EU have also made concerted efforts to negotiate a China-EU Bilateral Investment 
Treaty. This prospective bilateral investment treaty (hereinafter “BIT”) will replace the 
25 existing BITs between China and 27 EU Member States with one single 
comprehensive investment agreement. Since China and the EU have presented 
conflicting attitudes regarding various issues in investment dispute resolution, 
disagreements regarding what constitutes appropriate dispute settlement systems in the 
prospective China-EU BIT is expected to be one of the major stumbling blocks in the 
negotiations. Based on the exploration of the legal cultural characteristics in China’s 
and the EU’s dispute settlement mechanisms (hereinafter “DSMs”) and the influence 
thereof on their relevant internal and international practice, as well as their current 
investment legal relationship, the present thesis anticipates both parties’ possible 
proposals, discusses the potential thorny issues and recommends solutions that are 
worthy of consideration. 
The legal cultural features influenced by the legal traditions of China and the EU and 
presented in their internal dispute settlement systems are discussed respectively in the 
first place. In China, traditional philosophies, especially Confucianism, constituted the 
ideological foundation of Chinese legal culture. Under Confucianism, harmony was 
particularly prioritized and took the central position. As a result, dispute settlement 
focused on restoring a harmonious relationship through amicable informal DSMs. The 
core values of traditional Chinese philosophies have been arguably inherited by 
contemporary Chinese ideology, and non-adjudicated solutions to disputes through 
amicable mechanisms are consistently preferred. Different from traditional 
philosophies, the socialist rule of law is established, but it is subject to the overall 
objective of socialist harmony. Concerning dispute settlement in the Chinese legal 
system, six DSMs act as the main avenues for disputes arising from foreign investment, 
including negotiation, mediation, arbitration, complaints coordination for foreign 
investment, administrative review, and litigation. Examining the procedural design of 
these DSMs and the general structure of China’s dispute settlement system from a legal 
cultural perspective, elements from Chinese ideologies can be identified: the promotion 
of amicable DSMs aims at restoring harmony between disputing parties as well as in 
the society; the extensive use of mediation is in line with the requirements of various 
legal cultural elements; and even the construction of the socialist rule of law is 
combined with the pursuit of harmony. 
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Regarding the traditional values preserved in European legal history, three constants—
personalism, legalism and intellectualism—in particular formed the basis of the 
European legal culture of dispute settlement. Law is taken as the guarantor of justice, 
fairness and legal rights; the insistence on the rule of law ensures the supremacy of law; 
as a normal way of resolving disputes, litigation focuses on preserving substantive 
rights and procedural justice and, correspondingly, judges must make decisions 
according to law following due process. With regard to the commonly available DSMs 
for investment disputes in EU Member States, mediation, arbitration and litigation are 
identified. In addition to EU Member States’ relevant rules on these DSMs, the Union 
has also taken actions to regulate DSMs. The common underlying motivation here is to 
preserve individuals’ rights to access to justice, effective remedies and fair trial, which 
reflect the common values and principles arising from the constitutional tradition 
shared by the EU Member States. Taking a legal cultural perspective to analyse the 
DSMs in the EU Member States and the Union’s relevant regulating measures, three 
points deserve attention: a consistent pursuit of the rule of law can be identified in 
dispute settlement; litigation has been commonly used, which focuses on realizing 
substantive and procedural justice, and; the increased attention on mediation is based 
on the recognition of its function in ensuring access to justice.  
By comparison, the diverse features of dispute resolution employed by China and by 
the EU are typically reflected within legal culture, the perception of law, the role of law, 
and the objective of dispute settlement. The legal cultural characteristics of dispute 
settlement in China and those of the EU have further affected their legal systems, 
respectively. China’s dispute settlement system shows a strong preference for amicable 
DSMs, while in the EU the focus is on the use of litigation. In addition, China arguably 
adopts a service-based doctrine of dispute settlement, but in the EU, DSMs are used to 
realize justice and to serve a justice-based doctrine. Furthermore, both China and the 
EU have made efforts to enhance the use of mediation in dispute settlement, but China’s 
preference is based on the pursuit of social harmony, while the EU uses this DSM as 
an alternative way of realizing access to justice. 
In terms of the approaches in international investment dispute settlement, two DSMs, 
state-state mechanisms for resolving disputes about treaty application and 
implementation as well as investor-state mechanisms for investors to bring cases 
against host states regarding complaints related to specific investments, are discussed. 
For state-state dispute settlement, a hybrid approach combining diplomatic 
consultations and ad hoc arbitration has been consistently adopted in China’s Model 
BITs and most of its concluded International Investment Agreements (hereinafter 
“IIAs”). In addition, China’s most recent treaty practice adjusts this hybrid approach to 
a quasi-WTO dispute settlement panel proceedings model, which in fact has been the 
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practice of the state-state DSMs under its FTAs. Regarding investor-state dispute 
settlement, both the China Model BITs and its concluded IIAs witnessed the changes 
of China’s attitude towards investor-state arbitration over time: from no acceptance of 
investor-state arbitration or acceptance of international arbitration only for disputes 
about the amount of compensation for expropriation, to an overall acceptance of 
investor-state arbitration, and now the acceptance of investor-state arbitration is being 
carefully revised. Until now, there have been eight investor-state dispute arbitration 
cases brought under the IIAs concluded by China. Possible underlying reasons for this 
relatively small number include the Chinese government’s preference for the amicable 
settlement of investment disputes to preserve harmony and its political image as a 
friendly host state, together with foreign investors’ worries about the Chinese 
government’s retaliation and the lucrativeness of the Chinese market. In brief, China’s 
practice resonates with some of its legal cultural characteristics in dispute settlement, 
such as the preference for amicable settlements and confidentiality in the dispute 
settlement process. At the same time, it is also clear that China has increasingly 
recognized the function of international adjudication in state-state and investor-state 
dispute settlement. 
Similarly, the EU’s approach to state-state trade and investment dispute settlement is 
mainly reflected in its FTAs and IIAs, and performance in the WTO Dispute Settlement 
System. The state-state DSMs laid out in the EU’s FTAs and IIAs has chronologically 
shifted from a diplomatic approach to a quasi-WTO dispute settlement panel 
proceedings model. Along with its supportive attitude towards alternative DSMs, the 
EU has shown a preference for the judicial characteristics of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System. Regarding investor-state dispute settlement, before 2009, EU 
Member States had the competence to conclude IIAs with third states, and they were 
quite active and productive in this regard. Most of these IIAs provide for amicable 
DSMs as well as arbitration, and many cases have been heard under the latter. The 
Lisbon Treaty brought about a shift in competence to conclude IIAs from the EU 
Member States to the Union. In the three IIAs that have been concluded by the Union 
since 2009, a ground-breaking approach to investor-state dispute settlement—the 
Investment Court System (ICS)—has been adopted consistently. In the ICS, amicable 
DSMs, including negotiation, mediation and consultations are provided and 
strengthened, acting as alternative ways to have access to justice. For adjudication, the 
ICS establishes a standing two-tiered court-like mechanism with typical judicial 
characteristics. The pool of arbitrators who may be appointed to adjudicate a particular 
dispute in a specific case is supposed to be pre-selected by treaty parties, and the dispute 
settlement proceedings are to be operated with great procedural transparency. At the 
same time, the joint committee and treaty parties are afforded significant roles and 
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mechanisms for scrutinizing claims are created in particular. It can be said that from 
the proposal to reform the WTO Dispute Settlement System, the gradually improved 
state-state DSMs in its FTAs and IIAs, to the ICS, the EU’s direction is clear: it calls 
for building a multilateral, judicialized and permanent system that respects the 
international rule of law to resolve international economic disputes. 
Comparing China’s and the EU’s practice in international investment dispute 
settlement, both similarities and differences can be identified. For state-state dispute 
settlement, China’s and the EU’s most recent IIAs similarly adopt a quasi-WTO dispute 
settlement panel proceedings model, although there are differences in the details. 
Regarding investor-state dispute settlement, the two parties seem to have different 
perceptions on the objective of the whole system and the focus among the various 
DSMs. China puts its emphasis on settling disputes amicably and restoring harmonious 
relationships, while the EU cares more about realizing the international rule of law and 
developing jurisprudence through the system. Such differences correspondingly 
resonate with their internal practice and legal cultural characteristics, especially China’s 
traditional preference for harmony and the EU’s consistent pursuit of the rule of law. 
Taking a particular look at the investment legal relationship between China and the EU, 
before 2009, the Union only concluded general economic cooperation agreements with 
China. While, at the same time, by exercising their treaty negotiating and concluding 
competence, China and EU Member States concluded 26 IIAs. Two categories of 
DSMs exist in these Agreements for investment dispute settlement: one for state-state 
and one for investor-state dispute settlement. The provisions on state-state DSMs are 
quite similar to each other: compulsory consultations through diplomatic channels is 
required as the first step; only if this fails, disputes can be submitted to ad hoc arbitration. 
In contrast, the situation of investor-state DSMs is more complex. Before 1997, the 
IIAs are characterized by a limited acceptance of investor-state arbitration, while the 
IIAs signed thereafter reflect an overall acceptance of investor-state arbitration. There 
have only been two investor-state arbitration cases under these Agreements. 
The dispute settlement system in the prospective China-EU BIT is expected to be 
composed of two sub-systems—one for state-state dispute settlement and one for 
investor-state dispute settlement. In terms of the former, it is appropriate to take the 
amicable resolution of disputes as the core objective. Disputes about the interpretation 
and application of treaty provisions should be allowed, based on which, treaty parties 
can raise diplomatic protection claims, interpretive claims and claims for declaratory 
relief. Specific DSMs within the state-state dispute settlement system can be divided 
into two categories—amicable and adjudicative ones. The former normally comes into 
play in the first place possibly through negotiation/consultations and/or mediation. A 
quasi-WTO dispute settlement panel proceedings mechanism serves as the general 
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structure for the latter. In this regard, a problematic issue may be the composition of 
tribunals, for which China and the EU are likely to reach an agreement on pre-
establishing a roster of adjudicators while leaving some room for party autonomy in 
specific cases. Another issue that deserves attention is procedural transparency. For a 
China-EU BIT, opening the whole process of adjudication to the public may be rejected 
by China, but third-party participation by submitting amicus curiae briefs is likely to 
be acceptable and even recommended. Regarding the effect of the decisions of tribunals, 
incorporating a provision similar to Article 3.2 of the DSU is anticipated to be the most 
acceptable option, which means the rulings would only have a precedential value 
instead of being binding on all following cases. 
Regarding the investor-state dispute settlement system under the prospective China-EU 
BIT, amicable DSMs should focus on settling disputes amicably, while the aim of 
adjudication is supposed to be the development of jurisprudence and the realization of 
the international rule of law. Both amicable DSMs and the adjudication process cover 
disputes between an investor of one treaty party and the other treaty party concerning 
treatment alleged to breach a provision of investment protection and to cause damages. 
Specific DSMs within this system can be divided into three categories: amicable 
mechanisms, adjudication mechanisms and local remedies. Amicable DSMs are 
expected to include voluntary negotiation and mediation, as well as compulsory 
consultations as a precondition to adjudication. In particular, five issues regarding the 
procedural design of mediation deserve attention: first, the basic principle of 
voluntariness should be adhered to; second, the qualification of potential mediators 
should be based upon the agreement of disputing parties, and it is appropriate to 
establish various standards for mediators and adjudicators; third, interest-based 
mediation should be prescribed as the default type of mechanism, unless disputing 
parties agree otherwise; fourth, it is better to keep confidentiality as a fundamental 
feature, unless disputing parties reach a different agreement, and; finally, in order to 
trigger the enforcement system, the settlement agreements reached in mediation can be 
incorporated into the decision-making stage of adjudication. In international 
adjudication, China’s attitude towards the EU’s ICS is expected to be modestly positive. 
The adjudicatory nature of the ICS would be generally acceptable, but China may argue 
for eliminating the system’s exclusive jurisdiction to open the door for other arbitration 
institutions. A pre-established roster of adjudicators selected by treaty parties could be 
preferred by both parties, but this is suggested to come with the disputing parties’ right 
to choose the adjudicators from the roster. In addition, a possible agreement is likely to 
be reached on the prospective binding force of the joint committee’s treaty 
interpretations. Procedural transparency should be respected in general, but it is better 
to allow for a reasonable degree of party autonomy to prevent public disclosure. 
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Furthermore, it does not seem to be necessary to have an appeal mechanism in a 
China-EU BIT. Regarding the relationship between local remedies and international 
DSMs, the prospective China-EU BIT may incorporate an article adopting the 
variant of the “fork-in-the-road” approach, and exhausting local remedies would not 
be required as a precondition to international adjudication. 
Finally, the relationship between the state-state and investor-state dispute settlement 
systems in the prospective China-EU BIT are assessed. Diplomatic claims in state-
state dispute settlement would be prohibited after investor-state dispute settlement has 
been resorted to by investors, while interpretive claims and declaratory relief claims 
should be generally allowed. At the same time, it is recommended to explicitly 
prohibit parallel proceedings concerning the same challenged measure. In order to 
preserve the system’s consistency and predictability, for sequential relevant state-state 
dispute settlement and investor-state dispute settlement cases, it is necessary to 
incorporate a provision stressing the role of the dispute settlement system in 
providing security and predictability. Innovative combinations of state-state 
and investor-state dispute settlement are particularly suggested to be realized 
through three ways: establishing state-investor-state mediation, combining the rosters 
of adjudicators for state-state and investor-state dispute settlement and, granting 
relevant investors procedural rights in state-state dispute settlement proceedings. 
It is believed that, with thoughtfully-designed procedural arrangements, the 
comprehensive dispute settlement system in the prospective China-EU BIT would be 
palatable to the treaty parties and attractive to potential users and, more importantly, 
may contribute to successful investment dispute settlement under, and sustainable 
development of, the prospective China-EU BIT. 
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Valorisation Addendum 
1. Social Relevance 
In order to to predict the form the dispute settlement system in a China-EU BIT would 
take, this thesis examines the legal cultures of China and that of the EU, which play a 
vital role in their respective dispute settlement practices. By examining the effect of the 
legal traditions and contemporary legal ideologies of China and the EU on the current 
dispute settlement systems in their legal systems, and by explaining how those systems 
are are culturally imbedded and socially constructed, this thesis helps society 
understand and recognize the inter-relationship between legal culture and a country’s 
practice in dispute settlement. Since legal cultural characteristics are closely tied to the 
legal system they exist in and are deeply rooted within their communities, the legal 
cultural analysis of the approaches of China and the EU to dispute settlement helps 
investors from one side to run their investment in the other side’s territory. At the same 
time, legal culture undoubtedly also reflects relevant features of individuals in the 
society, so the research result of this thesis enriches the capacity to understand the 
underlying reasons for particular behaviours in dispute settlement of individuals from 
China and the EU. 
2 Target Groups 
The target groups of this thesis include legal academics, scholars and students from 
different legal specializations, particularly in international investment law, 
international trade law and dispute settlement. This thesis may also be interesting to 
audiences outside the academic community. First, since this thesis addresses the design 
of the dispute settlement system in the prospective China-EU BIT, policy makers, 
government officials, public policy experts and political scientists that are involved 
with foreign affairs, trade, commerce and investment departments would be interested 
in it. Second, legal practitioners, like lawyers, who want to understand the dispute 
settlement systems in China and in the EU, especially for foreign investment related 
issues, may also find some useful discussions in this thesis. Third, considering one of 
the innovative features of this thesis——analyzing dispute settlement from a legal 
cultural perspective, this thesis is of interest to people who work in the fields of law 
and social science. Last but not least, the general public can also find this thesis useful 
in order to gain an understanding of the legal systems and general legal culture of China 
and the EU. 
3. Activities/Products 
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The concrete products of this thesis include a presentation of the approaches taken by 
China and by the EU in internal and international investment dispute settlement. It also 
examines the legal culture in China and that in the EU regarding dispute settlement in 
general. 
Topics related to this thesis have been presented in several conferences. The following 
are some of the presentations: 
 “The Investor-State Dispute Settlement System in a China-EU Comprehensive
Agreement on Investment: Setting a Sample of Integration”, presented at the
International Conference of “Multilateral Reform of Investor-State Dispute Resolution:
A Dialogue among Different Approaches” in September 2019 in Xi’an, China
 “The EU’s Proposal for Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Adding ‘EU-elements’ to
the International Rule of Law”, presented at the 23rd Ius Commune Annual Conference
in November 2018 in Amsterdam, the Netherlands
 “Resolving Foreign Direct Investment-Related Disputes in China’s Legal System:
What to Expect and How to Understand?”, published in Vesna Lazić & Steven Stuij
(eds.), International Dispute Resolution—Selected Issues in International Litigation
and Arbitration, Springer/Asser Press (2018), 109-127
 “Alternative Dispute Resolution for Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism in a
China-EU Bilateral Investment Treaty”, presented at the 7th Conference of the
Postgraduate and Early Professionals/Academics Network of the Society of
International Economic Law (PEPA/SIEL) in April 2018 in Nicosia, Cyprus
 “Investor-State Mediation in a China-EU Bilateral Investment Treaty: Talking About
Being in the Right Place at the Right Time”, published in Chinese Journal of
International Law (SSCI), 2018(17), 111-135
 “Promoting Mediation to Restore Trust in Investor-State Dispute Settlement”,
presented at the 22nd Ius Commune Annual Conference in November 2017 in Utrecht,
the Netherlands
 “China’s Approach to Trade and Investment Dispute Resolution: from Domestic
Mechanisms to International Platforms”, presented at the 2nd Annual PhD Colloquium
of International Economic Law in January 2017 in Brussels, Belgium
 “Tribunals’ Discretion in Realizing Transparency in Investment Arbitration”, presented
at the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg Guest Forum in February 2017 in Luxembourg,
Luxembourg
 “Jurisdiction Ratione Temporis in Successive International Investment Agreements—
What Can China and Chinese Investors Learn from the Ping An Case?”, published in
China and WTO Review, 2017(3), 61-90
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 “Tribunals’ Discretion in Realizing Transparency in Investment Arbitration”, presented 
at the 21st Ius Commune Annual Conference in November 2016 in Maastricht, the 
Netherlands 
 “The Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in a China-EU Free Trade and Investment 
Agreement”, at the 1st Annual PhD Colloquium of Young Researchers on A New 
Architecture for International Economic Law in April 2016 in Antwerp, Belgium 
4. Innovativeness 
This thesis is innovative in at least two respects: 
First, this thesis conducts a legal cultural analysis by focusing on the manner in which 
the legal culture of China and that of the EU has shaped their performance in resolving 
investment disputes. Such an analysis is instructive in terms of predicting how it would 
affect the current negotiations on a China-EU BIT. In existing literature, legal cultural 
analysis is used more often when one legal system is being examined. The legal cultural 
analysis in this thesis takes into account the practice on dispute settlement by China and 
by the EU respectively at both internal and international levels. Specifically, it identifies 
both parties’ legal cultural characteristics in dispute settlement as influenced by their 
legal traditions at the first step. It then assesses the DSMs in the internal legal systems 
from a legal cultural perspective. In this regard, internal dispute settlement systems can 
be taken as formally reflecting and confirming legal cultural characteristics. In other 
words, certain arrangements in DSMs reflect and  help to maintain the deeply held 
normative values of the society. Third, a legal cultural analysis is also conducted of the 
performance of both parties in international investment dispute settlement. 
Second, this thesis adopts and applies a systemic analysis in two aspects. First, dispute 
resolution is discussed by combining the practice of a state in international trade and 
investment in the system of international economic law. In other words, in order to 
understand a state’s practice in the past and forecast its attitude to international 
investment dispute settlement in the future, a related area, international trade dispute 
resolution, which is another constituent of the field of international economic law, is 
examined for inspiration, especially for the analysis of state-state investment dispute 
settlement. Second, various DSMs are viewed as a whole constituting a comprehensive 
dispute settlement system. Different DSMs, such as negotiation, mediation, 
consultations, and adjudication, are normally considered and examined separately. 
However, a systemic view is necessary for designing a coherent and comprehensive 
dispute settlement system composed of various DSMs. Such a systemic approach has 
the potential to improve the functioning of investment dispute settlement. However, 
this approach seems to have been unfortunately overlooked in literature and treaty 
practice. 
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5. Schedule & Implementation  
Valorisation can be achieved in the following ways. Firstly, the author will continue 
doing research on this topic. This thesis contributes to research regarding the possible 
design of the dispute settlement system in the prospective China-EU BIT based on their 
legal cultural characteristics and practice in dispute settlement. However, more research 
remains to be carried out. For example, whether and if so, how an entity’s approach to 
resolving disputes in other relevant areas, such as international maritime law, affects 
the entity’s performance in international economic law. The author aims to obtain an 
academic position in relation to international dispute resolution in a Chinese university, 
where there is good access to latest news and publications to facilitate the future 
research. At the same time, cooperation with the supervisors and other researchers will 
continue. Secondly, the author will seek opportunities to participate and present on the 
topics derived from this thesis at events that aim to communicate the up-to-date issues 
regarding international dispute settlement. Thirdly, some topics that are touched upon 
in this thesis will be further developed with the aim to publish in journals. For instance, 
the combination of and interaction between state-state and investor-state dispute 
settlement system. Fourthly, this thesis is planned to be further improved and published 
in a book in order to reach a wider audience. 
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